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1
Introduction
The birth of the new minimum wage research (NMWR) can be
dated to a conference at Cornell University held in late 1991 and the
subsequent symposium that appeared in Industrial and Labor Relations
Review (see Ehrenberg [1992] for a description of the conference and
its attendees). The first period of this research came to a close nine
years later. Prior to the conference, empirical research on the minimum
wage had been dominated by studies that considered only the effect of
the federal minimum wage on teenage employment, using aggregate
time-series data. These earlier studies generally concluded that a 10
percent increase in the minimum wage is associated with a 1–3 percent
decrease in teenage employment (Brown 1999). Energized by increases
in the federal minimum wage in 1990, 1991, 1996, and 1997, researchers approached minimum wage issues through a variety of statistical
frameworks, techniques, and data sources; explanatory economic models proliferated, as did the number of articles.
By the end of the first period in 2000, it was no longer possible to
identify a dominant line of research. In this review, which primarily
focuses on articles published from 2000 forward, we have considered
more than 200 scholarly and policy papers relating to the minimum wage
that have appeared in English since the conference. While a few are
surveys, most are original analyses, and most of these are statistical in
nature rather than presentations of theoretical models or survey results.
This book is our attempt to make sense of the research.1 We look at
which observable, measurable variables (e.g., wages, employment,
school enrollment) the minimum wage influences; how long it takes for
the variables to respond to the minimum wage and the size and desirability of the effect; why the minimum wage has the results it does (and
not others); and the workers most likely to be affected by changes to the
minimum wage. Our emphasis is on studies that analyze data from the
United States, but we also touch on studies of data from other countries:
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom and other
countries in Western Europe.

1
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One set of issues revolves around who is affected by changes in
the minimum wage. It is almost a given that those living in poverty are
less likely to be affected than low-wage employees, since those below
the poverty line, to a great extent, are not involved in the labor market
(Freeman 1996). There remains an issue of who, among those who are
employed and those who want to be employed, is affected when the
minimum wage is increased. Among the employed, does the minimum
wage affect only those who would be earning less than the minimum
without it, or does it also affect those higher up the wage scale? Older
minimum wage studies have generally focused on teenage workers—
with their low skills and limited attachment to the labor market, it was
thought that teenagers were most sensitive to the minimum wage and
therefore any effect would be clearest here. While much of the NMWR
examines what happens to teenagers when the minimum wage rises,
many studies focus on other demographic groups with limited skills and
labor market attachment, as well as workers identified specifically by
their low wages, by membership in a specific demographic group (such
as single mothers, young women, or immigrants), or by the industry in
which they work (primarily hospitality and home care/nursing home).
Another issue relates to identifying the outcomes of minimum
wage increases. As with earlier research, most NMWR focuses on the
number of jobs or the probability of employment. However, there has
been considerable expansion of issues, even within the realm of employment broadly defined. We review studies of the consequences for
hours worked, turnover, unemployment, and labor force participation,
along with studies of the effects on wages and their distribution, fringe
benefits and training, prices and profitability, and the effect of the minimum wage on school enrollment.
The timing of effects of the minimum wage has become a recognized and challenging issue. How long it takes for the response to the
minimum wage to play itself out is central to the effectiveness of policy.
Before the NMWR, response to the minimum wage was thought to be
nearly immediate. Most recent research also assumes that the response
is rapid and examines only a short period immediately following an increase. Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger (1999), in a look at the Canadian
experience with a minimum wage, argue that such assumptions result
in missing much of the response, which can take up to six years. Studies of timing require careful attention to dynamics, which is generally
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absent in the NMWR. The few analyses of this issue (including some
of our own work, such as Belman and Wolfson [2010]) suggest that the
response is not entirely immediate but ends well before six years.
Assessing the size of effects is also important to understanding the minimum wage. By and large, the size of the impact of an
increase in a minimum wage is related only to the issue of job loss,
and the observations are all over the map. For over a decade, the
minimum wage elasticity of employment was widely believed to be
between !0.3 and !0.1, with greater faith in values closer to zero.2
This accord no longer exists, with the range of estimates for U.S. teenagers extending “from well below !1.0 to well above zero” (Neumark
and Wascher 2007, p. 107). In addition, the issue of the magnitude of
the impact is composed of at least two distinct parts: 1) does the wide
range of results apply to all outcomes or only to employment, and 2) are
patterns in the magnitude of the response related to who is under study,
the methods used in the study, measurement issues, or other factors?
Researchers have spent a great deal of effort developing models to
explain the results just mentioned, but no agreement yet exists on which,
if any, should replace the simple supply and demand model of the labor
market that Stigler (1946) expounded. Card and Krueger (1995) devote a chapter to various theoretical models before leaning toward one
in which employers have market power in the labor market, enabling
them, up to a point, to set wages rather than take them as given by the
market. They conclude that “this . . . is inconsistent with the proposition
that the standard model is always correct” (p. 383). We take no stand on
which model is most useful, much less settle the question. Rather, we
present three general models discussed in the literature—the competitive labor market, the monopsony labor market, and search models of
the labor market—and show how they relate to the issues at hand.

MINIMUM WAGE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF
HOURLY EARNINGS
As much as the minimum wage is an issue of importance in policy
circles, few of those involved in the analysis or debate have had recent experience with the minimum wage. Many may have earned the
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minimum wage or close to the minimum wage when in high school
or college, but that was typically many years ago. To many of those
involved in this issue, the minimum wage would seem very low and
unlikely to affect many in the labor force.
Contrary to this view, the minimum wage and jobs that pay close
to the minimum wage play an important role in the U.S. labor force.
Research reviewed in this monograph indicates that changes in the minimum wage affect 20–30 percent of the labor force. As such, considering
minimum wage policies and their effect is more than a scholastic exercise—they may affect a large portion of the labor force. We consider in
detail the place in the earnings distribution of the minimum wage itself
and near minimum wage earnings in the chapter on wages and earnings,
but we briefly discuss this now.
Table 1.1 provides three views on the importance of the minimum
wage in the distribution of wages and hourly earnings. The first, panel
A, considers the wages associated with points in the distribution of individual wages in 2010. Panel B displays the percentiles of the wage
distribution associated with specific hourly wages. Panel C considers
the proportion of the employed earning no more than a percentage of
the minimum wage in their state. In each panel, the left-hand column
of data is for individuals who are paid by the hour, and the right-hand
column adds employed salaried workers. The distributions are limited
to those who report that they are not enrolled in school. Individuals
who report being enrolled in school are fairly evenly distributed across
family incomes. By removing this group from our data, we improve the
association between being employed near the minimum wage and being
from a lower-income household, and thereby improve the association
between the minimum wage and economic need.
Panel A displays the association between individuals’ place in the
national distribution of wages and the wage they earn. Those at the 5th
percentile for wages or hourly earnings are very close to the federal
minimum of $7.25 and below the minimum wage for some states. At
the 10th percentile, those paid by the hour earn $8.00, 110 percent of the
federal minimum wage; for all employees the 10th percentile is $8.50.
Twenty percent of wage earners earn $9.25 or less; 20 percent of all
employees earn $10.00 or less. Thirty percent of wage earners earn no
more than $10.25, $3.00 per hour more than the federal minimum; the
30th percentile for all employees is $12.00. Considering the distribu-

Table 1.1 The Distribution of Hourly Wages and Hourly Earnings in 2010 for Individuals Not Enrolled in High
School or College

Percentile
5th
10th
20th
30th
40th
50th (median)

Panel A: Earnings by percentiles
Panel B: Percentiles by wage or hourly earnings
Wage of those
Wage at this
Percent of
Percent
paid hourly at this percentile including
Wage ($) or
those paid by the below including
percentile ($)
salaried workers ($)
hourly earnings
hour below
salaried workers
7.50
7.50
< 7.00
1.2
1.8
8.00
8.50
< 7.51 (minimum wage)
4.7
4.1
9.25
10.00
< 8.00 (1.10% of federal min.)
7.3
6.0
10.25
12.00
< 9.00 (1.25% of federal min.)
16.7
12.5
12.00
14.00
< 10.00
24.7
17.8
13.50
16.34
< 11.00 (150% of federal min.)
34.9
24.9

Panel C: The distribution of hourly wages and earnings relative to the effective minimum wage in 2010
Percent of those paid by the
Percent below minimum wage
hour below minimum wage
including salaried workers
Less than the minimum wage
2.9
3.0
At the minimum wage
5.9
4.8
Less than 110% of the minimum wage
10.7
8.1
Less than 125% of the minimum wage
21.9
15.7
No more than 150% of the minimum wage
36.4
26.0
NOTE: Calculations of average hourly earnings (inclusive of salaried workers) does not include those who report variable hours.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2010 Outgoing Rotation File of the Current Population Survey.

5
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tion for all employees, the more complete of the two distributions, only
1 in 20 employees works at or very close to the minimum wage, but 1
out of 10 employees who are not also students earn within $1.25 of the
minimum wage, and 1 out of 5 employees who are not also students
earn within $2.75 of the minimum wage.
Panel B provides a different view of the same data. Here we calculate the percentage of our sample who work at or below particular
wage levels. For example, 4 percent of all employees (the right-hand
data column) work at or below the federal minimum wage (allowing
for rounding). Six percent earn no more than 1.1 times the federal minimum, 13 percent earn no more than 1.25 times the federal minimum
wage, and 1 out of 4 employees work for no more than $11.00 per hour,
1.5 times the federal minimum wage. Research reviewed in this volume suggests that increases in the minimum wage affect the earnings
of those in the lower quarter of the earnings distribution; and we might
then expect that those earning up to $11 per hour would see their wages
rise in response to the minimum wage.
A limitation of Panels A and B is that we compared wages to the
federal minimum in a period when many states have minimum wages
above the federal minimum wage. In Panel C we calculate the ratio of
individuals’ wages and hourly earnings with respect to the higher of
the federal or state minimum wage, often called the effective minimum
wage, and then create a distribution from this ratio. Again, focusing
on the more complete distribution, that for all employees (right-hand
column), 8 percent of the nonstudent workforce are employed in jobs
paying no more than the minimum wage, 8 percent are in jobs paying
no more than 1.1 times the minimum wage, 16 percent are paid no
more than 1.25 times the effective minimum, and 25 percent are paid
no more than 1.5 times the effective minimum. The proportion earning no more than each of the levels above the effective minimum is, of
course, substantially higher for those on hourly pay. Again, although
the proportion of employees earning exactly the minimum wage is
modest, the proportion earning close to the minimum wage comprises a
substantial proportion of the labor force. Given evidence that increases
in the minimum wage extend to some of those whose earnings are
above the new minimum wage, and that the minimum wage is a benchmark for those earning above the minimum, the minimum wage can
affect a substantial proportion of the employed labor force.3
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Another view to consider is the ability of those earning the minimum wage to meet their basic needs. To do this, we consider a household
with either one or two individuals working full time at the minimum
wage, and compare its total earnings to three standards of income adequacy: 1) the poverty line, 2) the income limit for qualifying for food
stamps, and 3) a basic family budget provided by the Economic Policy
Institute (EPI) (Bernstein and Lin 2008). The latter measure updates a
budget developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which compiled
the costs of essentials such as housing, transportation, food, and like
items. We also consider a household with one or two members earning
150 percent of the minimum wage, a point near the upper limit at which
wages respond to changes in the minimum wage.
The upper panel of Table 1.2 provides calculations of family income with one and two earners who earn either the minimum wage
or 150 percent of the minimum wage. In the first row, the household
has either one or two earners working full time, 2000 hours, at the
current federal minimum wage. If there is only one earner, the annual
earnings for a 2,000-hour work year are $14,500; if two, $29,000. The
second row provides annual household income if a household has one
or two individuals working full time in positions that pay 150 percent
of the minimum wage. In this case, household earnings are $21,750 and
$43,500, respectively.
The second, middle panel, considers two common measures of
income adequacy, the poverty line and food stamp eligibility, for families of between one and four members.4 Poverty thresholds are used to
evaluate the extent of serious economic deprivation in our society and
determine eligibility for income maintenance programs. To establish
the adequacy of the minimum wage in providing an income that moves
households beyond this threshold, we can compare our annual earnings
estimates from the upper panel to the poverty threshold for households
of various sizes. For example, comparing the 2012 federal poverty
threshold to our annual income calculations for households earning
exactly the minimum wage, we find that a single-earner household is
above the poverty line for a single-person household, at the poverty
line for a two-person household with no other income, and below the
poverty line for a three- or four-person household. With two minimum
wage earners, the household income is well above the poverty line for
even a four-person family. A household with one member employed
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Table 1.2 How the Minimum Wage Relates to Measures of Income
Adequacy
Family earnings if family members work 2,000 hours
One earner ($)
Two earners ($)
Earners employed full time at
14,500
29,000
minimum wage
Earners employed at 150% of
21,750
43,500
the federal minimum wage
Measures of income adequacy
Number of family members
1
2
3
Federal poverty threshold
10,890
14,710
18,530
($, 2011)
Food Stamp eligibility ($)
14,157
19,123
24,089
Low family budget (2007)
1 adult, 1 adult, 2
1 child
children
Utah (rural) ($)
26,089
32,961
Utah (Salt Lake City) ($)
31,898
38.769

2 adults,
1 child
33,358
37,933

4
22,350
29,055
2 adults, 2
children
39,125
43,499

SOURCE: Bernstein and Lin (2008). Food Stamp eligibility guidelines: http://www
.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility#income (accessed March 18, 2014). Health and Human
Services poverty guidelines: http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/11poverty.shtml (accessed
March 18, 2014).

full time at 150 percent of the minimum wage comes close to exceeding
the poverty line for a family of four, and, with two earners, household
income is well in excess of the poverty line for even a family of four.
Food stamp eligibility is a second measure of whether a family is
earning enough to avoid serious economic deprivation.5 A one-member
household whose member earns the minimum wage is only $343 above
the income limit for food stamps. Larger households without additional
earners are between $4,623 and $14,555 below the limit on food stamp
eligibility. Households with the income from two people earning just
the minimum wage are slightly below the limit (that is, eligible for food
stamps) if they have four members, and above the limit with only three.
A household with a single earner who earns 150 percent of the minimum wage (at 40 hours per week or 2,000 hours per year) is below the
food stamp limit for a household of three or more. The household of
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four is not eligible for food stamps if it has two full-time earners with
wages equal to 150 percent of the minimum wage. Just as in the case of
the poverty line, full-time earnings at the minimum wage help move a
household above the threshold, and earnings of 150 percent of the minimum wage on an annual basis substantially improves the likelihood that
a household would be above the threshold for food stamps.
An alternative measure is a basic family budget, the income a family needs to secure safe and decent-yet-modest living standards. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics developed the basic family budget as part
of a broader set of standard-of-living measures, which were published
annually from 1966 to 1979 (the program was discontinued after 1979;
see Johnson, Rogers, and Tan [2001]). The basic family budget is the
income that a household needs for a nutritionally adequate diet, shelter,
clothing, and transportation. The EPI updated this basic budget in 2007.
It includes the cost of health insurance, renting shelter at the 40th percentile of the rental housing distribution in the area, child care, limited
necessities, and taxes, but it does not include savings of any type, restaurant meals, emergency funds, or insurance to cover emergencies. EPI
calculates this budget for rural areas and for the metropolitan statistical
areas of each state. We use basic family budgets for Utah, the state that
has a median income closest to the U.S. median family income. Table
1.2 provides the 2007 basic budgets for rural areas and for Salt Lake
City. The budgets are calculated for one- and two-adult households; all
households include at least one child.
Households in which the earners only make the minimum wage do
not net enough for the basic family budget, even when there are two
working adults. The maximum income earned by two adults employed
at the minimum wage is $29,000. The minimum income required for
the modest but decent basic budget in Utah is $33,358; in Salt Lake City
it is $37,933. The result is substantially better if the adults are earning
150 percent of the minimum wage. A single earner is still not able to
earn a sufficient income to meet any of the basic family budgets, even
in rural areas. A two-earner household earns somewhat more than the
rural basic family income, and just at the level of a basic family income
in Salt Lake City.
In summary, a large proportion of the labor force works at or relatively close to the minimum wage. While only about 1 in 20 nonstudent
employees work at no more than 110 percent of the minimum wage,
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almost 1 in 6 earn no more than 125 percent of the effective minimum
wage, and better than 1 in 4 earn no more than 150 percent of the effective minimum. Having a single minimum wage earner does not assure
any but the smallest households of incomes above the thresholds for
economic deprivation, but having two full-time minimum wage earners
moves households above this mark. With two individuals earning 150
percent of the minimum wage, the representative family of four moves
into the ranks of those living at a safe and decent standard of living.

THREE LABOR MARKET MODELS USED IN NMWR
Competitive
Relying on the simplest and most widely used economic model
to analyze the labor market leads to the conclusion that whenever the
minimum wage results in higher wages, someone who would have been
employed, in the absence of the minimum wage at a wage less than the
minimum wage, must instead now be out of work. This is easily seen in
Figure 1.1 Competitive Labor Market with a Minimum Wage
Wage

Supply

Demand

Minimum
wage

Equilibrium
wage

Min. wage employment

Equilibrium employment

Labor
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Figure 1.1, which shows the demand for labor increasing as the wage
decreases, and the supply of labor increasing as the wage increases. In
the absence of a minimum wage, their intersection indicates how many
people will be working, indicated by equilibrium employment, and the
wage that they will receive, the equilibrium wage. In this analysis there
are many firms, none large enough to have a detectible effect on the labor market by itself, and there are many prospective employees, none of
whom individually have any effect on the wage or employment. Each
firm hires just to the point where if it employed one worker more or
fewer, profits would be lower. If there is a minimum wage that exceeds
the equilibrium wage, more people will want jobs, but firms will not
want to employ as many. Both of these facts can be seen where the
dashed line indicating the minimum wage intersects the supply and demand curves. Because there is no compulsion to hire but there is to pay
at least the minimum wage, the wage will be higher, but there will be
fewer jobs than in the absence of a minimum wage.
Before moving on to the next model, an explanation is required to
explain the derivation of these demand and supply curves and to make
the two analyses comparable. The marginal product of labor (MPL) for
each firm is defined as the increase in total output that is associated with
employment of the last, or marginal, worker: MPL(N) = Q(N) ! Q(N ! 1),
where Q(N) is the amount of output the firm produces when employing
N workers. The marginal cost of labor (MCL) is the increase in total
payroll from employing the marginal worker: MCL = W(N) ! W(N ! 1),
where W is the total payroll when N workers are employed. Both must
be measured in the same units if they are to be compared, so let both be
measured in money terms (dollars), and let R(N) be the firm’s revenue
when it employs N workers, net of all costs of production other than
labor (materials, energy, and so forth).
Deriving the industry or aggregate demand curve requires working
backward. Each firm can calculate its MPL for each level of employment, each value of N. The labor demand curve is the horizontal sum
of the individual firm MPL curves. That is, for each value of the wage,
we find the level of employment for each firm that equates the MPL to
the wage, and add all those values of employment. Doing this for all
values of the wage gives the demand curve. The equilibrium wage is the
value that equates this sum, total labor demanded, to the corresponding
value of the supply curve. The way the market is considered to work is
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that it is already functioning when each firm enters the market. There is
already an equilibrium wage that the entering firm can see, and the firm
knows it must pay that wage if it is to hire any employees. It will hire
employees to the point where the MPL equals the equilibrium wage.6
Because each firm is small, and because each firm’s impact on the market is not detectible, its decisions have no effect on the equilibrium
wage, and the firm can hire as many or as few workers as it wants at
this wage. The equilibrium wage is its MCL; it hires to the point that
MPL = MCL = equilibrium wage. A competitive market is at one logical extreme.
Monopsony
Another labor market model is monopsony, in which only one firm
is in the labor market, appropriately defined: only one firm that hires
teenagers, for instance. Here, the competitive assumption is replaced
by the assumption that the single firm recognizes its effect on wages,
and that if it wants to hire an additional worker, it must not only pay a
higher wage to attract that one, it must also raise wages for all current
employees.
Like the competitive firm, the monopsonist hires until MPL = MCL,
but unlike the competitive firm, the wage necessary to attract the desired
amount of labor is less than the MCL (because in raising the wage to
attract an additional worker it must also raise wages to that level for all
current employees), so it pays a lower wage. This is graphed in Figure
1.2. Equilibrium employment here is less than it would be if the monopsonist did not recognize its effect on wages; if the monopsonist did not
recognize this effect, the equilibrium level of employment would be the
same as in the competitive model, where MPL = supply.
Figure 1.3 shows what may happen when a minimum wage is imposed on a monopsony labor market. Because the employer must pay
at least the minimum wage to all its employees, its MCL equals the
minimum wage for all levels of employment less than some value (labeled minimum wage employment). The MCL exceeds the minimum
wage only at employment levels higher than this, where a higher wage
is necessary to attract that much labor. In Figure 1.3, the relevant MCL
schedule is indicated with a solid line, and the one that is relevant only
in the absence of a minimum wage is indicated with a dotted line. The
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Figure 1.2 Monopsony Labor Market with No Minimum Wage
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monopsony firm once again hires until the further hiring would raise
the MCL above the MPL, and this is a higher level of employment than
without the minimum wage.
Search Models
While the minimum wage can raise both employment and wages
in the case of monopsony, the monopsony model has one important
drawback. Evidence that it is relevant to low-wage labor markets where
the minimum wage is relevant is scarce on the ground. Except for those
living in the most isolated areas, teenagers in the United States typically
have more than one fast food establishment in a small neighborhood to
canvas for employment opportunities, and often possibilities exist in
other sectors as well.
A more plausible but more complicated class of models that generate analytic results similar to those of monopsony is that of search
models. The fundamental distinguishing feature is that prospective
workers and employers cannot find each other without some cost, so
that not all individuals willing to work at wages that firms are willing
to pay can find employment. This is based on the observation that information is neither free nor perfect, and that individuals must use time
and resources to determine who is hiring. Individuals recognize this
and must decide on the basis of incomplete information whether it is
worthwhile even to engage in search.7
Two key variables in search models are 1) the contact rate, the
probability that someone who is searching for a job will be offered one
in any period of time; and 2) the distribution of wage offers. In the
competitive model, the contact rate equals one and the offer distribution
implies that all offers equal the equilibrium wage. In search models,
the contact rate is positive but less than one, and the wage distribution
is not necessarily degenerate. Other important parameters include an
individual’s cost of searching, typically positive; the rate at which jobs
disappear due to layoffs, firings, and quits; and the value of not being
employed, for instance, the value of additional schooling, leisure, or
unpaid work in the home.
Along with other details of model specification, it is possible to use
these models to analyze not only employment but also unemployment,
participation in the labor force, job vacancies, and wage distributions
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within and among firms. While it is not necessarily the case that search
models of the labor market generate results similar to that seen in Figure 1.3—that is, both higher wages and employment—it is a possibility
when the model is appropriately specified. In Flinn (2006) and Ahn,
Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2011), this is largely because the participation rate responds to the minimum wage, and within a certain range, the
greater ease of hiring dominates the greater cost of employment in the
response of firms to the minimum wage.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK
This review includes more than 200 articles on the minimum wage.
Most date from 2000 forward but some, on topics that have not received much attention, date back to the 1980s and 1970s. Chapters
are organized around narrowly defined topics. We focus on micro and
market-specific outcomes in the earlier chapters and then turn to broader, macro issues toward the end of the review.
Chapter 2, the first chapter in the Micro section of the book, considers the research on employment, or more precisely, on the effect of the
minimum wage on the number of employees or jobs. Chapter 3 broadens the measures of employment in considering research on the effect
of the minimum wage on hours of work. Here we find strong evidence
that the implementation of a minimum wage in the United Kingdom
reduced hours of work, but that the evidence for the United States is
inconclusive. Chapter 4 presents a meta-analysis of the employment
and hours research, providing estimates of the effect of the minimum
wage corrected for publication bias and article-specific effects, including specific estimates for young workers and the restaurant industry.
Although estimates of the elasticity of employment/hours with respect
to the minimum wage vary across estimates, most are either statistically nonsignificant or are too small in magnitude to be economically
meaningful.
Starting with Chapter 5, the review considers a broader set of the
labor market outcomes. Chapter 5 addresses the effect of the minimum
wage on the level and distribution of wages and the provision of fringe
benefits. We find almost universal agreement that increasing the mini-
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mum wage raises the wages of bound and near-bound workers, and that
the effect of the minimum wage is far stronger for women than for men.
Chapter 6 considers the effects on human capital formation, including
education and employer-provided training. Results on education are
sufficiently varied, and sufficiently problematic, to preclude a simple
conclusion; the evidence on training is likewise too varied to support a
straightforward summary. Chapter 7 looks at the evidence about the impact of the minimum wage on wage inequality, poverty, and the length
of time individuals remain at low wages. Although the magnitude of the
effect remains in play, there is universal agreement that the minimum
wage reduces wage inequality, particularly among women. In contrast,
the minimum wage appears to have no effect on the poverty status of
individuals, possibly because so few of those below the poverty line
are employed. Finally, although most employees who earn a wage at
or close to the minimum rapidly move to wages considerably above
the minimum, a substantial number remain at wages no more than 150
percent of the minimum wage in the initial decade of employment.
Chapters 8 and 9 return to employment-related issues, with Chapter
8 looking at gross flows in the labor market and Chapter 9 considering
the effect of the minimum wage on firms’ hiring and layoff behavior
and unemployment. Current research finds that increases in the minimum wage reduce both hiring and layoffs almost equally; both labor
force participation rates and unemployment appear to increase slightly
with increases in the minimum wage. The minimum wage has a differential effect on unemployment duration, with duration declining for
better-educated and rising for less-educated workers. The effect of the
minimum wage on product markets is addressed in Chapter 10. Although there is too little research to reach any conclusions about the
effects of the minimum wage on firm performance in the United States,
research using data from the United Kingdom suggests that profitability
declines with increases in the minimum wage, but this does not lead to
an increase in firms leaving the market or a decrease in share prices.
Rounding things off, the conclusion attempts the yeoman’s work
of summarizing our review, suggesting issues that are in need of further research, and providing some thoughts on improving the quality of
research on the minimum wage. The conclusion is followed by an appendix, which discusses data sources and variables and their construction.
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Finally, a brief discussion on our statistical approach is in order.
According to one well-known opinion, the function of cavalry in modern warfare is “to give tone to what would otherwise be a mere vulgar
brawl!” (Hammerton 2011). It is our hope that this is not the role of
statistics in the minimum wage debate. Our approach has been to hold
the articles we discuss to reasonable standards. We typically apply a 5
percent p-value in determining whether there is an effect. Given typical sample sizes used in this research, this standard is a low hurdle. We
also require that specifications be reasonably complete—that there are
no grounds to be skeptical about estimated standard errors. This may
lead to an apparent fetish about p-values, but with the large number of
studies we consider, setting a minimum standard is a necessary screening device.
Different standards and criteria may appeal to readers. Our metaanalysis of the employment and hours studies remedies this otherwise
arbitrary, discontinuous, either/or cutoff with a continuous method of
weighting estimates based on their estimated standard error. The summary tables in each chapter provide fairly complete information about
the studies included in this review. The reader is invited to use these to
reach their own conclusions.

Notes
1. More than 600 scholarly and policy papers that mention the minimum wage have
been published since 2000. The 200 that we review were selected because they
included empirical research on developed countries.
2. An elasticity between -0.3 and -0.1 indicates that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage will reduce employment by 1–3 percent.
3. We use benchmark to mean a guideline for assessing how satisfactory a wage or
wage offer is.
4. The column for a one-person household reports only the annual income from having a single person employed at the minimum wage because it is difficult to have
more than one earner in a one-person household. The balance of the columns report household earnings with both one and two individuals receiving the minimum
wage.
5. Although based on both income and assets, we attend only to the income requirement since that is the only one that the minimum wage directly affects.
6. In the standard analysis, it is assumed both that the MPL is positive in the range
of employment considered, and that it gets progressively smaller as N increases.
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7. This is most often modeled from the perspective of the individual looking for
work. Depending on the issue of interest, it can also be viewed from the perspective of the firm, so that all firms willing to pay wages that individuals are willing to
accept can find people to hire only with some cost. In this case, firms must devote
resources to identifying individuals appropriate to hire and the suitable wage. Finally, both perspectives can be combined, so that firms and individuals encounter
difficulty finding suitable partners for an employment relationship.

Part 1
Micro

2
Employment
Employment, specifically the number of jobs, is square one for disputes about the minimum wage and its effects. Support for the minimum wage is premised on its improving the lives of those most vulnerable in the labor market. If a minimum wage leads to job loss for many
of those same people, serious questions arise with respect to its relative
benefits and costs, especially if third parties, such as employers, also
bear some of the costs. The disagreement here is not so much whether
the minimum wage ever leads to some loss of jobs but whether it always or usually does. If it does not, then legislation setting a minimum
wage is not necessarily a bad idea. The NMWR has yet to come to any
widely accepted resolution on this issue, and we will not presume that
we can settle the matter here. This chapter presents a comprehensive
review of research on the effects of a minimum wage on employment,
describing the contributions and mutual criticisms of the best-known
early protagonists in the NMWR, followed by a detailed look at more
recent research.

EARLY NMWR
The employment effect of the minimum wage is the topic of four of
the five (revised) papers from the conference that appeared the following year in the Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Among them,
they contained many of the features that were to become common in the
NMWR: state-level panels and establishment data rather than national
aggregates, quasi experiments in addition to regressions, and ways of
gauging minimum wage changes other than the Kaitz index (or similar
measures).1 Neumark and Wascher (1992) draw on the framework of
the earlier aggregate time-series research on teenagers to study a panel
of state-year observations. Card (1992a) performs a differences analysis of state-level data to examine the response of teenage employment
to the federal minimum wage increase in 1990; the minimum wage
21
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variable is the fraction affected, the percentage of a state’s teenage employees who were earning less than the higher minimum wage in the
three quarters before the increase.2 Katz and Krueger (1992) perform a
differences analysis of establishment data to examine the employment
response of Texas’s fast food industry to the federal minimum wage increase in 1991; the minimum wage variable is a wage gap measure, how
much an establishment’s starting wage would have to rise from its value
five months before the increase in order to comply with the new minimum wage. Card (1992b) uses the 1988 increase in California’s minimum wage as an opportunity for a (proto-) difference-in-differences
analysis of several employment responses: of teenagers, of the retail
sector as a whole, and of one specific part of the retail sector, eating
and drinking establishments.3 Only Neumark and Wascher (1992) find
a negative employment response, consistent with the earlier literature.
A year and a half later, an exchange between Card, Katz, and
Krueger (1994) and Neumark and Wascher (1994) appeared. Card,
Katz, and Krueger (1994) criticized aspects of Neumark and Wascher’s
(1992) analysis, including the reconciliation with Card (1992a,b) that
Neumark and Wascher believe shows that Card’s (1992b) specification was unable to detect much of the employment response. Card and
Krueger (1994), the most well-known and controversial analysis in the
NMWR, appeared almost immediately following this exchange. Building on Katz and Krueger (1992) and Card (1992b), Card and Krueger
(1994) use the 1992 increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage to construct a quasi experiment. The treatment group consists of fast food
establishments in New Jersey, and the control group consists of similar
establishments in nearby Pennsylvania counties. This generated a final
exchange of criticism (Neumark and Wascher 2000) and response (Card
and Krueger 2000). In describing this work in detail, the focus will be
on what has turned out to be most influential: Neumark and Wascher
(1992), Card and Krueger (1994), and the exchange that each generated.
The Conference: Staking Out Positions
Prior to NMWR, studies of the minimum wage and teenage employment in the United States relied on aggregate time-series data or,
much less frequently, a cross section of states. Neumark and Wascher
(1992) introduce to this literature state-by-year panels based on the CPS
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Outgoing Rotation Groups. Analysis of data sets like this became possible because of both advances in computer technology and the availability of data at this level of aggregation, and it was useful because of
the increasing variation in the minimum wage across states.4 The basic
version of Neumark and Wascher’s (1992) empirical model resembles
that of the older time-series work. Their outcome variable is the teenage
employment ratio, their minimum wage variable is the Kaitz index, and
their control variables, reflecting fluctuations in supply and demand,
are drawn from the same short list as in the older literature.5 The panel
structure allows for an obvious extension, two-way fixed effects (i.e.,
dummy variables for each state and year) to account for factors that
are roughly constant within each state over time or within each year
across states. They present several versions of the basic model to verify
robustness of results, and the one that became the most prominent included not only a contemporaneous term of the minimum wage but
also a single (i.e., one-year) lagged term. For this version they report an
employment elasticity (with respect to the minimum wage) of −0.19.
The importance of the lagged minimum wage term becomes apparent when Neumark and Wascher (1992) reconcile their results with
Card’s (1992a,b) report of a “positive contemporaneous correlation between changes (that is, short first differences) in the minimum wage and
changes in the employment of teenagers” (p. 67). When Neumark and
Wascher estimate their model in first differences, they too find no employment response to the minimum wage (or a small positive response).
The difference between the two specifications, one in first differences
and one in levels with both contemporaneous and lagged minimum
wage terms, is that the former can capture only short-term effects of the
minimum wage, while the latter can capture longer ones as well. That
is, it takes time for the minimum wage to influence teenagers’ employment, and specifications that do not allow for this possibility will be
unable to detect it.
Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) make serious criticisms of Neumark
and Wascher (1992), the most important of which concerns the variant
of the Kaitz index that Neumark and Wascher use.6 A major part of the
index is a ratio, of which the numerator is the nominal value of the minimum wage and the denominator is the average nominal adult wage. Card,
Katz, and Krueger object that this way of measuring the minimum wage
leads to the mistaken attribution of effects to the minimum wage when
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they are actually due to other factors.7 Card, Katz, and Krueger conclude
by reconsidering Card’s (1992a) examination of the 1990 increase in the
federal minimum wage, modifying the analysis in two ways. First, they
include a measure of teenage school enrollment. Second, they measure
employment change over two years rather than one to capture the same
phenomena that the lagged minimum wage term does in Neumark and
Wascher’s specification. The minimum wage variable remains the fraction affected. With only the minimum wage variable on the right-hand
side of the equation, its effect on teenage employment is positive and
statistically significant. However, once they include a variable to control
for the business cycle, the estimated minimum wage coefficient remains
positive but is no longer statistically significant.
Neumark and Wascher (1994) disagree with each criticism that
Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) level at their work and argue that the
two-year window that Card, Katz, and Krueger consider in their reanalysis is not equivalent to the lagged term in their own specification.
We are left neither with agreement between the two parties nor with an
obvious way to determine independently who is correct. The dispute
has no clear winner. In addition to the question, “Does the minimum
wage always reduce employment if it leads to higher wages?” other issues that are left unresolved include the appropriate way to measure the
minimum wage in addressing this question and the time frame in which
employment responds (if indeed it does).
Card and Krueger (1994) and After
Card and Krueger (1994), the best-known article in the NMWR, is
the coming-of-age of the quasi experiment in this literature. Like Katz
and Krueger (1992), they survey several hundred fast food restaurants,
but they do so in two states rather than one: in New Jersey and in several
counties of eastern Pennsylvania that are close to New Jersey. Like Katz
and Krueger (1992), they perform a differences analysis using a measure
of the wage gap, but the best-known part of their study is a differencein-differences analysis using a treatment dummy. In April 1992, the
minimum wage in New Jersey rose from $4.25 to $5.05, while that in
Pennsylvania remained constant at $4.25. This allows Card and Krueger
to define their treatment group as fast food establishments in New Jersey
and their comparison group as the fast food establishments in eastern
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Pennsylvania. They also consider a secondary comparison group of New
Jersey fast food establishments that were paying at least $5 per hour at
the time of their first survey, before the law went into effect. With neither
comparison group are they able to detect a loss of employment in response to the minimum wage increase. Nor could they detect any effect
when they considered the opening of new McDonald’s establishments
rather than employment. Card and Kreuger find that prices did rise in
New Jersey more than in Pennsylvania following the increase, but not
more in lower-wage New Jersey establishments than in the higher-wage
ones that constituted the secondary comparison group (p. 792).
Neumark and Wascher (2000) begin their response to Card and
Krueger’s (1994) analysis with a long, detailed critique of the data set
that Card and Kreuger constructed. At the center of their argument is
an alternative data set that they constructed from historical payroll records for fast food establishments in the same areas and the same chains
as Card and Kreuger examined, and that they believe is superior to
Card and Krueger’s. It consists of two parts, one of establishments for
which they compiled the data, and one of other establishments whose
data were given to them independently of their own efforts. Neumark
and Wascher assert that a comparison of their data set with Card and
Kreuger’s brings to light problems in the latter that cast doubt on the
results. Further, when they replicate Card and Krueger’s analysis on
their data, they find employment losses in the New Jersey fast food
establishments relative to those in Pennsylvania that are about the size
one would expect from their earlier analyses of teenage employment.
To bolster their case, they next turn to two government data sets for
employment in the entire restaurant industry (since neither allows them
to examine the fast food sector alone). Based on both a quick examination along quasi experimental lines and a more careful regression analysis over a longer period, Neumark and Wascher conclude, “Taken as a
whole, it is our view that the BLS data on employment at eating and
drinking places neither confirm nor reject our findings from the payroll
data that the New Jersey minimum-wage increase appears to have reduced fast-food employment in that state. The BLS data do, however,
provide complementary evidence that minimum-wage increases reduce
employment in the restaurant industry” (pp. 1389–1390).
Neumark and Wascher (2000) explain the differences between their
results and Card and Krueger’s (1994):
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We think that there is simply considerable measurement error in
[Card and Krueger’s] data, attributable to the design of their survey. In contrast, our data should accurately reflect the actual
quantity of labor employed at each restaurant in each survey period. . . . Because the Pennsylvania sample in both data sources
is rather small, and much of the difference between the two data
sources arises for Pennsylvania, it is entirely possible that random
measurement error in Card and Krueger’s data is the culprit. . . .
The second possibility is that the measurement error is not random.
(p. 1387)

Card and Krueger (2000) respond in several steps. First, addressing
the criticisms of the data set that they had constructed themselves, they
follow Neumark and Wascher’s (2000) lead and turn to the same BLS
data that are gathered to administer the unemployment insurance program.8 Using the same type of analysis as in Card and Krueger (1994),
they generate similar results about the employment effects. New Jersey’s 1992 minimum wage increase.9 Second, having constructed a
sample through the middle of 1997 from the government data, they perform the same analysis for the 1996 increase in the federal minimum
wage, which increased the minimum wage for Pennsylvania but not
New Jersey.10 Once again, Card and Krueger (2000) find no evidence of
employment responding to the minimum wage.
Finally, they turn their attention to the data set at the heart of Neumark and Wascher’s (2000) critique. Neumark and Wascher clearly feel
vulnerable to questions about the two different sources for their data,
devoting several pages to showing that, despite concerns about its provenance, it is in important ways similar to unquestionably reliable data.
Card and Krueger have elsewhere labeled the two parts of the sample as
the NW sample and the Berman sample, BNW when combined (Card
and Krueger 1999). They detail numerous problems with the samples,
the most serious being that the Berman sample, more than 40 percent
of the whole, was constructed in part through personal contacts in the
industry. As a result, it is not at all a random sample and has all the
problems that that entails for statistical analysis. All 23 observations for
Pennsylvania in the Berman sample came from a single Burger King
franchisee. Neither subsample contains any establishments in Pennsylvania affiliated with KFC, one of the slower-growing chains in Card
and Krueger’s (1994) original sample. In comparing these data with
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their own, Card and Krueger (2000) find a strong resemblance in the
New Jersey portions, but not in those for Pennsylvania until they remove the 23 Pennsylvania observations of the Berman sample. They
conclude, “The increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage probably had
no effect on total employment in New Jersey’s fast-food industry, and
possibly had a small positive effect . . .” [italics in the original].
The only data set that indicates a significant decline in employment in New Jersey relative to Pennsylvania is the small set of
restaurants collected by [Berman]. Results of this data set stand
in contrast to our survey data, to the BLS’s payroll data, and to
the supplemental data collected by Neumark and Wascher. . . . We
suspect the common denominator is that representative samples
show statistically insignificant and small differences in employment growth between New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania, while
the nonrepresentative sample informally collected for Berman produces anomalous results.
An alternative interpretation of the full spectrum of results is that
the New Jersey minimum wage increase did not reduce total employment, but it did slightly reduce the average number of hours
worked per employee. Neumark and Wascher (1995b) reject this
interpretation. Although we are less quick to rule out this possibility, we are skeptical about any conclusion concerning average
hours worked per employee that relies so heavily on the informally
collected Berman/EPI sample, and the exclusion of controls for the
length of the reporting interval. Moreover, within New Jersey the
BNW data indicate that hours grew more at restaurants in the lowest wage areas of the state, where the minimum-wage increase was
more likely to be a binding constraint. This finding runs counter
to the view that total hours declined in response to the New Jersey
minimum wage increase. (Card and Krueger 2000, pp. 1419–1420)

In contrast with the exchange following the conference (Card,
Katz, and Krueger 1994; Neumark and Wascher 1994), this one leaves
the reader feeling confident about the appropriate resolution of the
disagreements between the two contending parties. Card and Krueger
(1994, 2000) demonstrate that the minimum wage is not necessarily
bad for employment, contra Neumark and Wascher (1992, 1994, 2000).
Rather than directly defend their original data set, they analyze an alternative one drawn from government data about which no serious concerns have been raised; the results are similar to their original results.
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Finally, they examine Neumark and Wascher’s (2000) BNW data set
thoroughly and show that once questionable observations are deleted, it
too gives similar results.
The 1990s Studies in Retrospect
The next important developments for this literature (but not actually of or by it) were several methodological pieces that brought to
light statistical issues sufficiently severe to destroy confidence in most
inferences from both lines of research, both the state-year panels of
Neumark and Wascher and the simple quasi experiments of Card and
Krueger. Rather than explain this in media res, it will be better to start at
the beginning. Kloek (1981) and Moulton (1986, 1990) examine situations in which ordinary least squares (OLS) is used on data that can be
grouped, and within each group either some regressors have a constant
value or it is plausible that the error term is correlated (as with a random
effect) or both. Not only are the coefficients inefficiently estimated but
the estimated standard errors are biased downward. A common solution
is to estimate the coefficients with OLS and to cluster observations by
group when estimating the standard errors.
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) demonstrate that even
where the Moulton problem as conventionally understood is appropriately addressed, serial correlation remains and results in estimated
standard errors that have a large downward bias.11 They begin with a
50 × 20 (50 states by 20 years) repeat cross section in a difference-indifferences framework, soon switching over to a 50 × 20 panel of aggregated data to make clear that the symptoms they are examining are
related to serial correlation. Hansen (2007a,b) explores this further in
the context of panels and more conventional serial correlation than is
typical of the treatment dummy of difference-in-differences analyses.
Hansen (2007a,b) and Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan demonstrate
that in the presence of positive serial correlation, the estimated standard
errors of key variables are biased downward substantially, leading to
fantastically high rates of false positive results. This is true not only
for estimates based on conventional formula that take no account of
serial correlation but also for several commonly used parametric and
nonparametric treatments of serial correlation (Wolfson 2011). Only
clustering and several bootstrap procedures that account for unspecified
serial correlation do not exhibit this problem.12

Employment 29

Donald and Lang (2007) examine (what has become known as)
the Moulton problem, specifically in the difference-in-differences
framework. In the two-by-two framework of Card and Krueger (1994,
2000)—two states and two periods—if all restaurants within each state
are subject to common factors each year (other than the minimum wage)
that affect their employment, and these are not included on the righthand side of the regression equation, the dummy variable for each cell
will reflect those factors. Calculated as the difference-in-differences
from these dummy variables, the estimate of the employment effect absorbs these common non–minimum wage factors. With a mean of zero,
they do not cause the estimate of the employment effect to be biased.
However, its estimated variance reflects only the contribution from the
sample of restaurants within each state-year cell and nothing from the
sample of the common non–minimum wage factors across the stateyear cells. With additional time periods or states in either the comparison or control group, it is possible to estimate this part of the variance,
but not in the two-by-two framework. Consequently, the standard errors
are biased downward.
Where does this leave us? First, it is worth noting that both of the
problems identified raise more serious questions for studies that report
a statistically significant employment effect, whether negative or positive, than for those that do not. Second, Donald and Lang (2007) show
that those results of Card and Krueger’s (1994, 2000) that are based on
a statistically significant treatment dummy are questionable. However,
Donald and Lang’s point does not undermine those results based on a
treatment variable that varies across treated units, as (for example) a
wage gap variable that relates the ex ante wage or wage bill to ex post
employment. Since both of their analyses include a differences analysis using a wage gap, Donald and Lang’s point also does not undermine the statistically significant positive employment effect that they
report. Third, the problem of serial correlation that Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan (2004) highlight is an issue not only for Neumark and
Wascher’s (1992, 1994, 2000) analyses of panels during the 1990s but
also for much of the work into the first decade of the new millennium.
In what follows, rather than repeating these concerns with each
analysis, we take up only results for which we believe the problems
are not too serious. This is (almost completely) straightforward with
respect to quasi experiments and the bias problem that Donald and Lang
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(2007) describe. Several factors come into play, however, with regard
to serial correlation in panels: the degree of bias in the standard errors
depends not only on the amount of serial correlation in the error term
but also on the minimum wage variable and the number of time periods
in the data. Further, when the number of groups is too small, neither
clustering nor the simplest bootstrap procedure that accounts for serial
correlation (known variously as the cluster-robust or block bootstrap)
turns out to be ineffective. What number of groups is “too small”? The
Monte Carlo results of Hansen (2007b) suggest that clustering works
reasonably well with as few as 10 groups, while those of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008)
indicate a figure closer to 20. Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller examine
several alternative techniques when there are very few groups, three of
which appear to work reasonably well with as few as five groups.
This leads us to some rules of thumb in evaluating analyses that rely
on panels or longitudinal data. The first is that analyses based on more
than seven periods must account for serial correlation. Second, if there
are fewer than 10 groups, clustering is ineffective. A third is that the
degrees of freedom depend on the number of groups: while a consensus
about the precise value does not currently exist, there is some agreement that it should be no more than the number of groups (Angrist and
Pischke 2009; Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008); t-statistics should
be evaluated accordingly.
We respond to these problems by discussing entire articles in some
cases, while discussing only parts of others. Where we entirely neglect
a study, we nevertheless include it in our tabulations of papers and articles toward the bottom and indicate with a footnote that the standard
errors are suspect. This set includes nearly all panel-based analyses
that appeared before 2008. It also includes all difference-in-differences
analyses that use a two-by-two framework and an at-risk or treatment
dummy, as well as those that have more comparison groups or periods
but do not take advantage of that fact to correct the estimated standard
error of the employment effect so that it is not biased. With multiple
comparison and treatment groups, as in Allegretto, Dube, and Reich
(2009, 2011) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), the estimated standard error automatically reflects this contribution to the variance, so this
source of bias is not a problem. Because clustering is ineffective with
fewer than 20 groups, several otherwise attractive analyses of Canadian
provincial data are not discussed.13
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THE NEW MINIMUM WAGE RESEARCH SINCE 2000
To provide an understanding of the current state of research on the
minimum wage and employment, we review 50 articles published or
written between 2001 and early 2013 that address this issue (and include more than 20 additional analyses with suspect standard errors
or other serious problems toward the bottom of the tables). The primary focus will be studies of U.S. data, but English-language studies of
data from other advanced (that is, OECD) economies are also included.
Analyses are organized in two broad classifications. The first concerns
the employment response of a demographic group; the list of groups
studied includes not only teenagers but also young adults, women who
satisfy various criteria, immigrants, and a small assortment of others.
The second concerns the employment response of selected industries,
most often fast food or restaurants more broadly, but also hotels and
motels, retail, broader sets of low-wage industries, and, in the United
Kingdom, nursing homes. In the first category, the dependent variable is
most often the employment rate of the target demographic group when
aggregate data are being studied and the employment status of members
of the target demographic group when individual data are used. In the
second category, the dependent variable is the number of jobs, whether
in the entire industry or particular establishments. In both categories,
several consider either group members who were employed prior to a
minimum wage increase or industry employees prior to an increase, to
examine the effect of the minimum wage on their likelihood of continued employment. The discussion below makes no attempt at complete
descriptions of any studies, focusing only on what is directly germane
to employment and the minimum wage in each, and largely ignores
those that exhibit the econometric problems described above. The tables, however, will include them at the bottom.14 Finally, fewer studies
than one would wish report elasticities, and those that do too rarely
report the relevant standard errors. Unless an elasticity is reported, the
focus in the discussion of an article will be qualitative, not quantitative.
Since the end of the first decade of the NMWR, the study of the teenage and youth employment response remains the most common, both
in studies that examine U.S. data and in those that use data from other
countries. Less than a handful of these analyses use one-dimensional
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data structures, aggregate time-series, and cross sections, to which they
apply much more sophisticated econometric techniques than typical
in this literature. Panels are the most common data structure early in
the period, giving way to repeat cross sections in the second half of
this period. The most common analytic approach in this group of papers is similar to that of Neumark and Wascher (1992) and the older
time-series literature, although several studies, of both youth and other
groups, rely on economic search models. Individual-level data are more
common much earlier in studies of other countries than of the United
States, especially longitudinal data. Quasi experiments are relatively infrequent in studies of both U.S. demographic groups and industries but
quite common in foreign studies. Rather than rely solely on a broadly
defined demographic group, a handful try to identify those affected,
whether employed or not, based on traits typically found in a wage
equation. Several pay careful attention to the choice of the implicit or
explicit comparison group against which the employment effect of the
minimum wage is measured. Below, studies of U.S. data are discussed
first, then of foreign data. Within the discussion of U.S. studies, the
order is youth employment, other low-wage groups, other demographic
groups, the hospitality sector, and other low-wage sectors. The discussion of other countries has no section on other demographic groups and
combines all low-wage sectors into one section.

U.S. STUDIES
Demographic Groups
Youth
Studies that use aggregate panels. Table 2.1 lists the 12 studies
that analyze panel data for the United States; all but one rely on data
from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The typical or canonical
framework is that of Neumark and Wascher (1992): estimation of a single equation in which the dependent variable is the employment ratio
and the list of independent variables includes both one that reflects the
value of the minimum wage and others that reflect supply and demand

Employment 33

characteristics of the labor market: for example, the unemployment
rate for all workers in a state, and teenagers’ share of the population
in a state. It is common to include two-way fixed effects, though those
for time are not universal, and occasionally a trend term is included. A
lagged term of the minimum wage variable is not uncommon, either
instead of or in addition to the contemporaneous value of the variable.
Neumark and Wascher (2004) include separate trends for each country
in some specifications, while Keil, Robertson, and Symons (2009) include no regressors other than the two-way fixed effects and separate
trends for each state.
Neumark (2001) was to be part of an intended symposium for
which he turned out to be the only participant.15 It was organized out
of concern that the protagonists in the minimum wage debates of the
1990s were able, consciously or not, to adjust their analyses to provide
“satisfactory” results. Neumark locked in his specification before the
data to be used, the CPS for the last three months of each year in 1995–
1998, were available. The specific question examined is the response of
teenage (and young adult) employment to the federal minimum wage
increases of 1996 and 1997. In contrast with all the rest of the minimum wage work that Neumark published before Neumark and Wascher
(2011), the evidence presented in support of the hypothesis that the
minimum wage reduces teenage employment is quite sparse. The only
statistically significant results are for those who are both not currently
enrolled in school and have no education beyond high school. Neumark
states that it is in this group, the youngest and least skilled part of the labor force, where one would expect the strongest disemployment effects;
he suspects that one reason for the lack of definite results is that with
such a short sample, imposed by the need to lock in the specification in
advance of the data, the standard errors are larger than they likely would
be in a longer sample. However, it is also in just such a short sample that
serial correlation is least likely to lead to biased standard errors; that
is, the results may be more, not less, reliable than in analyses of longer
samples that contain no correction for serial correlation.
To reconcile the first-round NMWR results of Neumark and Wascher
(1992, 2000) with those of Card and Krueger (1994, 2000), Bazen and
Le Gallo (2009) suggest that changes in the federal minimum wage
influence teen employment differently than changes in state minimum
wages. They examine several recent intervals: the mid- to late 1980s,

Study
Effect
Addison, Blackburn, Mixed
and Cotti (2013)
Bazen and Le Gallo Mixed
(2009)
Neumark (2001)

None

Sample
period
Novelty
Target groupa
Amplifying effect of
Teenagers 2005–2010
recessions?
2006–2009
Reconciling results of Teenagers
Various
Neumark and Wascher
and Card and Krueger
Prespecified research Teenagers, 1995–1998
design
young adults
Long-term
Teenagers, 1979–2001
consequences
young adults
Immigrants
Teenagers 1995–2005

Neumark and
None
Nizalova (2007)
Orrenius and
Mixed
Zavodny (2008)
Sabia (2009a)
Negative Using CPS to study the
retail sector
Sabia (2009b)
Negative Annual vs. business
cycle effects
Thompson (2009) Negative County-level data
Keil, Robertson, and None
Symons (2009)c
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Table 2.1 Youth (Panels, U.S. Data)

Rise in precision from
post-2000 data

Analytic
Unit of
Type of
approach observation standard error
Regression State-month
Clustered
State-year
Regression State-year Block bootstrap

Data
setb
CPS
ACS
CPS

Regression

CPS

State-year

Conventional

Regression State-cohort- Clustered (state)
year
Regression State-year Clustered (state)

CPS
CPS

Teens in
retail
Teenagers

1979–2004

Regression State-month Clustered (state)

CPS

1979–2004

Regression State-month Clustered (state)

CPS

Teenagers

1996–2000

QWI

1977–1995

Countyquarter
State-year

Clustered (state)

Youth

Quasi
experiment
Regression

Various, none
clustered

Regression

State-year

Conventional

CPS,
QCEW,
GPEU
CPS

Regression

State-year

Conventional,
PCSE-PSARd

May
CPS

Neumark and
Negative
Disequilibrium
Youth
Wascher (2002)c
methods
Neumark and
Negative Extending work on
Teenagers
enrollment-employment
Wascher (2003)c

1977–1989
1973–1976
1977–1998

Wessels (2007)c

Mixed

Redoing C&K’s
teenager study

Teenagers

1989–1997

Regression

State-year

Conventional

CPS

Teenagers refers to those aged 16–19. Young adults refers to those aged 20–24. Youth combines the two groups together.
CPS = Current Population Survey. ACS = American Community Survey. GPEU = Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment. QCEW = Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. QWI = Quarterly Workforce Indicators (based on Unemployment Insurance records).
c
This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).
d
PCSE-PSAR = Panel-corrected standard errors, allowing for different serial correlation coefficients for the residuals of each state.
a

b
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when the only increases in the minimum wage were at the state level;
the increases in the federal minimum wage of the early 1990s; and the
mid-1990s, when there were only a few increases in state minimum
wages and most but not all of the action was at the federal level. Bazen
and Le Gallo conclude that, on the whole, increases in state minimum
wages have no impact on employment but that increases in the federal
minimum wage do. Why? In the 1980s, few states increased the minimum wage, and most of the increases were both regionally localized
(in New England, the upper midwest, and the Pacific Coast states) and
individually small, even if their cumulative total over time was large.
This suggests some selection bias to Bazen and Le Gallo; states that increased their minimum wages did so knowing from experience that the
employment effect would be small. Over the same period, firms in those
states acquired experience in preparing for and responding to binding
minimum wages, further reducing the employment effects of increases
in the state minimum wages. In the 1990s, when increases in the federal
minimum wage played a more important role, the changes were both
relatively larger and more widespread, and firms in many affected states
lacked this expertise. These conditions were reflected in teen employment. Because Neumark and Wascher (1992, 2000) consider both state
and federal minimum wage increases over an extended period of time,
and the increases at the federal level had effects on teenage employment, while Card and Krueger (1994, 2000) study only a single state
minimum wage increase, which did not affect employment, it should
be no surprise that their conclusions disagree, according to Bazen and
Le Gallo.16
Analyzing a five-year-long quarterly panel of county-level data,
Thompson (2009) starts with the assumption that a county’s sensitivity to the minimum wage is negatively related to the mean quarterly
earnings of its employed teenagers. Employment will be more sensitive
to the minimum wage in a county where mean quarterly earnings of
employed teenagers is low than in a county where that figure is high.17
With this, he constructs a quasi experiment to examine the effect of the
federal minimum wage increases of the late 1990s on the teen share of
employment. The treatment group consists of counties with low values for teens’ earnings, while the comparison group is another set of
counties with high values for teens’ earnings. In addition to the quasi
experiment, which entails excluding a large fraction of counties with
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intermediate values of mean teens’ earnings, he also performs a regression analysis on a full sample, using teens’ earnings in the first quarter
of 1996 as the measure of sensitivity to the minimum wage. Following the increase in October 1996, the teenage employment share fell in
the treatment counties by three percentage points relative to that in the
comparison group, using a broad definition of high- and low-earnings
counties, and by six percentage points using a narrower one. The regression results show that the teen share of employment fell by about
one percentage point for each $100 decline in prior per capita teens’
earnings.
Different cuts at the data are illuminating. Teenage employment can
be split into roughly equal halves: stable jobs, which last the full quarter
in which the minimum wage rose, and transitory jobs (all others). This
dichotomy indicates that the minimum wage had no impact on stable
employment but a substantial effect on transitory employment. Further
analysis shows that employment of young adults (age 19–22) is not
measurably affected, and that much of the decline in the teen employment share, at least in 1997, can be attributed to a drop in the hiring of
teens.18
Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2013) ask, “What accounts for
the difficulty in uncovering adverse minimum wage effects in recent
studies?” (p. 1). They examine the possibility that relatively tight labor
markets in the U.S. data may explain this. That is, the employment response to moderate minimum wage increases is muted when labor is
scarce, only to be amplified during recessions. To study this, they use
two data sets and several equation specifications to study the impact
on teenagers in a period that straddles the beginning of the 2007–2009
recession, a period when both the federal minimum wage and the average of state minimum wages rose from one-third of the average manufacturing wage or less to about three-eighths or more. The key variable
is an interaction between the minimum wage, on the one hand, and on
the other, the difference between the state unemployment rate and the
mean national unemployment rate in the three years before the onset of
the recession. In the absence of the interaction term, three of four point
estimates of the effect on teenagers’ employment are positive, and none
are statistically significant.19 The point estimate on the interaction term
is negative, statistically significant, and quite small. It appears that teenagers’ hold on their jobs may be unusually tenuous during recessions,
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and the authors believe that the previously tighter labor market is the
answer to the question posed at the beginning of this paragraph.
Full discussions of four analyses, Neumark and Nizalova (2007),
Orrenius and Zavodny (2008), and Sabia (2009a,b), appear later because
they each consider minimum wage effects on youth employment only
as by-products of their main concern. Neumark and Nizalova examine
the long-term effects of the minimum wage experienced as a teenager
and young adult. For Orrenius and Zavodny the focus is the effect of
the minimum wage on immigrants who lack a high school diploma,
while for Sabia (2009a) it is the effect on employment in retail.20 Sabia
(2009b) is more methodological, primarily concerned with the best way
to account for the business cycle in minimum wage studies. In both of
his articles, Sabia uses similar but not identical models to analyze the
same data. He reports point estimates of the elasticity of employment
with respect to the minimum wage, ranging from a low of about −0.20
in specifications without annual dummies to a high of about −0.30 in
specifications that include them, but he makes no mention of standard
errors.21 The lack of standard errors nevertheless makes it difficult to
determine whether the differences between his elasticity estimates are
statistically significant. None of the elasticity estimates that Orrenius
and Zavodny (2008) report for all teenagers or for teenage girls is statistically significant. For teenage boys, the elasticity estimate from a
regression equation that includes business cycle controls is statistically
significant, and at about −0.20, in the middle of what was previously the
consensus range. For teenagers, Neumark and Nizalova report no statistically significant employment response to the average minimum wage
that has prevailed since one turned 16 in the current state of residence.
Substituting 20 for 16, they report the same for young adults (20–24),
even those with no more than a high school education.
Studies that use individual-level data. Table 2.2 lists eight studies
that examine individual-level data. Three—Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2011); Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2011); and Flinn (2006)—
start with fairly sophisticated search models of the labor market, which
they put to quite different uses. The remainder broadly resemble earlier work, though each has its own novelty or twist. Allegretto, Dube,
and Reich (2009, 2011) emphasize the importance of controlling for
regional heterogeneity and show that neglecting it can result in holding
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the minimum wage responsible for effects that are due to factors with
which it is correlated. Neumark and Wascher (2011) present results
for teenage girls in the course of examining the employment response
of single mothers to both the minimum wage and the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC). Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen (2012) study the
minimum wage increases in New York in 2005 and 2006 from several
different quasi experiment perspectives and conclude that it reduced
employment of young people who had not graduated from high school.
These six studies all rely on repeated cross sections, where individuals
are not followed over time.
Flinn (2006) develops and analyzes a search model in which the
minimum wage can affect both the probability of finding a job and
the wage offer. Only unemployed individuals engage in search; once
employed, workers remain at that job until it disappears, an event that
happens with a constant probability. Individuals are identical except
for factors that influence their decisions about labor participation, especially the opportunity cost of participation. Similarly, firms are identical. These assumptions imply that no firm or individual is consistently
more or less productive than any others. Productivity depends only on
the specific match of individual and firm. The value of a match is its
productivity and is immediately known to both parties when they begin
to consider the possibility of joining forces; it is the basis of the wage
negotiation, the outcome of which depends on the relative bargaining
power of labor and management. Because employed workers do not
engage in search, an individual will turn down a wage offer that is too
low, since accepting it would preclude further search.
A minimum wage creates a distinction between jobs that would
have been offered in its absence. Those for which the value is less than
the minimum wage will not be offered, and matches that would have
been made because the low offered wage would nevertheless have been
acceptable to the searcher will not be made. In this way, the minimum
wage reduces the value of search. Firms will continue to make job offers where the value of the match exceeds the minimum wage, but the
wage offered will now always be at least the minimum wage. The minimum wage imposes a wage floor for these matches since, previously,
workers’ low bargaining power would have otherwise allowed firms to
make some of these offers for a lower wage. In this way, the minimum
wage increases the value of search. Flinn (2006) describes this latter

Study
Effect
Novelty
Eckstein, Ge, and Negative Enforcement of
Petrongolo
MW in a search
(2011)
model
Ahn, Arcidiacono, Mixed Search model of
and Wessels
the labor market
(2011)
Allegretto, Dube,
None
Addressing
and Reich
regional
(2009)
heterogeneity,
commuting zones
Allegretto, Dube,
None
Addressing
and Reich
regional
(2011)
heterogeneity
Flinn (2006)
Mixed Search model of
the labor market
Neumark and
Mixed
MW-EITC
Wascher (2011)
interaction
Sabia, Burkhauser, Negative New York State
and Hansen
minimum wage
(2012)
increase
Turner and
Demiralpc
(2001)

Mixed

Minority and
inner-city teens

Target
groupa
White male
high school
graduates
White
teenage boys
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Table 2.2 Youth (Individual-Level Data, U.S. Data)
Sample
period
1979–
1996

Analytic
approach
Regression

1989–
2000

Regression

Teenagers Various

Regression
and quasi
experiment

Individual- Repeated
quarter cross section

Clustered
(state)

Census,
ACS

Teenagers

1990–
2009

Individual- Repeated
year
cross section

Clustered
(state)

CPS

Youth

1996–
1998
1977–
2006
2004,
2006

Regression
and quasi
experiment
Regression

Quasi
experiment

1991

Regression

Single
mothers
Youth,
16–29, not
high school
graduates
Teenagers

Regression

Unit of
Data
Type of
Data
observation structure standard error setb
Individual- Longitudinal General
NLSY
month
method of
moments
Individual- Repeated Conventional CPS
year
cross section

Individual

Repeated Conventional CPS
cross section
Individual- Repeated
Clustered Various,
month cross section
(state)
CPS
Individual Repeated Clustered SE CPS
cross section bootstrap
Individual Longitudinal FO Taylor
Expansion

SIPP

Teenagers refers to those aged 16–19.
ACS = American Community Survey. NLSY = National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. SIPP = Survey of Income and Program Participation.
c
This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).
a

b
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effect as the equivalent of an increase in labor’s bargaining power. Both
of these effects increase total unemployment, the first because some
workers who would have willingly accepted a low wage cannot now
find a match, the second because individuals with higher reservation
wages now enter the labor market in response to the wage floor. If the
second dominates, both labor force participation and total employment
may increase.22
Flinn (2006) derives a likelihood function and estimates it using data from CPS outgoing rotation groups for four nonconsecutive
months that together span each of the two federal minimum wage increases of the mid-1990s. To measure the effects of the minimum wage,
he plugs different values of the minimum wage into two versions of
the estimated model. The second model, which Flinn believes to be
more reliable, indicates that employment of young workers rises until
the minimum wage equals about $7.50 per hour.23 It further implies
that the youth employment rate rose slightly in response to the 1990s
increases in the federal minimum wage, from a bit more than 57 percent
to a bit more than 58 percent. As with more than one analysis previously
discussed, the lack of confidence bands for these results (equivalent to
standard errors) makes it impossible to determine whether this difference is statistically significant or the equivalent of noise.
Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2011) elaborate on Flinn’s (2006)
model to study the compositional effect of the minimum wage on the
employment and labor force participation of white teenage boys. They
distinguish these boys according to traits of the head of the household
in which they live: marital and employment status, and especially educational achievement. The intuition is that the opportunity cost of working is greater for boys living in households that are more affluent and
more stable, so drawing these boys into the labor market requires a
higher expected wage. Once in the market, however, they are better at
navigating the process of finding a job because of skills associated with
their background. Because the expected wage is a product of the probability of finding a job and the wage paid once a job is found, the effect
of the minimum wage on their decision is ambiguous. If they decide to
enter the market, they likely outcompete others already in the market,
taking jobs that would otherwise have gone to boys from less favored
backgrounds.
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Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2011) estimate the model with data
from 12 years (1989–2000) of CPS outgoing rotation groups (excluding summer months), which leads to problems. Their theoretical and
econometric work is ambitious and impressive, but they overlook the
issue of serial correlation and standard errors already mentioned. They
report statistically significant results for the expected compositional
effects (i.e., higher employment and labor force participation of boys
from advantaged backgrounds, lower values of these variables for boys
from disadvantaged backgrounds). With standard errors that are almost
certainly biased downward, it is not possible to ascertain whether the
estimates are statistically significant.
Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2011) analyze the importance of noncompliance with federal minimum wage laws, along the way generating
estimates from which it is possible to calculate employment elasticities (but not their standard errors) for white males who completed high
school between the ages of 17 and 19 and were never in either college
or the armed forces. Their search model specifies two types of workers
and assumes that the wage distribution depends on the distribution of
productivity across firms. Increases in the minimum wage affect both
sides of the labor market. On the demand side, an increase reduces employment by driving low-productivity firms out of business, resulting in
a lower rate at which job seekers receive job offers. On the supply side,
it raises both the reservation wage and the expected wage of job offers.
The first two effects both lead to lower employment, but the last one
leads to higher employment, so what happens to the employment rate
following a minimum wage increase is not evident a priori.
For the population Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2011) study, the
minimum wage elasticity of employment during the first year after
graduation and in the labor force is −0.061, and it is −0.035 during
the next three years, two to four years after graduation and in the labor force.24 These values correspond roughly to those for teenagers and
young adults, respectively. It is difficult to evaluate them both because
they are for groups that do not closely match those examined elsewhere,
and no standard errors are reported. In any event, both point values are
very small. Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo write,
Increases in the minimum wage and/or compliance deliver small
effects on the wage distribution and the nonemployment rate. (p.
580)

44 Belman and Wolfson
According to our model, the employment effect of the minimum
wage comes from a combination of lower job offer arrival rates
and (ambiguous) changes in the reservation wage. However, empirically we find that [the minimum wage] has a negligible impact
on [the reservation wage]. Thus the increase in nonemployment
driven by the increase in the minimum wage is almost entirely
driven by the fact that [most but not all low productivity firms
choose not to evade the new minimum but instead] leave the market. (p. 604)

The vein of research that rests on data aggregated or grouped by
state has from the start addressed the possibility of geographic heterogeneity with state fixed effects. Using two different approaches, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) show that this is insufficient
because the problem is not just one of heterogeneity but one of local
or regional correlation. Both analyses measure the correlation between
employment and the minimum wage only within well-defined regions
in order to reduce the likelihood of mistakenly attributing to the minimum wage employment effects that are instead due to other factors with
which the minimum wage is correlated. Allegretto, Dube, and Reich
(2011) argue that regions of the country have different economic cultures that result in regional differences in both the level of the minimum
wage and the functioning of labor markets.25 Distinguishing the specific
effect of the minimum wage from that of the broader economic culture
requires comparing states only with close neighbors rather than, say,
Maine to Texas or California to North Dakota. Allegretto, Dube, and
Reich (2009) approach this issue from a different angle, drawing on
other work that relies on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ definition of
commuting zones to treat them as local labor markets. In their data,
74 of these commuting zones straddle state boundaries and comprise
counties with different contemporaneous minimum wages at some time
in their sample.
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) account for geographic correlation with a set of dummy variables for census division by quarter combinations. This reduces the point estimate of the employment
elasticity by two-thirds, from statistical significance to insignificance.
The effect of these controls on the response of teenagers’ wages to the
minimum wage is just the opposite, increasing the elasticity by about
one-third (more than one standard error) with no discernible effect on
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the estimated standard error.26 Their treatment group consists of those
counties whose minimum wage is contemporaneously higher than that
of other counties in the same commuting zone, and they are matched to
specific counties in the comparison group, those in the same commuting zone with a lower contemporaneous minimum wage. To show the
importance of the commuting zone to their results, Allegretto, Dube,
and Reich begin with a conventional regression framework that they
apply to all 741 commuting zones. Then, in two steps, they move to a
difference-in-differences framework by changing the regressors until
the estimated coefficient of the minimum wage comes entirely from
the difference that exists within each of the 74 cross-state commuting
zones.27
After the obligatory demonstration of a wage response in each of
their specifications, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009) turn to the employment response. In the version that corresponds to the conventional
model, they get a conventional result: an elasticity of −0.16. The result
from their difference-in-differences analysis is an employment elasticity that is positive and almost as large in magnitude, 0.13. An intermediate specification that controls for regional heterogeneity at a grosser
level, census divisions, generates an intermediate elasticity of 0.01.
None of these are statistically significant at a 0.05 level, although using
their preferred specification, they state that “we can rule out at the 5 percent level an employment elasticity more negative than −1.5 percent.
Tests of coefficient equality between [the conventional model and the
difference-in-differences analysis] can be rejected at the 1 percent
level” (p. 17).
The central concern of Neumark and Wascher (2011) is interactions
between the minimum wage and the EITC, but they also briefly consider the side effect of what happens to teen employment.28 In equations
that include only the minimum wage variable, the employment impact
for boys who are black or Hispanic is negative and significant but insignificant for other boys.29 For both groups of boys, the results appear not
to be statistically significant when the EITC is considered.30 The pattern
is different for girls: by itself, the minimum wage reduces employment
for girls who are neither black nor Hispanic but not for those who are
either black or Hispanic. However, once interactions with the EITC are
accounted for, the only statistically significant effect is on girls who
are either black or Hispanic, for whom “the additional increase in labor
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supply among adult women in response to the combination of a high
minimum wage and generous EITC [leads] to noticeable reductions in
both the employment rates and wages of female teenagers, thereby reducing their earnings sharply.” This effect is not found to apply to teenage boys.
Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen (2012) construct a quasi experiment
to study the combined effect of New York’s 2005 and 2006 minimum
wage increases on the employment of those aged 16–29 who do not have
a high school diploma.31 Their primary analysis is a 4 × 2 difference-indifferences, with a comparison group consisting of three nearby states,
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. The availability of several
comparison states makes it possible to avoid the problems of biased
standard errors produced in the simpler 2 × 2 model (Donald and Lang
2007), but they do not take advantage of this; however, they present
two other analyses that sidestep the problem. The first uses the technique of difference-in-differences-in-differences (D3), and the second
uses the synthetic comparison group technique of Abadie, Diamond,
and Hainmueller (2010).
The additional dimension for comparison in the analysis based on
the D3 approach is people in their twenties who have completed high
school. To the extent that this group and the less-educated one experience the same state-year shock to employment, the three-way differencing removes it from both the treatment and comparison groups,
and Donald and Lang’s (2007) concern is no longer an issue. While
more-educated individuals in their twenties do not make an ideal comparison group for teenagers who have not completed high school, the
use of this group in both the treatment and comparison states means
that, at worst, the only likely consequence is additional noise in the
estimates. The point estimates are negative for both the whole target group (aged 16–29) and for each of three subgroups: teenagers,
those aged 20–24, and those aged 25–29. The only statistically significant point estimate, however, is for teenagers, and the point estimate of
the corresponding elasticity, −0.95, is more than three times the size of
the largest value in the older consensus range.
In the second analysis, a synthetic New York is constructed from
the 25 states that had a minimum wage that both remained constant
from 2002 through 2006 and was equal to New York’s ex ante minimum wage of $5.15. This approach relies on calculating, from the 25
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nontreatment states, a weighted average that very closely matches employment of the target group in New York for several years before the
minimum wage increase, and then comparing the two ex post values of
employment, for New York and synthetic New York. Sabia, Burkhauser,
and Hansen (2012) instead perform a difference-in-differences analysis, likely because in the synthetic New York, the employment ratio of
those aged 16–29 who did not possess a high school diploma was consistently 0.05 to 0.10 higher than in actual New York, something that
was also true of the original comparison group of neighboring states.
It appears that the synthetic control technique is not a substantial improvement over the original analysis, but this is not quite right. Inference is based on a quasi t-distribution that is derived from pretending
that each of the 25 nontreatment states, one by one, raises its minimum
wage in 2005 and 2006, and applying to it the same technique of synthetic comparison groups.32 Because Donald and Lang’s (2007) concern
is equally an issue for all combinations of states, the quasi t-distribution
incorporates it and the problem disappears. All point estimates of the
employment effect using the synthetic control technique are negative,
for the target group as a whole and for each of the three age subgroups
listed above, but when the test statistics are compared to those of the
quasi t-distributions, none are statistically significant.33
Studies that use simpler data structures. Table 2.3 lists three remaining analyses of youth employment and the minimum wage, each
distinguished by the use of sophisticated statistical techniques in an attempt to extract all the information from data sets with simpler internal
structures than panels and repeat cross sections. Two, Williams and Mills
(2001) and Bazen and Marimoutou (2002), analyze aggregate data on
teenage employment typical of the older literature but use newer, more
powerful techniques of time-series analysis. The third, Kalenkoski
and Lacombe (2008), applies techniques of spatial econometrics to a
cross section of counties using data drawn from the 2000 census.
Williams and Mills (2001) use techniques of time-series analysis
that have become part of the standard tool kit since the older literature
on the minimum wage, testing for unit roots and correcting as appropriate, and estimating vector autoregressions (VARs) in order to calculate
impulse response functions (IRFs) that are estimates of the dynamic
response to a shock. This allows them to examine how employment

Study
Bazen and
Marimoutou
(2002)
Kalenkoski and
Lacombe
(2008)
Williams and Mills
(2001)
a
b

Effect
Negative
Negative
Mixed

Novelty
Structural
time-series
models
Addressing
geographic
correlation
Time-series
issues: unit
roots, VARs
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Table 2.3 Youth (Simpler Data Structures, U.S. Data)
Target
groupa
Teenagers

Sample
period
1954–1999

Analytic
approach
Regression

Unit of
observation
Year

Data
structure
Time series

Data
setb
Old timeseries data

Teenagers

2000

Regression

County

Cross section

Census

Teenagers

1954–1993

Regression

Quarter

Time series

Old timeseries data

Teenagers refers to those aged 16–19.
The Current Population Survey is the source for most of this data, but the authors received the data sets from earlier workers in the literature, which facilitates comparison with prior work.
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changes over time following a minimum wage increase, something
more interesting than a typical coefficient estimate. A drawback of IRFs
is that the results can be sensitive to necessary but arbitrary choices. To
address this problem, Williams and Mills report results from several
IRFs, examining in each the employment response to a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage. The results are quite similar, with the teen
employment ratio decreasing for eight quarters, until it is four to eight
percentage points lower than it would otherwise be. It remains roughly
flat for the next four quarters, after which it returns to normal by the
16th quarter after the increase. Williams and Mills place more faith
in the smaller estimates of the response, the intermediate drop of four
rather than eight percentage points. Even according to the generous 90
percent confidence intervals (corresponding to a test size of 0.10) that
they report, the decline is significant only in quarters 8 and 12 following the increase; this pattern suggests that the apparent statistically significant response to the minimum wage may well be due to inadequate
treatment of seasonality.
Bazen and Marimoutou (2002) use structural time-series modeling
techniques based on the Kalman filter, which allows for unusually flexible treatment of trend, seasonality, and business cycles. This approach
generates estimates of the employment response to the minimum wage
that are much more stable than was apparent from the accumulated results of the older literature. They find a statistically significant shortterm elasticity of −0.10 and a long-term elasticity of −0.30, the two
extremes of the range commonly reported in the older literature. The
contrast with the results of Williams and Mills (2001), who found a
large short-term response that, rather than getting larger, disappeared
over time is worth noting.
Kalenkoski and Lacombe (2008) apply techniques from spatial
econometrics that correct for correlation between observations made
at locations near each other, similar to statistical techniques that correct
for correlation over time. These tools, which are not in widespread use
in economics, allow for much finer correction of spatial correlation than
dummy variables of the sort used to control for state and census-division
effects. The authors estimate three models of geographic correlation on
county-level teenage employment ratios. The simplest, analogous to a
one-period moving average, allows for correlation between adjacent
counties but not those farther apart. In the intermediate model, analo-
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gous to a first-order serial correlation process, correlations attenuate
more gradually as the number of counties in between grows. The most
general version allows for both kinds of correlation. Specification tests
support the second model. The corresponding minimum wage elasticity
of teenage employment equals −0.3, at the high end of the range of the
old consensus range.
The techniques used in these three pieces efficiently extract information from the data to which they are applied, but the onedimensional nature of the data limit the information that they contain.
The time-series data obscure much regional variation that is quite important and illuminating, as the analyses of Allegretto, Dube, and Reich
(2009, 2011) have shown. Because the cross section that Kalenkoski and
Lacombe (2008) analyze consists of only a single period, going beyond
a very careful study of the correlation between the minimum wage and
employment is not possible. To draw reliable inferences about causal
relationships, it is necessary to distinguish carefully what is due to the
minimum wage and what is due to other, correlated factors, something
that is exceedingly difficult or impossible with these data.
Summary of the effect on youth employment. What do studies
since the last exchange between Neumark and Wascher (2000) and Card
and Krueger (2000) tell us about the response of youth employment to
the minimum wage? Of the seven discussed based on aggregate panels,
only Neumark (2001) finds no detectable effect. Three, Sabia (2009a,b)
and Thompson (2009) find unambiguous negative effects. Two others,
Bazen and Le Gallo (2009) and Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2013),
find an occasional negative effect that each attributes to the timing of
increases in the minimum wage. Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) report
mixed results, negative for teenage boys, but no detectable effect on
either teenage girls or teenagers as a whole.
Of the seven studies that use individual-level data, four build on the
approach that Neumark and Wascher (1992) introduced, which itself
built on the older time-series approach. Three of these four, Allegretto,
Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) and Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen
(2012), pay careful attention to the comparison group, essentially the
counterfactual of what would have happened in the absence of a minimum wage increase. They give different answers: Allegretto, Dube,
and Reich (2009, 2011) report no impact on teenage employment while
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Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen (2012) detect a much stronger one for
teenagers than is typically reported in this literature. The fourth of these
studies, Neumark and Wascher (2011), reports a negative employment
response for teenage girls who are black or Hispanic but not for other
teenagers. The other three studies—Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels
(2011), Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2001), and Flinn (2006)—ground
their analysis in a search model that allows for examination of a variety of effects on the minimum wage, but because none reports reliable
standard errors, it is not at all clear how much faith we should place on
the point estimates of their most interesting results.
We are left with some interesting hints but nothing definite. It is
unlikely that increases in the minimum wage that raise wages always
or even often have negative consequences for youth employment. They
may, however, perhaps because of poor timing, as Bazen and Le Gallo
(2009) and Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2013) suggest, perhaps
for other reasons such as low education, as is implied by Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen’s (2012) definition of their target. Or it may be that
the apparent, occasional negative impact is due to inadequate controls
for other factors, as Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) argue.
Other groups
Table 2.4 lists several studies that consider the effect of minimum
wage legislation on groups other than young workers. Four of these appeared in the sections on young workers, including three that glanced at
the response of youth employment response along the way to examining the effect on other groups, and which are presented in more detail
below: Orrenius and Zavodny (2008), Neumark and Wascher (2011),
and Neumark and Nizalova (2007). The fourth, already discussed in
some detail, is Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2011). Two other studies
are introduced here: Sabia (2008) examines the effect of the minimum
wage on single mothers, including their employment; and Luttmer
(2007) uses the rotation structure of the CPS estimate to examine how
the minimum wage affects the wage and skill structure of the low end
of the labor market, and the consequent effect on the employment of
unskilled and low-skilled individuals.
As poorly educated immigrant populations grow in the United
States, Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) believe that it is increasingly im-

Study
Eckstein,
Ge, and
Petrongolo
(2011)
Luttmer (2007)
Neumark and
Nizalova
(2007)
Neumark and
Wascher
(2011)
Orrenius and
Zavodny
(2008)
Sabia (2008)

Effect
Novelty
Negative Enforcement
of MW in a
search model
Mixed
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Table 2.4 Other Groups (U.S. Data)
Target
group
White male
high school
graduates

Sample
period
1979–
1996

Focus on job
rationing

Unskilled,
1989–
low-skilled
1992
workers
Negative Long-term Adults, 25–29 1979–
consequences
2001

State

Regression

State-cohortyear

Panel

Clustered
(state)

CPS

Regression

Individualmonth

Repeated
cross section

Clustered
(state)

CPS

1995–
2005

Regression

State-year

Panel

Clustered
(state)

CPS

Low-income, 1992–
single mothers 2005

Regression

Individualyear

Repeated
cross section

Clustered
(state)

CPS

Effect on
Female heads 1979–
welfare rolls of families
2000

Regression

Individual

Repeated
Clustered
cross section (state-year)

March
CPS

Quasi
experiment

Individualmonth

Repeated Conventional
cross section

CPS

MW-EITC
interaction

Mixed

Immigrants

Mixed

Focus on
poverty

None

Hoffman and Ke
(2012)b

None

Unit of
Data
Type of
Data
observation
structure standard error
seta
Individual- Longitudinal
GMM
NLSY
month

Regression
(differences)

Mixed

Grogger (2003)b,c

Analytic
approach
Regression

National quasi
experiment,
DIDID

Low-income, 1997–
single mothers 2006
Immigrants

Low-skill
workers

2009

Cross section Huber-White

CPS

Hoffman and
Negative NJ-PA(1996
Trace (2009)b
increase)

Youth and
1996
those w/low
education
Mastracci and
None IN-IL (2004, Low-wage
2003–
Persky (2008) (Emp.) 2005 increases
workers
2005
b
in IL)
Neumark,
Negative Those earning Wage earners 1979–
Schweitzer,
(much) higher
1997
and Wascher
than minimum
(2004)b
wage

Quasi
experiment

InidividualRepeated Conventional
month
cross section

CPS

Quasi
experiment

Individualyear

CPS

Regression

Individual- Longitudinal
month

Repeated Conventional
cross section
Robust

CPS

NLSY = National Longitudinal Survey of Youths. CPS = Current Population Survey.
For repeat cross-section data, clustering within each state and year rather than within each state (over all years) does not resolve serial correlation; much too frequent rejection of the null hypothesis (of no effect) remains a problem (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan [2004]).
c
This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) or Donald and Lang
(2007).
a

b
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portant to understand the effect of various policies on this group. To
this end, they construct a state-year panel from the CPS for the years
1994–2005 to study the minimum wage, focusing on immigrants who
have not completed high school. They report that the overall response
of these immigrants’ wages is nearly as large as that of teenagers’
wages, with elasticities in the range of 0.15 to more than 0.20. Wages
of low-educated immigrant women respond more strongly than those of
teenage girls. However, Orrenius and Zavodny detect no employment
effect on these immigrants, neither overall nor for either men or women
separately. They question whether the absence of an employment effect
may be due to immigrants’ choosing to avoid or leave states with higher
minimum wages in the expectation that employment there is harder to
come by. To explore this, they calculate simple regressions of several
variables on the minimum wage, including the population shares of
both native born and immigrants without a high school diploma, the
average years of education of both these groups, and the fraction of
each group that lacks a high school diploma. They find that states with
higher minimum wages have lower proportions of immigrants in their
populations and suspect that immigrants pay attention not specifically
to the minimum wage but to the location of appropriate jobs, and that
firms with such jobs relocate in response to the minimum wage. This
suggests issues similar to those that Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009,
2011) raise concerning correlation between economic growth rates and
the minimum wage across regions of the country, and the need for appropriate controls to disentangle minimum wage effects successfully.
Using CPS data to construct a state-year panel for 1991–2004, Sabia (2008) studies the effect of the minimum wage on single mothers.
After concluding that it does not affect whether their income is less than
the poverty line, he turns to consideration of other outcomes, including
their employment status. He finds no employment response for either
the entire sample of single mothers or for those who have high school
diplomas but does find a substantial employment effect when he narrows his focus to the 20 percent of the sample that have not completed
high school; the point estimate of the employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage is −0.9 (he reports no standard error). This
is quite large, comparable to the elasticity that Sabia, Burkhauser, and
Hansen (2012) report for youth without a high school diploma. Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) report statistically insignificant estimates of
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the employment elasticity that range between −0.1 and −0.2 for female
immigrants who lacked high school diplomas. An explanation for these
divergent effects on different groups of low-educated women is that
employers do not view single mothers as desirable employees; when
child care arrangements fall apart or a child is sick, a single mother is
likely to miss work on short notice. If the minimum wage draws into
the labor force women who do not have these problems, it is likely that
employers will substitute toward them (even if there are legal issues
related to this). It would be useful to know if this is indeed the explanation, or at least to know who replaces less-educated single mothers
among the employed when the minimum wage rises.
As previously discussed, Neumark and Wascher (2011) use
individual-level data from the CPS to examine whether and how the
minimum wage interacts with the EITC.34 The EITC subsidizes the
earnings of low-income families, primarily those with children. With
regard to the minimum wage and employment, their analysis considers
two issues:
1) Intended effects. If the EITC encourages employment by increasing returns from working, does the minimum wage
amplify this effect or attenuate it by reducing employment
opportunities?
2) Unintended consequences. If the EITC harms others who are
already in the labor market but ineligible for the EITC by increasing competition for jobs, does the minimum wage amplify
this by reducing employment opportunities?
To examine these issues, Neumark and Wascher (2011) run two
similar sets of regressions, one set for intended effects and one for
unintended consequences or side effects; within each set, the estimation sample is what distinguishes the results. The first regression for
examining intended effects uses a sample of all single women aged
21–44; the next two use two overlapping subsamples: single women
with no education beyond high school, and black and Hispanic single
women. The first regression for examining side effects begins with
a sample of childless individuals, 21–34, “who are not eligible for
the much more generous EITC available to families with children”
(Neumark and Wascher 2011, Note 5). The sample is then reduced once
by deleting those who did not go past high school and are neither black

56 Belman and Wolfson

nor Hispanic; the treatment group is childless blacks and Hispanics who
did not go past high school, and the comparison group is childless individuals who completed high school. It is reduced a second time by deleting all black and Hispanics who did not go past high school and were
not single males; the treatment group is now childless, single black and
Hispanic men, aged 21–34, who did not go past high school, while the
comparison group remains childless individuals who completed high
school.
For both sets of equations, the dependent variable is a dummy that
indicates employment status, and the ancillary variables are the stateyear unemployment rate and dummies for a variety of demographic
traits and state and year effects. The focal variables are the two policy
variables that measure the minimum wage and EITC, their interaction,
and interactions of these three variables with a treatment dummy that
indicates the group of interest in the regression. In the regressions that
examine intended effects on different groups of single women, the treatment dummy indicates whether the household includes children. Consequently, in each sample considered (all single women, single women
whose education went no further than completion of high school, or
black or Hispanic single women), the treatment group is single mothers
in the sample and the comparison group is single women in the sample who are not mothers. In the regressions examining the unintended
consequences on ineligible individuals, the treatment dummy indicates whether education proceeded no further than high school. Consequently, the comparison group in each sample considered is the same:
all childless men and women aged 21–34 whose education continued
past high school. In the first sample, the treatment group is all childless
men and women in this age group whose education went no further than
high school (designated low-skilled). In the second, the treatment group
is childless black or Hispanic men and women whose education went
no further than high school, and the final treatment group is childless
black or Hispanic single men whose education went no further than
high school. Neither type of regression includes the treatment dummy
by itself, without interactions with other policy variables.
This absence begs the question, “With regard to the interaction
terms between the policy variables and the treatment dummies, do the
coefficient estimates partly reflect the effect of the dummy alone?” If the
answer is “Yes,” then the estimates do not accurately measure the ef-
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fects of the policies. As specified, each equation is based on an assumption that without the two policies, labor market outcomes of otherwise
identical individuals distinguished only by the dummy variable would
be identical; whether or not they have children, single women would be
expected to have the same employment status but for the EITC and the
minimum wage; similarly, were it not for the EITC and the minimum
wage, otherwise identical ineligible individuals would be expected to
have the same employment status whether or not their education continued past high school graduation. The statement about single women
seems doubtful as soon as it is stated, and the one about ineligible individuals seems so after a moment’s thought, since many who continue in
school past high school are out of the labor market in their early twenties
until they leave school.35
Finally, of interest from the perspective of this survey is the coefficient of the stand-alone minimum wage term in each equation and some
of the sums of this coefficient and that of the interaction term. While
point estimates of the sums are easily calculated, standard errors are not,
in the absence of the relevant covariance terms.36
Turning first to the regressions that examine the intended effects of
the policies, of those on samples of single women, nearly all reported
coefficients on the terms of interest (both policy variables, their interaction, and all three of these interacted with the treatment dummy) are
positive, and the three that are not are dwarfed by their standard errors. The only terms that are statistically significant are the minimum
wage by itself in the regression on those whose education did not go
beyond high school, and those that include the EITC interacted with
the treatment dummy (with and without the minimum wage).37 These
results suggest that, at worst, the minimum wage does not reduce employment of single women, whether or not they have children, and, at
best, it slightly increases employment of single women who have no
more education than high school. Further, the minimum wage and the
EITC appear to work quite powerfully together to draw single mothers
into employment. If the equation included a stand-alone dummy for
children, it is plausible that its coefficient would be negative (single
mothers are less likely to be employed than childless single women), in
which case the positive effect of these two policies on the employment
of single mothers is even larger.
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In the regressions that examine the unintended consequences of
these policies, those on samples of childless individuals aged 21–34,
the overall effect of the minimum wage on employment (to the extent
that we can tell) appears to be positive. In the largest sample, considering all childless individuals in this age group, the only statistically significant estimate of the six coefficients is the one where the minimum
wage stands alone, and it is positive. When the sample is reduced so that
the only people in the sample with no more than a high school education are either childless single blacks and Hispanics or childless single
black and Hispanic men, the story is more complicated. The results
clearly indicate that the EITC reduces the employment of these groups
and the minimum wage amplifies this effect, but without the EITC, the
minimum wage increases their employment. For the two samples restricted to blacks and Hispanics, the statistically significant coefficients
are precisely the interactions that include the treatment dummy. Unlike the previous set of regressions where the absence of the treatment
indicator may well have reduced the size of the estimated effects, here
it is less clear, which makes it harder to feel confident in these results
and what they mean. It does not appear that the minimum wage reduced
employment of low-skilled individuals, certainly not in the absence of
the EITC, but we cannot be certain.
Luttmer’s (2007) central concern is whether minimum wage increases disorganize the labor market so much that some individuals
who are employed have higher reservation wages than some otherwise
identical people who are not employed; he deems this situation allocatively inefficient. Estimation of reservation wages requires some ingenuity, especially with respect to the CPS’s rotation structure in a way
that may be a step too far. As part of this, he classifies employed individuals into skill categories according to their wage decile and considers the effect of the minimum wage on the employment of the unskilled
and low-skilled, those who are in the bottom two deciles (or would be
if employed). Luttmer
find[s] suggestive evidence that the 1990/91 increase in the federal
minimum wage reduced employment among unskilled workers.
However, their employment reduction seems to be largely compensated for by increased employment among the next skill group,
which is likely to be a close substitute. Hence, for a more broadly
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defined group of less skilled workers, [he does] not find evidence
of a large negative employment impact. (p. 31)38

Neumark and Nizalova (2007) raise the possibility of scarring,
long-term effects on individuals’ employment prospects; if the minimum wage reduces employment among teenagers, they will have less
opportunity to develop skills and behaviors that will lead to labor market success in the long run. Neumark and Nizalova (2007) construct an
aggregate panel that is similar to those often used to study the minimum
wage with CPS data, but instead of a single observation for each stateyear combination constructed from the corresponding information for
teenagers aged 16–19, they construct a separate observation for each
state-year-age, where age runs from 16 to 29: 15 observations for each
state and year rather than one. For the equation in which they are most
interested, they use the observations for ages 25–29. The dependent
variable of interest here is the employment ratio. They regress this on
three minimum wage variables and fixed effects for state, year, and each
age (16, 17, 18, and 19 for teens; 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 for young adults;
and 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 for adults in their late twenties). The minimum wage variables are the mean value of the minimum wage in the
current state of residence when individuals of this age were 1) in their
teens, aged 16–19; 2) young adults, aged 20–24; and 3) aged 25–29.
The estimated effect on employment for those in their late twenties of
the mean minimum wage at the time when they were teenagers is negative and statistically significant. The corresponding employment effect
on the same age group of the minimum wage when they were in their
early twenties is negative, statistically significant, and twice as large.39
One serious problem is that the channel through which this is supposed to work is reduced employment at an early age, which leads to
less human capital, which in turn reduces employment at a later age.
As discussed in the earlier brief mention of this article in the section on
youth, none of the estimated employment effects for teenagers or young
adults are statistically significant; the contemporaneous minimum wage
reduces the employment of neither teenagers nor those in their early
twenties. It is not evident how the minimum wage could then have any
effect on human capital formation that would have consequences later
in life, undercutting their explanation for their primary result.
More important is that the data used are poorly suited to this analysis. With Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS
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ORG) data, it is possible to track individuals for no more than a year,
but the analysis is based on relations between variables over periods of
more than a decade. As a result, very strong assumptions are necessary
about what happens during periods in which data are not observed.
In their analysis of the importance of noncompliance with federal
minimum wage laws, Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2011) present estimates from which it is possible to calculate employment elasticities
with respect to the minimum wage (but not their standard errors) for
white male high school graduates. Having already considered those for
men in the first four years of their work history, roughly older teenagers
and younger young adults, we now turn to those for somewhat older
men. For those who graduated between five and nine years ago, the
elasticity is −0.040 and for those 10–18 years out, it is 0.034. These
elasticities are both very small and roughly constant after the first year
in the labor force.
Of the six studies that have examined the effect of the minimum
wage on the employment of groups other than the young, Orrenius and
Zavodny (2008) find no effect on the employment of immigrants who
have not completed high school. The results of Neumark and Wascher
(2011) suggest that the minimum wage by itself has a small positive
effect on the employment of single women, aged 21–44, with no more
than a high school education; of childless individuals, aged 21–34; and
of adults who have gone beyond high school, whether single women
or blacks and Hispanics. Further it amplifies the measured effects of
the EITC on employment, both positive and negative. Luttmer (2007)
can find no net employment effect on the lowest skilled workers (as
defined by position in the wage distribution), although there may be
some compositional effect. Elasticities for male high school graduates
in, roughly, their early twenties through mid-thirties can be calculated
from the numbers that Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2007) report.
They are negative and quite small. Whether they rise above background
noise is something that we cannot tell since no standard errors are available. Neumark and Nizalova (2007) report a long-term scarring effect
on employment prospects from the minimum wage experienced when
a teenager and young adult, but there are several problems with these
results, including both the alleged transmission mechanism and the appropriateness of the data for this analysis. Ultimately, only Sabia (2008)
finds any adverse effect on employment, a very large one for single
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mothers who have not completed high school.40 This is not precisely the
same group that Neumark and Wascher (2011) denote “low-skilled,”
since their group includes high school graduates, but their results do not
seem to be consistent with Sabia’s (2008). Further work is necessary
to determine the source of the differences, whether they are due to the
varying definitions of “low-skilled” or the specification issues raised in
this section and elsewhere by Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011).
Sectoral Studies
Restaurants (and hotels)
Table 2.5 lists 11 analyses of the restaurant industry or restaurant
and hotel industries. Six are regression-based analyses, 5 supplement
that technique with difference-in-differences analyses, and 1 relies primarily on the response of prices to the minimum wage in the United
States to infer the employment response. The 3 that rely on the QCEW,
derived from data collected as part of the unemployment insurance system, use county-quarter panels, and the fourth uses a state-quarter panel.
The 4 based on private surveys have before-and-after observations (or
occasionally only before) on each establishment. The other data sources
provide monthly or annual time series at the state-industry level.
Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) follow the approach pioneered by
Card and Krueger (1994), collecting data and performing a differencein-differences analysis of the effect on restaurants: primarily their wages
and employment. They study the establishment of a citywide minimum
wage in San Francisco that went into effect in early 2004 for firms with
at least 10 employees. They divide restaurants into three size categories:
small (4–8 employees ex ante), midsize (14–35 workers ex ante), and
larger ones. The treatment group is midsize restaurants in San Francisco
with at least one employee whose ex ante wage would have to rise in
response to the new law. Midsize restaurants in nearby communities are
the primary comparison group, and results from this analysis are subject
to the problem that Donald and Lang (2007) identify. However, Dube,
Naidu, and Reich (2007) also report results for two other comparison
groups of restaurants in San Francisco: small restaurants, which were
initially excused from the minimum wage, and similar-sized restaurants
that prior to the law had no employees whose wages would have to be
raised. In addition, they report regression results where the minimum
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Table 2.5 Restaurants and Hotels (U.S. Data)
Sample
period

Analytic
approach
Calibration

Unit of
observation
Labor market

Data
structure
—

Type of
standard
error
Data seta
—
—

Study
Effect
Novelty
Target
Aaronson and
Negative Test output price Restaurant
French (2007)
implications
industry
of monopsony
model
Addison,
None New data source Eating and
1990– Regression County-quarter Panel
Clustered
Blackburn, and
drinking
2005
(state)
Cotti (2012)
establishments
Addison,
Mixed Amplifying effect Eating and
2006– Regression
State-year
Panel
Clustered
Blackburn, and
of recessions?
drinking
2009
(state)
county-qtr.
Cotti (2013)
establishments 2005–
state-month
2010
Dube, Lester, and
None
Addressing
Eating and
1990–
Quasi
County-quarter Panel
Clustered
Reich (2010)
regional
drinking
2006 experiment
(state)
heterogeneity establishments
Dube, Naidu, and
None
Replicate Card San Francisco 2003–
Quasi
Firm-year
LongituRobust
Reich (2007)
and Krueger
restaurants
2004 experiment
dinal
(1994) for SF
and regression
Even and
Negative
Tip credit
Full-service 1990– Regression State-quarter
Panel
Clustered
Macpherson
restaurants
2011
(state)
(2014)
Hirsch, Kaufman,
None
Studying other
Fast food
2007– Regression Establishment- Longitu- Clustered
and Zelenska
dimensions of restaurants in 2009
month
dinal
(establish(2011)
adjustment
GA and AL
ment)

QCEW
ACS
QCEW
CPS
QCEW
Private
survey
QCEW,
CPS
Private
survey

Persky and
Baiman (2010)

Mixed

Singell and
Terborg (2007)

Mixed Loosely modeled
on C&K (1994)

Powers (2009)b
Ropponen (2011)b

Negative
Mixed

IL minimum
IL fast food 2003– Quasi experiwage increases establishments 2005
ment (2x2)
SIC 58, 70

1994–
2001

Regression

OR, WA
IL minimum
IL fast food 2003– Quasi experiwage increases establishments 2005
ment (2x2)

ChangeNJ fast food 1991– Quasi-experiin-changes
establishments 1992
ment (2x2)
analysis of C&K
(1994) and N&W
(2000) data

Firm-year

Longitudinal

Conventional

State-industry Multiple Convenmonth
time series tional

Private
survey
BLSCES

Firm-year

Longitudinal

Conventional

Private
survey

Firm-year

Longitudinal

—

Private
surveys

QCEW = Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. ACS = American Community Survey. CPS = Current Population Survey. BLSCES = Bureau of Labor Statistics-Current Establishment Survey.
b
This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Donald and Lang (2007).
a
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wage variable is the fraction affected (à la Katz and Krueger [1992]),
and the estimation samples are the union of the treatment group and
variously defined comparison groups. The discussion below is limited
to these results, which should be robust to this statistical issue.
Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) detect a wage effect from regression results except in models that exclude fast food restaurants from the
treatment group. In the difference-in-differences analysis that neglects
restaurant closings, three of the four point estimates of the employment
effect are positive and none are statistically significant. When they take
account of establishments that closed between the two surveys, which
occurred at higher rates in both comparison groups, the positive point
estimates of the employment effect become larger, the negative estimate becomes positive, and all remain statistically not significant. Regression estimates also indicate only employment elasticities that are
positive and not statistically significant. Dube, Naidu, and Reich conclude that there is no evidence of a disemployment effect, and that their
confidence intervals are sufficiently tight as to rule out relatively large
effects, both the positive ones of Card and Krueger (1994) and the negative ones of Neumark and Wascher (2000).
Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2012) perform a regression analysis on a national data set of employment and payroll in eating and drinking establishments for each county in the United States that they created
from Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data for
1990–2005. They loosely derive their regression equations from simple
specifications of labor supply and demand and then present results from
a variety of specifications in order to examine their sensitivity to different modeling choices. Only the sparest specification (the one with
the fewest controls) indicates a negative employment response. Once
they begin adding additional controls, in particular allowing for countyspecific trends, they report a statistically significant elasticity of earnings with respect to the minimum wage of about 0.17, but no discernible employment response.
Powers, Persky, and Baiman (2007) collect data from about 200 fast
food outlets in eastern Illinois and western Indiana to analyze the effects
of the minimum wage increases in Illinois that occurred at the beginning
of 2004 and 2005, à la Card and Krueger (1994). Not reaching agreement on the interpretation of the analysis of the data, they published
two separate reports, Powers (2009) and Persky and Baiman (2010). As
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with Card and Krueger, the central analysis in each uses a difference-indifferences framework, but both also present alternative analyses of the
employment effect. Persky and Baiman (2010) present results from a regression based on a wage gap to measure the incidence of the minimum
wage that avoids the problems that Donald and Lang (2007) identify,
and Powers (2009) presents results from a D3 analysis that does not
avoid these problems. The D3 analysis splits the sample period into two
parts, comparing the differences from after and in between the minimum
wage increase with those from in between and before. Each of these
difference-in-differences is subject to distinct, independent shocks of the
type that Donald and Lang (2007) identified; the point estimate of the
D3 value is unbiased and its standard error is inconsistently estimated.
The definition of the wage gap that Persky and Baiman (2010) use is
the percentage increase in an Illinois establishment’s 2003 starting wage
that is necessary to bring it up to the 2005 value of the Illinois minimum wage. As dependent variables, they consider both the change in the
number of positions in each establishment and the size-weighted growth
rate (Note 11, p. 135). In different specifications and samples (the differences are mostly attempts to control for potential data problems), while
most estimated coefficients of the minimum wage are negative, all are
not statistically significant.
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) present a very rich analysis of
QCEW data that uses several distinct but closely related frameworks to
address the most serious criticisms of earlier studies. These frameworks
allow for close comparison of conflicting findings, which they believe
are due to several overlooked statistical problems. All of their results
derive from regressions in which the dependent variable is restaurant
employment for 1990–2006, and the right-hand-side variables include
total employment and population in each county, and the effective minimum wage.41 What distinguishes the analyses from one another is the
sample of counties, dummy variables, and trends. Two important features of their work relate to their concern with unobserved heterogeneity, and the careful way that they sequentially structure their analyses so
that the reader can understand the source of differences in results.
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) do not identify a particular source
of unobserved heterogeneity, instead listing a variety of traits that are
similar across states within the same region but differ between states
that are farther apart. Among these are the cost of living, regulation,
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growth rates, and business cycle behavior and how the local economy
responds. They observe that
as recently as 2004, no state in the South had a state minimum
wage. Yet the South has been growing faster than the rest of the
nation, for reasons entirely unrelated to the absence of state-based
minimum wages. . . . By itself, heterogeneity in overall employment growth may not appear to be a problem, since most estimates
control for overall unemployment trends. Nonetheless, using states
with very different overall employment growth as controls is problematic. The presence of such heterogeneity in overall employment suggests that controls for low-wage employment using extrapolation, as is the case using traditional fixed effects estimates,
may be inadequate. (pp. 6–7)

To address this problem, their regression equations include separate
dummy variables for each quarter by census division rather than a single
national dummy for each quarter. As a result, the effect of the minimum
wage in New York in the first quarter of 2005, when it rose from $5.15
per hour to $6.00 per hour, is calculated in comparison with only New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, where it remained at $5.15 per hour, rather
than all states across the country.
To make the source of their results transparent, Dube, Lester, and
Reich (2010) begin with an analysis designed to resemble Neumark
and Wascher’s (1992, 1994) regression-based studies of teenage employment.42 They then proceed, step-by-step, to an analysis designed
to resemble the difference-in-differences studies of Card and Krueger
(1994, 2000). Along the way, they demonstrate the importance of the
unobserved heterogeneity described above. The key analyses are the
first and last pairs.43
In the first pair of analyses, the sample consists of quarterly observations of all counties in the continental (contiguous) United States
from 1990 through the first half of 2006. The first analysis includes
fixed effects for each county and quarter so that the analysis is similar in
form to studies of teenage employment based on state-year panels. The
point estimate of the employment response to the minimum wage is in
the range of those often reported for teenagers, −0.18, and statistically
significant. The second specification replaces the aggregate time effects
with controls for unobserved regional factors, quarterly effects that differ across each of the nine census divisions. The consequence is a re-
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duction in the employment response by nearly five-sixths, to −0.03, and
it is now, at about half the size of its standard error, statistically insignificant. Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) infer from this pair of analyses
that the results of studies of the minimum wage and teenage employment based on the canonical framework of Neumark and Wascher (e.g.,
1992) are due to neglect of unobserved regional heterogeneity.
In the last pair of analyses, which culminates in a difference-indifferences analysis, Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) reduce their sample to counties that are within metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
that have more than one minimum wage for at least one quarter during
the sample period; by and large, the MSAs straddle a state border, and
these counties are adjacent to each other on opposite sides of the border.
The first analysis of this pair resembles the first analysis of the previous
pair, with a set of aggregate quarterly dummies; it indicates a minimum
wage effect of −0.11, about two-thirds as large as that for the complete
national sample (−0.18) and statistically significant only at the 0.10
level. The second analysis in this pair replaces the aggregate quarterly
dummies with quarterly dummies for each pair of adjacent counties. As
a consequence, the minimum wage effect is estimated from only minimum wage differences within MSAs, exhibiting a familial resemblance
to Card and Krueger (1994, 2000). The estimated employment response
is positive and about half the size of its standard error.
Following an extensive sensitivity analysis in which they vary the
specification and industry examined, Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010)
offer some suggestions about why the results of studies that examine
national data on teenage employment differ from those that use local
data on low-wage sectors. They disagree with the view that it is due to
the short duration of the samples used in the local studies, which arbitrarily cut off the data before the minimum wage has had time to reduce
employment. Rather, the differences
result from insufficient controls for unobserved heterogeneity in
employment growth in the national-level studies using a traditional fixed-effects specification. The differences do not arise from
other possible factors, such as using short before-after windows in
local case studies. . . . The large negative elasticities in the traditional specification are generated primarily by regional and local
differences in employment trends that are unrelated to minimum
wage policies. (p. 962)
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Singell and Terborg (2007) analyze the experiences of Washington
and Oregon, adjacent states with similar economies and largely complementary histories of minimum wage increases for several years beginning in the mid 1990s. The heart of the analysis consists of two multiple
regression analyses, one of monthly employment data for eating and
drinking establishments, and another for hotels and lodging that makes
little use of time-series techniques. They estimate several slightly different equations for monthly employment growth rates in two industries
in each state. Their results are statistically significant and largely consistent within each industry. For restaurants, the elasticity of employment growth with respect to minimum wage growth ranges from −0.07,
when no lag of the minimum wage is in the equation, to −0.20 percent
when it is. For hotels, the figures are 0.15 and 0.19, which Singell and
Terborg explain on the grounds that the minimum wage was not binding
in this industry and that employment was instead responding to other
factors, especially the health of the economy. This, of course, raises
questions about the quality of their control variables, since if the minimum wage is not binding, positive estimates are possible but ought not
be (highly) statistically significant. In addition, residual serial correlation is the norm with time-series data, and if present and not addressed,
undercuts statistical inference. The authors mention serial correlation
and refer somewhat vaguely to a test that indicates it is not a problem.44
The focus of Even and Macpherson’s (2014) study is the tip credit,
which allows employers in full-service restaurants to pay certain employers a much lower minimum wage under the assumption that tips that
these individuals receive make up at least the difference between the
typical minimum wage and this lower one. The two minimum wages
do not move together, with no increase in the federal level of the tipped
minimum since April 1991, but they report that more than 30 states have
higher tipped minimums. Except for the presence of two contemporaneous minimum wage terms, one for the regular minimum wage (hereafter called “the minimum wage”) and one for the tipped minimum, their
log-log regression equation resembles the canonical model that Neumark
and Wascher (1992) developed to study youth employment. Although
uncomfortable with the use of state-specific trends, they estimate equations that include them. However, their more interesting method for controlling for state-specific time-varying confounding factors is to perform
an analysis analogous to the “triple-difference” approach. With data from
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the QCEW, the dependent variable is not the change in employment in
the full-service sector but the difference between the change in employment in the two sectors—the full-service sector minus the limited-service
sector—where they judge the tipped minimum wage to be almost entirely
irrelevant.45 With data from the CPS, which has occupational information, they can distinguish between workers who are likely tipped and others who most likely are not; here, the dependent variable is the difference
between change in employment of the two types of workers.
Even and Macpherson (2014) follow a two-step process, first confirming that the minimum wage affects eating and drinking places, then
studying the effect on employment. They find that the QCEW’s average weekly earnings in the full-service sector respond to both the tipped
minimum wage and the minimum wage, but those in the limited-service
sector respond only to the latter. The tipped minimum wage reduces employment in the full-service sector in three of the four sets of estimates,
the exception being that from the full sample when state-specific trends
are included. The statistically significant elasticities lie in the interval
[−0.102, −0.029]. They conclude that using QCEW data, their models
indicate an elasticity of employment with respect to the tipped minimum
wage of less than 0.1 in the full-service sector. When they apply their
analysis to CPS data, they detect no effect of either the minimum wage or
of the tipped minimum wage to either group of workers.46
A limitation of these four regression-based studies is that, despite
the length of their data sets—64 quarters in Addison, Blackburn, and
Cotti (2012), 66 quarters for Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), 88 quarters for Even and Macpherson (2014), and 96 months for Singell and
Terborg (2007), long enough to model the dynamics of employment using techniques common in time-series analysis—they neglect the timeseries nature of their data. The econometric model underlying their
equations includes the explicit assumption that, but for the minimum
wage (and random noise), the labor market is at equilibrium in every
period. The location of that equilibrium responds to supply and demand
factors, but wherever it is, the market always finds itself there (with the
same proviso concerning the minimum wage). The substantial inertial
component of employment means that this assumption is unlikely to
be satisfied, but this need not interfere with estimation of the response
of employment to the minimum wage if it is appropriately modeled.
Including lagged employment terms among the regressors or, if neces-
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sary, removing unit roots should address the problem adequately. The
reporting of standard errors and t-statistics based on clustering at the
state level goes some way toward mitigating skepticism about statistical inference in three of these studies. This solution would not be appropriate for the two-state data set of Singell and Terborg (2007), but
they present no other solution and appear to be unaware of any possible
problems.
We have already encountered Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2013)
in the section on youth, where they study whether recessions amplify
the effect of the minimum wage on teenagers’ employment. They perform a similar analysis for the restaurant industry using county-level
data from the QCEW, as well as state-level data from the CPS and the
ACS, which they examine in their consideration of teenagers. In the
basic model, which lacks the key variable, the interaction between the
minimum wage and the unemployment rate, they do not detect any employment result either for the sector as a whole nor for its constituents,
full-service restaurants, and limited-service restaurants.47 When they
include the interaction term, the QCEW data provide clear evidence of
a small effect in the sector as a whole. Once they look at the two subsectors separately, it is clear that the effect is only in the limited-service
sector. Although there appears to be a basic effect (one not dependent
on recessions to amplify it) for the full-service sector in this specification, a joint test that the minimum wage terms as a group do not belong
in this equation is resoundingly not rejected. The CPS data tell a clearer
story, providing no support for the hypothesis that recessions amplify
the employment effect of the minimum wage. Addison, Blackburn, and
Cotti conclude that even for the restaurant sector, recessions do not appear to amplify any negative employment effects of the minimum wage.
Aaronson and French (2007) take an ingenious approach, constructing a model of the restaurant industry that includes both a labor
market and an output market. They use this to determine whether the
restaurant labor market is better described by the competitive or monopsonistic model. Drawing on a variety of estimates for values of the
model’s parameters, especially on the response of restaurant prices
to minimum wage increases (Aaronson 2001; Aaronson, French, and
MacDonald 2008), this analysis works back from the product market
to the labor market in order to infer the implied response of employment to the minimum wage. Two key assumptions are that the price
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and quantity of output vary inversely with each other, and the quantities
of employment and output vary positively with each other. The logical
consequence of these assumptions is that a rise in employment following a minimum wage increase leads to a rise in output and a decline in
prices. Because prices in fact rise, both output and employment must
fall. In each market, they examine the implications of different degrees
of deviation from perfect competition. After calculations based on a
range of parameter values, they conclude that the elasticity for total
employment in the industry is about −0.2, and about −0.3 for the employment of low-skilled labor.
Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska (2011) begin with a statistical analysis of the employment response to the three increases in the federal
minimum wage of 2007–2009 using electronic payroll data for 81 fast
food establishments in Alabama and Georgia, all in the same national
chain and owned by three franchising corporations. Although their use
of a wage gap variable rather than a treatment dummy allows them to
avoid the problems that Donald and Lang (2007) had, the nonrandom
nature of their sample, similar in some regard to that of Neumark and
Wascher (2000), leads to other problems of inference. However, this
analysis is merely the stepping off point for a careful consideration of
how establishments in this industry respond to the minimum wage,
based on an extensive survey of managers and employees. The authors’
implicit position is that “the minimum wage increases raised operating
costs, yet employment has not decreased to match. The restaurants must
have adjusted in other ways. What are they?” The answer, according to
Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska, is higher prices, lower profit margins,
reduced turnover, higher performance standards, and, in the short to
medium term, wage compression. This study trades off generality and
rigor for detail and the possibility of generating useful hypotheses for
further work, something rarely seen in this literature.
Beyond the hospitality sector: other low-wage sectors
Table 2.6 shows nine analyses that examine the employment response in various parts of the retail sector. Addison, Blackburn, and
Cotti (2009) study several low-wage parts of the sector in an analysis
that parallels their study of the restaurant industry (Addison, Blackburn,
and Cotti 2012). Sabia (2009a) studies the whole retail sector using a
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state-quarter panel. Orazem and Mattila (2002) report on a two-part
analysis of the retail and nonprofessional service sectors in Iowa from
1989 to 1992, the beginning of a period when the Iowa minimum wage
exceeded the federal minimum wage. Giuliano (2013) analyzes very
detailed data from a single company with more than 700 stores throughout the United States. Finally, the pieces by Belman and Wolfson (2010)
and Wolfson and Belman (2001, 2004) use current time-series techniques to study employment in a collection of low-wage industries.
Using quarterly, county-level data from the QCEW, Addison,
Blackburn, and Cotti (2009) study the effect of the minimum wage on
both earnings and employment in each of five low-wage retail sectors:
1) food and beverage stores, 2) supermarkets and other grocery stores,
3) convenience stores, 4) specialty food stores, and 5) beer, wine, and
liquor stores. They consider a variety of specifications in order to examine the sensitivity of their results to their modeling choices. The most
basic specification suggests that earnings respond to the minimum wage
in only one industry (beer, wine, and liquor stores), and even here there
is no indication of an employment response. Once they include countyspecific trends, they also detect earnings responses in convenience
stores and in specialty food stores, and find positive employment responses in convenience stores and in beer, wine, and liquor stores; that
is, in two of the three industries in which they detect a positive wage
response, they also detect a positive employment response. A Hausman specification test strongly favors the model with county-specific
trends in two of these industries (not beer, wine, and liquor stores), and
its estimates are more precise than those of the basic model, without
the trends. A conservative interpretation is that these results indicate
positive wage responses in all three of the industries mentioned, a positive employment response in convenience stores, and no employment
response in any of the remaining industries.48
Sabia (2009a) constructs a state-month panel from CPS data to
study the effect of the minimum wage on employment in the retail sector. As part of a robustness check, he presents a variety of estimates
based on differences in the sample, estimation technique, way of measuring the minimum wage, and model specification. The last involves
whether to include a lagged minimum wage term, a correction for serial
correlation, and/or state-specific trends (à la Dube, Lester, and Reich
[2010]). The elasticities range from a statistically insignificant 0.07 at

Table 2.6 Other Low-Wage Sectors (U.S. Data)
Study
Effect
Addison, Blackburn,
None
and Cotti (2009)
Belman and Wolfson
None
(2010)
Giuliano (2013)
Positive
Orazem and Mattila
(2002)

Negative

Target
sector
Low-wage
retail food
Low-wage

Sample
period
1990–2005

Analytic
approach
Regression

Unit of
observation
County-quarter

1972–2003

Regression

Industry-month

Retail

1996–1998

Regression

1989–1992

Regression

1979–2004
1961–1997

Regression
Regression

Retail,
service not
professional
Sabia (2009a)
Negative Retail workers
Wolfson and Belman
None
Low-wage
(2001)
industries
Wolfson and Belman
None
Low-wage
(2004)
Potter (2006)b
None
All, some
low-wage
Dodson (2002)b
Negative
All jobs

Data
structure
Panel

Multiple
time series
Establishment- Longitudimonth
nal
County-industryPanel
quarter

Type of
standard error
Clustered (state)

Data
seta
QCEW

Conventional

BLS-CES

Huber-White
Robust
Conventional

Private +
Census
Various

State-month
Industry-month

Panel
Clustered (state)
CPS
multiple
Conventional BLS-CES
time series
1947–1997 Regression Industry-month multiple
Conventional BLS-CES
time series
2003–2005 Quasi experiFirm-year
Longitudi- Conventional
ES-202
ment (2x2)
nal
1988–1995 Regression
County-year
Panel
Robust
REIS,
Census

NOTE: The column for Novelty does not appear because in this table it would largely echo the information in Target sector.
QCEW = Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. BLS-CES = Bureau of Labor Statistics-Current Establishment Survey. REIS =
Regional Economic Information System.
b
This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) or Donald and Lang
(2007).
a
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one end, when state-specific trends are included, to a statistically significant −0.11 at the other. Most are right around −0.10, the low end of
the previous consensus (for teenagers, not retail). He gently dismisses
the positive point estimate on the grounds that “state trends may, in
fact, be capturing retail employment variation that the model seeks to
explain” (Sabia 2009a, p. 88). The question, then, is how to account
for the type of regional factors that Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) and
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2010) show to be of great importance.
Either trends or annual effects specific to each census division would
go far to addressing this issue without raising his concerns (and an Ftest would indicate whether they belong in the regression). The neglect
of time-series issues, already discussed with reference to studies of the
restaurant and hotel industries, is also problematic in both Addison,
Blackburn, and Cotti (2009) and this study.
Iowa established its own minimum wage above the federal minimum wage at the beginning of 1990, and it remained higher until late
1996. Orazem and Mattila (2002) present two analyses for 1989–1992,
one based on quarterly data for Iowa counties, the other on data for
about 170,000 employees that they generated from their own survey of
retail firms. Both analyses consider retail and nonprofessional services.
For the county-level analysis, they detect no employment response after either one quarter or one year. In the second part of their analysis,
Orazem and Mattila estimate a wage equation as a function of characteristics of the employee, employer, and county of employment, which
they then use to examine whether, in quarters immediately following
increases, the minimum wage is higher than an employee’s wage would
otherwise have been. With this information, they examine the consequent compositional change in firms’ workforces, and consider, cui
bono, who benefits and who suffers from the minimum wage. For those
who would otherwise have earned less than the minimum wage, they
report elasticities of their share in firms’ labor forces of between −0.03
and −0.10. That is, if 50 percent of a firm’s labor force after a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage consists of workers whose wages
would otherwise have been less than the new minimum, then without
the increase, such workers would have instead made up between 50.15
percent and 50.5 percent of the labor force.
In what is essentially a statistically oriented case study, Giuliano
(2013) examines a single retail company that provided 30 months of
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sales and personnel records (February 1996–July 1998) and descriptive information for each of its more than 700 stores located throughout the United States. The data are sufficiently rich that she is able
to verify compliance with the law both before and after the increases
that she studies—those of the federal minimum wage in 1996 and
1997. Combining these data with information from the 1990 census,
she identifies whether each employee lived in a high- or low-income
zip code and then examines some of the same compositional consequences of the minimum wage as Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels
(2011).
Using the wage gap to measure the sensitivity of each establishment
to the minimum wage, Giuliano (2013) compares the first and last six
months of her sample, two periods that bracket the minimum wage increases. The effect of the increases on wages is very clear. Although the
mean effect on overall employment is negative, the variance is high—
enough so that one would be (or should be) unwilling to accept a bet at
odds of 95 to 5 that for a store selected at random from this sample, the
employment response is negative (but one should accept the same bet
that the effect is positive for the share of teenagers in that store’s labor
force).49 The flip side of these employment results is a decline in adult
employment.50 An in-depth examination shows that the employment
share of teenagers from zip codes of all income levels rises, but only
the increase of those who live in affluent zip codes is worth betting on.
To make sense of her results, Giuliano (2013) begins by distinguishing between models of dynamic monopsony (Burdett and Mortensen
1998) and monopsonistic competition (Bhaskar and To 1999) on the
one hand, and models of search (Flinn 2006) and of adverse selection
(Akerlof 1970; Drazen 1986) on the other. Models of either type can
rationalize the rise in teenage employment. That the share of teenagers
in new hires rose following the minimum wage increase suggests the
greater appropriateness, she believes, of the second sort of model, with
its emphasis on induced changes to labor supply. The second group of
models gains further support from another result: teenagers from affluent zip codes, who likely had higher opportunity cost of employment,
increased their share of both teenager hiring and employment. This suggests an increase in their labor force participation at the same time that
other teens experienced no decline in their share of either overall hiring
or employment.
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Wolfson and Belman’s three articles (2001, 2004; Belman and
Wolfson 2010) all study a variety of low-wage industries in the United
States, applying techniques of time-series analysis to national monthly
employment data. In each case, out of concern that the set of industries
is too broad and may include some that are not sensitive to the minimum wage, the first step is to identify industries that exhibit a wage response to the minimum wage.
Using monthly data from the BLS Current Employment Statistics,
Wolfson and Belman (2001) take Milton Friedman’s methodology of
positive economics to heart by examining whether including information about minimum wage increases in forecasting equations reduces
the forecast error. Looking separately at each increase in the federal
minimum wage between 1961 and 1996, and at data for as many as 33
industries, they find that even in situations where the minimum wage
improves wage forecasts, it leads to an improvement in the employment
forecast only half as often as not. They conclude that any link between
low-wage employment and the minimum wage as historically experienced is tenuous.
Wolfson and Belman (2004) and Belman and Wolfson (2010) are
more conventional statistical analyses of the same data that pay careful
attention to the time-series properties of the data. Examining the impact
of the federal minimum wage on 23 low-wage industries between the
mid-1970s and early 2003, they detect a wage response in 17 of the industries, but an employment response to increases in only 6, 1 of which
is positive: and an employment response to declines in the real value
of the minimum wage in only 7, 2 of which are negative. A simulation
of a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage shows that the wage response is complete by 24 months, and that no trace of any employment
is detectable in the four years following the increase.
Direct estimates of the restaurant sector with reliable standard errors do not indicate that minimum wage increases lead to a decline in
employment that is different from zero, certainly not substantively different and typically not significantly different statistically. Indirect estimates that work back from the behavior of restaurant prices imply a
demand elasticity for low-skilled labor of −0.3 (Aaronson and French
2007). While the former should be more reliable, a question remains
until these differences can be explained. Studies of other sectors give
results that are all over the map. Paying careful attention to the time-
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series dynamics that confound many studies of this topic, Belman and
Wolfson (2010) and Wolfson and Belman (2001, 2004) analyze several low-wage industries and find no systematic employment response.
Unfortunately, the nature of their data permits them to study only the
federal minimum wage, not any of the state minimum wages that are
important in the later part of the period that they study. Studies of a
single state, like Orazem and Mattila’s (2002), are even more vulnerable to the common criticism of Card and Krueger’s (1994) study that it
was excessively narrow in space and time, focusing on a single episode.
Sabia (2009a) also reports a negative employment response but does
not address issues of either regional heterogeneity or time-series dynamics. Giuliano’s (2013) analysis is ingenious, and the results are both
very interesting and strongly suggestive, but in the end it remains a case
study and it is not obvious that these results hold generally. Finally, in
their examination of low-wage retail sectors, Addison, Blackburn, and
Cotti (2009) do not find a negative employment response, but this may
reflect inadequate treatment of dynamics.

OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
More than a few studies of the minimum wage and employment that
use data from developed countries other than the United States have appeared in English during this period. Two differences from studies of
American data most stand out. One is the much heavier reliance on
individual-level data, especially longitudinal data (rather than repeated
cross sections). The other is the frequency with which the focus is on
bound workers, that is, workers who were employed and earning less
ex ante than the ex post minimum wage, rather than all members of a
demographic group or the number of jobs in an industry.
Yuen (2003) and Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) use
longitudinal Canadian data to explore the sensitivity of results in quasi
experiments to the definitions of both the comparison group and the
policy variable.51 Although both report standard errors that are almost certainly biased downward (Moulton 1990), the methodological
points that they examine are important. Stewart (2002, 2004a) analyzes
the employment response of bound workers to the imposition of the
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National Minimum Wage (NMW) in the United Kingdom, after several years with no minimum wage, and Stewart (2004b) repeats part
of the latter study for the first two subsequent increases in the NMW.
Mulheirn (2008) continues this with a look at the effect of the 2006
increase. Dolton, Rosazza-Bondibene, and Wadsworth (2012) study the
entire period of the NMW, 1999–2007, using an approach similar to
Stewart’s (2002). Pereira (2003) and Portugal and Cardoso (2006) examine very detailed data that the Portuguese tax agency collects on every firm in the country to assess the response of employment to the large
minimum wage increases in the late 1980s. Pinoli (2010) uses Spanish
data to study an implication of the rational expectations hypothesis, that
the timing of the employment response may depend on whether a minimum wage increase is anticipated or not. Using quarterly time-series
data from several Australian states, Lee and Suardi (2011) test employment equations for parameter instability if minimum wage increases
are not explicitly modeled, something that would be expected if the
minimum wage were relevant for employment. Hyslop and Stillman’s
(2007) analysis of New Zealand’s minimum wage increases early in
the new millennium is the closest approach to the canonical framework
of Neumark and Wascher among this group. Pacheco’s (2011) study
of New Zealand over a longer period adds an ingenuous twist in an
attempt to focus more carefully on those whom the minimum wage
directly affects.52
Kramarz and Philippon (2001) consider a variety of costs that
French employers incur, including the minimum wage, in their study
of the employment of low-wage workers. Laroque and Salanie (2002)
consider a variety of social welfare policies in France, including the
minimum wage, in their study of employment of married women. For
Machin and Wilson (2004) and Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003),
the UK care home industry (similar to the U.S. nursing home industry)
plays much the same role as the restaurant industry does in analyses of
U.S. minimum wage policy, a very low-wage industry where employment should respond to the minimum wage if employment does in any
industry. Galindo-Rueda and Pereira (2004) is an ambitious examination of the NMW throughout the entire United Kingdom economy that
ultimately founders on the inadequacy of the data to the task.53
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Young Workers
Table 2.7 lists 15 analyses of data from countries other than the
United States to examine the response of youth employment to the minimum wage.54 Although both Yuen (2003) and Campolieti, Fang, and
Gunderson (2005a) fall prey to problems with standard errors discussed
earlier in the chapter (and for this reason appear in the lower part of the
table), they both raise and address other issues of interest, and the latter
piece makes itself part of a careful and thoughtful discussion between
the two. It is therefore worthwhile to start here.
Canada
Using 12 quarters of data on each of 9,000 Canadian youth aged
16–24 at the beginning of the sample, Yuen (2003) shows that the definition of the comparison group can greatly influence the perception
of the employment response to the minimum wage. After defining his
treatment group as those who were employed in a province in the quarter before a provincial minimum wage increase and were earning less
than the ex post minimum wage, he considers two different comparison
groups. One of the groups, which he describes as similar to those used
in much prior work, includes all those who are not in the treatment
group but are employed at the same time as members of the treatment
group. This comparison group consists of two sets of employed individuals: 1) those in a province-quarter cell that does not include members
of the treatment group (because the province quarter did not experience
a minimum wage increase), and 2) those in province-quarter cells that
did experience a minimum wage increase but whose wage is too high
for them to be in the treatment group. The other comparison group is
smaller and includes only low-wage workers who are contemporaneously employed in other provinces, where low-wage means a wage no
more than Can$0.25 above the minimum wage in their own province.55
Using an at-risk dummy to identify members of the treatment group,
he reports an estimated effect that is negative and statistically significant with the larger comparison group, similar to that in prior work, but
negative and not statistically significant with the smaller comparison
group of similarly paid workers. En route to the smaller comparison
group, he presents another result using the larger, conventional com-
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Spain, and 16–29 in New Zealand. In Neumark and Wascher’s (2004) cross-country analysis, the definitions vary from country to country, “but generally
cover some subset of workers between the ages of 15 and 24” (Neumark and Wascher 2004, Note 1, p. 225).
b
HLFS = (New Zealand) Household Labor Force Survey (quarterly CPS counterpart). LFS = Labor Force Survey. IS = (New Zealand) Income Survey. QP
= (Portugal) Quadros de Pessoal (Personnel Records, Portuguese Ministry of Qualification and Employment). NES = (United Kingdom) New Earnings
Survey. BHPS = British Household Panel Survey. EPAS = (Spain) Economically Active Population Survey (quarterly household survey). LMAS = (Canadian) Labour Market Activity Survey. SLID = (Canadian) Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics. Finland’s payroll records come from the Finnish
employers’ association.
c
This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) or Donald and Lang (2007) or have other
data problems.
a

81

82 Belman and Wolfson

parison group to motivate the switch to the smaller one. For the at-risk
dummy he substitutes a low-wage dummy that identifies not only those
in the treatment group but also those in both of the comparison groups
described above. For both teens and young adults, the estimate for the
coefficient on the low-wage dummy is negative (though smaller than
that of the at-risk dummy in the initial regression) and statistically significant; low-wage workers have a lower probability of continued employment whether or not they are subject to a minimum wage increase.
This is likely part of what the at-risk dummy measures when the sample
contains the larger comparison group.56
Analyzing seven years of annual data from the successor to the survey that Yuen (2003) uses, Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a)
begin by replicating Yuen’s results. They next introduce nine intermediate comparison groups defined by steps in the wage ceiling that start
from the ceiling of Yuen’s original narrow comparison group and culminate in his original broad comparison group. Starting from the narrow one with the lowest wage ceiling, as the ceiling rises, so too do both
the point estimate and t-statistic of the employment effect. Both soon
stabilize within a narrow range about half way through the set of comparison groups. The t-statistic (apparently) indicates statistical significance of the point estimate. While of interest, this supports rather than
contradicts Yuen’s emphasis on the definition of the comparison group.
To capture the intuition that the likelihood of being laid off rises
with the difference between the ex post minimum wage and the ex ante
wage, Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson’s (2005a) next step is to replace the at-risk dummy with a more sensitive measure: the wage gap.
For individuals in the comparison group, this is zero; for individuals in
the treatment group, it is the difference between the ex post minimum
wage and the individual’s ex ante wage. With even with the narrowest
definition of the comparison group, the specification with the wage gap
indicates that minimum wage increases reduce the probability of continued employment, and the size of the employment response is in the
middle of the range at which it stabilizes when using the at-risk dummy.
The point estimates remain statistically significant for all broader definitions of the comparison group. For the broader half of groups, the
response is about 15 percent larger than for the narrowest one.
Finally, allowing that the wage gap variable may be picking up
some purely low-wage effects, they introduce the wage gap variant
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model. Their approach is problematic; understanding why requires a
detailed explanation. Their narrowest comparison group is composed
of individuals who satisfy two conditions. First, they were employed in
a year after which there was no minimum wage increase in their own
province but there was in at least one other province. Second, they were
earning at least the minimum wage in their own province and less than
that minimum wage plus Can$0.25. The next larger comparison group
has a $0.50 ceiling instead of a $0.25 ceiling, and so on up to a ceiling
of $1, then increments of $0.50 rather than $0.25, up to $4 more than
the minimum wage. For the wage-gap variant model, they introduce
a new variable (let us call it the low-wage worker variable) to capture
the effect of all purely low-wage effects on the probability of continued
employment. For those in the treatment group, the low-wage worker
variable equals the wage gap. For those who are in the same province
or provinces as members of the treatment group, but whose wage puts
them in the comparison group, it is zero. Finally, for members of the
comparison group who are not in the same provinces as members of the
treatment group, it is a quasi-wage gap using the ceiling that defines the
comparison group rather than the minimum wage; it equals the difference between that ceiling and the individual’s ex ante wage.
This definition of the low-wage worker variable is sensitive not
only to the wage ceiling that defines the comparison group but also to
which group (i.e., province) a worker is in. It would work well if all
minimum wage increases were roughly the same size. Most of the yearover-year increases that Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) consider are no more than $0.25. However, several are larger, with the largest being $1.00. Based on this, Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson argue
that a ceiling of $0.25 is too restrictive and prefer one of $0.50, $0.75,
or $1.00. Consider the situation where the treatment group is defined
by a $0.25 increase in the minimum wage, and the comparison group is
defined by a $0.75 wage ceiling. The low-wage worker variable treats
the following two individuals equivalently: a member of the treatment
group who had been earning the ex ante minimum wage plus $0.20,
$0.05 less than the ex post minimum, and a member of the comparison
group in another province who had been earning $0.70 more than that
province’s minimum wage, $0.05 less than the wage ceiling used to define the comparison group. If distinct traits common to low-wage workers do exist, the low-wage worker variable is likely to conflate two (or
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more) types of worker when the comparison group has a ceiling higher
than the ex ante minimum wage of the treatment group.
The results presented suggest that this is indeed happening. When
the wage-gap variant model is estimated with the narrow comparison
group, the estimated minimum wage effect is small and not statistically
significant. As ever broader definitions of the comparison group (and
of the low-wage worker variable) are used, the estimated size of the
effect grows almost monotonically until it peaks at the second-most
broad comparison group (each is statistically significant except when
the narrowest definition is used). Furthermore, except when using the
narrowest comparison group, the estimated employment effect of the
minimum wage from this model is almost as large or larger than the
estimate from the simple wage-gap model, typically exceeding it by
20–30 percent. This is the opposite of what would be expected if, absent the low-wage worker variable, the wage gap alone were reflecting low-wage worker traits. It suggests that the low-wage worker variable is assigning to members of the treatment group traits that belong
to higher-paid workers, and that the estimated effect of the minimum
wage increase is having to grow to offset this.
Neither of these analyses corrects for the source of bias in the
standard errors that Moulton (1990) identified, undercutting both their
methodological and substantive results. It is nevertheless worth listing the former, keeping in mind what might have been. Yuen (2003)
demonstrates the sensitivity of results to the choice of the comparison
group. Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) show with their wagegap model that the use of a more sensitive measure of the treatment
can offset these problems. Finally, Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson’s
(2005a) attempt to control for low-wage characteristics is ingenious but
is not successful and causes more problems than it solves. Alternative
approaches that might well better address the situation include using a
variable that identifies the provincial wage quantile in which an individual is located, or performing a difference-in-differences-in-differences
analysis to control for unsatisfactory fit between treatment and comparison groups, à la Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen (2012). It would
be worth revisiting these issues while simultaneously addressing the
Moulton problem and, depending on the data used, any other statistical
issues, for example, serial correlation.
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The United Kingdom
Starting early in the twentieth century, the United Kingdom had
a system of administratively set minimum wages that differed by industry.57 The Conservative government weakened the system in 1986,
effectively making minimum wage law one of the issues separating the
Labour and Conservative parties in the 1992 election. The Conservatives won and abolished the minimum wage altogether in 1993. This
situation was replayed in 1997, when Labour won and established a
NMW of £3.60 per hour starting in April 1999. The level has increased
several times since then.
As part of his study of the NMW, Stewart (2002, 2004a) looks
specifically at the employment effect on bound workers, aged 18–21.
Although the NMW imposed a uniform minimum wage in the United
Kingdom, local wage distributions varied considerably across the country just prior to it, especially in the location of the bottom of the distribution relative to the NMW. Across the 140 administrative regions of
the United Kingdom, the percentage of bound workers varied between
1 and 12 percent. After confirming that establishment of the NMW
raised wages of young bound workers, Stewart (2002) presents a variety of results on employment effects, using regional variation in percent
of bound workers to measure vulnerability to the NMW.58 Looking at a
variety of data sources and specifications (e.g., employment ratio, probability of continued employment), he reports both positive and negative
employment effects for bound youth, none statistically significant. In
the later article, Stewart (2004a) examines the same episode with data
from three different surveys, each with its own relative strengths and
weaknesses. The New Earnings Survey (NES) collects data from the
electronic payroll records of 1 percent of all employees every April,
leading to great confidence in its accuracy. Although quite large, the
breadth of information it collects leaves something to be desired, as
does its coverage of very low-paid workers, many of whom are women
working part time. The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a
considerably smaller survey that collects more detailed information on
individuals over many years. Finally, the Labour Force Survey, which
follows individuals for five consecutive quarters, is smaller than the
NES but has better coverage of low-paid workers and is larger than the
BHPS but has less detail.
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Stewart (2004a) focuses on the probability of continued employment of young men and women who previously had been earning less
than the £3 hourly wage set as the youth minimum wage (the adult
minimum wage was set to £3.60 per hour). In addition to the different
surveys, he also tries different approaches, including both differencein-differences using a comparison group of slightly higher paid workers, and regression analysis where the minimum wage measure is the
wage gap. He reports effects for young men that are positive but nearly
all are not statistically significant, and for young women that are generally positive and never statistically significant.
Stewart (2004b) extends the analysis of Stewart (2004a) using the
Labour Force Survey to examine the effects of the increase in 2000.
The study is fairly elaborate, using pseudo-treatment and pseudocomparison groups to correct for the comparison group’s being a less
than ideal match for the treatment group; this requires finding two additional groups that respond similarly to the NMW but whose differences otherwise parallel those of the original treatment and comparison groups. That is, the pseudo groups are otherwise equally less than
ideal matches as the original groups. Then the difference between the
pseudo-treatment and pseudo-comparison group can be subtracted from
the difference between the actual treatment and comparison group, thus
correcting for the original mismatch. Because the pseudo-groups respond similarly to the minimum wage (presumably, not at all), this entire operation will not mask the estimated minimum wage effect based
on the original groups. The results resemble those of the two other studies (Stewart 2002, 2004a): mostly positive point estimates for young
workers and for adult men, slightly more negative than positive ones for
adult women, and none at all that are statistically significant.
Portugal and Spain
Pereira (2003) and Portugal and Cardoso (2006) study the increase
in the teenage minimum wage due to repeal of the subminimum wage
for teenagers in Portugal at the beginning of 1987. This led to an overnight increase of 50 percent in the effective minimum wage for teenagers, and a year-over-year real increase of more than one-third. The
dependent variable in both studies is the teenage share of firms’ labor
forces. Both analyses rely on detailed employment data that the govern-
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ment requires firms to report each March. Because the change in policy
was first broached in August 1986, data from March 1986 should be
free of any taint if used as the ex ante period for a quasi experiment.
Pereira (2003) asks, “On average, did Portuguese firms change the
age structure of their workforce in response to the increase in the relative cost of young workers?” She answers the question using a sample
of 30 percent of the firms in the data set. Her treatment group is 18and 19-year-olds, and her primary comparison group is young adults,
20–24-year-olds. Recognizing that older workers are not the best comparison group for teenagers, she performs a difference-in-differencein-differences analysis, using much older workers, 30–34 years old, as
controls on the controls. Pereira finds that the answer to her question
is affirmative: employment shares of both teenagers and young adults
grew, but growth in the share of young adult employment was much
larger, and statistically significant, while employment growth of teenagers was not statistically significant.
Portugal and Cardoso (2006) begin with the same data set but construct their sample differently because
The overall employment trends reported for teenagers in the affected age group—both by the Ministry of Labor, covering the
population of firms employing wage earners in the private sector,
and by the National Statistical Office, in its Labor Force Survey—
are at odds with the ones offered in the study by Pereira. . . . Her
data set is a nonrandom sample from the Ministry of Labor data;
this sample is not representative of the population of firms (that
we use) and, in particular, is severely biased with respect to the
actual trend in employment for the affected group of workers. (pp.
994–995)

They also ask different questions, examining differences in gross
employment flows of teenagers and adults less than 35, rather than in
the net change of each group’s employment.
To understand gross flows into and out of employment, it is necessary to consider each of the following three categories separately:
1) Entry: new firms that only came into being in the period after
the minimum wage rose.
2) Exit: previously existing firms that disappeared in the period
after the minimum wage rose.

88 Belman and Wolfson

3) Survival: previously existing firms that continued following the
increase.
Entering firms contribute only to gains in employment and exiting
ones only to losses, while surviving firms contribute to both gains and
losses. Portugal and Cardoso (2006) note three responses to the rise in
the minimum wage for teenagers that separately and together contributed to a decrease in the employment share of teenagers. First, new
firms, those that came into existence following the increase, had lower
shares of teen employees than did new firms before the increase. Second, firms that went out of existence following the increase had larger
shares of teen employees than did exiting firms before the increase.
Third, at continuing (or surviving) firms, the teen share of hiring declined. However, outweighing all these effects put together was a sharp
decline in the teen share of separations at continuing firms. As a result,
teen employment rose both absolutely and relative to adults. That is,
when the minimum wage increased, those teenagers who were already
employed hung onto their jobs so tenaciously (or perhaps the firms
hung onto these employees so tenaciously, or both) as to outweigh the
other consequences of the minimum wage increases. Among the several
reasons that Portugal and Cardoso offer for the sharp decline in separations of teens is the possibility that having hired and trained them, firms
were reluctant to lay them off because they were at least as productive
as older workers who would have to be hired, trained, and paid as much.
They also offer several caveats that limit how much these results can
reasonably be generalized.
Pinoli’s (2010) central insight is that those studying the minimum
wage may be missing its impact because they are looking in the wrong
place or, rather, at the wrong time. Many minimum wage changes are
anticipated well in advance, and cost-minimizing firms may well begin
preparing for them in advance, likely by not replacing employees following separations. Most studies look for the consequences only after
the increase in the minimum wage, by which time much of the response
will have already occurred. She uses the search model of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) to place this idea on a firm theoretical footing
and then turns to the data to distinguish anticipated from unanticipated
increases in the minimum wage. Anticipated increases are either announced well in advance or occur on a regular schedule, while unan-
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ticipated ones satisfy neither of these conditions. The minimum wage
increase in New Jersey that Card and Krueger (1994) studied, which
was widely expected about two years before it went into effect, was an
anticipated increase. So too were the Spanish minimum wage increases
that went into effect on the first day of each year between 1997 and
2004. The Spanish minimum wage increase of mid-2004 was an unanticipated increase; it was passed and implemented by a government that
unexpectedly won an election in March 2004, three days after a major
terrorist action in Madrid.
Using individual-level (quarterly) data, Pinoli’s (2010) dependent
variable is employment status. Her central variables are the percentage
increase in the minimum wage interacted with dummy variables that
identify whether the increase is anticipated or unanticipated; the equation also includes both leads and lags of these variables and control
variables. She sets up the analysis as a quasi experiment, using various
demographic groups aged 16–24 in the role of the treatment group, and
various parts of the adult population aged 25 years and older in the role
of the comparison group. For all young workers, the unanticipated increase had an effect only following the increase, while the anticipated
one had an equally large effect only in the period before the increase.
For young women, the estimates are inconclusive, and for low-educated
young women, both increases had an effect only following the increase.
The section late in this chapter on the timing of effects discusses this
issue further.
Australia and New Zealand
At first glance, the approach that Lee and Suardi (2011) take in
their study of the Australian minimum wage resembles those of both
the older literature and the aggregate state-year panel framework that
Neumark and Wascher introduced to this literature, with controls for
supply and demand factors in the labor market. The important way in
which Lee and Suardi’s approach differs is that they do not include
a minimum wage term in their equation, examining instead whether
point estimates of other coefficients in the equation change coincident
with increases in the minimum wage. In April 1997, a federal government agency in Australia established a minimum wage that was legally
(though not necessarily economically) binding on all or nearly all em-
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ployees in three states. Lee and Suardi analyze teen employment from
each state as a separate time series. In no states does the minimum wage
affect employment or, rather, as they say, employment dynamics (since
the nature of the data requires that they consider employment growth
rather than employment itself). They engage in some careful sensitivity analysis to ensure that their statistical test is reasonably able to find
no effect when there is none and to detect one when one indeed exists.59 How well their results generalize is not clear, not only because
the institutional structure of the minimum wage they study is unusually
complicated but also because wages well above the minimum wage are
pegged to the minimum, rising along with it. As a result, firms are less
likely to substitute higher paid, more-skilled workers for lower-paid,
less-skilled ones, than in countries such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Canada, where the minimum wage directly affects only
low-paid workers.
Hyslop and Stillman (2007) perform a difference-in-differences
analysis of the minimum wage response of teenage employment
in New Zealand.60 Following an election in late 1999, the new government made large changes in the youth subminimum wage. Starting in March 2001 and continuing through March 2003, in steps well
announced in advance, the minimum wage was increased by 87 percent between 2000 and 2003 for 18–19-year-olds and by 49 percent
for 16–17-year-olds. Over the same interval, that for older adults increased only 13 percent. In their analysis, the two treatment groups
are 16–17-year-olds and 18–19-year-olds, and their main comparison
group is 20–25-year-olds, though they also look at 20–21-year-olds.
They compare employment in the five quarters following the last of
these increases (2002Q2–2003Q3) with the last five quarters before the
election in 1999 (1998Q2–1999Q3). Relative to the main comparison
group of 20–25-year-olds, employment increased by a statistically insignificant amount following the policy reform.
Pacheco (2011) proposes a solution for a widely perceived issue in
the minimum wage literature. Although the minimum wage may reduce
the employment of teenagers as a whole more than that of any other
easily identified group, defining the treatment group to be all teenagers
may nevertheless result in estimates of the effect that are so imprecise as
to be statistically insignificant not because there is no effect but because
many teenagers may not be so affected (recall the compositional effects
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that Flinn [2006]; Ahn, Arcidiaco, and Wessels [2011]; and Giuliano
[2013] report). Relying on the same primary data source as Hyslop and
Stillman (2007), Pacheco (2011) combines it with an annual supplement to identify those aged 16–29 most likely to be earning at or near
the minimum wage and to weight the effect of the minimum wage on
an individual accordingly. This leads not only to a much larger (negative) estimate of the employment effect in comparison to the estimate
from a regression without the weights but also one that is statistically
significant; however, the employment elasticity when considering all
teenagers only changes from −0.045 to −0.089.61
Pacheco’s (2011) approach is ingenious but problematic, so it is
worth considering it in some detail. Rather than consider a few increases in the minimum wage around the turn of the century, as Hyslop
and Stillman (2007) do, Pacheco (2011) uses data from the beginning of
the Household Labor Force Survey (HLFS) in the period 1986–2004. It
contains a wealth of demographic detail but little or nothing with which
to identify an earned wage level. For that, Pacheco turns to the Income
Survey, an annual supplement begun in 1997 that collects information
on pretax income from a variety of sources for individuals in the HLFS.
For the years 1997–2004, Pacheco (2011) uses the Income Survey to
create a dummy variable equal to 1 “if the individual is deemed to be affected by increases in the minimum wage. This is the case if they are either a sub–minimum or a minimum wage worker” (p. 596). The dummy
variable is the dependent variable in a probit equation that otherwise
resembles a wage equation conditional on employment, and the estimated equation is used to generate fitted values for all observations in
the bigger HLFS sample, for all years and whether or not the individual
is then employed. The fitted values are the weights used to mediate the
effect of the minimum wage on the probability of employment in the
estimated employment equation. To distinguish these two probit equations, we will designate the first as the minimum wage worker equation
and the second as the employment equation.
Pacheco (2011) alludes to two problems with her technique. The
first is the classic problem of sample selection bias, often referred to as
the Heckman problem. She writes,
Assuming no sample selection bias (i.e., that nonworkers and
workers with the same Xi characteristics face the same probability
of working at the minimum wage), the coefficients from Equation
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(2) are used to create a probability of the individual earning the
minimum wage for all individuals in the 1986–2004 HLFS data
set (i.e., no longer restricting analysis to only those employed).
(p. 597)

If they have done nothing else, years of research in labor economics
have demonstrated the existence of systematic differences in the expected wages of those not employed and the actual wages of otherwise
observationally equivalent individuals who are employed. Turning the
wage equation into a binary variable does not persuasively get around
this issue. At the very least, test results for sample selection bias would
be helpful. This problem raises serious questions about the usefulness
of the calculated weights.62
The second issue concerns identification of the probability measure. Pacheco (2011) uses the same demographic variables in both probit equations, the one used to calculate the probability of being affected
by the minimum wage and the one estimating the employment effect.
About this she writes,
One potential issue with the use of this adjusted policy variable is
collinearity, because of the similar nature of the variables used to
^
construct Pit and those used as explanatory variables along with
^
ln RMWi,t − k Pit in Equation (4). However, this issue is minimised
^
by the method of constructing Pit , in that the specified characteristics it depends on enter Equation (3) in a nonlinear and multiplicative fashion, and therefore does not result in perfect collinearity in
Equation (4). (p. 598)

That there are no variables in the minimum wage worker equation that
are excluded from the employment equation raises serious issues of
identification. In his survey of sample selection bias, Vella (1998) discusses this issue, concluding that “these two-step procedures should
be treated cautiously when the models are not identified through exclusion restrictions” (p. 135). It is hardly an exaggeration to say that
without any exclusion restrictions, Pacheco’s (2011) approach is not a
new way of measuring the effect of the minimum wage that allows it
to vary across individuals but an employment equation that includes interactions between the minimum wage and all the demographic dummy
variables.
In Canada, Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) detected a
negative net employment response of young workers to the minimum
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wage. The studies of the NMW in the United Kingdom find no effect on
youth employment, and the more reliable of the studies of Portugal reports a net positive effect on employment because previously employed
teenagers are much more likely to continue in their current employment
when the minimum wage rises. Pinoli’s (2010) analysis of anticipated
and unanticipated increases in Spain finds negative effects where she
expected to when looking at all young workers but was not able to detect any for either young women or for young women with little education. The two studies of data from Down Under also found no effects on
the employment of young workers. That is, except for Pinoli (2010), to
which we will return in the final section of this chapter, and Campolieti,
Fang, and Gunderson (2005a), these studies do not contain evidence of
a negative effect on the employment of the young. Recent work from
both the United States and from other countries are similar in providing
no clear consensus about the employment response of youth workers,
but the trend, certainly in the United States, as various statistical issues
are recognized and addressed, seems to be fewer and fewer reports of
statistically significant negative employment responses.
Other Low-Wage Workers
Table 2.8 displays information about nine studies of the employment response of other low-wage groups to the minimum wage in countries other than the United States (although the multinational data set of
Addison and Ozturk [2012] includes U.S. data).
Canada
Fang and Gunderson (2009) use the same data and approach as
Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) to study the employment response of older workers (those at least 50 years old) whose ex ante wage
was less than the ex post minimum wage. Because of the close similarities, it is not necessary to repeat a description of their framework. Unlike the earlier piece, they report standard errors clustered by province,
although with only seven years of data, it is not certain that this correction is necessary, and with exactly 10 provinces, there is some reason
for doubting its effectiveness.63 Fang and Gunderson report nearly four
dozen probit estimates based on three different specifications and many
definitions of the comparison group, where the dependent variable indi-
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Total employment cost

Target
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Table 2.8 Other Low-Wage Groups (Other Developed Countries)
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United 1999– Regression
workers Kingdom 2007
Low-wage France
workers

Laroque and Salanie Negative Formal model
Married France
(2002)
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employment
Mulheirn (2008)
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The United
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Kingdom’s
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The United
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Kingdom’s
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Stewart (2004a)
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Canada
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ASHE = (United Kingdom) Annual Survey of Hours and Earning. NES = (United Kingdom) New Earnings Survey. LFS = Labor Force
Survey. BHPS = British Household Panel Survey. SLID = (Canadian) Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics.
b
This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) or Donald and Lang
(2007).
a
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cates whether or not an individual who was employed ex ante remains
employed ex post. All the point estimates are positive, but few are statistically significant: 3 of the 11 results for the wage-gap variable and 11
results for the wage-gap variant variable. They suspect that employers
are substituting away from young workers toward older ones, but the
Scotch verdict, not proven, seems most in order.
The United Kingdom: Bound Workers
Stewart (2002, 2004a) considers not only bound young workers
(18–21) but also bound older workers.64 In both studies, Stewart confirms that wages of the treatment group rose after the NMW was established in April 1999. In neither does he report any adverse effect on
the employment of bound older workers. Stewart (2002) finds negative
effects on the employment of various high-risk groups (women, those
with less than a whole year of tenure, the unskilled, the hotel and restaurant industries, and those in industries with a large fraction of bound
workers). To study the effect of the first two increases in the NMW
subsequent to its implementation (3 percent in 2000 and 11 percent in
2001), Stewart (2004b) uses the Labour Force Survey, one of the three
data sets he analyzed earlier (Stewart 2004a). He concludes that these
increases also had no effect on the employment of bound workers.
Mulheirn (2008) repeats Stewart’s (2004b) analysis to examine the
effect of the 6 percent increase in 2006. He reports results that vary
by specification, either a simple difference-in-differences framework
with an at-risk dummy or one that incorporates a wage-gap variable,
and for men and women combined and for each separately. The only
statistically significant results—several of those for men—strike him
as implausible; the probability of separating from a job following the
increase falls by about four percentage points. Mulheirn warns against
making too much of this because of the small sample size but is struck
that the only evidence of an employment effect is that the higher minimum wage leads low-wage men to become more attached to their jobs.65
Noting that by design this study cannot detect any reduction in hiring
due to the NMW, Mulheirn (2008) concludes that this increase in the
NMW did not increase the likelihood of those already employed losing
their jobs.
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Dolton, Rosazza-Bondibene, and Wadsworth (2012) expand on
Stewart’s (2002) analysis in three dimensions. They use three different
measures of the minimum wage, including the fraction affected. They
use three different definitions of regions, including the local administrative regions that Stewart (2002) examines. They extend the time
period to include all the increases in the NMW through 2006; this last
involves concatenating data from the NES, which Stewart (2002) used,
to data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Employment, its successor. In addition to the fraction affected, they also consider the Kaitz index, despite its problems, so that their results are comparable with other
work, and the spike, the fraction earning exactly the minimum wage ex
post. In addition to the local administrative region, they consider both a
less aggregated and a more aggregated definition of geographic area.66
The longer sample and the annual increases in the NMW that began 18
months after the NMW went into effect allow them to do something
that Stewart (2002) could not: consider the possibility of time-varying
impacts. However, they first report results that allow only for a constant
impact; once they include two-way fixed effects and a set of controls,
the estimated effects are predominantly positive, tiny, and not statistically significant.67 Estimates from the equation with time-varying employment effects show a few statistically significant negative point estimates in the early and middle years for the spike measure; however, for
this measure in the late years (after 2003), for the fraction affected in
the middle to late years (after 2002), and for the Kaitz index throughout,
the only statistically significant point estimates are positive.

France
Laroque and Salanie (2002), like Neumark and Wascher (2011),
worry that social welfare policies, among them the minimum wage, may
have unintended consequences in the labor market. Instead of single
mothers, the demographic group that concerns them is married women.
They use 1997 data from an annual survey of French households to
examine this issue. The econometric model is itself fairly simple, but
its derivation is informed by a sophisticated theoretical model. The first
part of their model is a wage equation for women aged 25–49 who
live with a partner (i.e., are considered married). This relates the wage
that they earn (or would if employed) to personal characteristics. The
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second equation relates their reservation wage to the wage that the first
equation predicts, and to a number of household characteristics, including the number of children, their husband’s employment status, and the
total value of income derived from social welfare benefits.
Laroque and Salanie (2002) distinguish four possible states for each
woman based on her employment status and the sign of the difference
between her actual or prospective wage and reservation wage:
1) employed, in which case her wage exceeds her reservation wage;
2) voluntarily unemployed if her reservation wage exceeds what
she could earn;
3) classically unemployed (one way to be involuntarity unemployed) if the minimum wage exceeds her prospective wage
and that in turn exceeds her reservation wage, then the minimum wage prices her out of the market; and
4) otherwise unemployed (all other ways to be involuntarily unemployed): if her prospective wage exceeds both her reservation wage and the minimum wage, she is unemployed for other
reasons, e.g., due to the business cycle or to being between jobs
while searching for one.
Between 50 and 60 percent of the married women in Laroque and
Salanie’s (2002) sample are not employed. Based on their model, they
estimate that 38 percent of the sample chooses not to be employed, and
that slightly more than one-half of the remaining unemployed—about
one-tenth of all married women—are in a situation of classical unemployment, which they attribute to the minimum wage. They estimate an
elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage of −0.7,
quite large and comparable to Sabia’s (2008) result for a group of single
mothers in the United States. This is much bigger than other estimates
for American women or for American teenagers, which is likely due to
institutional differences between France and the United States. They
present standard errors of their parameter estimates but not of the derived elasticity estimates.
Kramarz and Philippon (2001) inform us that in France, the true
cost of the minimum wage to employers is much higher than its nominal value because payroll taxes finance mandatory employee benefits.
Offsetting this are tax exemptions, which differ across the wage dis-
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tribution and have changed over time. Using data primarily from the
French Labor Force Survey for the years 1990–1998, they define their
treatment group to be workers whose wages fall between the contemporaneous value of the minimum wage and its value in the following
year (bound workers). The comparison group consists of individuals
whose wages in the first year are at least as high as the greater of these
two values of the minimum wage, and no more than 110 percent of
this value.68 They report a substantial employment effect: a 1 percent
increase in employment costs due to a minimum wage increase leads to
a 1.5 percent decrease in the probability of being employed.69
Taken together, analyses of demographic groups other than youth
indicate that the minimum wage can have unintended consequences. No
evidence has come to light that the NMW has reduced the employment
of previously bound workers, young or old. In France, however, the effect of the minimum wage appears to generate classical unemployment,
which employment subsidies reduce to some extent. This contrasts with
the United States, where the direct effects of the EITC and minimum
wage complement rather than counteract each other (although the increased competition for jobs that results has adverse spillover effects
for individuals who are not eligible for the EITC).
Industry Studies
Table 2.9 presents information for four studies that consider the
effect of the minimum wage on industry employment—three use data
from the United Kingdom and one uses data from Sweden.
The United Kingdom
Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003) and Machin and Wilson
(2004) examine the effect of the 1999 introduction of the NMW on
the British care home industry, a particularly low-wage sector, using
establishment data collected in surveys in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Machin and Wilson perform several differences analyses that vary
along several dimensions: the presence or absence of control variables,
the geographic range of the sample, and whether the fraction affected
or the wage gap is used to measure the NMW. Machin, Manning, and
Rahman perform a difference-in-differences analysis by combining the
data mentioned above with that from an earlier survey that allows them

Target
Study
Effect
sector
Machin and
Negative Home care
Wilson (2004)
Machin, Manning, Negative Home care
and Rahman
(2003)
Skedinger (2006) Negative Hospitality
sector

Sample
Analytic
Country
period
approach
United 1998–1999 Regression
Kingdom
United 1992–1999
Quasi
Kingdom
experiment
Quasi
experiment

Individualyear

Galindo-Rueda
and Pereira
(2004)

United 1997–2001 Regression
Kingdom

Firm-year

Negative

All firms

Sweden 1979–1999

Unit of
observation Data structure Type of SE
Firm-survey Longitudinal Conventional
wave
Firm-survey Longitudinal Conventional
wave
Longitudinal Conventional
Panel

Clustered
(firm)
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Table 2.9 Studies of Industries (Other Developed Countries)
Data seta
Private
survey
Private
survey
CSE
Various

NOTE: Galindo-Rueda & Pereira (2004) is included for completeness but not discussed in the text because of severe data problems.
a
CSE = Confederation of Swedish Enterprise.
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to construct a comparison group with a pseudo–minimum wage at the
same point of the earlier wage distribution as the NMW falls in the later
survey and a corresponding pseudo impact.70 Both studies report statistically significant, positive wage responses.
Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003) try several minimum wage
measures and report negative but statistically insignificant employment responses. However, they present average employment elasticities based only on a differences analysis of the period in which the
NMW was instituted. These range between −0.14 and −0.38. The larger
ones are derived from statistically significant point estimates, so it is
unclear how to reconcile these with the results of the quasi experiment.
Although in the middle to high end of (what is considered) the consensus range of employment elasticities for American teenagers, Machin,
Manning, and Rahman believe them to be small relative to the wage
impact. Because this is one of the lowest-paid industries in the United
Kingdom, they caution against generalizing these results to the whole
labor market.
Machin and Wilson (2004) report statistically significant, negative
employment responses to the introduction of the NMW for two minimum wage measures (fraction affected and wage gap) in their most
complete model when they use a sample that covers the entire country.
However, when they restrict the sample to the South Coast, the wage
gap (their more sensitive measure of vulnerability to the minimum
wage) does not generate this effect.71 This result reminds us of the pattern that Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) and Dube, Lester,
and Reich (2010) report in their explorations of geographic correlation,
and more broadly the issues that Yuen (2003) and Campolieti, Fang,
and Gunderson (2005a) examine: that when large differences between
the treatment group and the implicit comparison group make the entire
sample too heterogeneous, effects of other factors may be attributed to
the minimum wage. Extending their analysis to the effects of the 2001
increase in the NMW on the South Coast, Machin and Wilson (2004)
report a negative but not statistically significant employment effect,
which is broadly consistent with their results for the introduction of the
NMW in that area.
Reconciliation of these two analyses is difficult, one finding a statistically significant employment effect that the authors judge to be small,
the other finding none. This contrasts with studies of low-wage sectors
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in the United States, some of the most careful analysis of U.S. data,
which has, with a few exceptions, reported no effect on employment.72

THE TIMING OF THE EMPLOYMENT RESPONSE
Several studies have explored the timing of the employment response to minimum wage increases.73 Before the NMWR, the most
common specification included lags of the minimum wage variable in
the regression equation, which was estimated on quarterly data (Brown,
Gilroy, and Kohen 1982, p. 507, Note 25). When compared, however, the
dynamic implications of estimates of this specification with those from
specifications that included only the contemporaneous term indicated
little difference, suggesting that the minimum wage had its entire impact
in the quarter of the increase. In the first decade of the NMWR, concern
with the presence or absence of a lagged minimum wage term was a byproduct of attempts to reconcile results from examination of aggregate
panels with those based on other data structures (cross sections in which
the dependent variable was the change in employment before and after
a change in the minimum wage, and the two-period panels used in quasi
experiments). Pinoli (2010) raises the issue from the perspective of the
rational expectations approach, suggesting that much of the response to
anticipated increases precedes the increase itself, and several analyses
tested her claim as part of their robustness check. Two studies relied on
time-series techniques, which allow for dynamic simulations to study
the response over time.
Whether the chosen regression models provide dependable estimates of the dynamic response to the minimum wage is an important
issue. The body of statistical technique most concerned with estimation
of dynamics, especially with the problems that arise in estimation, is
time-series analysis, and it is most thoroughly developed for time-series
data. Panel data have the potential for more complete examination of
dynamics, but it presents difficulties of estimation that were until recently considerably less tractable. Perhaps as a result, attempts to study
dynamics with panel data have rarely relied on time-series techniques
and more on ad hoc approaches. Because the former are rare in the
NMWR and ad hoc approaches that use panel data are more numerous,
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we begin with a discussion of the latter. With one exception, Baker,
Benjamin, and Stanger (1999), all the studies below have already been
discussed, and it is the only one that will be examined in detail (except
as necessary).
The Early Debate: Panel Studies That Include a Lagged Term
of the Minimum Wage
Neumark and Wascher (1992) pay a fair amount of attention to explaining why they detected a statistically significant, negative response
of employment to the minimum wage, whereas Card (1992a) does not.
They repeat and extend this effort (Neumark and Wascher 1994) with
regard to Card, Katz, and Krueger’s (1994) response. They make two
related points in this discussion that shape later analyses of the timing
of the employment response: 2) omitted variable bias, and 2) a lengthy
period for adjusting employment in response to changes in the minimum wage.74
The omitted variable bias was due to the absence of a lagged minimum wage term in the regressions of Card (1992a) and Card, Katz,
and Krueger (1994). Although the primary results in Neumark and
Wascher’s (1991) conference paper are based on regressions that include only a contemporaneous (same year) minimum wage term, they
present results from several regressions that include a lagged term, variously as a robustness check or to reconcile different results. In the revised version published a year later (Neumark and Wascher 1992), they
rely more heavily on specifications with the lagged term, referring to
them as “correctly specified models” and writing “that the failure to
consider lagged effects of minimum wages . . . results in substantial upward bias in the estimated effects of minimum wages on employment,
leading to elasticities that are too close to zero, and frequently positive”
(p. 78).75 Under certain conditions for which they present evidence, the
consequence of omitting a lagged minimum wage term is a finding of
no effect.76
Their second, closely related observation is the qualitative difference in results between those based on a first difference of consecutive
observations, say 1990 and 1989 (similar to Card [1992a]), and those
from a first difference of observations further apart, 1998 and 1990, for
example. Relative to the shorter period, differences over the longer pe-
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riod are shifted to the left, that is, smaller if both are positive or negative
and farther from zero.
Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger (1999) substantially clarify matters when they apply theoretical techniques of time-series analysis to a
province-by-year panel of Canadian data. Decomposing the minimum
wage into short-term and long-term components, they demonstrate that
the lagged term is a rough-and-ready approximation of the long-term
component. Refining their analysis to identify long-term and short-term
components more precisely, they conclude that in Canada, it takes at
least six years for the full effects of the minimum wage to be apparent in
the teen employment figures. They speculate that this is because of interplay between lags in adjusting capital and the long-run expectations
about labor costs that are relevant when making investment decisions.
Unfortunately, the serial correlation that Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) identified as a problem for statistical inference in panels is almost certainly a problem for the analysis of Baker, Benjamin,
and Stanger (1999). They examine the Canadian counterpart to the U.S.
data of Neumark and Wascher, and both the outcome and policy variable exhibit serial correlation similar to that in the U.S. data. For the
initial regression, with only the contemporaneous minimum wage, they
report standard errors corrected for second-order serial correlation, but
it is not clear that this solves the problem of exaggerated t-statistics
(Wolfson 2011). Furthermore, for the regressions based on their timeseries analysis, Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger report only conventional
standard errors. It is well known that the moving average transformation that underlies their long-term component creates serial correlation
where none previously existed and increases it in variables that already
exhibit positive serial correlation.77 In their more complete decomposition, Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger distinguish the components more
finely into five terms ranging from shortest term to longest term. This
concentrates the serial correlation in the longer-term components more
completely than the simpler distinction does, causing a greater amount
of bias in its standard error than in that of the moving average term of
the simpler decomposition.
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Does the Response Ever Precede the Increase?
Pinoli (2010) argues that firms will begin responding to minimum
wage increases well in advance of their occurrence if they anticipate
them, because gradual adjustment will minimize the cost of this adjustment. She reports a response to expected increases before they take
effect.
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) examine this possibility in
several different ways in their study of teenage employment. Their regression equations include both leads of four and eight quarters of the
minimum wage, and lags of 4, 8, 12, and 16 quarters. In addition, they
reestimate their equations both on a sample that excludes automatic
increases that respond to inflation because they believe that these are
likely to be well anticipated, and on a sample that excludes states that
ever indexed their minimum wage, reasoning that this sample should
further heighten the contrast between anticipated and unanticipated
minimum wages. They detect no response of employment or hours in
advance of a minimum wage increase, and neither of their restricted
samples provides any evidence of a response to unanticipated increases
after the increase.
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), in their border discontinuity study
of teenage and restaurant employment, allow for not only a contemporaneous response to minimum wage increases but also responses up to
two years before and up to four years after an increase. They find only
contemporaneous effects: a decline in separations of both teenagers and
restaurant workers, an increase in earnings, and a decrease in the overall
turnover rate.
Time-Series Studies
Williams and Mills (2001) rely on time-series techniques to study
the response to the federal minimum wage of the teenage employment
ratio, and Belman and Wolfson (2010) do the same for employment
growth in low-wage industries. Williams and Mills simulate the response of the teen employment ratio to a 10 percent increase in the
minimum wage, based on regressions using different minimum wage
measures. Simulations based on relative minimum wage measures indicate a decrease in the employment ratio that first becomes statistically
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significant between one and one and a half years after the increase in the
minimum wage.78 It moves in and out of statistical significance for the
following two years and disappears altogether after about three years.
The maximum decline in employment during this interval, relative to
the initial period just before the increase, is between 4 and 5 percent
(not percentage points). Simulation results based on the real minimum
wage are similar; the only statistically significant response is a 5 percent
decrease (relative to employment in the initial period) 11 quarters after
the minimum wage increase, and this disappears shortly thereafter.
In their analysis of 23 low-wage industries, Belman and Wolfson
(2010) perform a simulation to examine the question, “What would
have happened to the average wage, the total number of jobs and total hours if the federal minimum wage had increased by 10 percent in
September 1998?” For the next 42 months, the simulation tracks the
difference in outcomes between the hypothesized situation of a 10 percent increase and one of no change.79 The average hourly wage is immediately higher than it would have been by about 1.25 percent, and the
size of the difference fluctuates in a narrow range, mostly less than 1.25
percent, until about two years after the increase; at that point it begins
a slow, steady increase to between about 1.3 percent and 1.4 percent,
three and a half years after the increase. After about six months, the
point estimate of the number of jobs is about one-half percent less than
it would otherwise have been, the difference slowly growing to −0.75
percent two years after the minimum wage increase, and fluctuating
around that value for the remaining year and a half of the simulation.
At no point is the difference statistically significant. The response of
total hours worked is initially much noisier, and while the difference
stabilizes after a year at −0.1 percent, it too is not statistically significant
at any point.
Summary
During what interval of time, relative to a change in the minimum
wage, do the data for employment contain evidence of it? The little
work that addresses this issue is mixed. Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger
(1999) is the earliest and by far the most cited study to examine this
issue; however, their use of conventional standard errors in the canonical panel framework of Neumark and Wascher leaves it vulnerable to
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the critique of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), raising serious questions about the statistical significance of their results. More
recently, Pinoli (2010) reports that Spanish firms begin preparing or
responding to minimum wage increases at the earliest moment that it
is cost effective to do so, once they can reasonably anticipate them. Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010)
find no evidence of this phenomenon in U.S. data. While time-series
analysis of U.S. data picks up an immediate increase in teenagers’
wages that eventually leads to further wage growth after two years, the
employment data suggest at most a decrease in youth employment after one year or more, perhaps not until nearly three years. In any case,
this decrease has disappeared altogether after three years. In low-wage
industries, it is not possible to reliably detect an employment response
at any point in the three and a half years following an increase. Finally,
it is worth observing that not much work considers the timing of the
response to minimum wage increases. Not only is additional examination of this point necessary, but it is likely that until the disagreement
about the existence of a response is settled, questions about its timing
will also remain unsettled.

CONCLUSION
At the end of the first round of the NMWR, nothing was resolved.
Although parts of Card and Krueger’s (2000) analysis contain statistical
problems identified by Moulton (1990) and Donald and Lang (2007),
other parts remain. Their message is that in the months following the
1992 increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage, employment at fast food
establishments there did not suffer in comparison with employment at
those just across the state border in Pennsylvania. There were criticisms
of this work: the time period following the increase was too short to correct and account for long-term employment trends that differed between
the two states; the time period was too short to capture the employment
response, much of which occurred after the end of the period; and because information about the increase was available well in advance,
much of the adjustment occurred before the beginning of the sample
period.
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A further decade of debate has not resolved the disagreements, but
there has been progress, much based on improvements in technique.
A significant amount of the earlier work was seen to suffer from mistakenly small estimates of standard errors, which implied effects that
it is now understood were not reliably detected. More recent work is
better at avoiding this problem. Yuen (2003) and Campolieti, Fang, and
Gunderson (2005a) explore the importance of both accurate measures
of the treatment’s impact and of control groups that are well matched for
the treatment group under study. With more recently developed awareness of econometric pitfalls, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011)
and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) demonstrate (rather than explore)
the importance of appropriate control variables to avoid misattribution
of effects, and show through step-by-step changes in sample and specification the connection between a conventional regression framework
and a quasi experiment. The result is convergence, not yet complete,
between results from best practice in both frameworks.
What is necessary for the employment response of the minimum
wage to be better understood? First is more careful technique. The
longitudinal data sets in increasing use allow more careful attention to
time-series dynamics, something not previously the case. One consequence would be standard errors that are not only robust to serial correlation but also reliably smaller so that minimum wage impacts can
be measured more precisely. Similarly important are spatial correlation
and geographic heterogeneity, not only as in the articles mentioned just
above, but also using spatial econometric techniques introduced by
Kalenkoski and Lacombe (2008).
Second, we need to recognize that studies can come to apparently
different results without contradicting each other. If employment in
a demographic group moves in response to the minimum wage, that
reveals nothing about total employment absent further information; it
is certainly possible that employers substitute workers from other demographics who are perhaps more skilled than those displaced. Ahn,
Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2010); Neumark and Wascher (2011); and
Giuliano (2013) all provide evidence for this sort of offset. Similarly, if
employment in an industry does not move in response to the minimum
wage, that reveals nothing about employment elsewhere in the economy. Although it is certainly possible that employment falls elsewhere,
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the typical choice of researchers is to examine industries in which employment is thought to be especially sensitive to the minimum wage.
Third, the focus on employment, or rather on the number of jobs, is
perhaps misplaced. It may be that the effect is felt not in employment
but in hours of work. That is the topic of the next chapter. Another possibility is that there are changes in the gross flows, in accessions and
separations that combine to determine changes in employment. If these
change but in such a way that the net result is zero, that would not show
up in an employment response as measured in these studies. That, too,
is the topic of another chapter.
Finally, some way of summarizing the results would be beneficial.
The formal body of statistical technique that does this, combining many
studies into a single result, is known as meta-analysis. One particular
technique that is especially useful is metaregression. After looking at
studies that consider hours of employment, we will present results of a
formal meta-analysis.

Notes
1. Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982, p. 499) define the Kaitz index as “the ratio of the
nominal legal minimum wage to average hourly earnings weighted by coverage.”
2. An older term for individuals who make up the fraction affected is bound workers.
3. “Proto-” because the article contains none of the formal statistical analysis or hypothesis testing currently characteristic of difference-in-differences analysis. Instead, it consists of a very detailed descriptive analysis of a treatment group (California) and a control group, states chosen to be similar to California in important
ways but that did not experience a minimum wage increase during the period in
question.
4. At the beginning of 1982, only Alaska and Connecticut had minimum wages
higher than the federal minimum wage (and Connecticut’s was $0.02 higher). By
the beginning of 1990, 16 states, including all of New England and all the states
that border the Pacific, had a minimum wage that was higher than the federal
minimum wage.
5. In the older time-series literature, the demand side of the list is a business cycle
indicator; for example, an adult unemployment rate. The variables on the supply side were the teenage share of the population, and the fractions of teenagers
who are enrolled in school, in the armed forces, and in government employment
and training programs (Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982, p. 501). Neumark and
Wascher (1992) include the first three of these variables, the importance of the last
two having declined considerably since the 1970s.
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6. Another criticism concerns the definition chosen for school enrollment, a variable
meant to control for teenage labor supply, and whether it is reasonable to treat any
measure of school enrollment as exogenous to teenage employment. While this
generated a flurry of work shortly thereafter, the effect of enrollment on employment is no longer relevant in this literature. We discuss school enrollment and the
minimum wage in the chapter on human capital.
7. Over the business cycle, wages and employment of both adults and teenagers
move up and down together. During a business cycle expansion, employment of
both groups rises; so too (in particular) do wages of adults. Because the Kaitz
index includes the adult wage in its denominator, it falls as teenage employment is
rising, and this employment growth is credited to the Kaitz index. The unemployment rate is used to control for business cycle effects, but since the Kaitz index,
by construction, fluctuates with the business cycle, it will inevitably capture some
of this variation. Aggravating this phenomenon is that the unemployment rate is a
lagging indicator of the business cycle.
8. Known then as the ES-202 file, it is the basis for the currently available Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages.
9. One difference between Card and Krueger’s (2000) use of this data and Neumark
and Wascher’s (2000) is worth noting: Card and Krueger (2000) use establishment-level data for the four chains that they had previously studied. Neumark and
Wascher (2000) aggregate up to the level of each state.
10. In this way, Card and Krueger (2000) respond to concerns that the unusual results
in Card and Krueger (1994) were due to employment trends in New Jersey (but
not Pennsylvania) for which they had not explicitly accounted. The 1996 federal
minimum increase raised the minimum wage in Pennsylvania but not New Jersey, where the minimum wage was already 6 percent higher than the new federal
minimum.
11. The examples that Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) consider may suggest
that their concern is a particular instance of the Moulton problem, one in which a
group consists of observations of a state over time and the variable that is constant
within each group is the at-risk dummy, the treatment variable. However, as Hansen (2007b) shows, the problem they address persists when the variable of interest
is not constant but merely exhibits positive serial correlation.
12. For more detailed discussions of these issues, see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009,
section 6.5, “Difference-in-Differences Methods”) and Angrist and Pischke (2009,
section 8.2, “Clustering and Serial Correlation in Panels”).
13. Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) present numerous possible solutions, at least
two of which should be effective for Canadian provincial data.
14. Several of these studies (for example, Mastracci and Persky [2008]) use data that
would allow them to address the issue that Donald and Lang (2007) raise, with
multiple states in the comparison group, but do not take advantage of this.
15. Neumark (2001) makes no correction for serial correction, but the panel he uses is
short enough that serial correlation is unlikely to be a problem.
16. Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2010) agree with Bazen and Le Gallo (2009) about
selection bias but disagree about its direction. They report that states that raised
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17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.

their minimum wages had low and declining teenage employment rates in the
eight quarters before increases.
Thompson (2009) defines teenagers to be those aged 14–18 years old.
Unlike Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), Thompson (2009) does not report the response of the teen share of separations.
Of the four, the only one that is negative is one that includes the state trends, which
Sabia (2009a, p. 88) objects to (below) in Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010).
Both of these analyses will be described more fully in later sections, where the
prime focus of each paper is discussed.
In replicating earlier work, Sabia (2009a,b) also reports one very much smaller
elasticity estimate, which he refers to as statistically insignificant. Except for three
point estimates of long-run elasticities, all derived from equations estimated with
a serial correlation correction and for which Sabia (2009b) reports very high levels
of statistical significance, the standard errors and significance results that he reports
are all for the coefficient point estimates rather than the elasticities themselves.
Recall that to be considered unemployed, an individual must have previously decided to participate in the labor market, that is, to engage in search.
Flinn (2006) warns against placing too much weight on implications based on
minimum wage values well outside the observed range ($4.25 per hour to $5.15
per hour), pp. 1059–1060.
Calculated from the top panel of Table V in Eckstein, Ge, and Petrongolo (2011),
these are the averages of elasticities from increases and decreases to the minimum
wage.
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) had previously relied on this hypothesis in their
analysis of employment in restaurants. The discussion of their work includes a
fuller explanation of sources of geographic correlation.
The wage response is statistically significant whether or not these dummy variables are included.
For the bulk of their analysis, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) use individual
data, combining 5 percent samples from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. censuses, with 1
percent samples from the American Community Surveys of 2005 and 2006. They
supplement this with a similar analysis of quarterly cross sections of individuals
from the CPS. It is not possible to apply the commuting zone framework to the
CPS data, so they cannot run exactly the same regressions, but this allows them to
compare their results more closely with previous work and demonstrate that they
are not due to the use of different data.
Following an earlier version of Neumark and Wascher (2011), Allegretto,
Dube, and Reich (2009) include trends that vary geographically. The issue of
their use has become increasingly important in recent years. We will see it again
in Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2009, 2012); Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010);
Neumark and Wascher (2004, 2011); and Sabia (2009b).
The EITC subsidizes earnings for low-income households with the goal of encouraging labor force participation and employment. The response of teen employment is of interest because if the interaction of the minimum wage and the
EITC encourages individuals with few skills to enter the labor force, the greater
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31.
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35.
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37.

38.

competition may reduce teen employment. This study is discussed in greater detail
on pp. 55–58.
Neumark and Wascher (2011) are not clear about their tripartite division that mixes
ethnic and racial categories, in particular which category includes individuals who
are both black and Hispanic; this is most likely Hispanic.
Neumark and Wascher (2011) do not present the total minimum wage effect, so
the numbers here are calculated from their tables. As is conventional, they do not
display covariances, so the statements here about statistical significance assume
small or negative covariances between the coefficients that are added to form the
total effect.
Warren and Halpern-Manners (2007) raise serious questions about the accuracy of
CPS measures of the educational attainment of teenagers.
This pretense is referred to as a placebo policy.
The synthetic control group was constructed to match New York employment
trends for everyone without a high school diploma between the ages of 16 and 29;
it is not obvious that use of the same synthetic control group for hypothesis tests
concerning age subgroups is appropriate. That is, just because a weighted average of some states is a good match for the aggregate employment experience of
16–29-year-olds without a diploma in New York in the years 2002–2004, it is not
obvious that the same weighted average of states is a good match for the aggregate
employment experience of 16–19-year-olds without a high school diploma in New
York in the years 2002–2004.
Neumark and Wascher (2011) mention that they had also considered other social
welfare policies that may influence labor market outcomes, but preliminary work
persuaded them to focus on the EITC. The minimum wage and the EITC are often
discussed together because both are policies intended to ameliorate poverty, and
proponents see the minimum wage as a tool for ensuring that all benefits of the
EITC go to workers rather than act as employment subsidies.
This also hints at another issue, which Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011);
Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a); Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010); and
Yuen (2003) examine, the choice of the comparison group and how this can affect
the point estimates.
In the absence of elasticity estimates and their standard errors, it is often difficult
to make comparisons with other results in a way that is both precise and meaningful; for instance, specification differences prevent a direct comparison with Sabia’s
(2008) coefficient estimates for single mothers that could be circumvented with
employment elasticities with respect to the minimum wage.
In the equation for black and Hispanic single women, the coefficient on the EITC
variable interacted with the treatment dummy is not statistically significant, only
the coefficient of the three interaction terms for the EITC variable, treatment
dummy, and minimum wage variable.
Luttmer (2007) continues, “My findings do not suggest that the minimum wage
increase led to a more inefficient rationing of jobs among unskilled workers. If
anything, the allocation of jobs seems to have become relatively more efficient in
states where the impact of the federal minimum wage increase was larger” (p. 31).
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39. An issue with the use of the CPS to study the effects of past periods on the present is that the CPS provides, at most, one year of retrospective data. As a result,
Neumark and Nizalova (2007) argue that a large proportion of young workers continue working in the state in which they grew up and that the history of that state’s
minimum wages can be used as the history of the individuals’ minimum wages.
While this assumption tends toward the heroic, it is possible that labor market
scarring occurs within states, that higher minimum wages do long-term damage
to the reputation of certain cohorts of young workers, and low-wage employers
become permanently reluctant to hire individuals from those cohorts.
40. It may seem peculiar that although Sabia (2008) reports a strong negative effect on
the employment of single mothers who have not completed high school, he finds
no effect on their poverty status. This has at least as much to do with peculiarities of the formal definition of poverty as anything else. We address this issue in
Chapter 7.
41. Total employment serves as the control for demand factors, i.e., the business cycle,
and total population as the control for labor supply factors. Because the results
that they report for both the restaurant industry and the entire private sector are
qualitatively similar in each specification, only those for the restaurant sector are
discussed. The calculation of the reported standard errors clusters observations by
county to allow for both unspecified forms of serial correlation in the residuals and
unspecified, arbitrary heteroscedasticity.
42. Although they are studying employment in restaurants, not of teenagers, Dube,
Lester, and Reich (2010) believe that sensitivity to the minimum wage should be
similar because the proportion of workers near the minimum wage is similar in the
two groups (employed teenagers and employees in the restaurant industry), and the
two groups overlap substantially.
43. This discussion elides some intermediate specifications for clarity. For example,
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) highlight the use of state-specific trends in combination with the time effects specific to each census division. We neglect these
results because they are not statistically significant (although positive), and because of Sabia’s (2009b) concern that this specification begs the question, “Are
state-specific trends due at least in part to minimum wage policy?”
44. The reference, to Durbin’s test, is unsettling because Durbin’s name is associated
with more than one test for serial correlation, none of which is known specifically
as Durbin’s test, and they neither elaborate further nor include values of the test
statistic in their results.
45. In a different context, Even and Macpherson (2014) mention that “it is possible
that a higher tipped minimum wage could increase employment at limited-service
restaurants as customers and/or employers switch from full-service to limitedservice restaurants in response to an increase in the relative cost at full-service
restaurants” (p. 12). If this does indeed happen, the differencing would overstate
the impact of the tipped-minimum wage.
46. Although they did not consider the tipped minimum wage, Addison, Blackburn,
and Cotti (2012) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), both using QCEW data, and
Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) consider full-service and limited-service sectors
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47.
48.
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50.
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53.

separately in some of their analysis and report rather different effects of the minimum wage in both sectors than Even and Macpherson (2014). Recognition and
discussion of this would have enriched this analysis.
One interesting result is that the point estimates from the CPS data are several
times as large as those from the QCEW, but so are the standard errors.
We ignore the positive, statistically significant employment response in food and
beverage stores because the lack of a wage response makes it difficult to understand
the mechanism through which the minimum wage would influence employment.
Because it is difficult to treat this data set as a sample from an underlying population or process, much less a random sample, conventional interpretation of the
standard errors is not reasonable: thus, this focus on betting.
This result agrees with Yuen’s (2003) findings for teenagers and young adults,
discussed below.
Recall that Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) and Dube, Lester, and Reich
(2010) have also addressed this general problem in a very different situation, that
of geographic correlation. Fang and Gunderson (2009) use the same data and analytic framework as Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005a) to study the employment response of older workers.
Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005b), in another analysis of longitudinal data
from Canada, examine the effect of the minimum wage jointly on employment
and enrollment of teenagers. The key result, the minimum wage elasticity of the
probability of being employed, is incorrectly calculated from the elasticities of the
probabilities of being “employed and enrolled” and “employed and not enrolled.”
Instead of reporting the average weighted by the relative size of each group, they
sum the two elasticities.
Skedinger (2006) is a very elegant and thorough analysis of the minimum wage
experience in the Swedish hospitality industry. However, the institutional framework resembles not so much a minimum wage, at least to someone in an Englishspeaking country, as an industrywide collective bargaining agreement, with wage
floors that vary by job classification, the age and experience or job tenure of the
individual, and, before 1985, region. Consequently, we will pass it by, other than
to quote briefly from the conclusion:
Using data from hotels and restaurants over the period 1979–1999,
we find that job separations tend to increase with rising minimum
wages (except for teenagers during 1993–1998). The evidence regarding accessions is less conclusive . . . there is some evidence of supply effects, i.e., increasing accessions as minimum wages rise. This
is contrary to the assumptions of the underlying model of demanddetermined employment and may be consistent with a monopsony
model. (p. 287)

The result for separations is quite different from what others found, e.g., Portugal
and Cardoso (2006) or Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010).
54. Böckerman and Uusitalo’s (2009) study of Finland is problematic. They report
decreases in the youth share of employment from both the decline and the increase
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in the minimum wages, a result they attribute largely to differential trends in labor force participation or employment that they cannot control for in their short
sample.
Yuen (2003) justifies the Can$0.25 definition because nearly two-thirds of minimum wage increases in his sample period were for precisely this amount.
One explanation for the negative relation between turnover and pay is that employers can identify and reward desirable characteristics of individuals that are
invisible in the data available to the econometrician. For more on this relation, see
Ehrenberg and Smith (2012, especially pages 385–387).
Dolton, Rosazza-Bondibene, and Wadsworth (2012) is discussed in the section
“Other Workers,” but they report that “when the analysis is repeated for youths,
aged 16 to 24, arguably the age group most likely to be at the margin of adjustment, the point estimates are similar to those for all workers, but are generally
insignificant, no matter which measure of the bite of the NMW is used” (p. 89).
Stewart (2002) presents results not only from regressions where the percent of
bound workers measures a region’s sensitivity to the minimum wage but also quasi
experiments where the control and treatment groups are determined by the percent
bound measure. Although less likely to suffer from the Moulton problem than
analyses based on states and provinces in North America, if only because treatment and control regions experience the same minimum wage, this discussion
takes a conservative approach and considers only results of the quasi experiment
framework.
Lee and Suardi’s (2011) examination of the power of their approach requires some
arbitrary choices, specifically about the particular alternative hypothesis that they
use, which, unfortunately, they neither explain nor justify.
Hyslop and Stillman (2007) also perform several regression analyses that are not
discussed here because of their vulnerability to the critique of Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan (2004), unlike the quasi experiment.
Pacheco (2011) does not report these elasticities; however, information that is presented in the text for calculating elasticities from the estimated contemporaneous
affect, in combination with other estimates, is sufficient for the reader to calculate
these values. As is too often usual, no standard errors are available.
A straightforward approach is to estimate a linear wage equation that is corrected
for selection bias between the employed and the nonemployed. This equation
(along with estimates of the inverse Mills ratio) can then generate a wage estimate
for each individual, whether or not employed, and the estimates in turn allow for
the classification of individuals as minimum wage or above minimum wage.
With 10 clusters, the t-statistics that Fang and Gunderson (2009) report should be
compared to critical values from the t-distribution with 10 degrees of freedom: the
critical values for a two-sided 0.05 test are –+ t10(0.975) = 2.23.
Both analyses have been described in some detail above, in the section on nonU.S. studies of youth employment.
Recall that Portugal and Cardoso (2006) found the same effect for teenagers in
Portugal.
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66. Data at the more aggregated level are not available throughout their sample period,
so they relegate those results to the appendix. Point estimates based on the less aggregated definition of regions are generally closer to zero and less often of statistical significance, something that the authors attribute to greater measurement error.
67. The controls, listed not in this article but in Dolton, Rosazza-Bondibene, and
Wadsworth (2010), are average age, and the gender and graduate shares.
68. Recognizing that this comparison group may not be ideal, Kramarz and Philippon
(2001) develop conditions based on demand and supply elasticities for the two
groups in which the comparison group as defined is well suited to this role, and
they state that the conditions are satisfied.
69. Kramarz and Philippon (2001) report no standard error for this value, although
they do for the ones on which it is based, and these are statistically significant.
70. Machin and Manning had conducted an initial pair of surveys in 1992–1993 to
prepare for the possibility of a Labour electoral victory.
71. The reason for considering the South Coast separately is that it was the area covered by the survey of 1992–1993 that was previously mentioned.
72. Galindo-Rueda and Pereira (2004) present an analysis of the economy-wide impact of the introduction of the NMW, but their data are ill suited to their purposes,
and construction of key variables depends on numerous assumptions and approximations. Trying hard, and failing, to match individuals across data sets, they find
that they must impute local industry averages of the fraction affected to individual
firms. Their conclusion is “that firms thought to be most affected by the introduction of pay floors (by region and industry) responded to the introduction of a NMW
by reducing the speed at which they hired new workers” (p. 8, point 18).
73. As discussed previously, Neumark and Nizalova (2007) examine the long-run impact on individuals’ employment histories, but the phenomenon that they examine,
scarring, is quite different from that discussed here, a slow response to a policy
change.
74. Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) and Card and Krueger (1995) respond to these
points, reinterpreting them in a way that they clearly thought appropriate for the
specification and minimum wage variable that they used. Neither their response
nor their specification had much influence in the subsequent discussion of the timing of the response, so we skip over it here.
75. Neumark and Wascher repeat this point in their later discussion (1994; Card, Katz,
and Krueger 1994), writing that “there is evidence of lagged minimum wage effects in the data, and . . . the omission of these lagged effects leads to substantial
upward bias in short first-difference estimates” (p. 508).
76. The lagged term implies that it takes more than a year for the full impact of the
minimum wage on teenage employment to play out, due to “hiring and training
costs, or because of an inability to adjust other inputs quickly” (Neumark and
Wascher 1992, Note 19).
77. Sargent (1987) discusses this in section XI.9, crediting Slutsky with the first recognition of this in economics.
78. Recall that Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) identify problems with minimum wage
measures of this type. During a business cycle upturn, both employment and the
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average wage increase, and the increase in the average wage mechanically causes
a decrease in the relative wage. In this way, this minimum wage measure automatically has a negative correlation with employment, correlated not through any
causal relation but through a third variable.
79. The data sample ends 42 months after September 1998, March 2002, so the simulation comes to a halt there. It is not necessarily the last month in which the minimum wage has an effect.

3
Hours of Employment
Perhaps evidence for the employment response is weak because of
the way that employment is being measured—as the number of jobs
or percent of people with jobs.1 Employees in minimum wage jobs are
paid by the hour. Unless the number of hours worked is the same in all
minimum wage jobs, jobs and hours worked are not equivalent measures of employment. Measuring employment by the number of jobs is
like measuring the total amount of water in different-sized pitchers by
counting the number of pitchers. Instead, the volume of water should
be measured directly by adding the amount in each pitcher to get the
total. If the number of hours that individual employees work varies,
then measure the number of hours. Perhaps rather than reduce staffing
in response to the minimum wage, employers should reduce hours of
some or all employees.
Underlying this hypothesis is another: that up to a point, hiring and
firing workers is more difficult or costly than raising and lowering the
hours that current employees work. Hiring involves some or all of the
following actions: get the word out about openings, review applications
to decide whom to interview, interview, check references, evaluate the
information acquired from the interview, and make a decision. Further,
even if no training is necessary, new hires in many jobs will initially
be less productive until they become familiar with the particular workplace and its routines. If employers lay off people when the minimum
wage rises, they will lose the value in these implicit training costs as
well as any skills developed on the job. Given this, it seems likely that
raising and lowering the number of hours individuals work is an easier,
less expensive way to adjust the amount of paid labor that is employed
(again, up to a point).
In the NMWR, Zavodny (2000) was the first to examine whether
these two measures of employment (jobs and hours) give different answers to the question, “Does the minimum wage (necessarily) reduce
employment?”2 Coming several years prior to Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan (2004), this study does not report a clustered standard,
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so we do not include it in the discussion below, but a number of studies
followed her lead, including several already discussed in Chapter 2.3

U.S. STUDIES
Demographic Groups
Youth
Table 3.1 shows the five studies that examine the effect of the minimum wage on teenagers’ hours of employment: Orrenius and Zavodny
(2008) and Sabia (2009a,b), which use state-level panels; and Allegretto,
Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011), which use repeated cross sections of individual-level data. We will consider first the studies of aggregate data.
Both Orrenius and Zavodny and Sabia aggregate CPS ORG data to the
level of the state; the first use annual data and the second monthly, and
both report results for unconditional average usual hours.4 Sabia also
reports estimates for conditional usual hours.5 Because a main theme of
Sabia’s analysis is the resolution of disagreement about the best way to
control for business cycle effects, he reports several results.
Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) estimate a conventional equation,
with two-way fixed effects (for state and year), the adult male unemployment rate and the teenage share of the population as the control
variables for demand and supply conditions, and one or the other of
two different minimum wage variables. The first is constructed using
a deflator that is common to all states in the same year, and the second
uses the average adult wage in each state and year, which therefore has
the same endogeneity problems as the Kaitz index (see Chapter 2). On
the basis of the common deflator, they report a negative response of
the hours of teenage girls to the minimum wage.6 The elasticity of total
hours with respect to the minimum wage is −0.31, with a standard error
of −0.12.7
Sabia (2009b) presents results for different log-log specifications
where the list of regressors always includes state and month dummies,
the adult male unemployment rate, the fraction of 16–64-year-olds who
are teenagers, and nominal values of the minimum wage and the mean

Table 3.1 Youth (U.S. Data)
Study
Allegretto, Dube, and
Reich (2009)
Allegretto, Dube, and
Reich (2011)
Orrenius and
Zavodny (2008)
Sabia (2009a)
Sabia (2009b)
Couch and Wittenburg
(2001)b
Zavodny (2000)b

Effect:
elasticity
−0.03 (0.03)

Target
group
Teenagers

−0.03 (0.04)
−0.31 (0.12)
−0.23 (0.12)
−0.51, −0.37,
−0.29
−0.42
−0.44–
−0.77
0.24 (0.12)
−0.11 (0.08)

Teenagers

Sample
period
1990, 2000,
2005, 2006
1990–2009

Analytic
approach
Regression,
QEa
Regression

Unit of
observation
Individual-year

Data
structure
Repeated
cross section
Individual-year
Repeated
cross section
State-year
Panel

Teen girls

1994–2005

Regression

Teen girls

1979–2004

Regression

State-month

Panel

Teenagers
in retail
Teenagers

1979–2004

Regression

State-month

Panel

1979–1992

Regression

State-month

Panel

Teenagers

1979–1993

Regression,
QE

State-year and
individual-year

Panel

Variable
Usual weekly
hours
Usual weekly
hours
Usual weekly
hours
Usual weekly
hours
Usual weekly
hours
Usual weekly
hours in
primary job
Usual weekly
hours (calcs
cond avg)

NOTE: Youth refers to those younger than 25; teenagers are 16–19. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Quasi experiment.
b
This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).
a
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adult wage. His specifications differ according to whether they include
in addition a one-year lag of the minimum wage, and either a set of annual dummy variables or a dummy to indicate whether the economy was
in recession that month. A hazard of using monthly CPS aggregates is
the tiny sample sizes underlying some of that state-month observations,
and Sabia reports results in which he weights each observation by the
number of respondents on which it is based. His sample is 1979–2004.8
In all of his specifications for unconditional hours, either the current
minimum wage or the lagged minimum wage is statistically significant
(but not both). Sabia (2009b) reports elasticities’ p-values only for the
two specifications that include the lagged term, and both are statistically
significant: −0.51 when the equation includes the recession dummy
rather than the annual dummies, and −0.37 with the annual dummies
rather than the recession dummy. The effect on conditional hours is
somewhat less pronounced; in one specification, the minimum wage
has no effect, and in the others the effect of either the contemporaneous
or lagged term is much smaller, although one or both remain statistically significant. The one significant elasticity is much smaller, −0.28
(with the recession dummy).
Recall that the focus in both analyses of Allegretto, Dube, and Reich
(2009, 2011) is that the employment response to the minimum wage reported in analyses that rely on the approach introduced by Neumark and
Wascher (1992) disappears in specifications that include controls for
factors correlated with but not caused by the minimum wage. Teenagers’ hours of employment is one of the variables that they examine in
each study. An important difference between the two studies is the data
used, which requires different control variables: Allegretto, Dube, and
Reich (2011) use CPS data that allow for sensitivity at a relatively high
frequency, but not for the fine-grain geographic distinctions that Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009) can make using census and related data.
Neither finds a statistically significant reduction in hours.
Recall that the focus in Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) is on
economic factors that vary not only over time, which conventional fixed
time effects would control for, but also regionally over time, so that the
New England states have their own set of time effects distinct from
those of the mid-Atlantic states, and so forth. Their hypothesis is the
existence of important regional differences in cultural traits and institutions that are both important for economic outcomes and correlated
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with regional differences in average minimum wages. Controlling for
these regional differences leaves the minimum wage to account only for
differences among states in the same region rather than these regional
differences across the whole country.
Point estimates from a model designed to resemble the canonical
one of Neumark and Wascher’s extensive oeuvre indicate a negative
response for all teens and especially for teenage girls of usual hours
worked. However, once the regional controls are included, this effect
disappears; the hours elasticity is −0.03, with a standard error of 0.04.
While Allegretto, Dube, and Reich’s (2011) specification addresses
only the effect on (usual weekly) conditional hours, lack of any detectable effect on the number of jobs implies that their result also holds for
unconditional hours. In response to concerns that the effect of well anticipated increases will be largely complete by the time of the increase
(recall Pinoli [2010]), they also distinguish between increases that occur as a result of automatic indexing for inflation, which are likely to
be anticipated, and other increases that are less likely to be anticipated.
When Allegretto, Dube, and Reich consider only nonindexed increases
in the minimum wage, they detect a “modest” and statistically insignificant negative hours response, with an elasticity of −0.07 (standard error
equals 0.04). When estimates are allowed to differ among white, black,
and Hispanic teenagers, they indicate no effect on hours for members
of the first two groups, but the effect is large and negative for Hispanics
(with an elasticity of −0.33, and standard error of 0.14). This is puzzling
since they find no evidence that the minimum wage affects the wages
of Hispanic teenagers.
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009) take a different tack. Figuring that a commuting zone is a (reasonably) unified labor market,
they compare the experience of teenagers who live in different parts of
commuting zones, where the different parts simultaneously have more
than one minimum wage because the zone straddles a state boundary.
They find a small, negative, and statistically insignificant effect on
usual hours (an estimated elasticity of −0.031, with a standard error of
−0.032). Combining this with the absence of any negative jobs effect
(the response of the number of jobs is positive and statistically insignificant), there appears to be, at worst, no effect on total hours worked.
Sabia’s (2009a) study of the retail sector includes results for hours
of teenagers in the retail sector. The most credible point estimate of the
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elasticity, because it is based on a regression with an autocorrelation
correction, is a long-run elasticity of −0.42, in the middle of the range
that Sabia (2009b) reported for all teenagers. The absence of any standard errors for the elasticity makes it difficult to judge the precision of
the estimate.
Other groups
Table 3.2 lists five studies that present results for the hours of employment of other demographic groups in the United States. Two of
these have questionable standard errors, and problems with a third,
Neumark and Nizalova (2007), are discussed in Chapter 2; two studies remain.9 The primary concern of Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) is
the effect of the minimum wage on immigrants who lack a high school
diploma.10 They detect no effect on immigrants’ hours of work and
speculate that immigrants may take local labor market conditions into
account in their location decisions, generating a pattern of location
choice that obscures the effect of the minimum wage on hours and employment. Sabia (2008) uses the annual March supplement to the CPS
to study the effect of the minimum wage on the poverty status of single
mothers to find very large negative effects on hours worked: −0.92 for
usual weekly hours, and −0.012 percent for annual hours. While he reports (state-clustered) standard errors for the regression coefficients on
which these elasticities are based, and they indicate statistical significance at a 1 percent level, he does not report them for the elasticities,
nor does he explain precisely how they are calculated. Although these
coefficients are statistically significant, the precision of the elasticities
themselves is not clear.
Sectoral Studies
What ties the studies in this section together is that they examine
the effect of the minimum wage on industries or sectors, rather than on
demographic groups or groups of employees (see Table 3.3).11 Three
use the two-by-two quasi experiment framework of Card and Krueger
(1994) to examine the effect of a local increase in the minimum wage
on employment in affected restaurants: Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007);
Persky and Baiman (2010); and Powers (2009). Of course, Donald and

Table 3.2 Other Groups (U.S. Data)
Study
Neumark and
Nizalova (2007)
Orrenius and
Zavodny (2008)
Sabia (2008)
Mastracci and
Persky (2008)b
Neumark,
Schweitzer, and
Wascher (2004)b

Effect:
elasticity
−0.09
−1.2 (3.8)
−0.11 (0.08)

Target
group
Adults, 25–29

Sample
period
1979–2001

Analytic
approach
Regression

Immigrants

1994–2005

Single mothers
1991–2004
with less than high
school degree
None (Emp.) Low-wage workers 2003–2005

−0.92
−1.18

Negative

Many wage earners 1979–1997

Data
structure
Panel

Regression

Unit of
observation
State-year
cohort
State-year

Regression

Individual-year

Repeated
cross section

Variable
Weekly hours
(avg. over all)
Usual weekly
hours
Hours worked
last year

QEa

Individual-year

Repeated
cross section

Hours usually
worked

Regression

Individualmonth

Longitudinal

Usual weekly
hours

Panel

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
a
Quasi experiment.
b
This study has standard errors that are suspect for reasons identified by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).
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Study
Belman and Wolfson
(2010)

Effect:
Target group or
elasticity
sector
−0.01 (0.05)
Low-wage
industries

Sample
period
1972–2003

Analytic
approach
Regression

Unit of
Data
observation
structure
Industry-month Multiple time
series

Dube, Naidu, and
Reich (2007)

None

San Francisco
restaurants

2003–2004

QEa and
regression

Firm-year

Even and Macpherson
(2014)
Orazem and Mattila
(2002)

None

Full-service
restaurants
Retail, service
not professional

1990–2011

Regression

State-quarter

1989–1992

Regression

County-qtr.industry

2003–2005

Firm-year

Persky and Baiman
(2010)
Powers (2009)
Sabia (2009b)
Vedder and Gallaway
(2002)

−1.10
−1.50
None

−0.1

IL fast food
establishments
IL fast food
establishments
Retail workers

1979–2004

QE (2×2) and
regression
QE (2×2) and
regression
Regression

Negative

All workers

1959–1999

Regression

None

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
a
Quasi experiment.

2003–2005

Variable
Avg. monthly
hours (calcs.
total)
Longitudinal FTE based on
avg. weekly
hours
Panel
Aggregate usual
hours
Panel
—

Longitudinal

FTE hours in
last pay period
Firm-year
Longitudinal FTE hours in
last pay period
State-month
Panel
Weekly hours
(avg. of all and
employed)
Country-year, Aggregate time Total hours
region-year
series
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Table 3.3 Studies of Industries (U.S. Data)

Hours of Employment 127

Lang (2007) identify serious problems with this framework, but each
study also contains regression results that are based on either a measure of the fraction affected or the wage gap, and these do not suffer
from these problems. Even and Macpherson (2014) use the canonical
framework of Neumark and Wascher (1992) to study the effect of the
tipped minimum wage on tipped workers in the restaurant sector; they
also present estimates of the effect of the nontipped minimum wage on
this group, as well as the effect of both types of minimum wage on nontipped restaurant workers. Vedder and Gallaway (2002) and Belman
and Wolfson (2010) use U.S. data from the BLS-EEH survey. They differ in their sample period, in the degree of aggregation used to define
both the industry and the time period for each observation, and in their
statistical approaches. Sabia (2009a), which we have already seen in
this chapter, uses the CPS to construct a state-year panel of retail workers. Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003) and Orazem and Mattila
(2002) both rely on data from privately commissioned surveys of a
group of business firms.12
As part of their survey of restaurants in the San Francisco Bay
area, Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) asked about the number of fulland part-time employees, and the average for each group of the number
of weekly hours worked. From these values, they calculate the total
number of hours for each establishment before and after the minimum
wage increase and divide by 40 to get “full-time equivalent employment.” To capture the effect of the minimum wage, what they call
“treatment intensity,” they calculate the fraction affected, which was
zero for both restaurants outside San Francisco and small restaurants in
San Francisco. They then regress full-time employment-employment
on treatment intensity. Over a variety of samples (differing primarily
in the restaurants for which treatment intensity is zero, but also considering full-service and fast food restaurants separately), the estimated
effect is always positive and never statistically significant (indeed,
rarely as large as the standard error).
Both Powers (2009) and Persky and Baiman (2010) use data on fast
food establishments in Indiana and Illinois that they jointly collected
(Powers, Persky, and Baiman 2007) to study the effects of the Illinois
increases in the minimum wage of 2004 and 2005. Powers writes, “The
raison d’être of this project is to collect hours data at the establishment
level” (p. 377). Both explore this with a wage gap measure, calculated
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as the percentage increase in ex ante starting wages needed to comply
with the ex post minimum wage, and Powers also considers the fraction
affected. Persky and Baiman (2010) consider both the change in fulltime equivalent hours and its establishment size-weighted growth rate
as dependent variables.13 Powers reports estimates from several closely
related specifications; the signs on each of the minimum wage measures
are positive slightly more often than they are negative, and none are statistically significant. Persky and Baiman report results for each of their
dependent variables, with and without Indiana in the sample (where
the establishments were not affected by the minimum wage increases).
With Indiana in the sample, the coefficients on the minimum wage are
negative and statistically insignificant for each dependent variable. With
it removed from the equation, the estimated effect on each dependent
variable is positive, and in the equation with the growth rate of hours as
the dependent variable, the coefficient is statistically significant.
Even and Macpherson (2014) use information in the CPS to identify
individuals employed in the restaurant industry, distinguishing between
those likely to be subject to the tipped minimum wage and those subject
to the regular minimum wage (hereafter, “the minimum wage”). Similar
to Neumark and Wascher’s approach, they aggregate the data within
each state and quarter into a single observation and estimate an equation
that resembles those of Neumark and Wascher (1992), with a similar list
of controls, except that it includes not one but two contemporaneous
minimum wage variables, one for each type of minimum wage. Their
dependent variable is total (usual) hours. To control for time-varying
state-specific factors, one of their sets of estimates comes from using
the log-difference of hours between tipped and nontipped workers as
the dependent variable. Each of their sets of estimates (tipped workers, nontipped workers, and the log-difference) includes a long sample
(1990:1–2011:4) and a short one (1994:2–2007:3) trimmed to exclude
the recession at each end of the period. For each sample, Even and
Macpherson estimate a specification with state-specific time trends and
another without them because of skepticism that they are appropriate.
All but one of the point estimates are negative, and most are bigger
than their counterparts in the employment equation, but only one out
of the two dozen estimates (2 minimum wage variables × 2 samples ×
2 specifications × 3 dependent variables) is statistically significant: that
for the tipped minimum wage and tipped workers. This is not especially
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compelling evidence that the tipped minimum wage is an important influence on total hours of tipped employees, or that the minimum wage is
an important influence on total hours worked in the restaurant industry.
Although we have already touched on Sabia’s (2009a) analysis, its
primary focus, the retail sector, puts it squarely in this section. For total
hours in retail, the point estimates of the hours elasticity are roughly
−0.1, and the regression coefficients on which they are based are statistically significant at the 0.01 level in more than half the specifications,
and at the 0.05 level in all but one of the rest.14
Recall from Chapter 2 that in their study of the effect of the increases in Iowa’s minimum wage in the early 1990s, Orazem and
Mattila (2002) analyze two types of data: 1) county-level aggregates
that the state of Iowa collects in conjunction with the Unemployment
Insurance program, and 2) data that they themselves collected about
firms and employees in the retail and nonprofessional services sectors.
In the former, Orazem and Mattila report moderately elastic responses
of hours for each part of the sample, roughly −1.1 in each case over
both one quarter and one year, i.e., 10 times as large as the estimated
employment elasticities.15 With the individual-level data, they estimate
a wage equation to measure workers’ to the minimum wage in order to
identify workers who would be earning less than the minimum wage
had it not risen. The reported hours elasticities are generally even larger,
ranging from about −1.1 to −1.5, about two- to three-and-a-half times
as large as the corresponding employment elasticities. The implication
of these estimates is that during this period, when the minimum wage in
Iowa rose by nearly 40 percent, weekly hours of those who would have
been earning less than $4.65 in 1992 fell by roughly 45 percent to 60
percent. According to their estimates, some of this occurred through job
loss, but even for those who remained employed, hours fell (though by
less than this proportion). They give no indication either in the text or
the table about the precision of the estimate of hours elasticities.
Belman and Wolfson (2010) analyze the response of total hours in
about two dozen low-wage industries to the national minimum wage
in the United States, using monthly data for the period 1972–1998,
and giving special attention to modeling the dynamic behavior of the
series analyzed.16 To summarize the impact, they perform a dynamic
out-of-sample analysis over all the industries, comparing what actually
did occur with what their estimates imply would have happened if the
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minimum wage had increased by 10 percent in September 1998 (from
$5.15/hour to $5.67/hour). The maximum decline in hours occurs about
nine months later, −0.5 percent in June 1999, but this rebounds sharply
the following month to −0.1 percent, and fluctuates close to this value
for the more than three and a half years that follow. Except for that one
month, the point estimate is always less than a standard deviation from
zero. That is, they report a statistically insignificant elasticity of −1 percent four and a half years after the increase and for almost every month
during this period.
Vedder and Gallaway (2002) use annual aggregate hours data for
1959–1999 to gauge the effect of the minimum wage. The three series they use are total hours in the private, nonagricultural sector of the
economy, and both total and overtime hours in manufacturing. These
sectors are considerably broader than those typically studied in the minimum wage literature, since it is widely believed that at the historical
levels of the minimum wage in the United States, effects will be detectible only in relatively homogeneous categories of low-paid workers,
industries, or demographic groups. They give very little information
about the time aggregation of the data used, but whether it is annual or
monthly, one would expect to see testing for unit roots and cointegration and, depending on the outcomes of the tests, perhaps differencing
or lagged dependent variables.17 For all three regressions, the minimum
wage coefficient is both negative and associated with large t-statistics,
but the lack of information about the data and the estimates themselves
makes it hard to interpret these results.
Summary of Results Based on U.S. Data
Studies of the response of hours worked to the minimum wage
report results for the United States that are all over the place. For teenagers, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) report point estimates
of elasticities that are both miniscule and statistically insignificant.
Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) report elasticity point estimates that
are 5–10 times as large, but only the largest (for teenage girls) are statistically significant, and Sabia’s (2009a,b) results range in size from
roughly the largest of Orrenius and Zavodny’s (2008) to more than
half again as large (all presumably statistically significant). Turning to
groups other than teenagers, Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) do not detect
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a statistically significant hours elasticity for immigrants who lack a high
school diploma; in his study of single mothers who lack a high school
diploma, Sabia (2008) finds elasticities that are roughly twice the size
as those he reported for teenagers. The sectoral studies are in nearly as
much disagreement. The four that examine restaurants (Dube, Naidu,
and Reich 2007; Even and Macpherson 2014; Persky and Baiman 2010;
Powers 2009) find no effect on hours. Sabia (2009b) reports a small
effect in the broader sector of retail, and Orazem and Mattila (2002)
report very large effects on hours in the even broader sector of retail
and nonprofessional services. In a collection of low-wage industries
that overlaps that broader sector (but does not include it), Belman and
Wolfson (2010) report a tiny negative effect on hours that is statistically insignificant. Using data for the entire macroeconomy, Vedder and
Gallaway (2002) report statistically significant, negative coefficients on
the minimum wage but do not appear to have addressed likely problems
related to serial correlation.

OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Types of Workers
Young workers
Table 3.4 lists five studies that report estimates of the effect of the
minimum wage in countries other than the United States on the working
hours of youth. We limit our discussion to two of these because each of
the other three has serious problems that undercut any faith in either the
point estimates or statistical inference based on them.
In their analysis of the substantial increase in the effective minimum
wage for teenagers in New Zealand, Hyslop and Stillman (2007) apply
both a difference-in-differences framework and a regression analysis to
individual-level data similar to the CPS ORG data. The first indicates
that employed 16–17-year-olds experienced a 20 percent increase in
hours worked and those aged 18–19 experienced a 6 percent increase,
both statistically significant. In combination with the absence of statistically significant negative employment outcomes, this indicates no

Study
Hyslop and Stillman
(2007)
Pacheco (2011)
Böckerman and
Uusitalo (2009)b

Effect:
elasticity (SE)

Target
group

0.49

Teenagers

Negative

Minimum
wage youth
Youth
workers in
retail trade
Teenage
workers
15–16year-olds

None

Pereira (2003)c

Negative

Shannon (2011)d

None/
negative

Country

Sample
period

Analytic
approach

Unit of
observation

New
Zealand
New
Zealand
Finland

1998–2003

1991–1996

QE

Firm-year

Portugal

1986–1989

QE

Firm-year

Canada

1976–2003

QE

Individualyear

1986–2004

QEa,
Individualregression
year
Regression Individual-qtr.

Data
structure
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Table 3.4 Youth (Foreign Data)
Variable

Panel

Hours worked
last week
Repeated
Usual
cross section weekly hours
Panel
Regular weekly
working hrs.
Panel

Average
monthly hours
Repeated
Actual hours
cross section
worked if
employed

NOTE: Youth refers to those younger than 25; teenagers are 16–19.
a
Quasi experiment.
b
Böckerman and Uusitalo (2009) doubt that they have adequately controlled for trends in employment and labor force participation.
c
Portugal and Cardoso (2006) report that Pereira (2003) is not representative of the population of firms from which it is drawn, and that
employment trends of teenagers in the sample and population are quite different.
d
Although Shannon (2011) reports standard errors clustered by province, this technique is ineffective with so few clusters.
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decrease in total hours. We can put these figures together with the increases in the effective minimum wage, 41 percent for 16–17-year-olds
and 69 percent for 18–19-year-olds, to derive elasticity measures for
the hours responses: +0.49 for the younger age group, and +0.09 for the
older age group (no standard errors available).
Results from the regression analysis are murkier. Estimates when
business cycle controls are not included indicate hours effects of similar
magnitude and degree of statistical significance as the difference-indifferences analysis. Inclusion of the business cycle variable, which an
F-test indicates to be appropriate, turns the hours effect negative though
insignificant for those aged 18–19. For those aged 16–17, the point
estimates of the effect remain positive, but the only one that remains
statistically significant is for the year following the second increase;
those for the years following the first and third increases become much
smaller, and their standard errors become much larger.18 Combining both
the absence of an initial employment effect and the eventual small negative employment effects with the effect on conditional average hours
leads to the conclusion that total hours increased. Hyslop and Stillman
(2007) interpret this as a “positive labour supply response by teenagers
(particularly 16–17-year-olds) to the minimum wage increases that was,
at best, partially accommodated by the demand side . . .” (p. 227).
Pacheco’s (2011) analysis, also examined more fully in Chapter 2,
briefly considers the effect of the minimum wage on hours. She reports
that for teenagers aged 16–17 who find the minimum wage binding,
usual weekly hours falls by 19 hours; the figure for the comparable
group aged 18–19 is 17 hours; for those aged 20–24, 11 hours; and
those aged 25–29, 27 hours. She does not give enough information to
calculate the effect either for all teenagers or for all members of any
of these groups (e.g., for all aged 16–17, not just those for whom the
minimum wage was binding), and given compositional employment effects that some studies have reported (also discussed in Chapter 2), it
is easily conceivable that total hours of work for any of these groups,
especially those of teenagers, are not affected.19
Other low-wage workers
Table 3.5 lists three articles—Connolly and Gregory (2002),
Stewart and Swaffield (2008), and Robinson and Wadsworth (2007)—

134 Belman and Wolfson

that consider several groups of workers in the United Kingdom who
were earning wages lower than the National Minimum Wage (NMW)
immediately before it went into effect on April 1, 1999. All three apply
a difference-in-differences framework to individual-level data, defining
the treatment group as employed individuals who fit a certain demographic profile. The comparison groups are defined to be similar to the
treatment group but not affected by the NMW. All three studies rely on
usual, not actual, hours of work, and because they compare hours for
individuals who were employed in both periods, they examine hours
conditional on employment, which, as previously mentioned, does
not translate directly to total hours of employment unless there are no
changes in the number of jobs.20
Connolly and Gregory (2002) use two annual surveys to study the
effect on women’s hours of the introduction of the NMW: the New
Earnings Survey (NES), which, with periodic updates, has used the
same large sample of workers for many years, gathering information
from their employers; and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS),
a smaller survey that tracks the same households across many years.
They consider data from both surveys because of their complementary
strengths and weaknesses. The NES, while very broad and inclusive, is
likely to miss workers who are very low-paid and part time, and those
who have recently started new jobs. Though smaller, the BHPS is less
likely to suffer from these particular problems. The data that Connolly
and Gregory use begin in 1994 and continue through autumn 2000
for the BHPS, and through spring 2001 for the NES. They compare
women who had been earning less than the NMW before its introduction with those who had previously been earning up to 10 percent more
than the NMW. Once they include the various control variables available in each data set, they find statistically insignificant effects on hours
worked (negative in the NHS data, positive in the BHPS data). Other
studies to which they refer have analyzed these data sets and found no
effect on the total number of jobs, which suggests that “there was no
effect on total hours” is a reasonable conclusion.
Stewart and Swaffield (2008) examine the hours response of lowpaid workers of both sexes and also use two different surveys because
of complementary features, the annual NES from 1994–2000 and the
quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 1997:Q1–2000:Q3. In this
case, the complementary features are the greater frequency of the LFS
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versus the much larger sample size and greater reliability of data in the
NES. Each of these surveys includes many if not all of the same individuals from one period to the next. In the LFS, individuals appear for
five consecutive quarters, and in each quarterly survey, 20 percent of
the sample is individuals who appear for the first time, and another 20
percent is individuals who appear for the last time. This 40 percent of
the sample is the only part that Stewart and Swaffield use, the first and
last quarter in which an individual appears in the LFS. Their (primary)
comparison group is those who were earning between the NMW and 10
percent more at the time of its introduction, and they use two treatment
groups: those who were earning less than the NMW at the time of its
introduction, and the subset who in addition specifically experienced
wage increases.21
Stewart and Swaffield (2008) define an initial effect and a lagged
effect of the NMW for both data sets. The initial effect is calculated
from the difference between the year’s worth of surveys immediately
before and the year’s worth immediately after the NMW went into effect. The lagged effect is based on the first and second years’ worth of
surveys after the NMW’s effective date. Because of differences in the
frequency with which the two surveys are administered, this leads to
differences in the definitions of the measured effect. What are the implications of these differences in how the initial and lagged effects are
measured? Unless a large part of any response occurs within the first
month following the implementation of the NMW, the NES-based measure of its initial effect is more accurately characterized (and referred
to) as the immediate effect. Both of the LFS-based measures, not only
the LFS-based lagged effect, are better compared to the NES-lagged
effect than to the NES-initial effect.22
For each combination of sex, type of effect, and way of measuring
hours worked, where sex is male or female, type of effect is initial or
lagged, and hours measure is total hours or straight time hours (i.e., with
overtime and without overtime, respectively), Stewart and Swaffield
(2008) present 8 difference-in-differences point estimates for the NES,
and 12 for the LFS.23 For men, all but one of the point estimates of
the immediate effect (i.e., the NES-based measure of the initial effect)
are positive, and none are statistically significant. For women, all point
estimates of the immediate effect are negative, all those for total hours
are statistically significant, and all those for straight-time hours are sta-

Hours of Employment 137

tistically significant when the treatment is limited to those whose wages
actually rose to be in compliance with the NMW. Based strictly on the
range of statistically significant point estimates, total hours fell by about
35 minutes per week for all women previously earning less than the
NMW, and for those women whose wages rose to be in compliance,
total hours fell by just a bit more than one hour per week while straight
time fell by between 40 and 50 minutes per week.
Over the year following the increase, we can compare differencein-differences estimates of the LFS initial effect and the NES lagged
effect for both sexes. The estimated hours effect for men is predominantly negative but not statistically significant (based on the LFS) or
uniformly negative (based on the NES). The NES indicates declines
over the course of the year of between 80 minutes and 110 minutes per
week in total hours for all men, and between 75 minutes and nearly
two hours per week in straight-time hours. For men whose wages rose
to be in compliance with the NMW, the point estimates of the decline
range from about 110 minutes per week to 140 minutes per week in
total hours and from about 100 minutes to 140 minutes per week in
straight time. For women, the NES point estimates of the lagged effect
are also statistically significant but smaller in size, perhaps due to the
considerably larger immediate impact: for all women, declines range
from about 80 to 90 minutes per week in total hours and from about 65
to 80 minutes per week in straight-time hours. For women, the point
estimates from LFS data are negative more often than not, but none are
statistically significant.
Finally, the LFS-based difference-in-differences lagged effect is
mixed. All but two of the point estimates for men are negative (both for
total hours), but none of those for total hours is statistically significant.
Nearly all the point estimates of the effect on men’s straight-time hours
are both negative and statistically significant. These indicate a decline
in straight time ranging between 2 hours 20 minutes and nearly 3 hours
40 minutes per week for all men, and between 3.5 and 4.0 hours per
week for those whose wages rose to be in compliance with the NMW.
For women, all the LFS-based lagged estimates are negative, but only
one is statistically significant.
Stewart and Swaffield (2008) mention some measurement issues
that raise questions about robustness of the LFS results. They also report estimated impacts on hours based on a wage gap that are roughly
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the same size, at the average value of the wage gap as those estimated
by difference-in-differences when the difference-in-differences estimates are statistically significant (but are often of the opposite sign
when the difference-in-differences estimates are not statistically significant). Because they believe the wage gap to be more vulnerable to
measurement errors than mere sorting of individuals into treatment and
control groups, they interpret the wage-gap results as merely confirming the difference-in-differences ones.
How to make sense of this plethora of results? For neither survey
does the estimate of the most immediate effect indicate a reduction in
men’s hours, but both do indicate a decline over the half year (LFS) or
year (NES) after that. For women, there is evidence of an immediate
decline in their hours (NES), but little thereafter. Stewart and Swaffield
(2008) conclude that “in broad terms the evidence presented in this paper suggests strongly that the introduction of the minimum wage led
to a reduction in the paid working hours of both male and female lowwage workers” (p. 165).24
Robinson and Wadsworth (2007) use the LFS to focus on the response of second-job holding to introduction of the NMW, and along
the way they also examine the hours response of those who held two
jobs. Their working hypothesis is that the only reason for holding two
jobs is that one cannot work as many hours (and earn as much) as desired in only one of the jobs available. When the NMW was introduced,
several effects were possible. If neither hours nor employment at the
primary job changed, then those who both worked at two jobs and experienced a wage increase in the primary job may well have reduced their
hours at the second one. If hours at the primary job declined (and more
paid hours at the secondary job were available), then hours worked in
secondary jobs may have increased. Their analysis compares those who
earned less than the £3.60 NMW in the year before it became law—
roughly the lowest decile of wage earners—with those who earned up
to £4.20—roughly the second decile.25 Robinson and Wadsworth report
that those in this treatment group worked roughly 1.3 hours less per
week at the main job than before the NMW (relative to the comparison
group) whether or not there was a second job. This was about a 5 percent reduction in hours (i.e., average hours before the NMW was about
26 hours/week for the treatment group) and was statistically significant
at a 5 percent level.
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Two of these three studies report small, statistically significant reductions in weekly hours for low-wage workers. With respect to the
exception, Connolly and Gregory (2002) and Stewart and Swaffield
(2008) raise the possibility that the treatment group is too broadly defined. When Stewart and Swaffield narrow their treatment group to
those whose wages actually increased to be in compliance with the
NMW, those point estimates that were previously statistically significant become larger, but the estimates that are not statistically significant
are largely unaffected by the sample used; this appears to weaken their
explanation of the difference. All three analyses focus on different
demographic groups, and the one that Connolly and Gregory (2002)
examine, low-paid women, is a subset of the one that Stewart and Swaffield (2008) study; a priori, it seems likely that hours of low-paid women
would be more responsive than those of all low-paid workers, not less.
Sectoral Studies
Machin, Manning, and Rahman’s (2003) study of the care home
sector in the United Kingdom, using data for individual establishments,
has been discussed in Chapter 2. The minimum wage varies only over
time; to introduce variation across firms, they rely on the number of employees making less than the minimum wage in each firm. They detect
a negative hours effect that is about as strong as the jobs effect, suggesting that those still employed are working the same amount and that
the full adjustment in hours is due to reduction in staffing. As shown
in Table 3.6, they provide several elasticity estimates (but no standard
errors for them), and the more reliable ones, because derived from regressions with various control variables, range between −0.2 and −0.4,
depending on the minimum wage variable used.

SUMMING UP
Where does this leave us? The clearest pattern is the negative impact on hours that three of the four studies of the introduction of the
NMW in the UK report.26 The two studies of low-wage earners find statistically significant, if small, declines in hours worked. Robinson and

Effect:
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Wadsworth (2007) report a decline of about 1.3 hours per week (roughly
5 percent) among low-wage earners with two jobs in the year following the introduction of the NMW. Stewart and Swaffield (2008) report
a similar figure among all low-wage earners in the two years following the introduction. A reasonable conclusion is that the total number
of hours worked declines. Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003) is a
simple, direct study of the minimum wage that uses data constructed for
precisely the purpose of studying the effects of the minimum wage, and
it also finds a negative hours response, with average elasticities ranging
between −0.2 and −0.4 for hours in the home care industry.
Five studies examine the effect of the minimum wage on the working hours of youth and two examine the effect on hours of other groups.
Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) and Sabia (2009a,b) detect negative
hours responses using the state-level panels and associated analytic
framework that Neumark and Wascher (1992) introduced to this line
of research. Orrenius and Zavodny report an elasticity of −0.3 for the
working hours of teenage girls (but none for either teenage boys or for
all teenagers), Sabia (2009b) reports somewhat larger effects for the
hours of all teenagers, as does Sabia (2009a) for the hours of teenagers in the retail sector. Based on repeated cross sections of individuals,
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011) report that they too find a statistically significant, negative response of teenage girls’ working hours
when they use the same analytic framework, but that when they include
controls that allow for more careful matching of treatment and control
regions, the responses become not only not statistically significant but
also much smaller (i.e., not practically significant). The two analyses of
other demographic groups report very different results from each other.
Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) find no effect on the hours of immigrants
without a high school diploma. Sabia (2008) reports a very large effect
on hours for single mothers without a high school diploma (estimated
elasticities of roughly −1.0), an outlier so much larger than any other
estimates that it needs careful reexamination to understand what underlies it. At this point, the balance of results leans slightly toward there
being no detectible effect on hours of teenagers or other U.S. groups
studied, weighting more heavily those studies that are both more recent
and more carefully constructed.
Of the sectoral studies, Belman and Wolfson (2010) find only a brief
effect on hours that quickly dissipates. Machin, Manning, and Rahman
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(2003) report negative elasticities on the hours worked in home care establishments in the range of −0.2 to −0.4. Vedder and Gallaway (2002)
report a negative result, but their use of very large aggregates and apparent inattention to serial correlation leaves its reliability up in the air.
Standard errors do not accompany the elasticity estimates reported in
Sabia’s (2009a) study of the retail industry or Orazem and Mattila’s
(2002) study of single-establishment Iowa firms. It appears that in the
United Kingdom, both employees in at least one low-wage industry
and members of low-wage groups worked fewer hours following the
introduction of the NMW.
In conclusion, it appears that the NMW did lead to reductions in
hours of various groups in the United Kingdom. It is not evident that
increases in the minimum wage in the United States have led to similar effects in recent years, but further work would be necessary before
accepting this with the level of confidence one would like. A useful
methodological exercise that would enable better understanding of this
issue is a careful comparison of the effect of the minimum wage on
usual hours and hours last week, and in conditional and unconditional
hours.

Notes
1. In this chapter we refer to both of these employment measures as “jobs” to distinguish them from those measures for which some measure of hours worked is
central, referred to as “hours.”
2. Card and Krueger (1994, 2000) consider full-time equivalents (as does Giuliano
[2013]). This is based not on an underlying measurement of hours but on a formula for aggregating full-time and part-time workers.
3. Except for Stewart and Swaffield (2008), each study reports that wages did indeed
rise following the minimum wage increase(s) examined (for Couch and Wittenburg [2001]), refer to Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg [2000] on this point).
In what follows, the minimum wage elasticity of hours is included if either the
authors reported it or it is possible to calculate a meaningful elasticity at average
values of the relevant variable from reported information.
4. Conditional hours means average hours conditional on being employed. Unconditional hours is the average hours worked per teenager for all teenagers, whether
or not employed.
5. Sabia (2009b) is not clear about the hours variable used, but Sabia (2009a), a companion piece that includes some of the same results, contains an explicit statement
to this effect. Since 1994, the CPS has allowed respondents not to specify a value
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6.

7.

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

for usual hours but to answer that they vary. In 2012 this group constituted only
4 percent of the employed labor force but a much larger fraction of the low-wage
labor force: 10 percent of employees who earned no more than 125 percent of the
2012 minimum wage. Because those who report variable hours have a missing
value for this variable, they are effectively excluded from analyses that rely on
usual hours. This may substantially affect the estimated coefficients if they are the
group whose working time is reduced in response to the change in the minimum
wage. Use of the actual hours data—which, in reasonably large samples, would
be an accurate measure of employee average hours, including those with variable
hours—would avoid this problem.
This is a bit peculiar when juxtaposed to their employment results; the only negative employment effect is for teenage boys. Teenage boys lose jobs, but those who
remain employed experience a (statistically insignificant) rise in hours. Teenage
girls do not lose (a statistically significant number of) jobs but do experience a
statistically significant decrease in hours.
This is the effect for all individuals. When they consider the response of average
hours conditional on employment, they find that those for teenage girls decline but
that those for teenage boys increase, suggesting some substitution toward teenage
boys.
Sabia (2009b) does not mention the 1993 survey redesign that resulted in a very
discontinuous hours variable. To the extent that the redesign resulted only in a
discontinuity in the variable and not in any other measurement differences, this
may pose no problems for the specifications.
“Hours” is one of the outcome variables that Neumark and Nizalova (2007) consider. Because of the problems with this analysis that are described in Chapter 2,
it is not considered further here.
Having described their analysis in detail in Chapter 2 and briefly in the preceding
section on teenagers, there is no need to repeat it here.
Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska (2011) consider hours worked as an outcome
variable, but because their analysis relies on a convenience sample, it is of questionable generality.
Refer to the discussion of these studies in Chapter 2 for a more detailed description of the data that they use.
Powers (2009) is not explicit about the dependent variable in her regressions, but
it appears to be the change in full-time equivalent hours, not the growth rate (p.
368).
The exception is his most elaborate specification, in which he both controls for
serial correlation and includes state-specific time trends, as recommended in Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2010). Sabia (2009a) is uncomfortable with this
specification, saying that “state trends may, in fact, be capturing retail employment variation that the model seeks to explain” (p. 88).
The estimated elasticities are statistically significant, but they do not provide the
information necessary for us to test the hypothesis that elasticities are (not) larger
than one in magnitude.
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16. The use of aggregate hours gets more directly at the volume of employment and
sidesteps issues raised by the choice of either conditional or unconditional average hours.
17. Table 4 in Vedder and Gallaway (2002), which presents the relevant results and
is labeled “OLS results . . .” contains a row labeled “ARIMA.” This may indicate
modeling of residual serial correlation but is left unexplained; if it does, then the
estimation is not OLS, contradicting its labeling. No other residual diagnostics of
the type one would expect with time-series data are presented.
18. For this group, the first two minimum wage increases were each nearly 20 percent,
and the third was much smaller.
19. In Chapter 2 we discussed some econometric problems with Pacheco’s (2011)
analysis, and that discussion applies to her estimates of the hours response; they
are affected by selection bias, and the standard errors have not been adjusted for
the heteroscedasticity associated with using an estimated value for the likelihood
of being bound. The failure to allow for selection effects in a sample that includes
both the employed and the nonemployed may account for the very large impact
of hours.
20. Although the British surveys distinguish between usual and actual hours, we do
not know if they have the same coding rules and issues, as discussed for the studies using CPS data.
21. Stewart and Swaffield (2008) are concerned that Connolly and Gregory (2002)
may have found no hours effects because the treatment group defined to include
all who were initially earning less than the NMW is too broad. Suspecting less
than perfect compliance, Stewart and Swaffield restrict the treatment group to be
those for whom employers’ compliance is not doubted, but it turns out to make no
important difference to their estimates.
22. The questions in the annual NES refer to April. The NMW went into effect on
April 1, 1999. The measurement of the initial effect of the NMW using data from
the NES is based on the difference between April 1999 and April 1998; i.e., whatever change happened within the first month after the NMW went into effect. The
lagged effect measures any additional response in the year following. As a quarterly survey, the LFS-based measurement of the initial effect responds to changes
over an entire year after the NMW went into effect: the differences between four
pairs of quarters where each of the quarters within each pair are separated by a
year and straddle the implementation of the NMW. The first increase in the NMW
occurred on October 1, 2000. To avoid contaminating measurement of the lagged
effect of the implementation of the NMW with this first increase, Stewart and
Swafford (2008) use only two pairs of quarters: 1999Q2 and 2000Q2, and 1999Q3
and 2000Q3. Thus, the LFS-based initial effect is the average difference in hours
in the year following the implementation of the NMW compared to hours from the
year before its implementation, while the NES-based initial effect is the difference
in the first month after compared to the same month a year earlier. The NES-based
measure of the lagged effect is the difference in hours in the thirteenth month following implementation and the first month afterward, while the two periods used
for the LFS-based measure of the lagged effect start at the same time as the cor-
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24.

25.
26.

responding periods in the NES measurement but continue for another five months
after the NES periods end. As a result of these differences in timing, the two do
not measure quite the same thing.
These different estimates reflect different definitions of the comparison group, the
real wage deflator, and so on. The term that Stewart and Swaffield (2008) use for
straight time is basic paid hours.
Had Stewart and Swaffield (2008) included basic descriptive statistics for each
data set, at least for average hours and average wage (both straight time and total)
by sex, it would be easy to calculate the average effect of the NMW on gross
weekly pay and thus determine whether the NMW was a net benefit for low-wage
workers. Stewart (2002, 2004b) reports that the introduction of the NMW had no
apparent impact on employment.
In studying the response of hours, it is not obvious that the usual caveats about
this comparison group when studying employment are appropriate, that turnover
of higher-paid workers is typically less than for lower-paid ones.
Connolly and Gregory’s (2002) study of part-time working women is the exception.

4
Meta-Analysis
Meta-analysis is a body of techniques for combining many statistical studies to determine an overall result. T. D. Stanley has written
extensively on a particularly useful and straightforward technique,
metaregression (Stanley 2001, 2005, 2008; Stanley and Doucouliagos
2012; Stanley and Jarrell 1989), as well as two recent applications to
the minimum wage (de Linde Leonard, Stanley, and Doucouliagos
2013; Doucouliagos and Stanley 2009). This section begins with a brief
description of the technique, drawing heavily on these articles, followed by a discussion of these two recent meta-analyses of minimum
wage research, and concludes with our own metaregression analysis of
the literature covered in Chapters 2 and 3.
When confronted with results from many studies of the same phenomenon, summarizing them or combining them altogether into a single overall result can be a challenge. The first problem is that they must
all be measuring the same thing and all must present the results in the
same units, or at least in a way that the metaresearcher can put them
into the same units. Once past this hurdle, an obvious way to aggregate
results is to calculate their average value, and with some complications,
this is what metaregression does. The complications arise from recognizing that for a variety of reasons, estimates are not all created equal,
and that it is therefore not appropriate to give equal weight to all results
in calculating the average.
Publication bias, an issue that Card and Krueger (1995) raise in their
discussion of the earlier pre-NMWR literature on the minimum wage, is
one reason for not treating all results as equally important. Publication
bias means that the probability of a paper’s being published depends on
the results it reports. It can occur for reasons that are nefarious, such as
journal editors’ refusing to publish papers in which results do not toe
a party line, or, as is more widely suspected, for reasons that are less
so, where a scarcity of journal pages leads editors to reject papers as
uninteresting because their results are indeterminate (i.e., not statistically significant) or they are deemed too insufficiently novel or inge-
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nious. For whatever reason, attempts to generalize without accounting
for publication bias give rise to biased meta-estimates of an effect by
overcounting certain results and excluding others.
Even absent publication bias, differences in standard errors are
another reason for not treating all results as equally important. Imprecisely estimated values are of less value in understanding and evaluating an effect than those that are measured with greater precision
(Stanley 2001) and should not be given equal weight in any evaluation.
Finally, estimated effects may differ systematically because of differences in statistical framework, data source, data period, unknown
and unrecognized actions of particular authors in analyzing the data
(Stanley 2001), and others too numerous to mention. Identifying which
of these factors are important and accounting for them in the metaanalysis make it possible to understand the source of differences in the
estimated values.
We can chart the progress of this argument with a series of equations, in the process of which the specific technique of metaregression
will become clear.1 We start with a simple average in Equation (4.1):
(4.1)

Effect k = Effect + uk = b1 + uk ,

where Effectk is a meta-estimate, an overall estimate of the size of the
effect in question. In the case of publication bias for statistical significance, a correlation will exist between the size of the effect and its standard error, standard errork in Equation (4.2):
(4.2)

Effect k = b1 + b0 SE k + uk .

This equation will remove that form of publication bias from
the meta-estimate of the effect size. However, it still treats estimates
equally regardless of their precision. The differences in estimates’ precision shows up as heteroskesdasticity. A correction for that is to weight
by the inverse of the standard error, which is equivalent to dividing the
variables in Equation (4.2) by the standard error, standard errork:
(4.3a)

Effect k
b
= 1 + b0 + v k .
SE k
SE k
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Dividing the estimate by its standard error turns the variable on
the left of Equation (4.2) into the t-statistic; that is, Equation (4.3a)
becomes
(4.3b) t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + v k ,
where the precision of an estimate is defined to be the reciprocal of its
standard error (since this describes how precisely the estimated value
has been measured. Equation (4.3b) is the basic equation for performing a metaregression on a set of estimates to derive a meta-estimate.2
Because of differences in data source and type, analytic framework,
idiosyncracies of individual researchers, and so forth, Stanley recommends including binary categorical variables to control for these. If
these variables form a vector, Xk, Equation (4.3b) then becomes
(4.4)

t k = b0 + X k B0 + (b1 + X k B1 ) precisionk + v k ,

where B0 and B1 are the metaregression vectors of coefficients for Xk.
With deviation coding of the Xk variables, b1 remains the meta-estimate
of the average effect.3 Finally, to minimize the role of the metaanalyst’s judgment in determining the results, Stanley argues for including all estimates from each analysis, with dummy variables by study or
researcher to prevent a large number of estimates from a single source
from unduly influencing the results.

A BRIEF SURVEY OF RECENT PRIOR WORK
Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) present results of a meta-analysis
of the literature that examines the response of teenage employment
in the United States to the minimum wage.4 They identify nearly 100
studies of U.S. employment and the minimum wage between the early
1960s and 2007, of which they exclude 31 from their analysis either
because inclusion would have made the sample too heterogeneous
for their purposes, or because it was not possible to gather both an
elasticity and its standard error from information in the study. What
remain are 64 studies with nearly 1,500 point estimates of the employ-
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ment elasticity. They report results from several metaregressions that
differ in specifications and estimation methods, and whether or not
they include moderator variables, i.e., control variables. In the simple
model, without the dummy variables to control for different factors,
they find strong evidence of publication bias that is large enough, by
itself, to make the average reported t-statistic negative and significant at a 0.1 level. Of greater interest, they find that the (appropriately
weighted) average employment elasticity is −0.01, or as they put it,
“A 10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment by
about 0.10 percent . . . but even if this adverse employment effect were
true, it would be of no practical relevance. An elasticity of −0.01 has no
meaningful policy implications. If correct, the minimum wage could be
doubled and cause only a 1 percent decrease in teenage employment”
(pp. 415–416).
Interpreting results from Doucouliagos and Stanley’s (2009) more
elaborate specifications requires some thought. Their control variables reflect the type of data used in each analysis as well as modeling
choices of each analyst. When all of these variables are zero (a not very
meaningful situation), the immediate employment response reflects a
statistically significant positive elasticity of about 0.1. A discussion of
what constitutes “best practice” follows to suggest which control variables should be taken into account in determining the “best estimate” of
the elasticity. Varying definitions give meta-estimates of the elasticity
ranging between −0.003 and 0.065, none of which, they believe, are
economically meaningful.
De Linde Leonard, Stanley, and Doucouliagos (2013) perform a
similar meta-analysis of 16 studies of data from the United Kingdom
that appeared between 1994 and 2010. From these 16 studies, they
gather 236 elasticities and standard errors. In addition, they perform a
parallel analysis based on partial correlation coefficients (PCC), which
can be derived from t-statistics calculated from OLS standard errors.5
This allows them to triple the number of observations to 710. Because
partial correlation coefficients are less familiar than elasticities, it is not
obvious what is a large value; according to the authors, “Cohen’s [1988]
guidelines suggest that any correlation less than 0.1 is negligible.” In
their simplest models, incorporating a correction only for publication
bias (corresponding to Equation [4.2]), they report a meta-estimated
employment elasticity of −0.01 that is not statistically significant, and
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a meta-estimated value of the PCC that is roughly one-thirtieth to onetwentieth the minimum size to be considered of practical significance.
In a more complicated specification, similar to Equation (4.4) but not
weighting to correct for heteroskedasticity, they examine a variety of
dimensions that may systematically affect estimates and conclude that
the only detectible effect in the United Kingdom of the minimum wage
on employment is in the care home sector, where it is both statistically
significant and just barely large enough to pay attention to: a PCC of
−0.1 in the large sample and an employment elasticity in the older consensus range for teenagers, −0.15.
Overall, these two meta-analyses of research on the minimum wage
conclude that the minimum wage has a detectable but negligible effect
on young workers in the United States and no detectible effect in the
United Kingdom outside of the care home sector, where it is just large
enough to notice.

THE DATA
We began with the 74 analyses of the employment effect published
from 2001 onward that are discussed or listed in Chapter 2, and the six
additional pieces in Chapter 3 that were not also in Chapter 2. From
these, 23 either had estimates of elasticities and their standard errors,
or it was possible to calculate them from information in the study, for a
total of 439 point estimates (see Table 4.1).
Before turning to further quantitative results, it will be useful to consider some graphs to get a feel for the data. Suppose we have estimates
and their standard errors from a collection of reasonably well designed
and executed studies. Absent publication bias, if we were to use each
estimate’s standard error to standardize it around the true effect and plot
this value against its degrees of freedom, the resulting graph should
look like random draws from the family of central t-distributions (the
specific distribution identified by the number of degrees of freedom).
As the degrees of freedom increase, the estimates should cluster more
tightly around the true value, and at each value the estimates should
be (roughly) normally distributed, symmetric about, and more densely
clustered near the true value and thinning out away from it. Of course,
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Table 4.1 Studies Included in the Metaregression
Number of
observations
28

Authors
Addison, Blackburn,
and Cotti (2009)

Title
Do Minimum Wages Raise Employment?
Evidence from the U.S. Retail-Trade Sector

Addison, Blackburn,
and Cotti (2012)

The Effect of Minimum Wages on Labour
Market Outcomes: County-Level Estimates
from the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector

6

Addison, Blackburn,
and Cotti (2013)

Minimum Wage Increases in a Recessionary
Environment

24

Addison and Ozturk
(2012)

Minimum Wages, Labor Market
Institutions, and Female Employment: A
Cross-Country Analysis

Allegretto, Dube, and
Reich (2009)

Spatial Heterogeneity and Minimum Wages:
Employment Estimates for Teens Using
Cross-State Commuting Zones

14

Allegretto, Dube, and
Reich (2011)

Do Minimum Wages Really Reduce
Teenage Employment? Accounting for
Heterogeneity and Selectivity in State Panel
Data

64

Dube, Lester, and
Reich (2010)

Minimum Wage Effects across State
Borders: Estimates Using Contiguous
Counties

27

Dube, Naidu, and
Reich (2007)

The Economic Effects of a Citywide
Minimum Wage

30

Bazen and Marimoutou Looking for a Needle in a Haystack?
(2002)

4

Belman and Wolfson
(2010)

The Effect of Legislated Minimum Wage
Increases on Employment and Hours: A
Dynamic Analysis

Campolieti, Gunderson, Minimum Wage Impacts from a
and Riddell (2006) Prespecified Research Design: Canada
1981–1997
Dodson (2002)

The Impact of the Minimum Wage in West
Virginia: A Test of the Low-Wage-Area
Theory

Even and Macpherson
(2014)

The Effect of Tip Credits on Earnings and
Employment in the U.S. Restaurant Industry

Hyslop and Stillman
(2007)

Youth Minimum Wage reform and the
Labour Market in New Zealand

4

68

30

6

30
4
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Authors
Keil, Robertson, and
Symons (2009)

Title
Univariate Regressions of Employment on
Minimum Wages in the Panel of U.S. States

Neumark, Schweitzer, Minimum Wage Effects throughout the
and Wascher (2004) Wage Distribution

Number of
observations
13
1

Orazem and Mattila
(2002)

Minimum Wage Effects on Hours,
Employment, and Number of Firms: The
Iowa Case

21

Orrenius and Zavodny
(2008)

The Effect of Minimum Wages on
Immigrants’ Employment and Earnings

36

Zavodny (2000)

The Effect of the Minimum Wage on
Employment and Hours

4

Pereira (2003)

The Impact of Minimum Wages on Youth
Employment in Portugal

1

Potter (2006)

Measuring the Employment Impacts of the
Living Wage Ordinance in Santa Fe, New
Mexico

5

Sabia (2009b)

The Effects of Minimum Wage Increases
on Retail Employment and Hours: New
Evidence from the Monthly CPS Data

Singell and Terborg
(2007)

Employment Effects of Two Northwest
Minimum Wage Initiatives

15

4

this standardization presumes more knowledge than we have, since the
true value is unknown.
In lieu of this, a commonly used graph is the funnel plot, a scatterplot in which the dimension of the x-axis is the estimated parameter
value and the y-axis is the precision.6 If there were no publication bias,
the estimates should be distributed symmetrically about the true value
of the measured effect, and the mean should be a good measure of the
true effect. Because the standard error generates a loose bound on the
distance an estimate falls from the true effect, more precise estimates
should be more densely clustered around the mean. The plot should
roughly resemble an inverted funnel, one resting on its top. In particular, asymmetry indicates publication bias toward a desired result, while
thick tails and a thinly populated central section are indicative of a tendency toward rejection of statistically insignificant results.
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Figure 4.1 Employment and Hours Elasticities vs. Precision
215
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Figure 4.1 is a simple funnel plot displaying all the estimates used
in the meta-analysis, using a logarithmic scale on the vertical axis.
The ticks on the x-axis indicate the raw mean, −0.075, and the minimum and maximum elasticities, −1.49 and 1.44, respectively. Vertical
dashed lines indicate the mean and the location of +/−1 standard deviation around the mean.7 The ticks on the y-axis indicate the minimum
precision, 1, the median precision, 11, the values at the 90th and 99th
percentiles, 27 and 91, respectively, and the maximum precision, 215.
The raw mean is slightly negative, and with 55 percent of the estimates
lying to the right of the mean, the median (−0.052) is slightly larger
than the mean. With only one-sixth of the estimates (74) lying farther
than one standard deviation from the mean (39 to the left, 35 to the
right), the distribution is densely populated near its mean. The mean lies
slightly to the left of the median, indicating a slight asymmetry, a slight
left skew that reflects not only that more points are far away from the
mean to the left than to the right but also that these distant points to the
left are on average somewhat farther from the mean than their counterparts to the right. Looking along the y-axis, the minimum precision is 1,
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and half of the estimates have precision less than 11. Only 10 percent
have precision greater than 27. The most precisely estimated elasticities
are (with one exception) just to the right of the mean, suggesting that
the precision-weighted mean is likely to be closer to zero than the raw
mean.
The remaining figures use modified funnel plots to display different
aspects of the data. Figure 4.2 separately identifies estimates with and
without reliable standard errors, where “unreliable” is taken to mean
that the critiques of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Donald and Lang (2007) are likely to be pertinent.8 Most of the estimates
lacking reliable standard errors are less than the mean, and several are
a standard deviation or more less than the mean. The bulk of the exceptions to this statement are a group of very low precision estimates less
than a standard deviation more than the mean. A handful of the unreliable estimates are apparently precisely estimated. Controlling for reliability in the metaregression is likely to reduce the magnitude of the
average elasticity.
Figure 4.2 Distinguishing between Reliable and Unreliable Standard
Errors: Employment and Hours Elasticities vs. Precision
215
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Figure 4.3 Eating and Drinking Places and Youth: Employment and
Hours Elasticities vs. Precision
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Figure 4.3 compares results from studies of the restaurant industry
with those of youth employment (studies belonging to neither group
appear in the background). With 278 observations, these two groups
make up more than five-eighths of the sample: 165 (three-eighths)
youth and 113 (one-quarter) eating and drinking establishments. The
two distributions are somewhat shifted horizontally relative to each
other, with the distribution of youth estimates to the left of that for estimates of eating and drinking establishments. One hundred of the youth
estimates are less than the overall unadjusted mean, and only 65 are
larger than it; 13 are more than 1 standard deviation less, and only 2 are
more than 1 standard deviation more than the mean. The most precisely
estimated elasticities belong to the youth group. Eighty-two of the eating and drinking estimates are larger than the mean, but only 2 are more
than one standard deviation above the mean, and none are more than
one standard deviation below the mean.
Figure 4.4 compares estimates from quasi experiments, which
have a clearly defined comparison group with those from regressions,
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Figure 4.4 Distinguishing between Quasi Experiments and (Other)
Regressions: Employment and Hours Elasticities vs. Precision
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which do not. At the extreme, the most precisely estimated elasticities
are from regressions, and moving away from the extreme, very precise
estimates are more likely to be from regressions. The most extreme
negative elasticity estimates are entirely from regressions, and the most
extreme positive elasticity estimates are from quasi experiments.
Finally, there is some evidence of publication bias due not to a preferred result but to a preference for statistically significant results (what
Stanley [2005] designates type II selection). Standardizing the estimates around the true value should result in a t-distribution, symmetric
and with roughly 5 percent of values greater in absolute value than 1.96.
Of course, the true value is not known, but we can select some plausible values: zero, the raw mean, the raw median, the precision-weighted
mean, and the precision-weighted median. Table 4.2 shows the percentage of observations in each tail for each centering value and for each
way of counting (unweighted and precision-weighted). When zero is
the centering value, more than 20 percent of the observations are less
than −1.96, and nearly 6 percent are greater than 1.96; the correspond-

Value used to center the elasticities
Zero
Raw mean −0.075
Raw median −0.054
Precision-weighted mean −0.053
Precision-weighted median −0.031

% less than −1.96
22.8
10.0
12.3
12.3
15.7

Precision-weighted Precision-weighted
% greater than 1.96 less than −1.96 (%) greater than 1.96 (%)
5.9
34.8
4.8
16.2
8.6
32.5
12.1
10.8
24.8
11.4
10.8
23.7
9.3
15.4
18.4

NOTE: Elasticities have been standardized by centering around the values in the second column and dividing by the estimated standard
errors. Absent publication selection for statistically significant results, we should expect to see roughly 2.5 percent in at least two adjacent
cells on one side or the other of the vertical lines.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.2 Percentage of Observations in the Left and Right Tails
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ing precision-weighted counts are about 35 percent and nearly 5 percent. Of course, this may well be because the true value of the elasticity
is not zero. However, the other possibilities are little better. With the
raw mean, more than 25 percent of observations are out beyond these
two borders (more than 40 percent for precision-weighted counts), and
at just under 25 percent, the number is little improved for the median
(the precision-weighted count drops to about 35 percent). Using the
precision-weighted mean or median generates similar percentages in
the tails. In no case are roughly 5 percent of observations in any of
these definitions of the tails, and with a few exceptions, symmetry is not
apparent. This suggests either that many (not all) editors put a thumb
on the scale in favor of statistically significant results or at least that
authors believe this to be the case.

METAREGRESSIONS—PART 1
Ensuring the Quality of the Metaregression Estimates
The actions required to correct the raw sample mean in order to
derive a meaningful meta-estimate of the effect of the minimum wage
on employment can be distinguished as either technical or substantive. The primary considerations in the technical category, corrections
needed for a reliable result, include adjusting for study or author effects,
for estimates’ precision, and for publication bias. Study (author) effects
include both lack of independence across estimates from the same
study (author) and variation in the number of estimates from each study
(author). The main type of substantive control concerns whether the
estimated effects for youth and for the food and drink sector differ from
the overall effect. It will be useful to present these separately so that the
consequences of the technical factors can be understood. For clarity of
presentation, new equations will be presented below.
Equation (4.5a), describing the meta-estimated effect uncorrected
for anything is the same as Equation (4.1):
(4.5a) Effect k = Effect + uk = b1 + uk
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Correcting only for the estimates’ precision gives equation (4.5b):9
(4.5b) t k = b1 precisionk + v k
Neither of these two equations corrects for publication bias. Equation (4.5a) has only a constant term (no standard error term), and when
that constant term is weighted by precision to generate Equation (4.5b),
the result is an equation with only one right-hand-side variable, precision, and in particular, no constant term. The effect of correcting for
publication bias, which will introduce the standard error into Equation
(4.5a) and a corresponding constant term in Equation (4.5b), is being
deferred until after considering the effects of weighting the observations and of controlling for the imbalance resulting from the widely
varying number of observations drawn from each study.
Equations (4.6a) and (4.6b) build on (4.5a) and (4.5b) by adjusting
for lack of independence among estimates from the same study:10
S

(4.6a) Effect k = b1 + ∑ cs Study s + uk
s= 2

S

(4.6b) t k = b1 precisionk + precisionk ∑ cs Study s + v k
s= 2

The Studys variables are indicator variables that are 1 if observation k comes from study s, −1 if from study 1, and 0 otherwise; that is,
they are indicator variables for the study, coded in deviation form and
where the excluded indicator corresponds to the first study. The difference between Equations (4.5a) and (4.6a) is that (4.6a) includes fixed
effects for the study. The difference between Equations (4.5b), which
includes no constant term, and (4.6b) is that (4.6b) includes interactions
between precision and the study indicator variables. Finally, Equations
(4.7a) and (4.7b) use random effects (μs ) and random coefficients (ρs),
respectively, to control for study effects:
(4.7a) Effect k = b1 + uk , uk = µs + ek
(4.7b) t k = b1 precisionk + v k , v k = ρs precisionk + wk
Table 4.3 presents estimates of b1 from these equations. The raw
mean, the employment elasticity of the minimum wage as meta-

Meta-Analysis 161
Table 4.3 Preliminary Meta-Estimates of the Minimum Wage Elasticity, b1
Equation estimated
b1
t
−5.77
Equation (4.5a): raw mean
−0.075
(0.013)
−9.57
−0.034
Equation (4.5b): precision-weighted mean
(0.004)
−5.76
−0.092
Equation (4.6a): (4.5a) + study fixed effects
(0.016)
−7.04
−0.050
Equation (4.6b): precision-weighted (4.6a)
(0.007)
−2.67
−0.099
Equation (4.7a): (4.5a) + study random effects
(0.037)
−3.30
−0.050
Equation (4.7b): precision-weighted (4.7a)
(0.015)
−3.62
−0.089
Mean of the unweighted estimates (4.5a, 4.6a, 4.7a)
(0.024)
−4.52
Mean of the precision-weighted estimates (4.5b, 4.6b, −0.044
(0.010)
4.7b)
−4.25
Precision-weighted mean of the unweighted estimates −0.085
(0.020)
−5.60
−0.040
Precision-weighted mean of the precision-weighted
(0.007)
estimates
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

estimated by Equation (4.5a), is −0.075 with a very small standard error
of 0.013. When precisely estimated values are given more weight, Equation (4.5b), the effect drops by more than half to −0.034, and the standard error drops by more than three quarters to 0.004. When we return
to the unweighted mean but instead control for lack of independence
within each study using fixed effects (4.6a), the meta-estimated effect
rises by about one-fourth from the first value of −0.075 to −0.092 (and
the standard error rises by about the same proportion, to 0.016). The
corresponding precision-weighted value (4.6b) is −0.050, half again as
large as the initial weighted mean and one-third less than the initial
unweighted value; the standard error is about twice as large as that for
the original weighted value, although the meta-estimate remains statistically significant by any standard (including particle physics) and

162 Belman and Wolfson

is about half that of the raw mean. Using random effects (or random
coefficients) in place of fixed effects leads to point values of the metaestimates that are about the same size as those from the corresponding fixed-effects equations, and to standard errors that are about twice
as large.11 Despite the increase in the standard errors, the coefficients
from the specification with random effects are strongly statistically
significant.
Two patterns in Table 4.3 stand out. One is that precision weighting reduces the meta-estimated magnitude of the employment effect.
The other is that identifying estimates that are from the same study and
accounting for their lack of independence increases the magnitude of
the meta-estimated effect. The first result is consistent with an editorial preference for statistically significant results, at least when they are
negative. The second tells us that in this sample, studies that presented a
large number of usable estimates (usable in that they included both elasticities and their standard errors) had smaller average magnitudes of the
estimates than those that presented fewer. It may be well be that authors
of studies that presented evidence against a negative minimum wage
effect provide a larger set of robustness and sensitivity tests (or their
editors or referees requested them) than those with more conventional
results.12 Including study controls will prevent this issue, if it exists,
from contaminating the metaregression.
The next step is to incorporate the standard error term into the equations to control for any bias toward statistically significant results in the
sample. This gives the following six equations (the first being the same
as Equation [4.2]):
OLS models:
(4.5aʹ)

Effect k = b1 + b0 SE k + uk

(4.5bʹ)

t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + v k

Fixed-effects models:
(4.6aʹ)

S

Effect k = b1 + b0 SE k + ∑ cs Study s + uk
s= 2

(4.6bʹ)

S

t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + precisionk ∑ cs Study s + v k
s= 2
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Random-effects models:
(4.7aʹ)

Effect k = b1 + b0 SE k + uk , uk = µs + ek

(4.7bʹ)

t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + v k , v k = ρs precisionk + wk

In addition, the controls for study should be interacted with standard
error:
(4.6aʹʹ)
(4.6bʹʹ)

S

S

s= 2

s= 2

Effect k = b1 + b0 SE k + ∑ cs Study z + SE k ∑ d s Study s + uk
 S

t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + precisionk  ∑ cs Study s 
 s= 2

S

+ ∑ d s Study s + v k
s= 2

(4.7aʹʹ)

Effect k = b1 + b0 SE k + uk , uk = µs + γ s SE k + ek

(4.7bʹʹ)

t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + v k , v k = ρs precisionk + δ s + wk

Table 4.4 displays estimates of b1 and b0 from these equations.13 Start
with the estimates of b1. In Equations (4.5aʹ)–(4.7bʹ), the patterns identified in Table 4.3 are present but weaker. With one slight exception in
each pattern, precision weighting results in meta-estimates of smaller
magnitude than not weighting, and accounting for the study effects
raises the meta-estimate.14 Including the standard error in the equation to control for (some types of) publication bias reduces the metaestimate of the effect size in each of these six equations relative to their
Table 4.3 counterparts. Third, including terms for the interaction of the
study effects with the standard error, Equations (4.6aʹʹ)–(4.7bʹʹ), has
little effect on the first of the fixed-effects meta-estimates (compare
[4.6aʹ] and [4.6aʹʹ]) but increases the precision-weighted fixed-effects
meta-estimate by a factor of three ([4.6bʹ] and [4.6bʹʹ]). In the randomeffect specifications, this change has little effect on the point values of
the meta-estimates, although the standard errors drop. The final noteworthy point is that the only meta-estimates in this table that are not
statistically significant are three of these last four estimates for b1, those
that include the fixed-effect interactions, and the unweighted metaestimate with the random coefficients for standard error.
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Table 4.4 Meta-Estimates of the Minimum Wage Elasticity of Employment,
b1, When a Correction for Publication Bias Is Included
b1 (Minimum
wage elasticity of
employment)
b0
MetaMetaestimate
t
estimate
t
−0.426 −4.02
Equation (4.5aʹ)
−0.020 −1.05
(0.106)
(0.019)
−0.487 −4.39
Equation (4.5bʹ): precision-weighted −0.022 −5.12
(0.111)
(0.004)
(4.5aʹ)
−0.300 −2.76
Equation (4.6aʹ): (4.5aʹ) + study fixed −0.059 −2.96
(0.109)
(0.020)
effects
−0.599 −4.67
Equation (4.6bʹ): precision-weighted −0.018 −1.86
(0.128)
(4.6aʹ)
(0.010)
−0.060 −1.62
−0.341 −3.16
Equation (4.7aʹ): (4.5aʹ) + study
(0.037)
(0.108)
random effects
−0.568 −4.45
Equation (4.7bʹ): precision-weighted −0.022 −1.32
(0.017)
(0.128)
(4.7aʹ)
Equation (4.6aʹʹ): (4.6aʹ) + fixed
−0.051 −1.18
−0.292 −0.32
effects interacted w/standard error
(0.043)
(0.925)
0.193
0.57
Equation (4.6bʹʹ): precision-weighted −0.048 −2.59
(0.019)
(0.339)
(4.6aʹʹ)
−0.059 −2.91
−0.276 −1.00
Equation (4.7aʹʹ): (4.7aʹ) + random
(0.020)
(0.277)
coefs. for standard error
Equation (4.7bʹʹ): precision-weighted −0.025 −2.03
−0.603 −2.39
(4.7aʹʹ)
(0.012)
(0.252)
−0.050 −0.96
−0.327 −0.99
Mean of the unweighted estimates
(0.052)
(0.331)
(4.5aʹ, 4.6aʹ, 4.7aʹ, 4.6aʹʹ, 4.7aʹʹ)
−0.027 −0.93
−0.413 −0.80
Mean of the precision-weighted
estimates (4.5bʹ, 4.6bʹ, 4.7bʹ, 4.6bʹʹ, (0.029)
(0.515)
4.7bʹʹ)
−0.048 −1.84
−0.345 −1.60
Precision-weighted mean of the
(0.215)
unweighted estimates (4.5aʹ, 4.6aʹ, (0.026)
4.7aʹ, 4.6aʹʹ, 4.7aʹʹ)
−0.024 −2.28
−0.487
2.81
Precision-weighted mean of the
(0.173)
precision-weighted estimates (4.5bʹ, (0.011)
4.6bʹ, 4.7bʹ, 4.6bʹʹ, 4.7bʹʹ)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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So far, we have seen a range of meta-estimates for the minimum
wage employment effect, from −0.018 to −0.099. Only four of the
meta-estimates, however, are from equations that control for dependence within study, precision, and (a type of) publication bias: Equations (4.6bʹ), (4.6bʹʹ), (4.7bʹ), and (4.7bʹʹ). In this group, the range is
about one-third as large, from −0.022 to −0.048 (Equations [4.7bʹ] and
[4.6bʹʹ], respectively). The mean of these four is −0.028 (and the precision-weighted mean is slightly smaller in magnitude, −0.026).

METAREGRESSIONS—PART 2
Finally, we turn to equations in which we control for not just the
study effects but for several other factors that are common to various
studies and which we suspect may systematically affect the estimated
elasticities. To this end, we include (deviation coded) indicator variables for whether the estimates:
1) have reliable standard errors, i.e., are free of the problems that
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) identified, as well as
those that Donald and Lang (2007) identified (called reliable);
2) are based on a quasi experiment or a more conventional regression framework (called regression);
3) are based on data from the United States or from other countries (called USA);
4) are based on employment or on hours of employment (called
employment).15
We present two sets of results, all of which include these variables.
One set also includes (deviation coded) indicators for whether the estimates are based on data for teenagers and young adults (youth) or for
eating and drinking places (E&D).
The addition of the first four variables, but not the last two variables, Youth and E&D, turns Equations (4.6bʹ), (4.6bʹʹ), (4.7bʹ), and
(4.7bʹʹ) into (4.8bʹ), (4.8bʹʹ), (4.9bʹ), and (4.9bʹʹ):16
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Fixed-effects models:
(4.8bʹ)
reliable
1

b

USA
1

b

S

t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + precisionk ∑ cs Study s +
s= 2

regression
1

reliablek × precisionk + b

USAk × precisionk

regressionk × precisionk +

employment
1

+b

employment k × precisionk + v k
S

S

s= 2

s= 2

(4.8bʹʹ) t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + precisionk ∑ cs Study s + ∑ d s Study s +
reliable
1

b

regression
1

reliablek × precisionk + b

USA
1

b

USAk × precisionk

regressionk × precisionk +

employment
1

+b

employment k × precisionk + v k

Random-effects models:
(4.9bʹ)

b0 + b1 precisionk + b1reliable reliablek × precisionk +

b1regression regressionk × precisionk

+ b1USAUSAk × precisionk +

b1employment employment k × precisionk + v k
v k = ρs precisionk + wk

(4.9bʹʹ)

t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + b1reliable reliablek × precisionk +

b1regression regressionk × precisionk

+ b1USAUSAk × precisionk +

b1employment employment k × precisionk + v k
v k = ρs precisionk + δ s + wk

k indexes each estimate (observation)
s indexes the study from which each estimate is drawn.
Meta-Estimates of Overall Models
Although the literature on the minimum wage is particularly concerned with the effect of the minimum wage on young workers and
on the eating and drinking places, we start with meta-estimates of the
overall effect, and hold off considering these more specific effects until
later in this chapter. Table 4.5 provides both coefficient meta-estimates
and sums of the coefficients for Equations (4.8bʹ)–(4.9bʹʹ). The table
includes not only the meta-estimates for each equation but also two
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means of these meta-estimates, the first a simple mean, the second a
precision-weighted mean.17 Because there are so many meta-estimates,
and because we are agnostic as to which of the models (4.8bʹ)–(4.9bʹʹ)
is the “correct” model, our discussion focuses on these means and,
in particular, the precision-weighted mean. We favor the precisionweighted mean, as this places the greatest weight on the meta-estimates
that are estimated with the least variance.18 As it turns out, however,
there is little difference in the point value or statistical significance
between the two means.
Our assessments of statistical significance deviate somewhat from
the standard we have used elsewhere in this book. To this point we
have used a two-tailed 0.05 standard to assess the statistical significance
of estimates. Given that conventional economic theory suggests that
the minimum wage should have a negative effect on employment and
hours, and that this view is held by many who follow this topic, we will
also use a 0.05 test for a negative effect against the null of no effect or
a positive effect. Using these criteria, we find weak evidence of a small
negative effect on employment, but even this effect does not appear
in studies of the United States. In terms of overall effects, the United
States has a far more favorable situation with respect to the effect of
the minimum wage on employment than the balance of the countries
covered by this research.
Table 4.5 is laid out in two panels. The upper panel, panel A, reports
point estimates, standard errors, and t-statistics for the coefficients; the
lower panel, Panel B, reports similar statistics for relevant sums of the
coefficients. Panel A provides meta-estimates of the average employment and hours elasticity (hereafter the average elasticity), the additional response associated with regression-based estimates (in contrast
with those based on quasi experiments), the additional effect for estimates that likely have reliable standard errors (against those that are
likely not reliable), the additional effect for those drawn from models
of employment (vs. models of hours), and the additional effect for those
drawn from analyses of U.S. data (against the balance of the world).
The sums in Panel B address issues such as what is the effect of the
minimum wage on employment and what is the effect of the minimum
wage on employment in the United States. These sums will be the
focus of our discussion, but we first need to consider the coefficient
meta-estimates.
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Table 4.5 Meta-Estimates of the Minimum Wage Elasticity of
Employment and Hours
4.8b´
b1
t
b1regression
t
b1reliable
t
b1employment
t
b1USA
t
b1
t
b1 + b1employment
t
b1 + b1USA
t
b1 + b1employment
+ b1USA

−0.099
(0.089)
−1.12

4.8b´´
4.9b´
4.9b´´
Panel A: Coefficient estimates
−0.237
−0.041
−0.024
(0.089)
(0.019)
(0.020)
−2.65
−2.13
−1.23

Mean

Precisionweighted
mean

−0.100
(0.0645)
−1.55

−0.057
(0.0418)
−1.37

−0.006
(0.016)
−0.37

−0.020
(0.018)
−1.13

−0.018
(0.011)
−1.64

0.009
(0.014)
0.68

−0.009
(0.015)
−0.59

−0.009
(0.014)
−0.60

−0.029
(0.053)
−0.56

0.044
(0.055)
0.80

0.015
(0.017)
0.87

0.031
(0.018)
1.69

0.015
(0.040)
0.37

0.019
(0.031)
0.60

−0.011
(0.007)
−1.49

−0.006
(0.008)
−0.81

−0.013
(0.007)
−1.84

−0.008
(0.011)
−0.75

−0.010
(0.008)
−1.14

−0.010
(0.008)
−1.21

0.147
(0.106)
1.39

0.240
(0.099)
2.42

0.037
(0.020)
1.83

−0.011
(0.022)
−0.48

0.103
(0.074)
1.39

0.045
(0.047)
0.97

−0.099
(0.089)
−1.12

Panel B: Sums of coefficients
−0.237
−0.041
−0.024
(0.089)
(0.019)
(0.020)
−2.65
−2.13
−1.23

−0.100
(0.0645)
−1.55

−0.057
(0.0418)
−1.37

−0.110
(0.089)
−1.24

−0.243
(0.089)
−2.73

−0.054
(0.019)
−2.88

−0.032
(0.019)
−1.72

−0.110
(0.064)
−1.71

−0.067
(0.041)
−1.63

0.048
(0.037)
1.29

0.003
(0.039)
0.08

−0.004
(0.022)
−0.19

−0.035
(0.022)
−1.58

0.003
(0.031)
0.10

−0.003
(0.029)
−0.10

0.037
(0.037)
1.01

−0.003
(0.039)
−0.08

−0.017
(0.021)
−0.80

−0.043
(0.021)
−2.01

−0.006
(0.031)
−0.21

−0.013
(0.028)
−0.45

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Before discussing this table, it is useful to clarify the interpretation of the coefficients when the indicators for regression, reliability,
employments, and USA are meta-estimated in deviation form. The
overall meta-estimate, b1, is the grand mean across all of the categories
of controls. Consider the meta-estimate of b1 for Equation (4.8bʹ) in
the upper left-hand corner of Panel A. Putting aside its lack of statistical significance, the coefficient of −0.099 indicates that a 10 percent
increase in the minimum wage would result in a 0.99 percent reduction
in employment and hours. If we want to know the effect on employment
alone, that is, the elasticity drawn only from estimates based on models
of employment and excluding those drawn from models of hours, we
need to add the coefficient on b1employment, −0.011, to b1. With this addition, the mean effect on employment of the 10 percent increase would
be a 1.1 percent decline in employment. If we wished to know the effect
on hours, we would subtract the coefficient on b1employment to find that the
effect on hours would be a decline of −0.88 percent. Given this coding,
we are most interested in the sums of coefficients, and most of our discussion will be about the sums in Panel B.
Turning briefly to Panel A, we are faced with five coefficients for
each of four equations. Although the meta-estimates are often similar
across equations, this is not always the case. For example, estimates of
the average elasticity, b1 , take on the values of −0.099, −0.237, −0.041,
and −0.024, and the t-statistics range between −2.65 and −1.12. We do
not have strong priors about which of the equations provide the correct
meta-estimates, and it therefore seems appropriate to average them. We
calculate two means: the first a simple average, the second weighted by
the precision of the meta-estimate. Allowing for statistical significance,
there are not meaningful differences between the two.
Considering specific coefficient meta-estimates and their means,
meta-estimates of the average elasticity show the largest range in both
coefficients and statistical significance. The fixed-effects models produce the largest effects, but only the (4.8bʹʹ) coefficient meets the 0.05
test. The random-effects coefficients are far smaller in magnitude and
(4.9bʹ) reject the null of no effect, but (4.9bʹʹ) does not. Neither the
simple mean nor the precision-weighted mean are statistically significant, but the simple mean is not greatly below a 0.05 one-tailed test criteria. Most of the other coefficients—b1regression, b1reliable , and b1employment—
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are very small, less than 0.01 in absolute value, and not significant; b1USA
is an exception to this statement.
Consider next the sums reported in Panel B, starting with the elasticity employment, b1 + b1employment.19 The simple mean indicates that
employment declines by 1.1 percent when the minimum wage is raised
by 10 percent and the precision-weighted mean is −0.67 percent; the
former passes a one-tailed 0.05 test, and the latter is very close to passing. The meta-analysis then indicates a small negative employment
effect across all studies without regard to the country of origin.
The estimates of b1USA are considerably different from those for the
other controls. It is positive in three out of four cases, and in those
instances it is virtually the mirror image of the average elasticity. This
is particularly striking for Equation (4.8bʹʹ), in which the meta-estimate
of b1 is −0.237 and the meta-estimate of b1USA is 0.240. Both are statistically significant, and, as a result, when the average elasticity for the
United States is calculated in Panel B, b1 + b1USA, it is a tiny, statistically
nonsignificant 0.003; in the United States, a 10 percent increase in the
minimum wage is meta-estimated to cause a 0.03 percent decline in
employment (whether measured by jobs or hours). Both the simple and
precision-weighted means of b1USA are sufficiently similar in absolute
value but opposite in sign to the b1 means that the meta-estimated elasticity in the United States is, in essence, 0.0.
These meta-estimates also find that the minimum wage does not
affect employment in the United States. Meta-estimates of b1 + b1employment
+ b1USA, the minimum wage elasticity of employment in the United
States (i.e., excluding studies of hours), are in the bottom row of Panel
B. The point estimates range between +0.037 and −0.043; the means
indicate that a 10 percent rise in the minimum wage would result in
a change in employment between +0.06 percent and −0.13 percent,
but neither is close to passing a conventional standard of statistical
significance.
The meta-estimates in Table 4.5 show that increases in the minimum wage do not affect employment and hours, but there is evidence
of a small negative effect on employment alone. This effect is, however,
an effect in countries other than the United States. The meta-estimated
effect on employment in the United States, b1 + b1USA, is both vanishingly small and not statistically significant in even the most generous
test. These initial results set the stage for investigating the effect of the
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minimum wage on two groups of particular interest, younger workers,
and those working in the eating and drinking places.
Separating Out the Effects for Youth and Eating and
Drinking Places
Next, we include the Youth and E&D variables in the equations to
allow for different elasticities for young workers and for eating and
drinking places:
Fixed-effects models:
(4.10bʹ)

S

t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + precisionk ∑ cs Study s +
s= 2

b1reliable reliablek × precisionk + b1regression regressionk × precisionk +
b1USAUSAk × precisionk

+ b1employment employment k × precisionk +

b1YouthY Youthk × precisionk + b1E & D E& Dk × precisionk + v k
(4.10bʹʹ)

 S
 S
t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + precisionk  ∑ cs Study s  + ∑ d s Study s +
 s= 2
 s= 2
reliable
regression
b1
reliablek × precisionk + b1
regressionk × precisionk +
b1USAUSAk × precisionk

+ b1employment employment k × precisionk +

b1YouthY Youthk × precisionk + b1E & D E& Dk × precisionk + v k
Random-effects models:
(4.11bʹ) t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + b1reliable reliablek × precisionk +

b1regression regressionk × precisionk

+ b1USAUSAk × precisionk +

b1employment employment k × precisionk +
b1YouthY Youthk × precisionk
v k = ρs precisionk + wk

+ b1E & D E& Dk × precisionk + v k
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(4.11bʹʹ) t k = b0 + b1 precisionk + b1reliable reliablek × precisionk +

b1regression regressionk × precisionk

+ b1USAUSAk × precisionk +

b1employment employment k × precisionk +
b1YouthY Youthk × precisionk
+ b1E & D E& Dk × precisionk + v k
v k = ρs precisionk + δ s + wk
Estimates Separating Out the Effect of Youth and Eating and
Drinking Places
Table 4.6 presents the coefficient estimates for Equations (4.10bʹ)–
(4.11bʹʹ). As we are interested in parsing out not only the average elasticity but also the effect on employment of youth and in eating and
drinking places, Table 4.7 presents sums that include the terms b1youth,
b1E & D, and b1employment.
Parallel to Table 4.5, Table 4.6 presents the estimates for the seven
coefficients of interest. Estimates of the additional effect on youth, b1youth,
are small, ranging from +0.022 to −0.029, and none are statistically significant even in a one-tailed 0.05 test. In contrast, the estimated additional effect on eating and drinking places, b1E&D, which range between
+0.001 and −0.093, are negative and statistically significant in three of
the four specifications. The mean values hover around −0.04, and the
precision-weighted mean is significant in a one-tailed 0.05 test. The
average elasticity, b1, is marginally more negative compared to the estimates in Table 4.5, which do not include indicator variables for youth
or eating and drinking places, but the means remain small in magnitude
and do not achieve statistical significance in a one-tailed 0.05 test. The
point estimates for b1regression, b1reliable, b1employment, and b1USA barely move,
with no changes occurring to the left of the second decimal position.
Panel B1 in Table 4.7 presents the same sums as Panel B in Table
4.5. As the youth and eating and drinking places indicators are in deviation form, the sums are very similar to those for the same terms in Table
4.5. The estimates of the employment elasticity, b1 + b1employment, differ
from the Table 4.5 estimates at the second or third decimal point, and
both means are statistically significant in better than a one-tailed 0.05
test, as before. A 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is estimated
to reduce employment between 1 percent and 0.64 percent. Studies of
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Table 4.6 Meta-Estimates of the Minimum Wage Elasticity of
Employment and Hours for Models with Controls for Youth
and Eating and Drinking Places

b1
t
b1regression
t
b1reliable
t
b1employment
t
b1USA
t
b1youth
t
b1E&D
t

4.10b´
−0.112
(0.086)
−1.30

4.10b´´
−0.222
(0.088)
−2.53

4.11b´
−0.043
(0.020)
−2.16

4.11b´´
−0.035
(0.022)
−1.60

Mean
−0.103
(0.063)
−1.63

Elasticityweighted
mean
−0.064
(0.043)
−1.50

−0.006
(0.015)
−0.40

−0.020
(0.018)
−1.14

−0.018
(0.011)
−1.61

0.010
(0.014)
0.75

−0.008
(0.015)
−0.58

−0.008
(0.014)
−0.59

−0.015
(0.051)
−0.28

0.050
(0.054)
0.94

0.017
(0.017)
1.00

0.036
(0.019)
1.90

0.022
(0.039)
0.57

0.024
(0.031)
0.78

−0.011
(0.007)
−1.52

−0.006
(0.008)
−0.77

−0.012
(0.007)
−1.77

−0.003
(0.011)
−0.31

−0.008
(0.008)
−0.96

−0.009
(0.008)
−1.07

0.148
(0.103)
1.44

0.218
(0.098)
2.24

0.041
(0.021)
1.95

−0.002
(0.023)
−0.11

0.101
(0.073)
1.39

0.049
(0.047)
1.06

0.022
(0.014)
1.56

−0.029
(0.022)
−1.33

−0.011
(0.011)
−1.08

−0.005
(0.012)
−0.38

−0.006
(0.015)
−0.38

−0.004
(0.014)
−0.30

−0.093
(0.023)
−3.98

0.001
(0.043)
0.02

−0.030
(0.016)
−1.92

−0.037
(0.018)
−2.05

−0.040
(0.027)
−1.46

−0.043
(0.023)
−1.84

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.

the United States produce much smaller estimates of minimum wage
effects. The two means of the estimates for b1 + b1USA are −0.002 and
−0.006, and neither is close to statistical significance. The estimates of
the employment-only elasticity, b1 + b1employment + b1USA, are −0.01 for the
simple mean and 0.014 for the weighted mean; t-statistics for both are
very small.
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Table 4.7 Meta-Estimates of the Minimum Wage Elasticity of
Employment and Hours for Models with Controls for Youth
and Eating and Drinking Places
Panel B1: Employment, hours, and U.S. coefficients
−0.112 −0.222 −0.043 −0.035 −0.103 −0.064
(0.086) (0.088) (0.020) (0.022) (0.063) (0.043)
−1.30
−2.53
−2.16
−1.60
−1.63
−1.50

b1
t
b1 + b1employment
t
b1 + b1USA

−0.122 −0.228 −0.055 −0.038 −0.111 −0.070
(0.086) (0.088) (0.019) (0.020) (0.063) (0.041)
−1.42
−2.61
−2.87
−1.94
−1.76
−1.71

t

0.036 −0.004 −0.003 −0.037 −0.002 −0.006
(0.036) (0.039) (0.022) (0.023) (0.031) (0.029)
1.00
−0.09
−0.13
−1.62
−0.06
−0.21

b1 + b1 employment
+ b1USA
t

0.025 −0.010 −0.015 −0.041 −0.010 −0.014
(0.036) (0.038) (0.021) (0.022) (0.030) (0.028)
0.71
−0.25
−0.71
−1.86
−0.33
−0.51

b1 + b1 youth
t

4.10b´
4.10b´´
4.11b´
4.11b´´
Mean
Panel B2: Sums that include the coefficient for youth, b1 youth
−0.090
−0.251
−0.055
−0.040
−0.109
(0.086)
(0.091)
(0.020)
(0.021)
(0.064)
−1.04
−2.76
−2.68
−1.86
−1.69

Precisionweighted
mean
−0.070
(0.043)
−1.64

b1 + b1 employment +
b1 youth
t

−0.101
(0.086)
−1.16

−0.257
(0.091)
−2.84

−0.067
(0.020)
−3.33

−0.043
(0.021)
−2.03

−0.117
(0.064)
−1.82

−0.078
(0.043)
−1.83

b1 + b1 USA + b1youth
t

0.058
(0.039)
1.49

−0.033
(0.045)
−0.73

−0.014
(0.023)
−0.61

−0.042
(0.024)
−1.75

−0.008
(0.034)
−0.23

−0.012
(0.031)
−0.38

b1 + b1 employment +
b1USA + b1youth
t

0.047
(0.038)
1.23

−0.039
(0.044)
−0.88

−0.026
(0.023)
−1.14

−0.045
(0.025)
−1.85

−0.016
(0.034)
−0.47

−0.020
(0.031)
−0.63
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Table 4.7 (continued)
4.10b´

4.10b´´

4.11b´

4.11b´´

Mean

Precisionweighted
mean

Panel B3: Sums that include the coefficient for eating and drinking places, b1E&D
−0.204
−0.221
−0.074
−0.072
−0.143
−0.107
b1 + b1E&D
(0.091)
(0.096)
(0.028)
(0.033)
(0.070)
(0.053)
−2.25
−2.29
−2.61
−2.19
−2.05
−2.01
t
b1 + b1 employment +
b1 E&D
t

−0.215
(0.091)
−2.37

−0.227
(0.096)
−2.36

−0.086
(0.027)
−3.14

−0.076
(0.030)
−2.56

−0.151
(0.069)
−2.18

−0.114
(0.052)
−2.21

b1 + b1 USA + b1 E&D

−0.057
(0.044)
−1.30

−0.003
(0.058)
−0.05

−0.033
(0.028)
−1.21

−0.075
(0.032)
−2.34

−0.042
(0.042)
−1.00

−0.045
(0.039)
−1.17

−0.067
−0.009
−0.045
b1 + b1 employment +
(0.043)
(0.057)
(0.027)
b1USA + b1E&D
−1.55
−0.15
−1.69
t
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.

−0.078
(0.029)
−2.70

−0.050
(0.041)
−1.22

−0.054
(0.037)
−1.46

t

The estimates of b1youth are small, and the sums that include b1youth
(Table 4.7, Panel B2) are similar to those without it (Table 4.7, Panel
B1). The means of the estimated elasticities for young workers, b1 +
b1youth, indicate that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduces
youth employment by between −0.7 percent and −1.1 percent, their
t-statistics closely straddling the value that marks a one-tailed 0.05 test
(the former not passing the test, the latter passing it). Estimates of the
youth elasticity that do not incorporate analyses of hours data, b1 + b1youth
+ b1employment, are slightly larger in magnitude and have larger t-statistics.
For the USA, values of the elasticity for youth, both with and without
observations derived from analyses of hours studies, b1 + b1youth + b1USA
and b1 + b1youth + b1employment + b1USA, indicate that higher minimum wages
do not reduce youth employment. Six of the eight coefficients and all
of the means are very small. Neither the means nor these six metaestimates are statistically significant. The other two meta-estimates are
negative and statistically significant but not large; a 10 percent increase
in the minimum wage leads employment to decline by less than 0.5
percent. Although the minimum wage is estimated to have a small nega-
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tive effect on youth across all studies, this is an issue for countries other
than the United States. Higher minimum wages are not associated with
reduced youth employment in the United States.
The minimum wage is associated with reduced employment in eating and drinking places in the full sample, but again, there is no effect
in the United States (Table 4.7, Panel B3). The average elasticity, b1 +
b1E&D, indicates that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage would
result in a decline of 1.1 percent to 1.4 percent in employment and hours;
the effect strictly on employment, measured by b1 + b1E&D + b1employment ,
is slightly greater, ranging from 1.1 percent to 1.5 percent. Again, the
effect on employment and employment and hours is much smaller in
the United States. Three of the four estimates for the effect on hours and
employment are not statistically significant in a 0.05 one-tailed test; two
of the four estimates for the employment effect are likewise not statistically significant. The means for b1 + b1E&D + b1employment + b1USA and b1 +
b1E&D + b1USA indicate that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage
would cause a decline in the corresponding measure of between 0.42
percent and 0.54 percent, but none of the means passes a one-tailed
0.05 test.20 Although the evidence for higher minimum wages being
associated with reduced employment in eating and drinking places in
the United States is stronger than the evidence for there being an effect
on young workers in the United States, it does not meet conventional
statistical tests and is small in magnitude.

CONCLUSION
In what must be the most cited review of research into the employment effect of the minimum wage, Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982)
concluded, “Time series studies typically find that a 10 percent increase
in the minimum wage reduces teenage employment by one to three percent. . . . We believe that the lower half of that range is to be preferred” (p.
524). Nearly two decades later, Brown (1999) wrote in another review,
“My reading of the new and old evidence suggests that the short-term
effect of the minimum wage on teenage employment is small. Timeseries estimates that centered on an elasticity of −0.10 moved closer
to zero in samples that included the 1980s” (p. 2154). Based on this
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meta-analysis of results from the most recent work from the NMWR,
Brown’s judgment concerning the minimum wage elasticity of employment remains valid, not just for youth but more broadly.
We have provided a very large number of meta-estimates of the
employment elasticity. The range of the simplest estimates, found in
Table 4.3, is [−0.099, −0.034], with the precision-weighted estimates
falling in the interval [−0.050, −0.034]. Including a correction for publication bias (Table 4.4) shifts the range toward zero [−0.06, −0.018],
with the precision-weighted estimates in the interval [−0.048, −0.018].
Tables 4.5–4.7 include 64 estimates of employment and employment/hours effects. Estimates and the statistical significance of the
estimates vary systematically according to the method of estimation,
the population under study, the controls, and whether employment or
employment and hours are considered. Using a weaker but appropriate standard of statistical significance than in the balance of our work,
we find some evidence that increases in the minimum wage results in
modest reductions in employment. Applying a one-tailed 0.05 standard
of significance to our more complete models, we find some evidence
that increases in the minimum wage result in very small reductions
in employment. Considering estimates that reflect the effect on both
employment and hours and on employment alone, a 10 percent increase
in the minimum wage is associated with a reduction of between 0.0
percent and −2.6 percent. Somewhat less than half of the estimates are
statistically significant, and of those, more than half find an employment decline toward the lower end of a range between −0.1 percent
and −0.03 percent. Not allowing for differences between studies of the
United States and other countries, the evidence suggests that there may
be no effect or a very small negative effect.
The means, which average across estimation methods, are somewhat easier to summarize because they reduce the sometimes substantial variance in estimates between methods of estimation. Considering
the 16 means that do not include the U.S. effect, somewhat more than
half indicate a small but statistically significant effect on employment
or employment and hours. Seven of the estimates do not meet any criteria for statistical significance, 5 meet a one-tailed 5 percent standard,
and 4 meet a two-tailed 5 percent standard or better. Statistically significant estimates fall in a range from −0.110 to −0.057, with the precisionweighted mean being consistently smaller than the simple mean.

178 Belman and Wolfson

The United States, however, faces a far more favorable situation.
Considering the 16 means of sums that include the term b1USA, a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is estimated to reduce employment
between 0.03 percent and 0.6 percent, but none of these estimates pass
even a one-tailed 0.05 test of statistical significance.21 Bearing in mind
that the estimates for the United States reflect a historic experience of
moderate increases in the minimum wage, it appears that if negative
effects on employment are present, they are too small to be statistically detectable. Such effects would be too modest to have meaningful
consequences in the dynamically changing labor markets of the United
States.
We must hedge our conclusion because a number of articles could
not be incorporated into the analysis. Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009)
excluded about one-third of the 100 studies that they identified, either
because they would make the sample too heterogeneous to be meaningful or because they lack an important piece of data to enable comparison with other studies, i.e., an employment elasticity or its standard
error. In this analysis, more than two-thirds of the 80 studies could not
be used. Heterogeneity is the hallmark of the NMWR, and if a common
measure can be calculated, it would be preferable to control for heterogeneity in the metaregression. The problem is that in the minimum
wage literature, the elasticity couplet (point estimate, standard error) is
too much a rare bird. One reason is that for some measures of the minimum wage—the fraction affected and the wage gap, which may well be
better measures in this context than the real minimum wage itself—it
is necessary to jump through more hoops in order to derive a minimum
wage elasticity of employment. However, without some common measure, and an elasticity is surely the most common measure in economics, it is not possible to compare or aggregate research results. Without
presenting some common measure as well as an estimate of its precision, the contribution to empirical knowledge of a particular piece of
research is self-limiting.
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Notes
1. This presentation draws heavily on Stanley (2001, 2005, 2008) and follows the
order in which he presents the equations.
2. Notice that with the heteroskedasticity correction, the constant term in Equation
(4.2) becomes the precision variable in Equation (4.3b), and the standard error
variable in Equation (4.2) becomes the constant term in Equation (4.3b). If, for
whatever reason, the metaregression does not include the term that corrects publication bias for statistical significance, Equation (4.3b) will have no constant term.
We return to this on p. 159 in the section titled “Metaregressions—Part 1.”
3. A good discussion of deviation coding is to be found in Chen et al. (2003).
4. In addition to metaregression, Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) present a graphical analysis that is useful in exploring publication bias. Because this issue is not of
particular interest here, beyond purging its effect so as not to distort the results of
meta-analysis, the focus is on their metaregression.
�
5. The formula is � �
,
�� � � ��

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

where t is the t-value of the estimated coefficient for the minimum wage variable,
and df is its degrees of freedom. We do not use this approach in our own analysis
as, according to the derivation in Greene (2011, pp. 36–37), the partial correlation
coefficient is related to the OLS t-statistic but not to t-statistics based on other
formulas, e.g., those derived from robust standard errors.
More robust but cruder measures of precision are sometimes used, including sample size or its square root, and the degrees of freedom,
The terminology begins to be confusing at this point. The primary variable in this
meta-analysis is a collection of point estimates of an elasticity. A very important
secondary variable is the collection of standard errors, the standard error associated with each point estimate: so far, so good. These two variables have a bivariate distribution, and each variable by itself has a mean and a standard deviation.
Because the point estimates of the elasticities are themselves means, and the standard deviation of a set of means is a standard error, the one-standard-deviation
lines in the graph indicate a standard error. This is obviously distinct from the collection of standard errors that make up the important secondary variable. For clarity, although the standard deviation associated with the lines is indeed a standard
error, that term (standard error) will refer only to the variable in this discussion
and not to the standard deviation indicated by the lines.
“Reliable” does not mean here that the standard errors are entirely or largely without problem, only that issues that Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and
Donald and Lang (2007) identified give no cause for concern.
Recall Note 4 concerning the source (or, in this case, lack thereof) of a constant
term in Equation (4.3b).
Two studies, each of which contributes only one elasticity estimate to the sample,
do not have a corresponding indicator variable in the list {2, 3, ... A}.
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Some authors were responsible for more than one study in the sample. Correcting by author-group instead of study has almost no impact on either the point estimates or their standard errors. To avoid overwhelming the reader with redundant
results, those corrected for study are presented here.
11. Clark and Linzer (2013) make two observations about the choice between fixed
and random effects, both without any claim of originality. The first is that the
random effects specification occupies the continuum between two extremes, one
identified with the pooled model and the other with the fixed-effects model.
As Gelman and Hill (2007, 258) note, . . . (the random effects estimator)
is equivalent to . . . (the fixed effects estimator) when we assume that
αj ~ N(μα, ∞)) rather than αj ~ N(μα, σ2α). In other words, the random
effects specification models the intercepts as arising from a distribution
with a finite|and estimable|variance sigma-alpha-squared, whereas the
fixed effects specification assumes the intercepts are distributed with
infinite variance. The pooled model, by contrast, implicitly assumes
σ2α = 0. (p. 4)
The second observation is the conventional wisdom that “under certain conditions [i.e., correlation between the effects and regressors], random effects models can introduce bias but reduce the variance of estimates of coefficients of interest. Fixed effects estimates will be unbiased but may be subject to high variance.”
Two common responses to this conundrum are to abjure bias and stick only to
fixed effects or to make the decision based on the results of a Hausman test. The
Hausman test is not ideal for several reasons. Based on results from their Monte
Carlo simulations, Clark and Linzer (2013) observe that it often lacks power necessary to detect the correlation that it is intended to detect. In our own experience
below comparing Equations (4.6b) and (4.7b), the difference of the covariance
matrices that is used to construct the test statistic was not positive definite, and
consequently, the test statistic could not be calculated. Most persuasively in our
view, Clark and Linzer remind us that the trade-off between bias and variance is
pervasive in statistical analysis and that some bias may be a reasonable price cost
for a sufficiently large reduction in variance; a biased estimate may well be better in a finite sample, closer to the true value of the parameter, than an unbiased
estimate with high variance. Their simulation results provide examples in support
of this point.
Rather than choose sides in this argument, we present estimates from both
fixed- and random-effects specifications, and later fixed- and random-coefficient
specifications. As we shall see in the results presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, for
simple models without any control variables for the estimates that make up our
sample, there is little difference between either the point estimates or their standard errors for otherwise corresponding models that differ on this dimension. In
the results with control variables, presented in Tables 4.5–4.7, this pattern changes.
Overall (but not uniformly), results for the parameters of interest from the fixedeffects and fixed-coefficient specifications are point estimates and standard errors
that are larger in magnitude, and t-statistics that are smaller in magnitude than
from the random-effects and random-coefficients specifications.
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12. In this case, the characterization of the phenomenon in the previous sentence is
less accurate than “studies with smaller average magnitudes of the estimates presented more of them, as well as their standard errors.”
13. A Hausman test of the random-effects model, Equation (4.7bʹ), vs. the fixedeffects model, Equation (6bʹ), was attempted, but as in Table 4.3, the difference of
the covariance matrices was not positive definite. However, for the corresponding
test with the more parameterized models, Equations (4.7bʹʹ) and (4.6bʹʹ), the test
statistic is 2.34 with a p-value of 0.13. This suggests that we have no statistical
reason for preferring one or the other of Equations (4.6bʹ) and (4.7bʹ). That we do
not reject the null hypothesis in the test comparing Equations (4.6bʹʹ) and (4.7bʹʹ)
suggests that the latter, the random-coefficients specification, is to be preferred
since it is less parameterized and more efficient. Both of the random parameter
terms in Equation 4.(7bʹʹ) have statistically significant standard deviations, each
with a t-statistic near 4, which suggests that in the event of a substantive difference
between Equations (4.7bʹ) and (4.7bʹʹ), the latter is to be preferred on statistical
grounds.
14. The exception for the consequence of precision weighting occurs in the equation
pair (4.5aʹ) and (4.5bʹ), where the magnitude of the precision-weighted estimate
of the effect, Equation (4.5bʹ), is 10 percent larger than the former. Note that the
estimate’s standard error falls by 80 percent; the estimate in Equation (4.5aʹ) is
not statistically significant, while that in Equation (4.5bʹ) is. The exception for the
consequences of including study effects occurs in the transition from Equation
(4.5bʹ) to Equation (4.6bʹ), where the point estimate falls by nearly one-fifth and
the standard error more than doubles.
15. Because the costs of varying hours of employment may differ from those of varying the level of employment, the respective elasticities with respect to the minimum wage may differ, and this allows for that possibility.
16. There are no Equations (4.8a) or (4.8b). We retain the primes and use only b to
label the equations so that the provenance of each equation is easier to trace.
17. The standard errors shown beneath each mean are calculated as the square roots
of the corresponding means of the squared standard errors (i.e., square roots of
the mean variances) in the row. This assumes that the meta-estimates have zero
covariance; since the most likely covariance is positive, these values are likely a
floor.
18. A primary concern is that many of the point meta-estimates from Equation (8b´´)
are outliers relative to the corresponding meta-estimates from the other three
specifications. Ignoring these values entirely in the calculation of the means is
one response, though perhaps an overreaction. Because the standard errors of
these meta-estimates are typically quite high, precision weighting is an alternative
approach that reduces their contributions to the means without throwing them out
entirely.
19. We do not use the coefficients for regression or reliability in our summed effects,
as these controls are not of interest in obtaining measures of the impact of the
minimum wage on employment or hours. They can be of interest in understanding
any biases associated with econometric techniques. We include the coefficient for
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the overall effect as the first entry for panel B of Tables 4.5 and 4.6 to facilitate
comparison with other summed effects.
20. One can speculate that the effect on youth employment in eating and drinking
places is quite strong. Because none of the estimates included in this analysis are
based on that conjecture, sums that include b1Youth + b1E&D extrapolate outside the
sample, so we do not pursue this.
21. Of the 32 sums of coefficients themselves, 7 pass this test for statistical significance, 6 from random-effects–random-coefficients specifications, and 8 from a
random-coefficients specification (that does not include random effects). None of
the 16 fixed-effects specifications, the specifications for which we can be reasonably certain are unbiased, are statistically significant.

5
Wages and Earnings
How do increases in the minimum wage affect wages, earnings,
and income? On its face, the answer is obvious: Those who are earning
less than the new minimum wage will see their hourly rates rise, and if
the effect on hours is not too severe, their earnings will also rise, as will
their household incomes. Once we know the effect on employment and
hours, straightforward calculations provide the answers to our question
on wages, earnings, and income. Case closed. Or is it?
The effect of the minimum wage on earnings may reach further
into the wage distribution and pose more challenging measurement issues. For example, does the minimum wage affect the earnings of those
who, prior to the increase, earned slightly more than the new minimum?
Are their wages unchanged, or do they too rise with the increase in the
minimum wage? Another issue is whether increases in the minimum
wage have a meaningful effect over time on the earnings of those affected by the minimum wage. If the pay of those at the minimum wage
rises rapidly after they are first hired, then the minimum wage can only
modestly improve their earnings trajectories and incomes over time. If
the wages of those earning the minimum wage remain close to the minimum for extended periods, an increase in the minimum wage will result
in a meaningful increase in both current and future earnings. There are
a number of such issues, and, as a result, the case is not quite as easy to
close as it seemed initially.
Our discussion of wage effects is organized around six questions:
1) How is the average wage affected by the minimum wage?
2) How does the minimum wage affect the wages of those who are
at or below the new minimum wage?
3) How does the minimum wage affect the wages of those who,
prior to an increase, were earning more than the new minimum
wage?
4) What are the dynamics of wage increases of those who are at or
are close to the minimum wage?
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5) How does the minimum wage affect the distribution of earnings?
6) How does the minimum wage affect the income of low-income
households, particularly those at or near the poverty line?
Answers to these questions provide a comprehensive portrait of the
impact of the minimum wage on wages, earnings, and income. In this
chapter we limit ourselves to the first three questions; the questions on
wage dynamics, wage growth, inequality, and poverty are addressed
in later chapters. Before turning to these three questions, we address
issues regarding measurement of wage effects and introduce some data
on the minimum wage in the United States.

MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
The interest of readers is seldom peaked with substantive discussion of definitions. However, the terms wages and earnings are used
inconsistently across studies, and it is often challenging to know what is
being measured. In order to better navigate the rough semantic terrain,
we have to define how these terms will be used in this review, and then
we discuss each of the studies using our terminology. For the purposes
of this review, wage rate refers to the straight-time hourly wage an individual is paid. Earnings is the pretax amount an employee receives in
her paychecks over some period. For those paid weekly (or biweekly or
monthly), hourly earnings would be the amount they are paid per week
(or fortnight or month) divided by the number of hours they worked that
week (or fortnight or month). For those paid by the hour, hourly earnings might also be their wage rate, but if they worked overtime at time
and one-half or better, hourly earnings might be greater than their wage
rate. While earnings can be computed for all employees, wage rates are
only available for those who are paid by the hour.1 In this review, we use
wages as a general term referring to employee pay. It encompasses both
wage rates and earnings, but, unlike wage rates or earnings, it is not a
specific measure. Payments for benefits and for the employer share of
payroll taxes are not included in any of these measures.2
A challenge to measuring the effect of the minimum wage on wages
is that observed and average wages, whether measured as wage rates or
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earnings, will almost certainly increase whether or not an increase in the
minimum wage causes any individual’s wage to increase. If wages rise
in response to an increase in the minimum wage, and if the minimum
wage is not so far below the market rate that no workers are bound by
the increase, two outcomes are possible, and both result in the minimum
wage becoming the floor on the wage structure. First, if the increase in
the minimum wage does not cause employers to lay off workers, the
case when the labor demand curve is entirely inelastic, then workers
who previously earned less than the new minimum wage have their
wages boosted to that minimum wage. Their wage rate rises, and, if
working hours are not reduced, weekly and monthly earnings also rise.
Average hourly wage rates and earnings increase.
The second, opposite case can be derived from an economic model
of a single labor market with workers of varying productivity. In the
extreme, an increase in the minimum wage would cause the layoff of
workers whose productivity was less than the new minimum wage,
all of the workers bound by the new minimum wage.3 As in the first
case, the new minimum wage is now the lowest wage rate in the labor
market. The average wage rate and hourly earnings will also have increased, and the average wage will be higher than in the case with no
layoffs. However, none of the previously bound workers will be better
off, as they are all without employment. We cannot then simply assume
that a rise in wage rates and hourly earnings following an increase in
the minimum wage corresponds to an increase in individuals’ wages.4
What would be evidence that the minimum wage increases workers’ wages and earnings? This depends in part on the structure of the
data. Longitudinal data enable the analyst to follow individuals across
minimum wage increases and to estimate the effect of the minimum on
both wage and employment outcomes for bound workers (Currie and
Fallick 1996). Both cross-sectional surveys of individuals and data aggregated by city, county, or state pose greater challenges because there
is no inherent connection between the before and after group in studies
over time, or the low and high minimum wage group in studies across
places. An increase in average wages cannot be taken as evidence that
any person is actually better off. One approach to this challenge has
been to estimate both employment and wage effects. The estimates
of employment effects can be used to determine the degree to which
higher average ex post wages are due to disemployment, rather than
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to higher wages for bound workers. If employment effects are small or
entirely missing, then the effect of the minimum wage is due in large
part to increases in wages for bound workers.5 Wolfson and Belman
(2004, 2010) explicitly consider the effects of the minimum wage on
wages, employment, and hours. This allows them to both focus on those
industries in which there is a wage effect and consider the degree to
which any wage effects are offset by declines in employment. In their
most recent study, they find that increases in the federal minimum wage
had a positive and significant effect on the average wage in 16 of 23
low-wage industries (70 percent), with little evidence of an employment effect.
Another approach to determining the effect on bound workers is
to compare the distribution of hourly wages before and after a change
in the minimum wage.6 Absent clumping in the distribution of individual productivity, wage distributions should be reasonably smooth
with little clumping of observations at any particular wage rate. This is
not entirely the case in survey data, because employers tend to pay in
round increments, and respondents tend to round their hourly earnings
to even dollar amounts. Consequently, mass points or “spikes” occur at
even dollar amounts. If an increase in the minimum wage causes bound
workers to lose their employment, then we would expect the distribution to be truncated at the new minimum wage with little or no spiking
at the point. If, on the other hand, those who are bound are moved up
to the new minimum wage, and retain their job, we would expect a
spike at the minimum wage. This occurs because employers who move
lower-wage employees up in response to the minimum wage are likely
to pay them at or close to the minimum no matter how far below the
new minimum they previously were.

WAGE DISTRIBUTION
Measurement of wage distributions is central to much of this chapter, and it is useful to define this concept, provide background on current
wage distributions, and consider descriptive evidence on spikes in recent and past distributions. A wage distribution charts the relationship
between a wage, or range of wages, and the proportion of the employed
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labor force earning that wage. Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 present these different ways of considering hourly earnings for those earning between
$3.00 and $100 per hour in 2010.7 Table 5.1, a cumulative distribution, reports the percentage of workers earning less than a given dollar
amount. The first two columns report these percentages for all respondents who report working for pay; the third and fourth column exclude
those aged 16–24 who report being enrolled in school. Within each pair
Table 5.1 The Distribution of Hourly Wages and Hourly Earnings by
Dollar Amount, 2010
Exclude full- and
All compensated employees
part-time students
Percent of Percent below Percent of Percent below
those paid
including
those paid
including
hourly earnings
salaried
hourly earnings
salaried
Earnings ($)
below
workers
below
workers
<7
1.5
2.0
1.2
1.8
<= 7.50
6.0
5.0
4.7
4.1
(minimum
wage)a
<8
9.4
7.4
7.3
6.0
<9
20.3
14.8
16.9
12.5
< 10
28.3
20.4
24.7
17.8
< 12
44.1
32.1
40.6
29.3
< 14
56.3
42.0
53.2
39.4
<15
61.0
46.2
58.2
43.7
<16
66.7
51.0
64.1
48.7
< 18
73.6
58.1
71.6
56.1
< 20
78.6
64.1
77.0
62.4
< 25
87.7
76.0
86.7
74.7
< 30
93.1
84.3
92.5
83.5
< 50
98.9
97.0
98.7
96.9
>= 100
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
The minimum wage is $7.25. Following conventional practice to allow for measurement error (i.e., inaccurate reporting), any wage reported to be between $7 and $7.50
is considered to be at the minimum wage .
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2010 CPS ORG. Calculations of average
hourly earnings (inclusive of salaried workers) do not include those who report variable hours.
a
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of columns, the first reports the distribution of wage rates for only those
who are paid by the hour; the second includes individuals who are paid
weekly, biweekly, or monthly and for whom average hourly earnings
can be computed. Hourly earnings in columns two and four are computed as the ratio of average weekly earnings to average weekly hours.8
The difference between these measures can be illustrated by looking at the row for the federal minimum wage (<= $7.50).9 Following
Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2011), we address reporting error by
creating a “thick” band that extends from $7.00 to $7.50. If we consider
those who are paid hourly without regard to whether they are enrolled
in school, 6.0 percent of workers are paid at or below the minimum
wage.10 This declines to 4.7 percent if we exclude students from the
sample (column 3). We can broaden our sample by moving from individuals who are paid hourly to all employees, including those paid
a salary. Considering the full workforce, 5.0 percent of the workforce
earns the minimum wage or less; if we exclude students, then this declines to 4.1 percent. Inclusion of the salaried workforce consistently
reduces the proportion of the workforce at a given pay level as salaried workers tend to earn more on an hourly basis than employees who
are paid by the hour; how many doctors are paid hourly? Although the
proportion working at or below the minimum varies across the four
samples, we can summarize by saying about 1 in 20 employees earns
the minimum wage or less.
What happens as we move up the wage distribution? Between one
in eight (12.5 percent) and one in five (20 percent) workers earn no
more than $9.00, $1.50 above the (thick) minimum wage band. From
one in six (18 percent) to one in four (28 percent) employees earn no
more than $10.00, $2.50 above the minimum wage. We complete our
tour of Table 5.1 at $14.00, almost twice the minimum wage. Between
39 percent and 56 percent of employees are paid no more than $14.00.
Even at the low end of these estimates, in excess of two in every five
employees earn no more than twice the federal minimum wage.
Table 5.2 provides another cut on this data. Here, we calculate the
wage or hourly earnings at a given percentile of the wage distribution.
Five percent of all workers who are paid by the hour earn no more than
the federal minimum wage. If we exclude students, the 5 percent cutoff rises to $7.50. Eight dollars per hour cuts off 10 percent of hourly
employees both when students are, and are not, part of the sample. Ten
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Table 5.2 The Distribution of Hourly Wages and Hourly Earnings by
Percentile, 2010
Exclude full- and
All compensated employees
part-time students
Highest wage,
Highest wage
including
Highest wage Highest wage,
for those paid
salaried
for those paid including salaPercentile
hourly
workers
hourly
ried workers
5th
7.25
7.50
7.50
7.50
10th
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.50
20th
9.00
10.00
9.25
10.00
30th
10.00
11.54
10.25
12.00
40th
11.25
13.60
12.00
14.00
50th (median)
13.00
15.85
13.50
16.34
60th
15.00
18.70
15.00
19.23
70th
17.00
22.00
17.50
22.67
80th
20.00
26.92
21.00
27.60
90th
26.00
35.19
27.00
36.05
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2010 CPS ORG. Calculations of average
hourly earnings (inclusive of salaried workers) do not include those who report variable hours.

percent of all employees inclusive of salaried employees also earn no
more than $8.00 per hour, but this rises to $8.50 when students are excluded (fourth column). The ceiling for the 20th percentile is between
the hourly wages of $9.00 and $10.00, and for the 30th percentile,
between $10.00 and $12.00. The median splits the paid workforce into
two equally large parts. Half of the hourly workforce earns less than
twice the federal minimum wage. If we include salaried workers, the
median earner is paid between 210 and 220 percent of the minimum
wage. Although a small minority of workers earn close to the minimum
wage, the federal minimum is not far from the wages of 30 percent of
the labor force.
The measure used for Table 5.3 accounts for state minimum wages
in excess of the federal minimum and provides a more comprehensive
measure of the fraction of the workforce that is “close to” the applicable
minimum wage. For this table, we first calculate the ratio of an individual’s wage to the higher of the federal wage or the minimum wage
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Table 5.3 The Distribution of Hourly Wages and Earnings Relative to
the Minimum Wage, 2010
Exclude full- and
All compensated employees
part-time students
Percent of those Percent below Percent of those Percent below
paid hourly including sala- paid hourly including salaearnings below ried workers earnings below ried workers
Less than the mini3.7
3.6
2.9
3.0
mum wage
At the minimum
7.4
5.9
5.9
4.8
wage
Less than 110% of
13.3
9.9
10.7
8.1
the minimum
wage
Less than 120% of
21.8
15.6
18.3
13.2
the minimum
wage
No more than
40.2
28.9
36.4
26.0
150% of the
minimum wage
No more than
52.1
38.5
48.7
35.7
175% of the
minimum wage
No more than
61.5
46.6
58.7
44.1
200% of the
minimum wage
No more than
84.3
70.8
83.0
69.4
300% of the
minimum wage
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 2010 CPS ORG. Calculations of average
hourly earnings (inclusive of salaried workers) do not include those who report variable hours.

of the state in which they live and then form the distribution from this
ratio. The table is organized similarly to Table 5.1 but uses these ratios
instead of dollar amounts: those earning no more than the minimum
wage (up to 103 percent of the minimum wage to allow for reporting
error), those earning no more than 110 percent of the minimum, those
earning no more than 120 percent of the minimum, and so on. The columns of Table 5.3 are arranged in the same manner as Tables 5.1 and
5.2.
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The fraction of the workforce that earns no more than the applicable minimum varies from 1 in 20 (5 percent) to 1 in 14 (7 percent).
The higher estimate includes all hourly paid workers without regard to
educational status, and the low estimate includes all salaried and hourly
workers except students. Moving up the distribution, the fraction of
workers earning close to the minimum wage rises substantially relative
to Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Between one in eight (13 percent) and one in five
(22 percent) employees earn no more than 120 percent of the applicable
minimum. At 150 percent of the minimum wage, the ratio varies between two in eight (26 percent) and two in five (40 percent), depending
on how the sample is defined. At twice the minimum wage, the smallest
estimate, 44 percent, is close to half the workforce, while the largest is
greater than 60 percent.
What conclusions can we draw from these tables? First, that a modest but nontrivial fraction of the workforce is paid no more than the
minimum wage. Table 5.3 indicates that between 4.8 percent and 7.4
percent of the workforce, at least 1 in 20 workers, earn no more than
the higher of the federal or state minimum wage. Second, the hourly
earnings of a large fraction of the workforce is not greatly above the
minimum wage. Between 13 percent and 20 percent of workers earn no
more than $1.50 above the federal minimum wage (Table 5.1). Between
18 percent and 28 percent earn no more than $2.50 above the federal
minimum wage (Table 5.1), and between 13 percent and 22 percent
earn no more than 150 percent of the applicable federal or state minimum wage (Table 5.3). Third, increases in the minimum wage likely
reach a considerable proportion of the labor force. Research discussed
below suggests that the minimum wage boosts the earnings not only of
those of who were bound by the new minimum but also of those who
previously earned more than the new minimum. This increase in the
earnings of those already above the new minimum is termed a “spillover effect.” Spillovers may reach as high as the third decile of the
wage distribution, positively affecting the earnings of workers earning
between $10.00 and $12.00 per hour. The minimum is then not simply a
very low wage reserved for teenagers and workers with impossibly low
productivity and poor work habits, irrelevant to the overwhelming majority of the workforce. Rather, for large proportions of the labor force,
the minimum wage is closer than it appears.
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Spikes in the Wage Distribution
The next issue is whether there is a spike at the minimum wage.
One of our issues is whether “those bound by the new minimum lose
their jobs or do they receive wage increases?” If the latter, then there
will be a spike at the new minimum as employers move bound workers up to but no further than the new minimum. If the former, if bound
workers are dismissed, then the distribution should be relatively smooth
and there shouldn’t be a pronounced spike. Evidence of a spike can be
found in Table 5.3. Between 1.8 and 3.7 percent of the workforce was
paid exactly the applicable minimum wage (the difference between the
proportion of workers earning no more than the minimum wage, row
2 in the table, and the proportion earning less than the minimum wage,
row 1).
The period 2006–2010 is good for examining the effects of the minimum wage visually. The minimum wage remained at $5.15 per hour
from September 1, 1997, until July 23, 2007. It rose to $5.85 on July
24, 2007, to $6.55 a year later and finally to $7.25 on July 24, 2009.
With a low inflation during this period, we would not expect wages to
be rising rapidly.
What Happened to the Distribution of Wages over This Period?
We present nominal and relative dollar wage distributions computed from the outgoing rotation files of the Current Population Survey
(CPS). Both are computed for average hourly earnings, the ratio of average weekly earnings to average weekly hours.11 In both Figures 5.1
and 5.2, the upper panels are the year prior to the 2007 federal increase,
and the lower panels are the year following the 2009 federal increase.
The distribution is formed using a kernel density smoothing process.12
Figure 5.1 represents the distribution of hourly earnings in nominal
dollars. The minimum wage line only references the federal minimum
wage; state minimum wage in excess of the federal minimum is not
depicted. Figure 5.2 compares the ratio of individual hourly earnings to
the applicable minimum wage, the higher of the state or federal minimum wage, for the same two periods. A ratio of 1 means the individual
earned exactly the applicable minimum wage for the individual’s state
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Figure 5.1 Kernel Density Estimate of Hourly Earnings
June 2006–June 2007
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of residence; a value of greater than 1 indicates the individual earned
more than the minimum wage.
Figure 5.1 depicts the distribution of nominal hourly wages between $3 and $25. The wages are on the horizontal axis, and the density
(proportional to the fraction of the labor force earning near that wage) is
on the vertical axis. The upper panel depicts the distribution for July 1,
2006, through June 30, 2007, prior to the first of the recent increases in
the minimum wage. There are numerous spikes in the wage distribution,
typically, but not always, at even dollar amounts, and large spikes at
$7.00, $11.00, $12.00, and $16.00. A small spike at $5.15, then the federal minimum wage, is consistent with the view that the minimum wage
causes employers to pay more for workers who, absent the minimum
wage, would receive less. The story that emerges from this distribution
is that, although there is a spike at the federal minimum, the minimum
wage is not having much effect by 2007. The labor market had passed
it by during its seven-year sojourn at $5.15.
The lower panel depicts the wage distribution in the year following
the 2009 increase in the federal minimum wage. Here the new minimum
wage, $7.25 per hour, is close to an inflection point in the second-largest
spike in the wage distribution, but the peak of the spike is at $7.90
per hour. Although the wage distribution is not the cliff followed by a
smooth distribution that would occur if all bound workers were disemployed, neither is the minimum wage the spike’s peak, as would be the
case if most bound workers received an increase to precisely the minimum wage. Again, as this is the nominal minimum wage, we cannot be
sure if the spike at $7.90 is due to the presence of higher state minimum
wages or some other factor.
Figure 5.2, which measures individuals’ hourly earnings relative
to the higher of the applicable state or federal minimum, provides additional insights. The upper panel again depicts the year prior to the
federal 2007 increase. There is an inflection point at a value of 1, the
ratio at which the individual’s hourly earnings are exactly equal to the
minimum wage, and a more marked inflection point at 1.1, where the
distribution flattens out. The lower panel, the 2009–2010 relative minimum wage distribution, has a marked inflection point slightly above
1.0 (at 1.02) and achieves an absolute peak at 1.09 times the applicable minimum wage. This is evidence of some change in the effect of
the state and federal minimum wage on the wage distribution. Rather
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Figure 5.2 Kernel Density Estimates of the Ratio of Hourly Earnings to
the Applicable Minimum Wage
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than just creating a single large spike at the minimum wage, it appears
that the minimum wage is affecting wages that are above the applicable
minimum.
An initial conclusion emerging from Figures 5.1 and 5.2 is that
while both the nominal and relative wage distributions are useful to
chart the effect of the minimum wage, with the increasing number of
states with minimum wages above the federal minimum, the relative
distributions better portray the effect of the applicable minimum wage.
Second, Figure 5.2 indicates that state minimum wages matter. Third,
the increases in federal and state minimum wages during this period
caused a large spike to form close to, but not at, the minimum wage.
The effect of the upward movement of the minimum wage is apparent from comparing the two panels in Figure 5.2. While the peak in
the distribution in the upper panel, prior to the increase in the federal
minimum wage, is at about 1.5 times the applicable minimum wage, the
peak in the lower panel, after the federal minimum wage had been increased to $7.25, is only 1.1 times the applicable minimum wage. This
is consistent with minimum wage increases altering the distribution in a
fashion that market forces, by themselves, would not have done.
Why is the peak often some distance above the minimum wage?
At one time, there was a very sharp peak immediately at the federal
minimum wage. Figure 5.3 is a kernel density estimate of the hourly
wage rate of those paid by the hour in 1981 following the increase in
the federal minimum wage to $3.35 on January 1.13 Here the peak of the
distribution is just to the right of the reference line at the federal minimum wage, and the distribution quickly flattens above the minimum
wage. Why the difference between this 1981 result, where the minimum
wage is the largest spike, and the results for 2009–2010, where the peak
is above (although still close to) the applicable minimum wage? Results from experimental economics suggest that the minimum wage has
become a benchmark from which a minimally acceptable wage is determined. Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder (2006) argue that the minimum wage
is currently viewed as the wage that anyone can earn without serious
work effort or application. To motivate workers, employers must pay
them above the minimum wage, if by only a small amount. Consistent
with this interpretation, experiments indicate that when informed about
a minimum wage, participants set their desired wage just a bit above
the minimum wage. Why would these perceptions affect labor market
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Figure 5.3 Kernel Density Estimate of Average Hourly Earnings, 1981
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outcomes in 2010 but not 1981? Perhaps because the minimum wage
was increased annually or biannually from 1961 to 1981, keeping pace
with trends in the labor market, it was considered a reasonable entrylevel wage. The two extended periods in which the federal minimum
wage remained fixed between 1981 and 2007, each about a decade long,
may have altered perceptions, turning the minimum wage from an acceptable entry wage to a benchmark from which the lowest acceptable
wage is determined.
Having seen this initial evidence that the minimum wage raises the
floor on the wage distribution, we now turn to the literature on the effect
of the minimum wage on wage rates and earnings. In the following sections we consider how the minimum wage affects those bound by the
minimum wage, and how it affects those earning above the minimum
wage.
The average wage
How the minimum wage affects the average wage is often the first
question in minimum wage analysis. If the average wage does not re-
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spond, and in the same direction as the minimum wage, then it is likely
that the latter is set too low to affect the labor market.14 In addition, if
the average wage does not respond, it is hard to argue that the minimum
wage improves outcomes for any workers.
The employees in a labor market are readily divided into those who
were earning between the previous and the current minimum wage,
workers bound by the new minimum, and those who were previously
earning more than the current minimum wage. Economic theory has
focused much of its attention on the effect on the bound workers, as it
is their earnings and employment that are most obviously affected by
the new minimum. The second group is less obviously affected, as their
employment is not in doubt, and any effects on their earnings could
only occur if the rise in wages of the less-skilled increases demand for,
and thus the wages of, the more-skilled and already better-paid employees. While a minimum wage increase could affect the wages of those
earning above the new minimum, such cross-price effects are viewed as
relatively small in magnitude and secondary in interest when addressed
at all.
The effects of an increase in the minimum wage on the wages of
both bound and higher-paid workers are captured in studies of the effect
of the minimum wage on average wages. As discussed in the beginning
of this chapter, there is no simple correspondence that assures that an
increase in the average wage is associated with individuals receiving
higher earnings. Although we would expect at least some employees
to receive higher wages even when there is job loss, it is not possible a
priori to determine how much of a change in the average wage is due to
higher wages for previously bound workers and how much is due to job
loss among the previously bound. Additional evidence about the presence and size of the employment loss is needed to interpret an increase
in the average wage.
Mindful of Galbraith’s (1972) observation that an advantage of
writing nonfiction is that one need not maintain suspense, we venture
our own observation that almost every study of average wages finds that
increases in the minimum wage result in higher earnings. There is very
strong evidence that higher minimum wages are associated with higher
individual earnings even after sorting out the studies where, because of
the limitations of the average wage measure, it is not possible to entirely
know the effect of the minimum on individuals’ earnings.15 We present
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31 studies of the effect of the minimum wage. To facilitate the discussion and provide an orange-to-tangerine comparison, we first consider
several hypothetical examples to explore how change in the average
wage depends on the level of job loss for bound workers. This provides
some useful background for trying to interpret the results in the work
that we survey. Only after having considered these examples do we turn
to the literature, studies of vulnerable groups, and especially of teens.16
We then move on to sectoral and industry studies and end with studies
of the United Kingdom.
What happens to the average wage following a boost in the
minimum wage?
Consider a simple hypothetical example. Suppose we have an economy in which half the workforce earns $10.00 per hour and half earns
$5 per hour. The average wage would be $7.50 per hour. Next, suppose
that the minimum wage rises to $7.50 per hour. If all of the lower-paid
workers remain employed and their hourly wage rises from $5.00 to
$7.50, then the new average would be $8.75 per hour. However, if all
bound workers were laid off, the new average wage would be $10.00
per hour. If some but not all bound workers lose their jobs, the average
wage will end up somewhere between $8.75 and $10.00. The smaller
the job loss, the lower the ex post average wage.
Let us now complicate this a bit and consider only teens. Assume
a national labor market in which the minimum wage is $5.00 per hour,
to be raised by 10 percent to $5.50 per hour. Twenty percent of teens
are bound by the new minimum, earning between $5.00 and $5.49 per
hour, and the remaining 80 percent earn at least $5.50 but no more
than $10 per hour. Also assume that the teens are uniformly distributed
within the low-wage and high-wage groupings. Under these assumptions low-wage teens are overrepresented, comprising 20 rather than
the 10 percent of employment they would represent if earnings were
completely uniformly distributed between $5.00 and $10.00. The average wage of the low-wage group is $5.25, the average wage of the
high-wage group is $7.75; the overall average is $7.25.
What happens to the average wage when the minimum wage rises
to $5.50/hour? In minimum wage studies that focus on teenagers, the
elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage varies
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between 0 and −0.3, with statistically significant elasticities between
−0.2 and −0.3.17 According to these latter figures, a 10 percent increase
in the minimum wage results in employment declines between 2 and 3
percent; limiting these job losses to the lowest-paid bound workers in
our example implies that 10–15 percent of the low-wage labor force
would lose their positions, and 85–90 percent would receive wage increases of between $0.01 and $0.39 per hour.18 Allowing for layoffs,
the average wage would rise to $7.34 when the employment elasticity
is −0.2, or $7.36 when the employment elasticity is −0.3. This suggests
an elasticity of the average wage with respect to the minimum wage
between 0.12 and 0.15. In contrast, were all bound workers to remain
employed and earning the new minimum of $5.50, the average wage
would rise only to $7.30 and the elasticity would be only 0.07.
Having explored these hypothetical examples, we now turn to a
realistic situation using data on teens from the 2010 CPS, when the
minimum wage was $7.25, and the average wage of teens was $8.89.
Forty percent of teens earned $7.99 or less, and 60 percent earned $8.00
or more. Some teens earn less than the adult minimum wage as employers may pay those under age 20 as little as $4.25 per hour for the first
90 calendar days following initial employment.19 A 10 percent increase
in the minimum wage would result in a new minimum of $8.00.20 With
a negative employment elasticity of −0.2, teens earning $6.75 or less
would become unemployed, and teen employment among the bound
would decline by 5.0 percent. With an employment elasticity of −0.3,
teens earning $6.99 or less would lose their positions, and bound teen
employment would fall by 7.5 percent.21
As relatively few individuals would lose their positions, more than
92 percent of those bound would benefit from the new higher minimum
wage. The average wage following the 7.5 percent layoffs under the
new minimum wage would be between $9.20 and $9.21. The elasticity
of the average wage with respect to the minimum wage would be 0.35.
Absent layoffs, the average wage would rise to $9.18, and the average
wage elasticity would be 0.32; if all bound working teens lost their
jobs, then the average wage would rise to $9.96, and the wage elasticity
would be 1.2.
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Studies of vulnerable groups
Teens. In contrast to research on employment, research on the effect of the minimum wage on wages is not as dominated by a focus on
the experience on teens. Nonetheless, there are more studies of teen
wages, nine in all, than any of the other groups that we review in this
chapter. In all instances, higher minimum wages resulted in higher average wages. In most cases in which elasticities were provided, they were
quite large.
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011); Dube, Lester, and Reich
(2011); Thompson (2009); Sabia (2009); Orrenius and Zavodny (2008);
Portugal and Cardoso (2006); and Neumark and Wascher (2011) each
use state-by-time panels or repeated cross sections to estimate wage
equations in which the average teen wage is a function of state and
federal minimum wages along with a set of controls (see Table 5.4).
All of the studies cluster observations by state when calculating standard errors to address the issue of serial correlation and avoid downward-biased estimates of standard errors. The studies consider different
time periods and use similar but not identical specifications. Sabia and
Thompson both report large and significant average earning elasticities,
ranging between 0.16 and 0.5 for Sabia and 0.4 and 0.6 for Thompson.
(Thompson argues that the large wage effect found in his work reflects
compositional change in the minimum wage labor force.) Both also report negative employment effects for employment (Sabia) or employment share (Thompson) with elasticities in the range of −0.2 to −0.3.
Neumark and Wascher report a positive and significant relationship
between the minimum wage and the hourly earnings, but no effect on
either weekly earnings or employment.22 Elasticity of average earnings
ranges from 0.22 to 0.37 when considering all teens and teens other
than Hispanic and black.23 The positive elasticity for women is partially
offset by a negative and significant interaction between the minimum
wage and eligibility for the earned income tax credit. Allegretto, Dube,
and Reich (2011), whose work parallels that of Sabia and Thompson but
better controls for heterogeneity in spatial-employment patterns, report
smaller but still highly significant earnings elasticities, with a preferred
value of 0.15, and no employment effects. Dube, Lester, and Reich estimate the effect of the minimum wage on teens and on employment in
eating and drinking places. Using Quarterly Workforce Indicators for
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Table 5.4 The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages, Vulnerable Groups: Teens
Data
seta
Census,
BLSEEH,
ACS

CPS
QP

Neumark and
A positive and significant Women,
Wascher (2011) relationship with hourly
single
earnings but no effect on mothers,
weekly earnings
and lesseducated
women
a

United RegresStates
sion

Individualmonth

Repeated
cross
section

Clustered Various,
(state)
incl. CPS

BLS-EEH = Bureau of Labor Statistics-Employee Earnings and Hours. ACS = American Community Survey. QWI = Quarterly Workforce Indicators. CPS = Current Population Survey. QP = QP (Portugal) Quadros de Pessoal (personnel records, Portuguese Ministry of
Qualification and Employment.
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2001–2009, they find that higher minimum wages are associated with
higher monthly earnings for teens, with elasticities varying from 0.11
to 0.14.24 Orrenius and Zavodny estimate an average earnings equation
for teens aged 16–19 as a benchmark for the effect of the minimum
wage on less-educated immigrant and native-born workers. Using a
state-by-year panel, reporting clustered errors 1994–2005 and including controls for business cycle effects, their estimated elasticity, 0.18,
is significant in better than a 1 percent test. When separated by gender,
the earnings elasticities are 0.22 for men and 0.14 for women; both are
significant at the 0.01 level. Portugal and Cardoso (2006), in a study of
the minimum wage in Portugal, find that extending the minimum wage
to teens aged 16–17 and increasing the minimum wage of those aged
18–19 raised average wages.25
Each of these studies finds a positive wage effect, but three also find
a negative and significant employment effect. Can these latter studies
be taken as evidence that increases in the minimum wage increase the
wages of individuals? As the hypothetical examples show, the estimates
of the elasticity of the average wage obtained from these studies are
more consistent with significant numbers of bound workers receiving a
higher wage than with most of the change in the average wage resulting
from the loss of employment.
The less educated. Teens are not the only group that is potentially
vulnerable to the employment effects of an increase in the minimum
wage. Those with less education and fewer skills have been singled out
as potentially vulnerable, as have single women (see Table 5.5 for article summaries for each of these groups). Three articles address the effect of the minimum wage on the less educated, two of which—Easton
(2006) and Krashinsky (2008)—find that higher minimum wages are
unambiguously associated with higher earnings. Neumark and Wascher
(2011), who allow for complex interactions between the minimum
wage and other federal income assistance programs, find the minimum
wage has a positive direct effect. The effect net of the interactions with
other federal income policies is however, difficult to parse given the
available information.
Running regressions on cross sections of CPS data for 1990, 1994,
and 1999, Easton (2006) considers the effect of the minimum wage on
the earnings of those who live in metropolitan areas and have no more
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than a high school education. Each regression includes controls for
individual characteristics as well as the wage and industrial characteristics of the urban areas. The less educated are divided between those
with less than a high school education and those whose education ended
with a high school degree. The minimum wage is measured both as a
level and as change from the prior minimum wage.
Estimates across all metropolitan areas are strictly positive but vary
considerably with respect to statistical significance by gender, year,
educational attainment, and measure of the minimum wage. However,
when the sample is limited to metropolitan areas for which there are at
least 36 observations, the combined effect of the two minimum wage
measures in all three years is positive, large, and statistically significant
in a 5 percent or better test for each gender and level of education attainment. The effect of the minimum wage on average wages persists
for some years after the increase, although the persistence is weaker for
those without a high school degree than for those with one. For men and
women with less than a high school education, Easton estimates that the
elasticity of the average wage with respect to the minimum wage ranges
from 0.1 to 0.5. The elasticities are smaller for those with no more than
a high school degree, with statistically significant estimates ranging between 0.06 and 0.14. Easton provides no employment elasticities, so it
is not clear who in particular benefits from higher wages.
Krashinsky (2008) finds that the decline in the real minimum wage
from the late 1970s to the early 1990s reduced the earnings of lesseducated men working as employees—those with a high school degree
or less—relative to similarly educated men who were self-employed. In
the United States, employees are protected by a range of laws regarding
minimum wage, overtime, union organization, unemployment insurance, and workers’ compensation. The self-employed are, in contrast,
not subject to these laws. All else constant, changes in the labor laws
should change the position of employees relative to their self-employed
counterparts. Using data on white males with no more than a high school
diploma for 1979–1991, the author estimates the effect of the minimum
wage on the ratio of the annual median earnings of the self-employed
to the annual median earnings of wage and salary workers. This is
benchmarked to the corresponding ratio for men with college degrees,
a group less affected by changes in the minimum wage and other labor
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Table 5.5 The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages, Vulnerable Groups: Other
Data
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market institutions. For those without a high school degree, the ratio of
the median wage of the self-employed to the median wage of wage and
salary workers rose steadily in the 1980s and reached equality in 1991.
This ratio also rose for those with high school degrees but did not reach
equality by 1991. In contrast, the ratio fell to equality for those with a
college degree. Regression estimates suggest that both the level and the
change in the minimum wage between 1979 and 1991 were negatively
and significantly related to the ratio both for those with less than a high
school and those with a high school degree. Fifteen to 16 percent of the
decline in the relative wages of the less educated of wage and salary
earners can be attributed to the decline in the real minimum wage (see
Table 5.6). In contrast, the minimum wage did not affect the ratio for
those with some college education or a college degree.
Neumark and Wascher (2011) report that higher minimum wages
increase the wages of less-educated individuals, but find there is a complex interaction with the earned income tax credit. The model, which
uses CPS ORG data for individuals aged 21–44 for 1997–2006, is estimated in the state-by-year panel framework they pioneered in the
NMWR and clusters errors by state. Estimates for all childless lesseducated individuals suggests that the minimum wage has a positive
and significant direct effect on hourly earnings. This is at least partially
offset by a negative and statistically significant interaction between the
minimum wage and EITC eligibility that, in its turn, may be offset by a
positive interaction between the minimum wage, EITC, and having no
more than a high school degree. Similarly complex patterns are found
for black and Hispanic individuals and for black and Hispanic males.26
Because of the complexity of these factors, it is not possible to be certain of the minimum wage’s net effect on hourly or annual earnings.
Single women. Another group of interest to minimum wage researchers are women, particularly single women. The income of single women and especially single women with children is low relative
to many other groups in the population; spells of unemployment and
low earnings that place them in poverty are relatively frequent for this
group. Compared to other groups, the effects of the minimum wage on
the earnings of single women are less certain, with an even division of
articles between no effect and a positive effect.

Table 5.6 The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages
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Wolfson and
Belman
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Belman and
Wolfson
(2010)

Dickens et al.
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BLS-EEH: Bureau of Labor Statistics-Employee Earnings and Hours.
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Studies of single women are not entirely comparable with the other
studies as they consider annual earnings, rather than hourly or weekly
earnings, and include those who have no annual earnings in the estimates. Sabia (2008) finds that, between 1992 and 2005, increases in the
minimum wage had no effect on the annual income of either all single
women or single women with at least a high school education. Higher
minimum wages had a positive effect on the annual earnings of single
women with less than a high school education (the estimated elasticity is 0.992), but this effect vanishes in a regression with conventional
controls. Neumark and Wascher (2011) permit the minimum wage to
affect the earnings of single women directly, and with interactions with
the presence of children, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and both of
these factors. The estimated pattern of interaction is complex both with
respect to sign, magnitude, and significance. The authors summarize
their findings: “These results suggest that the combination of an EITC
and a higher minimum wage may be especially powerful in raising the
employment and earnings of low-skilled single mothers. However, the
estimates also hint at the possibility that the positive labor supply response of single mothers eligible for the EITC may reduce employment
and earnings among low-educated or minority single women without
children” (p. 730).27 In some instances, the minimum wage only has an
effect through an interaction with the EITC. The estimates of the elasticity of annual earnings with respect to the minimum wage of women
with children relative to those without are consistently statistically significant and positive, but are quite small, likely because of the inclusion
of those who report no earnings.
Summary
What preliminary summary can we make of the studies by demographic group? Of the 12 studies reviewed, all but 1 report that the
minimum wage has a positive and significant effect on the measures of
earnings of vulnerable groups. Further, even where there was evidence
of a negative employment effect, our analysis suggests that the disemployment effect is moderate in size, and that a very substantial majority
of bound workers benefit from the minimum wage increase. Our initial
conclusion is that higher minimum wages raise the wage of many mem-
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bers of vulnerable groups, although the evidence on annual earnings of
single mothers is mixed.

SECTORAL AND INDUSTRY STUDIES
Studies focused on sectors, industries, and occupations bring advantages and disadvantages. They can incorporate detail about the
industries or occupations and better control for factors affecting wages
and employment than typical demographic studies, which omit industry
and occupational detail. Their implications are potentially more limited,
as care is needed in generalizing beyond the sectors, industries, and occupations under study.
Multi-Industry Studies
While most of these studies consider particular sectors or industries, Belman and Wolfson (2004, 2010) apply time-series methods to
wage, employment, and hours data to a varying set of low-wage industries (see Table 5.6 for a summary of multi-industry studies). The
employment chapter presents this work in detail, and so we limit our
discussion to our wage estimates. In the earlier of these studies, all but
a handful of the 120 estimates of the effect of the minimum wage on
average wages are positive, and about half are statistically significant
in a 5 percent test or better. The median elasticity of the average wage
with respect to the minimum wage is between 0.02 and 0.05, depending
on the panel. The later article, which applies a more flexible estimation
method to a single panel of data, and which allows for changes in hours
as well as employment, produces stronger evidence for a positive relationship between the minimum wage and average wage in low-wage
industries. Estimates for 16 of 23 low-wage industries are positive and
significant in a 5 percent test, with elasticities that range from 0.05 to
0.4. Taken together, these estimates suggest that, although increases in
the minimum wage do not affect the average wage in all low-wage industries, they boost wages in a majority of these industries.

212 Belman and Wolfson

Restaurants
The food and beverage service industry, consisting of eating and
drinking establishments, has been closely studied because much of its
labor force is paid close to the minimum wage (see Table 5.7).
The work on fast food establishments (Card and Kreuger 1994,
2000; Katz and Kreuger 1992) is well known. Three of the four studies
of the restaurant industry that predate the NMWR find that the minimum wage increases the average wage in the industry.
Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) perform an analysis similar to that
of Card and Krueger (1994), modified to reflect criticisms of the earlier
work, of the 2004–2005 increase in San Francisco’s minimum wage on
the restaurant industry. The city of San Francisco increased its citywide
minimum wage for midsize employers to $8.50 in 2004, exempting
small employers until 2005. Using data from a sample of restaurants
in San Francisco and the East Bay, the authors compare the change in
wages of affected restaurants—those that are midsize with at least some
employees earning less than the new minimum wage—with three comparison groups: midsize restaurants in the East Bay, small restaurants in
San Francisco, and midsize San Francisco restaurants with no employees earning below the new minimum ex ante.
The models were estimated with two distinct dependent variables:
1) the average wage of the establishment, and 2) the percentage of
workers at an establishment earning below $8.50, the new minimum
wage (the percent below $8.50 will vary systematically by time and
type of restaurant in San Fransisco and by location between San Fransisco and the East Bay). Difference-in-differences estimates of the
effect of the minimum wage increase indicate that it was associated
with a statistically significant increase in the average wage relative to
East Bay restaurants, with an effect that was significant in a 5 percent
test, and relative to midsize unaffected San Francisco restaurants, with
an effect that was significant in a 10 percent test but not relative to small
San Francisco restaurants.
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) use data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) to estimate the effect of the
minimum wage on earnings and employment in restaurants and other
low-wage sectors from 1990 to 2006. Panel regressions are estimated
for all U.S. counties, as well as for pairs of adjacent counties on opposite
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sides of state lines. This pairing is designed to control for an economic
climate that is, presumably, similar in small adjacent regions. The pairings of interest are those in which the applicable minimum wages in
each county of a pair differ. The pairing of counties does not have a
large effect on earnings estimates; the elasticity of the minimum wage
on earnings varies between 0.15 and 0.22 when models are estimated
with all counties and between 0.19 and 0.23 when only paired counties
are used. Significance is likewise not affected; standard errors allow
for rejection of the null in better than a 1 percent test for all earnings
elasticities. Further estimates find no evidence that the minimum wage
spills over from one county to the wages of the other in the county pairs.
The authors broaden their paired county work on restaurants by
using Quarterly Workforce Indicators for 2001–2009 to consider the effect of the minimum wage on not only average wages and employment
but also on hires, separations and turnover rates by age, and type of restaurant (Dube, Lester, and Reich 2011). Panel regressions are estimated
for all U.S. counties, as well as for pairs of counties that are adjacent to
each other but on opposite sides of state lines. The estimated effect of
the minimum wage on average wages is consistently positive and statistically significant for teens and young adults working in restaurants
as well as for restaurant workers as a whole. The estimated elasticities range from 0.17 to 0.22, depending on specification and sample;
the elasticities tend to be larger for estimates with paired counties than
for the full sample, suggesting that omitted variable bias may be reducing the magnitude of the minimum wage effect in the all-county
sample. The estimated effect on the average wage is also strictly positive and significant for both limited- and full-service restaurants for the
workforce as a whole. When broken down by age, the estimates show
a positive and significant effect on the wages of teens, of young adults,
and of all women, but none on those of adults 25 or older, nor those of
men (without regard to age).
Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2012) use quarterly data from the
QCEW to measure the effect of the minimum wage on both limited- and
full-service restaurants from 1990 to 2005. These data, which are derived from firms’ unemployment insurance filings, cover 98 percent of
the labor force, have far more complete coverage than any other survey,
and have sufficient observations to allow the study of industries at the
county level. This study demonstrates the importance of allowing for

Study
Dube, Naidu,
and Reich
(2007)

Sample
Effect
Target
Country period
The increase in the San San Fran- United 2003–
cisco
States
Francisco (SF) minimum
2004
wage in 2004 increased restaurants
the average wage in SF
restaurants relative to
East Bay restaurants
and “high wage” SF
restaurants

Type of
Analytic
Unit of
Data
standard
approach observation structure
error
Quasi
Firm-year Firm panel Robust
experiment
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Table 5.7 The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages: Restaurants
Data seta
Private
survey

Dube, Lester,
and Reich
(2010)

There is a positive effect Restaurants United
States
on the quarterly earnings of teens and young
adults but not adults 25+
in full- and limitedservice restaurants with
elasticities of 0.3 to 0.5.
There is a positive effect
on women but no effect
on men. The average
elasticity ranges from
0.17 to 0.22.

1990–
2006

Quasi
experiment

Countyquarter

Aggregate Clustered
panel with (state)
county
pairing
in some
estimates

QCEW

Addison,
Blackburn,
and Cotti
(2012)

Higher minimum wages Restaurants United
are associated with
States
higher county-industry
average weekly compensation in the restaurant

1990–
2005

Regression

Countyquarter

Aggregate Clustered
panel
(state)

QCEW

industry. The effect is
smaller in counties with
higher average wages.
Weekly earnings are
higher when limited to
counties that had minimum wage above the
federal level.
Servers’ and bartenders’ Servers
and
wages are increased by
bartenders
state minimum wages
set higher than the
federal level but are not
benefitted by less generous tip credit rules

United
States

1999

Regression,
some with
selection correction

Full- and
Even and
Higher cash wages and
limitedMacPherson higher minimum wages
(2014)
are associated with inservice
creased weekly earnings restaurants

United
States

1990:1–
2011: 4

Regression

Anderson and
Bodvarsson
(2005)

a

State

Cross
section

Conventional

Constructed
from
BLS,
BEA, and
National
Restaurant Association
data

Aggregate Clustered QCEW
Stateand CPS
panel
(state)
quarter and
individualmonth

QCEW = Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. CPS = Current Population Survey.

215

216 Belman and Wolfson

county-level trends in the estimation of the employment effect of the
minimum wage. The estimates almost universally indicate that higher
minimum wages are associated with higher weekly compensation
among restaurant workers.28 Elasticities in linear models vary between
0.17 and 0.22; more elaborate models suggest a nonlinear relationship
between the minimum wage and compensation, as well as possible interactions between the minimum wage and both county unemployment
and weekly earnings. The effect of the minimum wage on the earnings
of restaurant workers was larger in limited-service than in full-service
restaurants: the estimated elasticities were 0.25 and 0.14, respectively.
Food service workers may receive substantial tip income. Under
federal law, employers may pay as little as $2.30 per hour to tipped
employees, so long as tip income makes up the difference between this
amount and the federal minimum wage.29 Some states also allow for
“tip credits,” but there is considerable difference in state policies. Anderson and Bodvarsson (2005) consider the effect of state minimum
wage and tip credit legislation on the hourly earnings of wait staff and
bartenders. Although the authors divide the states into five categories
based on the level of the state minimum wage and the state tip credit,
the broad coverage of the federal minimum wage reduces this to three
operative categories: those that have no requirements beyond federal
requirements, those where the tip credit and/or the state minimum wage
is more generous than the federal policy, and those with no tip credit
but with a minimum wage above the federal level. It would be expected
that servers and bartenders would have higher average wages in states
that exceeded federal requirements in one dimension or another. The
authors report that there is no gain in the hourly earnings of bartenders and servers in states where tip and/or minimum wage policies are
more generous than the federal policy. However, with controls for selection into differing legal regimes, waitstaff and bartenders in states
with minimum wages above the federal minimum (and no tip credit) are
estimated to earn an additional $1.34 an hour relative to states with laws
that are no stronger than the federal requirements.30
Even and Macpherson (2014) provide a more recent and sophisticated analysis of the effect of the minimum wage and tip credits on
restaurant employees’ earnings. Using quarter-by-state observations
aggregated from the QCEW, they examine the response of earnings of
employees of full- and limited-service restaurants to both state treat-
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ment of tipped income and state and federal changes in the minimum
wage during 1990:1 to 2011:4 and 1994:1 to 2007:3.31 The models
include state demographic and economic controls and state fixed
effects, and they are estimated both with and without state-specific time
trends. Increases in the tipped wage are estimated to increase average
weekly wages for employees in full-service restaurants, where tipping
is common, but not in limited-service restaurants, where tipping is uncommon. A 10 percent increase in the tipped wage is estimated to raise
weekly earnings between 0.3 and 0.5 percent. Higher minimum wages
are associated with increased average weekly earnings in both fullservice and limited-service restaurants. A 10 percent increase in the
minimum wage is estimated to increase weekly earnings of employees
in full-service restaurants by 1.3 percent and 1.5 percent, and from 1.5
to 2.2 percent in limited-service restaurants.32
Other retail industries in the United States
While the early NMWR focused on restaurants as a low-wage sector, more recent work has branched out to retail industries, another large
employer of low-wage labor. Of the four studies of retail, three find
positive wage effects, and the fourth finds large negative wage effects
(see Table 5.8).
The work of Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2009) is particularly
interesting because of its nuance and creativity in investigating the interaction between the minimum wage and other state employment laws.
Paralleling their work on the restaurant industry, they consider the effect of the minimum wage on industries within retail trade, again using
county-by-quarter data from the QCEW for 1990–2005.33 Initial panel
regressions indicate that the minimum wage has a positive and statistically significant effect on wages for only beer, wine, and liquor stores,
with an elasticity of 0.17. With controls for county-level trends similar
to those of Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2009, 2011), there are positive earnings effects for convenience stores; specialty food stores; and
beer, wine, and liquor stores but not for supermarkets or for food and
beverage stores as a whole. Moving beyond food and beverage stores,
they find positive earnings effects for gasoline stations, sporting goods
stores, general merchandise stores, department stores, and miscellaneous store retailers.

Sample
Study
Effect
Target
Country period
Addison,
The average wages of
Retail trade United
1990–
Blackburn, many sectors within retail
States
2005
and Cotti trade increase when the
(2009)
minimum wage increases.
There is an effect in rightto-work states but not in
non-right-to-work states.
Orazem and
Mattila
(2002)

Earnings elasticities are
negative, ranging from
−0.14 to −0.16.

Sabia
(2008)

Giuliano
(2013)

a

Retail,
service, not
professional

1989–
1992

Regression County-qtr.- Aggregate
industry
panel

Elasticity ranges from
All teens, United
0.13 to 0.18 for all work- and in retail States
ers in retail; from 0.32 to
0.38 for teens.

1979–
2004

Regression State-month Aggregate Clustered
panel
(state)

For the 1996 increase in
the minimum wage, the
elasticity of the average
wage with respect to the
wage gap was 0.75. The
effect declines over time
as wage trends catch up
with the minimum wage.

1996–
1998

Regression

Teens in
retail

Iowa

Type of
Analytic
Unit of
Data
standard
approach observation structure
error
Regression
County- Aggregate Clustered
quarter
panel
by state

United
States

Establishment-period

QCEW = Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. CPS = Current Population Survey.

Panel
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Table 5.8 The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages: Service Industries
Data
seta
QCEW

CPS

Conven- Private +
tional
census
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The authors take this research further by distinguishing between
right-to-work and non-right-to-work states. In right-to-work states,
they find that the minimum wage has a positive effect on the average
wage for food and beverage stores as a whole and for supermarkets and
convenience stores in particular (they did not report other industries in
these estimates) but no wage effect in states without right-to-work laws.
Further, for the industries under study, either the presence of unions or
a union threat effect mitigates the effect of minimum wages on earnings
and employment.34 These findings suggest that state minimum wage
laws interact with other state employment laws and with the institutional characteristics of state labor markets.
Orazem and Mattila (2002), Sabia (2009), and Giuliano (2013) each
consider the effect of the minimum wage on retail earnings. Orazem
and Mattila report a large and significant negative elasticity of quarterly
earnings with respect to the minimum wage in a model using countyby-quarter and county-by-year regressions for Iowa for 1989–1992;
estimated elasticities range from −0.14 to −0.16. Sabia uses a state-bymonth panel for 1979–2004 to estimate the effect of the minimum wage
on retail earnings and employment for the sector as a whole as well as
for teens. Depending on the specification, the elasticity of the average
wage with respect to the minimum wage varies from 0.13 to 0.18; the
elasticity for teens ranges from 0.32 to 0.38. Guiliano’s (2013) study of
a single retail firm with more than 700 establishments considers the effect of the average wage gap—the proportional increase in the average
wage required to bring all workers up to the new minimum wage—to
estimate the effect of the increase in the federal minimum wage in 1996
on average wages. As the firm has stores in many states, wage gaps vary
systematically with the state minimum wage. Guiliano reports that a 10
percent increase in a store’s wage gap resulted in 7–8 percent growth in
average wages over two years following the 1996 increase.
British nursing homes
The residential care home industry (nursing homes in the United
States) is one of the larger low-wage industries in the United Kingdom,
and, as a result, it plays a role in studies of the minimum wage similar
to that of teenagers or the restaurant industry in studies of U.S. data.
In 1999, the United Kingdom implemented its NMW, which has since
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been increased several times. Each of the three articles on care homes
discussed below find that the implementation of, and increases in, the
minimum wage raised wages (see Table 5.9).
Machin, Manning, and Rahmin (2003) surveyed residential care
homes before and after the implementation of the NMW.35 Care assistants are among the most common and lowest-paid workers in
residential care homes; in all homes in the pre-NMW sample, 32–38
percent of them were bound by the minimum wage. On average, their
earnings were 4–5 percent below the NMW. Following implementation, average earnings of care assistants rose by 6 percent. Regression
estimates indicate that average hourly and weekly earnings grew faster
in homes with a larger fraction of care assistants bound by the NMW,
and in homes where there was a larger difference between the minimum
wage and the average earnings of care assistants. Further, the growth of
earnings accelerated relative to an earlier period before the NMW was
implemented. The authors indicate that there was “some evidence” of
reductions in employment and hours subsequent to the implementation
of the NMW.36
Machin and Wilson (2004) extended this work with a survey of
residential care homes along the South Coast of England to examine the
2001 increase in the NMW. Consistent with prior studies, they found
larger increases in the average wage in homes that had more workers bound by the minimum wage during the 1999 implementation and
2001 increase in the minimum wage. In addition, there was a statistically significant decline in employment in care homes following the
implementation of the NMW, but not in response to the 2001 increase.37
The pattern of employment decline suggests that the initial increase in
the average wage was due to both employment decline and an increase
in wages for those bound workers who kept their jobs, but that the subsequent average wage increase reflected solely an increase in wages.
As part of a broader study of the effect of the NMW on care homes,
Georgiadis (2008) revisited the same survey data on the 1999 implementation of the NMW. Regression estimates indicate that the increase
in the average earnings in a care home was positively and significantly
related to both the proportion of staff bound by the new minimum wage
or by the wage gap—the proportional increase in earnings needed to
bring all workers to the new minimum wage. Wage-gap elasticities—

Table 5.9 The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Average Wages: Studies of the United Kingdom
Study

Effect

Machin, Manning, Implementation of the NMW
and Rahman
increased the average wages
(2003)
of care assistants, with the
largest increases in homes
with the largest proportion of
care assistants bound by the
minimum wage.

Sample
Target Country period
Home
care

Analytic
Unit of
Data
approach observation structure

Type of
standard
error

Data
set

Care homes
United 1992–
King1999
dom

Quasi Firm-survey
experiment response

Twoperiod
panel

Conventional

Private
survey

Regression Firm-survey
response

Twoperiod
panel

Conventional

Private
survey

Care home Care home Convenby year
tional

Private
survey

Machin and
Average wages of cared assis- Home
Wilson (2004) tants in care homes rose most care
rapidly in homes with larger
numbers of bound workers.

United
Kingdom

1998–
1999

Home
Georgiadis (2006) A positive relationship between the proportion of work- care
ers bound by the minimum
wage and the increase in the
average wage in care homes.

United
Kingdom

1999–
2001
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the change in average earnings associated with a 1 percent decline in an
establishment’s wage gap—are close to 0.9.
Summary
Research on the effect of the minimum wage on average wages is
surprisingly strong, given the divided results obtained for other outcomes; higher minimum wages are associated with higher average
wages. Of the 29 empirical articles on the effect of the minimum wage
on average wages, 26 report that higher minimum wages or increases in
the minimum wage result in a higher average wage. Nine of 10 articles
on teens and vulnerable groups report a positive wage effect; the one
contrary article (Sabia 2008) estimates the effect on the unconditional
average annual wage as the dependent variable (that is, the average
wage is calculated over all single women rather than the employed).
Twelve of 14 articles on industries and sectors report that a higher minimum wage is associated with higher average wages.
This is not to assert that the effect of the minimum wage is consistent across all groups and industries. For example, Belman and Wolfson
(2010) find positive and significant effects in 16 of 23 low-wage industries, suggesting that there is no effect in some low-wage industries.
Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti (2009) find that the minimum wage does
not affect weekly earnings of service industry employees in states without right-to-work legislation but does have a large effect in states with
such laws. Sabia (2008) finds that increases in the minimum wage do
not improve the unconditional annual earnings of single women. Nuance is then the order of the day. The evidence also indicates that the
increase in the average wage is benefitting a substantial majority of
bound workers and may raise the wages of those who were already
earning more than the new minimum wage. Results from studies that
consider both employment and the average wage do not suggest that the
increase in the latter is simply due to job loss among bound workers.
Some studies report no employment effect, but even where negative
employment elasticities are found, they are consistent with large majorities of bound workers retaining their positions and receiving higher
wages because of the increase in the minimum wage. Estimates of the
average wage elasticity are sufficiently large that wages of workers not
previously bound are, in all likelihood, also rising.
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WORKERS WHO ARE BOUND BY THE NEW
MINIMUM WAGE
To this point, we have considered the overall effect of the minimum wage on the wages of the whole labor force. We now consider
our second question, does an increase in the minimum wage raise the
hourly earnings of those who had been earning less than the new value?
Differing from much of the work in this chapter and book, some of this
research is descriptive, rather than organizing itself around hypotheses.
The richness of the description and care taken in consideration of both
employment and earnings issues make it useful for understanding the
impact of the minimum wage on bound workers. All but one of these
descriptive studies are from the United Kingdom. All provide strong
evidence that a higher minimum wage raises the earnings of those previously bound by the minimum wage. We finish this discussion with
three articles using longitudinal data to formally test the impact of increases in the minimum wage on the wages of bound workers (see Table
5.10).
Descriptive Studies
Reich and Hall (2001) describe the effects of the increase in the
federal and California minimum wages from 1994 to 1999 on wages
and employment. In 1994, both the federal and California minimum
wage stood at $4.25. They both rose to $4.75 in 1996 and then to $5.15
in 1997. The California minimum wage rose again in 1998 to $5.75.
In 1994, prior to the increase in the minimum wage, 11.7 percent of
wage and salary earners in California were earning less than $5.75. In
contrast, in 1999 only 3.9 percent were earning less than $5.75 (their
Table 10, reprinted as Table 5.11).38 Reich and Hall’s employment
analysis finds that the increase in the minimum wage did not depress
employment or employment growth. Consequently, the increases in the
minimum wage should have benefitted bound workers.
Was this improvement in the earnings of lower-wage Californians
truly due to the minimum wage, or was it something that would have
occurred regardless of changes in the minimum wage, perhaps because
the California economy was booming through this period? If a strong

Study
Reich and
Hall
(2001)

Effect
Wages of those
bound by the
minimum wage
and those at
low wages were
increased.

Target
California
labor force

But for the agri- Agricultural
cultural minimum labor force
wage, about half
of English and
Welsh agricultural
workers would
have earned less
than the minimum
wage.
Dickens
The imposition Adult populaand
of the NMW
tion 22 and
Manning raised the wage
older
(2004)
of the lowest-paid
workers, about
6–7% of the labor
force.
Burton and
Dorset
(2001)

Type of
Sample Analytic
Unit of
Data
standard
Country period approach observation structure
error
Data set
CPS
United 1994– Descrip- Individuals Description n/a
Outgoing
statistics
tive
States 1999
Rotation
from sucGroup
cessive
cross sections

England 1991– Regression Individuals Multiple Selec- Survey
cross sec- tion cor- of Earn1995 corrected
and
rected ings and
tions
for selecWales
Hours
tion

United
Kingdom

1999– Estimated Individuals
density
2001
functions

Cross
section

n/a
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Table 5.10 The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Those Bound by the New Minimum Wage
Comments
Only provides
descriptive statistics,
but the magnitude
of the changes and
size of the samples
would likely result
in significant tests
of appropriate
hypothesis.
Study considers
the effect of the
Agricultural Wages
Boards, a regime
that has since been
supplanted by the
NMW.

Labor The NMW had no
Force detectable effect on
Survey earnings at the 10th
percentile, possibly
because the initial
level was deliberately set very low.

Lam et al.
(2006)

Implementation
Individuals United
and increase in earning within Kingthe NMW caused
£3 of the
dom
distinct spikes
NMW
in the earnings
distribution.

1998–
2004

Descrip- Individuals Descriptive
tive
in employer statistics
survey
from cross
section and
longitudinal
data

n/a

Annual
Survey of
Hours and
Earnings

Butcher
(2005)

Wage growth of
Low-wage United
individuals in the workers rela- Kinglower part of UK tive to balance dom
earnings distribu- of employed
tion accelerated
workers
following implementation of the
NMW.

1998–
2003

Descrip- Individuals
tive

n/a

New
Earnings
Survey

Cross
section
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Table 5.11 The Effects of Minimum Wage Increases in California,
1994–1999
Percentage earning below ($):
5.75
6.50
7.25
1994
11.7
15.0
21.2
1995
12.8
17.9
21.7
1996
11.8
18.2
21.8
1997
10.9
16.9
20.4
1998
5.8
14.9
20.8
1999
3.9
13.7
20.6
Change 1994–1999
7.8
1.3
0.6
NOTE: The California minimum wage rose from $4.25 in 1995 to $5.75 in 1998. Reich
and Hall measure change from 1995, the year prior to the first increase in the minimum wage, to 1999, the year following the increase in the minimum wage. We have
recalculated the result using 1994 as the base year, as there was a bump up in the percent of workers at below $5.75 and $6.50 in 1995. By starting in 1994, we avoid using
1995, with Reich and Hall’s (2001) “bump up” as a base. The choice of base year does
not materially affect description of the effect of the minimum wage.
SOURCE: Reich and Hall (2001, Table 10), using data from CPS ORG.

economy were the cause of the reduction in the proportion of individuals working at very low wages, one would expect that the entire lower
end of the wage distribution would have shifted up. This did not happen. The fraction of workers earning less than $6.50 declined by 1.3
percentage points from 1995 to 1999, about one-sixth the decline in the
fraction below the 1999 minimum wage ($5.75), and there was virtually no decline in the percent earning less than $7.25. Reich and Hall
(2001) report that while the wage at the 5th percentile of the income
distribution rose by 19 percent, from $4.85 in 1995 to $5.75 in 1999, the
increase at the 10th percentile was half as large, 10 percent, from $5.49
to $6.04: at the median (50th percentile) the increase was $0.37 (less
than 3 percent), from $12.63 to $13.00. There was then no large, general
upward movement in the lower half of the wage distribution. For bound
workers, those directly affected by the new minimum wage, the shift
was substantially larger than for those higher up the wage distribution.
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Several Studies from Overseas
While studies of effects of the minimum wage on bound workers
are relatively rare in the United States, four European studies have examined this issue. This greater interest may reflect recent changes in
European minimum wage policies. In contrast with the United States,
where the minimum wage has been in place for more than 70 years and
has risen in modest increments in the last several decades, the British
implemented an entirely new minimum wage system in 1999. Several
other European countries have recently raised their minimum wages
proportionally more than the United States has ever done.
Studying the earnings of English and Welch agricultural workers
in 1991–1994 under the supplanted Agricultural Wage Board system,
Burton and Dorsett (2001) find distinct spikes among the different grades
of agricultural workers, with each spike corresponding to the minimum
wage for a particular grade of worker. Forty percent of “craft” workers
and 20 percent of ungraded workers earned exactly the minimum wage
in their “grade” in 1991–1992. Selection adjustment is a technique
that corrects for the change in the characteristics of workers caused by
minimum-wage-induced job loss.39 Using data on agricultural workers
from the Survey of Earnings and Hours from 1991–1995 and making
this adjustment, the authors estimate that without the minimum wage,
half or more of the agricultural labor force would have earned less than
the applicable minimum.40 Based on work that was particularly attentive
to limitations of United Kingdom data, Dickens and Manning (2004a)
find that increases in the minimum wage increased the earnings of those
directly affected, between 6 and 7 percent of the employed.
In a dramatic policy change, the United Kingdom implemented an
economy-wide minimum wage, an NMW of £3.60/hour in April 1999.
The NMW was further increased to £3.70 in 2001, £4.10 in 2002, £4.20
in 2003, and £4.50 in 2004. The initial NMW was intentionally set
relatively low so as not to impose too great a burden on industry. Subsequent increases raised the NMW to a level at which it might be expected
to affect a larger proportion of individuals. While it is unlikely that the
reasons for implementation included creation of an opportunity for research, several seized this unique chance, providing detailed descriptive
studies of both the implementation and initial increases in the NMW;
Lam et al. (2006) and Butcher (2005), all associated with governmental
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organizations in the United Kingdom, report faster wage growth at the
bottom of the wage distribution due to the NMW.
Using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), Lam et
al. (2006) construct distributions of straight-time hourly earnings for a
range of £0–£3 above the NMW for the period 1998–2004.41 The data
demonstrate increasingly large spikes at the applicable NMW following
the 1999 implementation and the 2003 and 2004 increases in the NMW,
as increases in the NMW affect increasing numbers of workers (Lam et
al. 2006, see Figure 5.4).
There is a distinct spike at the NMW in the 1999 data, the year
in which the NMW was implemented, which is higher than any other
spike that year. The spike at the NMW in 2003 is also distinct but below the spikes at £5 and £6. This changes in 2004, when the spike at
£4.5, the NMW, is well above any of the other spikes in the data. The
spikes at the NMW are consistent with employers upgrading bound
workers to, but not beyond, the required minimum wage. Lam et al.’s
Figure 5.4 Distribution of Hourly Wages in the United Kingdom,
1998–2004
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(2006) findings are particularly interesting because they are obtained
from employer data. A concern with household data is that spikes may
be the result of rounding by respondents rather than the actual distribution of wages. Because data from employer surveys come from payroll
records, spikes in employer data are more likely to reflect the true distribution of earnings.
Butcher (2005) takes a different approach to measuring the impact
of the NMW, comparing wage growth by percentile under the NMW
to wage growth in the period before implementation. Using data from
the New Earnings Survey, an employer-based longitudinal survey,
Butcher calculates the growth of hourly earnings, excluding overtime,
throughout the earnings distribution for the period 1992–1997, prior to
the implementation of the NMW, and for 1998–2003. Economy-wide
economic trends are incorporated by subtracting the growth rate of the
median earnings from the growth rate at each percentile in the earnings
distribution. Earnings growth relative to the growth of median earnings
is graphed by percentile of the earnings distribution and the period in
which the NMW was implemented and increased compared to the period prior to the implementation.
Prior to the implementation of the NMW, there was a simple positive
relationship between an individual’s position in the earnings distribution and earnings growth. The higher one’s place in the distribution,
the faster one’s earnings grew relative to median growth. The distinctly
slower growth of those at the bottom of the distribution is apparent in
Figures 5.5 and 5.6. The growth in earnings of both men and women
in the lowest 10 percent of the wage distribution is notably slower than
growth at the median of the wage distribution. The reduced rate of wage
growth at the low end is visible up to the 30th percentile of the wage
distribution. In contrast, in the period following the implementation of
the NMW, wage growth at the bottom of the wage distribution is very
high relative to growth at the median. It is perhaps as much as 5 percent
faster than median wage growth at the 5th percentile for women, and up
to the 20th percentile for both women and men, it is higher or equal to
growth at the median. Parallel results are found for both part-time and
full-time employees (see Figures 5.5 and 5.6), and when those employees are distinguished by gender (see Figures 5.7 and 5.8).
Although this analysis does not include measures of statistical significance or go beyond using the median to control for other conditions
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Figure 5.5 Increase in Percentile Gross Hourly Earnings Excluding
Overtime Minus Increase in the Median, Male Employees
(Aged 22 and Over), 1992–2003
Percentage increase in percentile earnings minus
percentage increase in median earnings
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Figure 5.6 Increase in Percentile Gross Hourly Earnings Excluding
Overtime Minus Increase in the Median, Female Employees
(Aged 22 and Over), 1992–2003
Percentage increase in percentile earnings minus
percentage increase in median earnings
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SOURCE: Lam et al. (2006).
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Figure 5.7 Increase in Percentile Gross Hourly Earnings Excluding
Overtime Minus Increase in the Median, Full-Time
Employees (Aged 22 and Over), 1992–2003

Percentage increase in percentile earnings minus
percentage increase in median earnings
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Figure 5.8 Increase in Percentile Gross Hourly Earnings Excluding
Overtime Minus Increase in the Median, Part-Time
Employees (Aged 22 and Over), 1992–2003

Percentage increase in percentile earnings minus
percentage increase in median earnings
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affecting the growth of hourly earnings, both the magnitude of the effect and its size in the lowest-earnings deciles suggest that increases in
the minimum wage have a large effect on the earnings growth of those
at the lowest-earnings levels.42
Longitudinal Studies
A challenge in measuring the effect of the minimum wage on bound
workers is that most surveys do not follow the same individuals across
changes in the minimum wage. As a result, although researchers are able
to measure the effect of the minimum wage on similar workers prior to
and after a change in the minimum wage, they rarely observe the experience of bound workers across the change. Longitudinal data, which
follow individuals over time, sometimes over many years, open the
possibility for following the same bound individuals through changes
in the minimum wage. It also makes it possible to remove unobserved
individual characteristics that may affect individuals’ employability and
earnings, thereby getting a better measure of the effect of the minimum
wage on wage and employment outcomes. (Longitudinal studies are
summarized in Table 5.12.) Currie and Fallick (1996), Zavodny (2000),
and Stewart (2004b) each estimate models of the effect of the minimum
wage on wages and employment with longitudinal data. While the latter
two studies find that higher minimum wages are associated with higher
earnings, Currie and Fallick’s work, which covers a period of peak inflation in the United States, suggests either a negative or nonsignificant
relationship. A synthesis of these studies provides a window into the
effect of the minimum wage during periods of high and low inflation.
As part of a study of the effect of the minimum wage on the employment of teens and young workers, Currie and Fallick (1996) estimate
the effect of the minimum wage on earnings. They follow individuals
who were between 14 and 21 years old in 1979 through the 1979 and
1980 increases in the minimum wage. Individuals’ wages, the dependent variable, are measured as the level and the change in log wage
(which is a good approximation of wage growth). The wage gap, the
difference between an individual’s ex ante wage and the new minimum
wage, is used as the measure of the magnitude of the effect of the minimum wage.43

Table 5.12 The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Those Bound by the New Minimum Longitudinal Studies
Study
Effect
Target
Bound
Currie and Increases in the
workers
Fallick minimum reduce the
(1996) real earnings of bound
workers.
Zavodny
(2000)

Larger wage gaps are Teenagers
associated with larger
increases in post–minimum wage increase
wages. At the mean
wage gap for bound
workers, those who
are bound have wage
increases of $0.50 to
$0.55 more per hour
than the unbound.

Stewart
Wage growth is
(2004b) considerably higher
for bound employees
than for those earning
above the NMW.
a

Bound
workers

Sample
Analytic
Unit of
Data
Type of stanCountry
period
approach observation structure
dard error
Individual Longitudinal Conventional
United 1979–1987 OLS and
States
fixed effect
regression
United 1979–1993 Regression,
States
D-D

United
Kingdom

Various

Quasiexperiment

Panel and Conventional
Stateyear and longitudinal
individualyear

Individualyear

Panel

Data
seta
NLSY

CPS

Conventional Matched
LFS,
BHPS,
NES

NLSY = National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. CPS = Current Population Survey. LFS = Labour Force Survey. BHPS = British Household Panel Survey. NES = New Earnings Survey.
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Consistent with the expectations of economic theory, Currie and
Fallick (1996) find that higher minimum wages reduce employment.
Their initial estimates for wage increases are, on their face, counterintuitive: higher minimum wages do not affect the rate of wage change
and have a negative effect on the level of the wage. This changes considerably when individuals with unusually high wage growth between
any two years, 100 percent or more, are excluded from the sample.44
With this exclusion, there is a large and statistically significant relationship between the wage gap and the change in the wage. Those with
larger wage gaps have faster wage growth following an increase in
the minimum wage. The coefficient on the wage-gap measure remains
negative in the model in which the wage (rather than wage growth) is
the dependent variable, but it is far from statistically significant. The
results are, in the end, puzzling and difficult to reconcile. The authors
raise some doubts about the accuracy of National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY) wage data and conclude that their estimates must be
interpreted with caution, as coefficient estimates are sensitive to outliers
and changes in specification.
Building on this approach, Zavodny (2000) estimates a model of
employment, hours, and hourly earnings for teens between 1979 and
1993 using CPS data matched across years to create longitudinal data
consisting of two observations on each person. Utilizing a specification
similar to that of Currie and Fallick (1996), she finds that each $0.01 increase in the wage gap results in a $0.023 additional increase in hourly
earnings following an increase in the minimum wage. Zavodny then
constructs a comparison group of teens who earn close to but above
the minimum wage in periods in which inflation is relatively low. She
compares the effect of a minimum wage increase on this group to the
effect of the increase in the minimum wage on the bound group and on
a group of high-wage teenagers. She finds that while the average wage
of bound teens rose by $0.57 relative to the high-wage group following
a minimum wage increase, the wage of the comparison group of lowwage but unbound teens rose by $0.36 cents following the increase in
the minimum wage.
Stewart (2004) also adopted Currie and Fallick’s method for longitudinal models of the effect of the implementation of the NMW in the
United Kingdom. Three sets of difference-in-differences, each relying
on a different survey (the British Labour Force Survey, the New Eco-
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nomic Survey, and the British Household Panel Survey), indicate that
the group of workers bound by the minimum wage increase experienced
a 4–10 percent faster wage growth than a control group composed of individuals previously earning just above the new minimum wage. While
the magnitude of the effect varied between surveys, results were invariant to use of a wage gap measure or a variable that simply indicated
whether an individual was bound by the minimum wage (and invariant
to controls for additional factors).
The three longitudinal studies point in somewhat different directions. While Currie and Fallick (1996) suggest that the minimum wage
has an uncertain effect on the wages of the bound, both Zavodny (2000)
and Stewart (2004) find a strong positive effect. How might these differences be explained, particularly given the similarity in methods?
While it may lie in part in differences between countries, or differences
in implementing and raising a minimum wage, the economic circumstances of the studies are quite different. Currie and Fallick focus on
minimum wage changes during a period of rapid inflation. While this
period is part of Zavodny’s study, her work also includes increases in a
period of stable prices. Stewart’s study covers a period of price stability in the United Kingdom. Inflation is then a prime suspect; it was so
rapid from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s that, in an attempt at least
to keep pace with inflation, the minimum wage was raised annually for
eight years. From 1979 to 1982, the period considered by Currie and
Fallick, the minimum wage rose by 14 percent, consumer prices rose by
33 percent, and the wages of production and nonsupervisory workers
by 25 percent. As earnings of those whose wages were determined by
the minimum wage fell behind wages in the broader economy, Currie
and Fallick’s finding of an uncertain relationship between the wage gap,
wages, and wage growth is not surprising.
In contrast, in periods of price and relative wage stability, which
characterize the period studied by Stewart (2004b) and much of the
period studied by Zavodny (2000), legislated increases in the minimum
wage often substantially exceed price and average wage growth. In
such periods, we would expect to find a positive relationship between
minimum wage increases and wage growth for bound workers.
Current research does not provide a clear answer with respect to
the relationship between inflation, the average wage, and the minimum
wage. These three studies suggest that, in periods of moderate price
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inflation, increases in the minimum wage have a substantial positive
effect on the wages and wage growth of bound workers, but that this
does not hold in periods of rapid inflation. In such periods, those whose
wages are determined by the minimum wage are likely to lag both inflation and general wage growth.45
Inclusive of the longitudinal studies, eight examine how the earnings
of bound workers respond to the level, the increase, or the imposition
of a minimum wage. Of these, seven find a positive effect and one finds
a mixed effect; this last appears to be a product of a macroeconomic
climate characterized by rapid inflation in which, as a consequence, the
minimum wage was lagging the inflation-driven increases in the wage
structure.

SPILLOVER EFFECTS
Does the minimum wage affect only those who were bound by the
new minimum wage, or is there also a pay increase for those who were
previously earning more than the new minimum? If it affects this group,
how far up the wage distribution does it extend?
The possibility that minimum wage increases raise the wages of
those already earning above the new minimum wage, referred to as a
spillover effect, has been part of the discussion of minimum wages since
before passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938. Why would
there be spillover effects? In a neoclassical model, the wages of those
earning above the new minimum may increase if these workers are substitutes for workers bound by the minimum wage. When the minimum
wage rises, employers substitute capital and more productive, higherwage workers for those whose productivity is below the new minimum.
The increased demand for higher-wage workers will increase their
equilibrium wage. This increase will depend on the size of the increase
in demand for their labor, which in turn depends on the degree to which
they are close—good—substitutes, and the degree to which their wage
rises in response to the additional demand. Grossman (1983) styles this
market-driven increase as an indirect effect, as employers are responding to market forces rather than directly to the legislated increase in the
minimum wage.
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Some economists—particularly those associated with the institutionalist, neoinstitutionalist, and behavioral streams of economics, but also
some more neoclassically oriented—locate the source of the spillover
effect in the way workers and their employers determine their appropriate wages and in the functioning of competitive markets. Although
each study—from Commons and Andrews (1916) and Webb and Webb
(1897) to Dunlop (1950) and Ross (1948) and on to Grossman (1983);
Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder (2006); Falk and Huffman (2007); Spriggs
(1994); and Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska (2011)—has a different
explanation of the wage structures and linkages that underlie spillover
effects, broad agreement exists that workers form their expectations of
wages and wage increases through comparison with other workers.46
The importance of comparing wages is variously attributed to workers’ desire to maintain their social status, to psychological processes, or
the method workers use to collect information about reasonable wage
increases. In a world in which workers form their wage expectations
from the wage improvements of a self-defined peer group, an increase
in the minimum wage will cause an upward revision in the wage expectations of those ex ante earning not far above the new minimum wage.
These higher expectations place pressure on employers, since failure to
meet such expectations may result in being viewed as unfair, with consequences for labor efficiency and turnover (Grossman 1983, p. 360).
The importance of comparison in forming a view of a reasonable wage
is not limited to individual comparisons; Ross’s (1948) description of
“orbits of coercive comparison” and their impact on wage formation is
another example of the view that comparison permeates wage setting
institutions.
This logic is supported by experimental economics. The minimum
wage creates a target that workers use to judge the adequacy of their
wage. When everyone is assured a minimum wage, the minimum is
identified as the wage that even the least capable employee is paid.
Those who identify themselves as better than minimum wage workers
adopt a reservation wage above the minimum wage (Falk, Fehr, and
Zehnder 2006).47 When the minimum wage is raised, employers who
wish to maintain morale and productivity must raise the wages of employees who use the minimum as a benchmark.
Several studies have searched for evidence of spillover effects,
some in particular industries or occupations, others at the national
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level. Evidence on spillovers from industry- and occupation-specific
studies is mixed, with the balance tending against there being meaningful spillover effects. Broader studies of the U.S. labor market suggest
the presence of spillover effects, particularly for women. Studies of the
United Kingdom find large spillovers for both sexes that reach a considerable distance up the wage distribution.
Industry- and Occupation-Specific Studies
If the spillover effect of the minimum wage operates through the
expectations of employees who, ex ante, earn the minimum wage, then
it will only appear ex post, when substantial groups of employees associate with or compare themselves to minimum wage workers. One
might expect the minimum wage to have a large effect in establishments
where many workers earn the minimum wage or close to the minimum
wage (e.g., restaurants and fast food establishments), but little effect in
establishments where the minimum wage is far from binding. Spriggs
(1994) investigates this in a survey of restaurants in Greensboro, North
Carolina, and Jackson, Mississippi, two states with relatively low wage
structures before and after the 1991 increase in the minimum wage.
(Studies of spillover effects are summarized in Table 5.13.)
The survey suggests that restaurants can be divided into three broad
categories with respect to wage policies: 1) those that pay high wages
and whose wage structure is not influenced by increases in the minimum wage; 2) those for which the minimum wage is a key or focal
wage, and which respond to increases in the minimum wage by moving
up their entire wage distribution; and 3) those that choose to minimize
wage costs by increasing the wages only of those for whom it is legally
required.48 The 1991 increase in the minimum wage caused wage increases for bound workers in which the minimum wage is a key wage,
and for those who view the minimum wage as a narrow legal requirement. The wages also rose for many workers in restaurants in which
the minimum wage is a key wage, creating some degree of spillover
in the industry. The wage difference between high-wage restaurants,
which ignored the increase altogether, and low-wage restaurants declined. Overall, spillover effects dominated, and the average restaurant
wage rose by between the amount that would occur if the typical restaurant increased the wage of each employee by $0.45, the increase in the
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nominal minimum wage, and that which would occur if the typical restaurant increased all wages by 12 percent, the proportional increase in
the minimum wage (Spriggs 1994, p. 227). The increase in wages was
affected by the proportion of workers below the new minimum wage
but not by the average difference between bound workers’ wages and
the new minimum wage. Spriggs also finds that the wages of restaurants
with a larger proportion of African Americans in their workforces increased less than those with a smaller proportion of African Americans.
Although primarily interested in the effect of the 2007–2009 increases in the minimum wage on employment, Hirsch, Kaufman,
and Zelenska’s (2011) study of three quick-food restaurant chains in
Georgia and Alabama addresses issues similar to those considered by
Spriggs (1994). They report that the increase in the minimum wage
resulted in increased wage compression. While wages of workers
bound by the increase in the minimum wage rose, employees earning
more than the new minimum wage received smaller than normal (or
no) wage increases. Compression was limited by the effect on the morale of the higher-paid workers, who were generally more experienced
and better-performing employees. Consistent with Spriggs’s research,
the employees of these chains were heavily African American (64 percent).49 Grossman (1983) studied the effect of minimum wage increases
on nine blue- and white-collar occupations earning slightly above the
minimum wage in 16 cities between 1960 and 1975.
Wages among white-collar workers were compressed for a time
after a minimum wage increase, as lower-wage white-collar occupations realize larger increases in earnings than higher-wage white-collar
workers. However, within a year and a half of the increase, the relative
distribution of earnings among white-collar occupations was largely
restored. Four of the six white-collar occupations realized earnings
increases associated with minimum wage increases one year after the
increase, and only two of the six still realized increases after an additional six months. There is no evidence that the minimum wage affects
the nonproduction blue-collar occupations of laborer, janitor, and order
filler.50
Dickens and Manning (2004a,b) find little to no evidence of spillover effects associated with the implementation of the NMW in 1999.
Using their survey of care homes, they find that home care workers
who earned more than the NMW prior to its implementation realized a
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in the
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Table 5.13 Spillover Effects: The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Those Earning More but Close to the New
Minimum Wage

as employees
earning above
the minimum
received smaller increases
than those
inbound.
Grossman
Increases in the Labor force United 1960–
Time
SMSA
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minimum wage
States
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Care home United
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appropriate
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(continued)
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Table 5.13 (continued)
Data
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effects were
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Table 5.13 (continued)
Comments

LFS = Labour Force Survey. CPS = Current Population Survey. ORG = Outgoing Rotation Groups. SIPP = Survey of Income and
Program Participation. CES = Consumer Expenditure Survey. NES = New Earnings Survey. BHPS = British Household Panel Survey.
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substantial wage gain afterwards, between 6 and 8 percent. However,
once adjustment is made for normal wage growth, estimated spillover
effect ranges between 1 and 2.5 percent; the lower estimate is not statistically significant in even a 10 percent test. In their work with national
United Kingdom data (2004b), they report that despite an increase in
the earnings of those bound by the NMW due to its implementation,
there was not a statistically significant spillover effect. They conclude
that the NMW had little effect on the overall wage distribution because
relatively few employees were directly affected.
If firms’ wage distributions change differently in response to increases in the minimum wage, even within an industry, as Spriggs
suggests, what additional issues need to be addressed in investigating
spillover effects? One is whether there is evidence of broad spillover
effects throughout the labor market. Is it isolated to a few firms or industries, or does it substantially affect the wages of many of those earning
above the new minimum wage? If there is a spillover effect, where are
we likely to find it? Which workers are likely to gain from spillovers,
and which firms are likely to increase the wages of their employees
who were previously earning more than the new legally mandated minimum? Finally, how high up the wage distribution do spillover effects
reach? No one article addresses all of these questions, but answers can
be synthesized from the articles that address some of these issues.
The U.S. Experience
Many studies limit their inquiry to specific industries or occupations, but several consider national wage structures. Harvey and
Bernstein (2003) consider the impact of the minimum wage on the
trends in hourly wage deciles from 1979 to 2000 using modern timeseries methods. They find a wage spillover effect in the first and second
deciles of the female wage distribution but no evidence of a spillover
even within the first male decile. Luttmer’s (2007) examination of the
effect of the minimum wage on employment by skill group finds that
the 1990–1991 increase in the federal minimum wage to $4.25 resulted
in higher rates of wage increase for workers whose ex ante wage was
as high as $6 per hour (see Figure 5.2 and discussion). Reich and Hall
(2001, Table 10) provide evidence for both spillover and compression
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(a narrowing of wage differences) following the rise in the minimum
wage to $5.75 in the mid-1990s.
This suggests that although the bottom of the California wage structure moved up considerably between 1995 and 1999, there was little or
no movement of wages above the top of the 2nd decile (20th percentile). Any spillover effects were occurring within the first two deciles.51
Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2011) find that minimum wage
increases are associated with detectable increases in the earnings of
workers making between 120 percent and 300 percent of the minimum wage.52 The authors analyze the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) for 1986–2007, the CPS for 1979–2007, and the
Consumer Expenditure Survey for 1983–2008. The estimate models of
family income in which pretax nonasset income is determined by leads
and lags on the effective minimum wage (the higher of the state or federal minimum wage), a fixed family effect, and dummies for year and
quarter.53 The regressions are also organized by the proportion of family income originating from minimum wage employment: those with no
minimum wage income, those with some family income (but less than
20 percent) originating from minimum wage employment, and those
families for which at least 20 percent of family income originates from
minimum wage jobs. Although this research considers the effect of the
minimum wage on family income rather than individual earnings, the
link between individual earnings and family income is sufficiently direct and these results sufficiently useful in understanding of the effect
of the minimum wage on earnings to consider in this part of the review.
Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2011) report, unsurprisingly, that
the income of families with no income from the minimum wage is not
affected by changes in the minimum wage. When the sample is limited to families with some of their income originating from a minimum
wage job, the average effect was $255 per quarter, significant in a 1
percent test.54 When limited to families that obtain at least 20 percent of
their income from minimum wage employment, the weighted average
effect was $209, again significant in a 1 percent test.
More relevant to the measure of spillover effects, the models differentiate among families that receive income from an adult earning an
hourly wage within 120 percent of the new minimum, and between 120
and 300 percent of the new minimum. They further subdivide this latter broad category into smaller bands of 120–200 percent and 200–300
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percent of the new minimum.55 Considering families that have at least
some income from the minimum wage and an adult earning between
120 and 300 percent of the highest applicable minimum, the weighted
average effect is small in magnitude, $58 per quarter, and does not
satisfy a 5 percent significance test. Similar results are obtained when
the estimates are limited to families that obtain at least 20 percent of
their income from minimum wage employment. When this group is
divided into those earning 120–200 percent and 200–300 percent of
the minimum, the effect estimated for the latter group is very small
in magnitude and far from being statistically significant. The effect of
a higher minimum wage on families with members earning 120–200
percent of the minimum wage are both larger and statistically significant. Higher minimum wages are associated with an additional $110 per
quarter for families with some minimum wage income, and $123 higher
for families for which a minimum wage job provides at least 20 percent
of family income. Both weighted estimates are significant in a 5 percent
test. If we convert these findings from “individuals’ wages as a percent
of the minimum” to “percentiles of the wage distribution (for those who
are not enrolled in high school or college),” the group earning no more
than 120 percent ($6.18) of the minimum wage in 2000 composed 8
percent of the employed population, while those earning 120–200 percent ($10.30) of the minimum wage composed an additional 30 percent
of the employed workforce. In this study, the effect of the minimum
wage reaches beyond the first decile, but not as high as the fourth decile, of the wage distribution.
The United Kingdom Experience
Butcher (2005) finds that the NMW affected the growth of wages
of men and women up to the third decile of the earnings distribution.
While wage growth of the first three deciles of the British wage distribution was less than the growth of the median wage between 1992
and 1997, it exceeded that figure from 1998 to 2003. The gain in wage
growth was larger and it extended further up the wage distribution for
full-time than for part-time employees.
According to Stewart’s (2004a) study of the introduction of the
NMW in 1999, wage growth among bound workers accelerated substantially following implementation. Wage growth among those who
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were ex ante earning more than the NMW, between £4.00 and £5.00,
also accelerated following implementation, but by a smaller amount.
There is some ambiguity about the effect on those whose ex ante wages
were between £3.60 and £4.00.
Lam et al. (2006) find that spillover effects reached as high as £6.50
following the implementation of the NMW in 1999 and its subsequent
increases through 2004. In the absence of a spillover effect, ongoing
increases in the minimum wage would gather an increasing fraction of
the labor force in a spike at the new minimum.56 However, the spike
at the minimum wage that occurred with the imposition of the NMW
in 1999 did not become ever larger with successive increases in the
minimum. Instead, the spike represented a relatively constant proportion of the population with low earnings throughout the increases in
2001–2004. Following the 2003 and 2004 increases, the distribution of
earnings above the NMW remained similar to that observed after the
1999 imposition of the NMW.
The clumping of observations at focal values of earnings, such as
between £1.00 and £1.50 more than the NMW, remained roughly similar
in 2003 and 2004 to what it had been in 1999. The fraction of workers at
round numbers such as £5.00, £5.50, and £6.00 becomes more marked
over time with the upward movement of the NMW, suggesting that the
earnings structure was stable relative to the NMW, with earnings above
the minimum rising with the successive increases in the minimum.
Further evidence that the low-wage market as a whole adjusts to increases in the minimum wage is provided by regressions for individuals
earning up to £2.00 more than the contemporaneous value of the NMW.
The greater an individual’s wage relative to the contemporaneous value
of the NMW, the larger his relative wage in the following year. For example, those earning £1.00 more than the NMW in 1999, 2000, 2001,
and 2003 were, on average, earning between £1.25 and £1.50 above
the new value of the NMW in the following year. Those at £1.50 more
than the minimum in those years earned, on average, between £1.70
and £2.10 in the following year. Lam et al. (2006) report that the likelihood of receiving a wage increase of a given size relative to the value
of the NMW in the following year stays constant over time, providing
additional evidence that the minimum wage serves as a benchmark for
the lower part of the wage distribution.57
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Summary
In the modest number of studies of spillover effects, the reported
outcomes are less cohesive than those of studies of the average wage
or wages of bound workers. Of the 10 nonexperimental studies, 8 report at least some evidence of spillovers at or above the 10th decile
of the earnings distribution. The magnitude of spillovers, how far they
extend up the wage distribution, and the groups, occupations, and industries where they exist, are less certain. There is broad evidence of
spillovers in the United States. Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2011)
and Luttmer (2007) both find spillovers for employed workers. Harvey
and Bernstein (2003) report a spillover effect up to the 3rd decile for
women, but no spillover effect for men. Spriggs (1993–94) finds evidence of spillovers for U.S. restaurants, and Grossman’s work suggests
spillovers for some white-collar occupations for a year following the
increase.
The evidence for the United Kingdom is mixed, with disagreement
over whether the introduction of the NMW spilled over into the wages
of those not directly affected. Dickens and Manning (2004) find no
spillovers in their national data and very small effects in their care home
data. Stewart (2004a), Lam et al. (2006), and Butcher (2005) each suggest some spillover in response to implementation. Research on later
increases by Lam et al. and Butcher provide considerable evidence of
spillovers as the NMW continued to rise in 2003 and 2004.
It then appears that spillover effects occur, but we are uncertain
about what groups realize spillover effects, which demographic groups,
occupations and industries they are likely to affect, or the magnitude of
the increase in the minimum wage that would initiate spillovers. It may
be that, as both Spriggs and Grossman suggest, more detailed studies of
specific wage and employment structures are needed to determine when
and where spillovers occur.

CONCLUSION
We began this chapter with three questions about the effect of the
minimum wage on wages: 1) does the minimum wage affect the earn-
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ings of bound workers, 2) are there spillover effects, and 3) does the
minimum wage affect average wages? Summed over the three classifications of articles, and permitting double counting where articles
address multiple issues, 37 of 41 studies of average wages, bound
workers, and spillovers reviewed in this chapter indicate a positive relationship between the minimum wage and some aspect of wages.
Although the results are not one-sided, the preponderance of evidence is that higher minimum wages raise the wages of both bound
workers and workers who had previously been earning above but close
to the new minimum. Average wages are almost always estimated to
rise in response to increases in the minimum wage. Even where higher
minimum wages are found to cause the loss of jobs, large majorities of
bound workers benefitted from the increase in the minimum wage. The
impact of spillovers varies considerably by study, but they may reach as
high as or beyond the 20th percentile of the wage distribution.
Several patterns emerge from this research. First, minimum wages
and minimum wage increases have a greater impact on women than on
men. Minimum wage increases are estimated to reach further in women’s wage distributions than men’s. Some studies indicate that up to
20 percent of women are affected by increases in the minimum wage,
but likely only 10 percent of men. This result should not be surprising
given the lower earnings of women, but the difference in the fractions
of women and men affected is very large. The minimum wage is then
particularly important to women’s earnings.
Second, there is evidence that the effect of the minimum wage has
become more complex over time in the United States. While at one
time the minimum wage was the entry wage for many workers, it has
evolved into a benchmark used to establish an acceptable entry wage
for workers who have completed their schooling. The spike in the wage
distribution that was formerly at the minimum wage is now somewhat
above the applicable minimum wage. As Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder (2006)
suggest, this change is consistent with workers’ seeing the minimum as
the wage paid to anyone who is employable. Inducing more than minimal work effort from employees requires the employer to demonstrate
that employees are not viewed as plain vanilla minimum wage workers,
by paying more than the minimum. This change in the psychology of
the minimum wage might be caused by the decline in its real value over
the last 50 years. What was once a substantial wage is now too low to
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call forth effort in jobs in which employee effort is important, and this,
in turn, transforms the minimum wage into a benchmark rather than a
true floor.
There is also diversity and richness in the results, particularly when
specific industries and occupations are considered. Spriggs (1994)
suggests that restaurants’ response to increases in the minimum wage
depend on their work organization and salary structure. Further, restaurants that have found other ways to achieve productivity goals increase
only the wages of bound workers when the minimum wage increases.
This parallels the finding that the implementation of the NMW only
moved bound workers at care homes up to the NMW and did not affect
the wages of those earning above the NMW (Dickens and Manning
2004a).
The implication is that differences in the work organization of
low-wage firms lead to differences both in response to increases in
the minimum wage, and in the number of workers affected by those
minimum wages. Similarly, Belman and Wolfson’s (2004, 2010) work
suggests that the average wage of many low-wage industries rises in response to increases in the minimum wage, but that this is not universal.
Besides finding differences in the wage response of detailed industries
within the food and beverage industry, Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti
2009) find differences in the impact of the minimum wage on wages
between states with and without right-to-work laws.

Notes
1. An additional problem, mentioned in Chapter 3, is that the CPS does not collect
hours data for those who report that their hours vary, that is, that they have no usual
hours. A measure of the wage, and thus of hourly earnings, is still available for those
who report being paid hourly. It is not possible, however, to calculate hourly earnings for those who are both paid by the week or month and report variable usual
hours.
2. When based on data gathered from the employee in a household survey such as
the CPS, the earnings distribution exhibits spikes not seen in data gathered from
employers and tax records—that is, data gathered from employees are less smooth
and more concentrated at certain values. It is believed that this is due to rounding
or the use of proxy respondents. Figures gathered from tax or employer records are
considered to be more accurate. In the United States, spikes appear in household
survey data at even dollar amounts or figures evenly divisible by $0.25.
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3. We abstract from diminishing marginal returns for this example. In a more realistic world, in which the reduction in the workforce resulted in rising productivity,
some of the previously bound workers would remain employed as the marginal
product of the labor force rose in response to layoffs.
4. A third possibility is that no workers are bound by the increase in the minimum
wage. In this instance, an increase in the minimum wage would have no effect on
employment, and neither wage rates nor earnings would be affected. Economic
theory suggests that, if labor demand curves are neither infinitely elastic nor completely inelastic, then there will be a mix of some layoffs and some bound workers
moving up to the new minimum wage.
5. In addition, finding a wage effect is necessary for there to be an employment effect. If the minimum wage doesn’t have a detectable effect on wages, then we
would not expect it to affect employment. We return to the effect of the minimum
wage on the average wage in the next section of the chapter.
6. Or between high- and low-minimum-wage locations.
7. The tables are computed from the Outgoing Rotation files of the Current Population Survey. The tables use wage rates for individuals who report being paid by
the hour, and average hourly earnings when samples include both those paid by
the hour and those paid on some other basis.
8. The organization of the data in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 does not allow us to adjust for
those instances in which the state minimum wage exceeds the federal minimum.
9. The federal minimum wage was $7.25/hour in 2010.
10. Because the minimum wage is supposed to be the lowest wage that can be paid
to employees, the reader deserves some explanation of the less than minimum
wage grouping. We use the applicable federal minimum wage for Tables 5.1 and
5.2, and certain groups of employees, domestics, those in agriculture, and those
working for small firms that are deemed not to be engaged in interstate commerce,
can be paid less than the minimum wage. The federal minimum wage for tipped
workers permits part of the value of the tips received to be counted against the
employers’ minimum wage requirement. As a result, employers only need to pay
tipped employees $2.30 per hour, so long as their tips make up the difference between $2.30 and the applicable minimum wage. Mistakes in reporting by tipped
employees, in which these employees only report the employer portion of their
pay, and employees’ reluctance to inform employers when tips do not fully top up
the earnings of tipped employees, is another source of individuals’ reporting earnings less than the minimum wage. Finally, not all employers obey the law and pay
the full minimum to their employees.
11. The estimates with wage rates are visually similar to those obtained using average hourly earnings. For all figures, the data used in their construction run from
August through July. Because the data in the CPS refer to a week in the middle
of the month, the data for the year preceding the 2007 increases do not straddle
that increase.
12. The parameters for the kernel density smoothing are taken from Neumark,
Schweitzer, and Wascher (2004).
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13. At this time, only Alaska and Connecticut had state minimum wages in excess of
the $3.35 federal minimum. Alaska’s minimum was $3.85, and Connecticut’s was
$3.37, $0.02 above federal minimum.
14. As a mathematical possibility, increases in the wages of low-paid workers and decreases in those of higher-paid workers can offset each other to leave the average
wage unchanged. The literature offers neither evidence nor explanation for such
an outcome, so we do not take it up.
15. In this review of the literature, we generally do not discuss articles in which
the empirical results were found to be suspect. These include Böckerman and
Uusitalo (2009); Neumark and Nizalova (2007); Neumark, Schweitzer, and
Wascher (2004); and Pereira (2003). In addition, we mention, but do not place
great weight on, state-by-time panels that do not cluster their errors by state
and find a significant relationship between the minimum and average wage.
This is not the case for state-by-time panels that do not cluster and do not
find an effect. As discussed in the employment chapter, the downward bias in
the estimate of standard errors results in rejecting the hypothesis of no effect too
frequently. Given the bias against finding “no effect,” such studies can dependably
be used when the hypothesis of no effect is not rejected.
16. The differences between studies are sufficient that, even with topical grouping, it
is difficult to argue we are making an apples-to-apples comparison. However, the
flavor and color are sufficiently similar within topics that an orange-to-tangerine
comparison is possible.
17. The −0.2 to −0.3 range is the top of the range obtained from the older minimum
wage research. Using this high a figure, which is considerably larger in magnitude than obtained from the new minimum wage research, suffices for the current
computation work.
18. If we suppose that those bound workers who are laid off were all previously paid
less than those who kept their jobs, then those who had been earning $5.10 or less
lose their positions, when the elasticity is −0.2. With an elasticity of −0.3, those
who had earned no more than $5.15 lose their jobs. The maximum wage increase
for those retaining their positions is then $0.39 per hour.
19. See http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs32.htm (accessed August 9,
2012).
20. Actually, $7.98, but we use $8.00 for simplicity.
21. We assume that all currently employed teens will complete their 90 days of employment at the youth subminimum wage and, if they remain employed, have their
wage increased to the full adult minimum wage. We also assume that teens will be
laid off in order from lowest to highest paid.
22. The lack of any effect on weekly earnings is likely related to including the unemployed and those not in the labor force in the calculation of weekly earnings, and
defining those individuals’ weekly earnings to be zero.
23. Although there is still no employment effect for male or female black or Hispanic
teens, the minimum wage is negatively and significantly associated with average hourly earnings and very negatively associated with average weekly earnings
for males. For black or Hispanic women, a higher minimum wage is associated
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25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

with higher average hourly earnings, but it does not affect weekly earnings except
through a negative interaction with the EITC.
When the model is estimated for teens who have been employed for more than one
quarter, there is not a statistically significant effect on monthly earnings for the
all-county sample but a positive and significant effect when controls for omitted
economic variables in spatially separated countries are implemented.
Other studies also find that a higher minimum wage is associated with higher
average wages for teens (Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg 2000; Campolieti,
Gunderson, and Riddell 2006). However, as the errors are not clustered, we cannot
tell whether their findings pass a 5 percent test for statistical significance.
The minimum wage generally is positively related to employment, but its interaction with the EITC is negatively related to employment for less-educated
individuals who are not eligible for the EITC. The minimum wage is found to have
a positive effect on weekly earnings, where weekly earnings includes nonworking
individuals who are assigned a zero for earnings, but the interaction between the
minimum wage and EITC is strongly negative. In net, the authors calculate that a
10 percent increase in the minimum wage has no effect on weekly labor earnings.
Because Neumark and Wascher (2011) use the logarithm of the wage as their
dependant variable, they assign values of $1 to hourly earnings for those who
have no earnings because of unemployment or not being in the labor force. Sabia
(2008) follows this approach in including those who are not employed in his estimates of annual income.
The QCEW provides data on quarterly payroll inclusive of direct hourly pay, overtime, tips, bonuses, stock options, and employer contributions to retirement funds.
Payroll is divided by total employment during the quarter to provide a measure of
average (weekly) earnings per employee. As such, the compensation measure used
in this study is considerably broader than the typical measure of earnings.
When first applied to restaurant employees, employers of tipped employees were
required to pay half of the minimum wage to employees, if the balance were made
up by tip income. However, since the 1990s, the minimum required pay for tipped
employees has remained at $2.30. This may reflect the influence of the restaurant
and bar industry in obtaining a quid pro quo for not strongly opposing increases
in these requirements.
There is a positive but nonsignificant effect in models that do not allow for selection. Anderson and Bodvarsson’s (2005) approach to classification, which mixes
the tip credit and level of the minimum wage laws, makes it difficult to distinguish
the effect of these two aspects of minimum wage policy. In addition, the data are
a cross section of states for 1999 with two observations per state, one each for
servers and bartenders, so there are only 100 observations that are pairwise nonindependent. Standard errors are then likely to be large relative to other studies
reported in this review and may be mismeasured, as the nonindependence is not
accounted for.
The shorter sample excludes the recessions at the beginning and end of the longer
sample.
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32. A limitation of this study is the failure to allow for the time-series structure of the
QCEW data. It assumes that effects are contemporaneous and that there is no inertia in economic processes. Although the clustering of the standard error by state
addresses the issue of serial correlation, equally important issues with unit roots
and cointegration are not addressed.
33. As the standard errors are clustered by state, there are not issues of an underestimate of standard errors.
34. An advantage of the QCEW is illustrated in these latter estimates. The countylevel detail provides many more observations than the more frequently analyzed
state-by-time panel, and this detail may be critical to obtaining precise estimates
of the interaction between the minimum wage and right-to-work laws.
35. Earlier work on the effect of minimum wages in the United Kingdom includes
Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003), who report that between 1950 and 1980,
the elasticity of average earnings with respect to the minimum wage was 0.4–
0.5 in England and Wales and 0.6–1.0 in Scotland and Ireland, with no effect on
employment.
36. Wage data from the 1999 survey were reanalyzed as part of a study on the effect of
the implementation of the NMW on care home profitability and survival (Draca,
Machin, and Van Reenen 2011). The authors report that the implementation of the
NMW had a large positive effect on average wages, and that a 10 percent wage
gap was associated with an 8.86 percent increase in the average wage in a regression with controls. The magnitude of wage change was substantially larger than
in an equivalent period in which there was no increase in the minimum wage (pp.
13–14).
37. Although the authors do not suggest this, the pattern is consistent with there being a “shock” effect associated with the implementation of the new wage—firms
reconfigure their workforces in response to the initial implementation of new labor
regulations. However, the reconfiguration is a one-time event, and further increases
in the minimum wage do not result in as large a displacement of workers.
38. Reich and Hall (2001, p. 9) indicate that the spike associated with the minimum
wage moved up with increases in the minimum wage.
39. Economic models suggest that the least-productive individuals would not be
employed when a sufficiently high minimum wage is in place because their marginal product would be less than the minimum wage. If the wage equation were
straightforwardly estimated with only the currently employed, it would be biased
by the exclusion of the lower-productivity workers and would provide an inaccurate estimate of the wage equation that would apply if the lower-productivity
workers remained employed. Selection correction allows estimation of a wage
equation appropriate to the workforce that would be employed in the absence of
a minimum wage.
40. Burton and Dorsett (2001, Figure 3) provide data for the income distribution without a minimum wage but do not calculate the proportion of the labor force that
would be earning less than the minimum. Examination of the figures suggests
that half or more of the labor force would have earnings below the minimum. The
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48.
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absence of formal testing of the effect of the minimum wage on the estimated
proportion earning below the minimum is a limitation of this study.
Wage rates are straight-time hourly pay.
The evidence that the effect on wage growth extends as far up as the 20th percentile of earners will be addressed in the section on wage spillovers.
The wage-gap variable takes a value of zero if the individual’s wage is equal to
or greater than the new minimum wage. Currie and Fallick (1996) do not indicate
whether they use the wage rate or hourly earnings measures for their wage and
wage-gap calculations.
Currie and Fallick (1996) find that excluding the small number of high-growth
outliers greatly affects the regression coefficients but not the standard errors (pp.
415–416).
This is similar to the finding that union/nonunion wage gaps close during periods
of inflation and tight labor markets, when market-determined nonunion wages
move upward rapidly while contractually determined union wages adjust slowly.
A detailed and useful explication of, broadly defined, institutional economists’
views of the minimum wage and the role it plays in labor markets and the economy is found in Kaufman (2007). It explicitly develops Commons’s, Perlman’s
and many less well-known institutionalists’ views. This article is recommended
for those who are interested in a deeper understanding of theories of economics
as these apply to labor markets and a thoughtful contrast between neoclassical
and other economic theories with regard to the minimum wage. It is particularly
enlightening in developing the institutional economists’ self-understanding that
they were explicating the framework within which neoclassical markets operated,
rather than developing an alternative to a neoclassical theory.
Experimental research also indicates that the effect of minimum wage boosts are
not reversible—once the minimum wage has created a standard for the wage, removal of the minimum wage does not automatically reduce workers’ expectations
about an appropriate wage.
Spriggs (1994) speculates that there may be a group of low-wage-restaurant firms
that can maintain productivity without maintaining their intra-firm wage structure.
Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska (2011) find considerable evidence that these restaurants adjust employment in ways consistent with institutionalist views. While
part of the adjustment took place through modest increases in prices, a considerable part of the adjustment resulted from taking advantage of reduced turnover
and improved human resource practices. The latter, in particular, is consistent with
a shock effect.
Grossman (1983) notes that this must be taken with some caution, as the data set
is small and the standard errors are large. The techniques used in this study, appropriate for when it was conducted but currently dated, also suggest the need for
caution in interpreting these findings.
Reich and Hall (2001) investigate and reject the hypotheses that increases in the
minimum wage adversely affected employment. Their observed change in the
wage distribution was therefore not due to truncation.
We also cite estimates provided by the authors but not incorporated into the paper.

Wages and Earnings 257
53. Families are referred to as units in this study; we use the term family for clarity
about the “unit of observation.”
54. Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2011) estimate their models with three different
surveys and report the estimates from each survey and calculate a cross-survey
weighted estimate and standard error. We report the cross-survey effect, as this
uses the largest sample and greatest range of data. The estimated effect based on
data from the CPS declines from $311 to $218 per quarter when the sample is
restricted to families receiving at least 20 percent of their income from minimum
wage jobs. There is also a modest decline in the CEX coefficient but an increase in
the coefficient for the SIPP, which becomes significant in a 10 percent test.
55. For the purposes of measuring spillover effects, treating those earning up to
120 percent of the minimum wage as minimum wage workers potentially results in some spillover effects being attributed to those earning the minimum
wage. We thank Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2011) for providing their estimates of the effect from 120–200 percent, and 200–300 percent of the new
minimum, as these do not appear in the 2011 version of the paper.
The estimates of these effects are sensitive to the period under study. In the
prior paper, in which data series ended in 2005 rather than 2008, CPS estimates
ranged from $336 to $419, and SIPP estimates ranged from $195 to $210, both
with statistically significant estimates in a 5 percent test. In this study, the CPS
estimates ranged from $45 to $83, with the lower estimate far from significant;
SIPP estimates ranged from $110 to $123 and were significant in a 1 percent test.
56. Inflation was very low during this period, averaging 1.2 percent annually. Any
effect it had on upward movement of the lower part of the wage distribution was
likely to be very small and would not substantially complicate this descriptive
analysis.
57. As these changes are not compared to wage growth prior to the implementation of
the NMW, it was unfortunately not possible to distinguish the portion that might
be attributed to “regular” wage growth from that attributable to spillover effects.

6
Human Capital
While research on the minimum wage most often examines its consequences for employment and wages, the minimum wage also potentially affects decisions about schooling, training, and the provision of
nonwage benefits. The largest body of research on these decisions considers the effect of the minimum wage on education and training—the
accumulation of human capital. Behind this is the concern that teenagers may discontinue their education to pursue the improved earnings
afforded by increased minimum wages, and that employers will reduce
the training they provide to employees. Furthermore, a reduction in the
development of skills might have negative consequences for individuals and society, as it would reduce future productivity and earnings,
particularly for low-wage workers.
This concern originates in the predictions of human capital theory.
Individuals’ productivity—their capacity to produce goods and services—is closely related to their knowledge, skills, and abilities. Although some part of an individual’s productivity is associated with
innate abilities, their productivity can be increased through education,
training, and work experience. This investment requires both time and
money, and individuals’ choices about investing in themselves through
education and training can be framed in a fashion parallel to investing
in physical capital. Developing human capital has a direct cost: money
invested in education and training, and an indirect cost, the earnings and
output forgone while the individual trains. The gain from these costs
is the increase in future output and earnings associated with improved
human capital. With this conceptualization of education and training,
the logic used to evaluate investments in physical capital can be applied
to investments in human capital. It is possible to compare the costs of
a particular investment in human capital to the discounted increase in
income associated with the investment. Alternative investments in human capital can be compared to one another, and to the returns from
an investment of the same resources in other markets. One might, for
instance, compare the return on a college degree with the income that
would otherwise be earned from starting work after high school.
259

260 Belman and Wolfson

Human capital theory can be used to evaluate the effects of social
policies on human capital formation and economic welfare. For example, laws that limit the types of work in which children can engage alter
the returns to leaving school at a young age. As children’s employment
opportunities are restricted, and their wages decline with the demand
for their labor, the cost of remaining in school declines, and returns to
continued investment in human capital rise. This would, in turn, result
in increased school attendance, the development of additional human
capital in society as a whole, and perhaps in an increase in national
income in the long term. A wide range of government policies, including those on college loans and grants, training, and subsidies to educational institutions, affect individuals’ and firms’ returns to investments
in human capital and their choices about such investments. By altering
the wages individuals and firms face, labor market policies change the
costs and returns to investments in human capital, possibly in a complex fashion.
The effect of an increase in the minimum wage on the accumulation
of human capital cannot be derived from theory alone. An increased
minimum wage may tempt low-performing high school students to
leave school because of the greater income available from working. If
employers are, however, less willing to employ teenagers at the new
higher minimum wage, the reduced likelihood of employment may instead cause the teen to reassess the decision to leave high school. A
minimum wage increase may cause a high school graduate to forgo
further education and training or may provide the income needed to
support improvements in their human capital. As theory does not posit a
certain outcome, the effects of changes in the minimum wage on human
capital are, in the end, an empirical issue.

THE LOGIC OF INDIVIDUAL AND FIRM INVESTMENT
IN HUMAN CAPITAL
Both individuals and firms invest in human capital. The issues facing individuals and firms are different, and we develop the individual’s
decision before turning to the firm’s decision. For the individual, the
decision about investing in human capital, either in the form of educa-
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tion or more specific training, is one of comparing direct and indirect
current costs in the present with the discounted increase in future income. The costs associated with investment in human capital are both
the direct costs of the training and the income that is forgone as training
time displaces paid employment. The gains are the improved earnings
realized by the individual in the future. Because the gains are in the future, they need to be discounted to reflect their current value. In making
decisions about investing in themselves, individuals compare the costs
of obtaining a particular form of human capital to the discounted gain in
earnings associated with that investment. If the net benefit is positive, it
is economically rational to undertake the investment. However, before
deciding on a course of action, individuals will compare various human
capital investments and choose among them based on their net return,
their rate of return, and other relevant criteria, choosing the one providing the largest net benefit.
Firms also invest in human capital to improve the productivity of
their employees and processes. Such investments make the firm more
efficient and profitable, and firms will invest as long as the discounted
net benefit is positive and better than other available investments.
Firms face a somewhat different problem than individuals in making decisions about investing in human capital.1 When people invest in
themselves, there is no question about who will benefit from that investment. Because there is no certainty that individuals will remain with
the firm, there is no assurance that the firm will reap the benefits of investments in their employees. From the firm’s perspective, investments
in employees range along a continuum from investments that improve
employee productivity in any setting, such as developing reading and
math skills, to investments that improve only employee productivity
with their current employer. The former is termed general human capital, the latter is firm-specific human capital.
The problem facing the firm is that the benefits of its investments
in general human capital may not accrue to employers. If a firm is to
invest in an employee’s general human capital, it must be able to recoup
the investment through the employee’s increased productivity. Even if
the firm shares some of the return with the employee, the firm cannot
share too much if it is to benefit from the investment. The wage paid
to the employee needs to be below, possibly substantially below, the
value produced by the employee so that the firm can realize a reason-
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able return on its investment. Firms that do not invest in training are in
a position to entice a trained employee away by offering a wage more
in line with the employee’s improved productivity. They can do this because they do not need to recover training costs. Because of the problem
of recapturing their investments, firms rarely invest in general human
capital. An exception occurs when an employee is willing to accept a
reduced wage in return for general training, in which case the employee
and not the employer is funding the training.2
The same problem is not present with firm-specific training. This
training, such as training on firm-specific machinery or procedures, is
not useful to other firms, and no incentive exists for other firms to offer the employee a wage greater than the employee’s current one. The
firm that provides the training captures the gains as long as the worker
remains an employee of the firm. It may choose to share some of the
productivity gain with the employee, setting his wage above what he
could earn from other employers, to reduce the likelihood that he will
leave the firm.

HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE MINIMUM WAGE
Changes in the minimum wage may affect decisions of individuals
and firms to invest in human capital. The effects of an increase in the
minimum wage are potentially complex and may occur among different
types of employees. While a higher minimum wage may induce a teen
to abandon school to pursue a job at the now higher wage, it might also
induce retired workers to invest in training that would enable them to
qualify for jobs. Although the effects of the minimum wage on training
might occur throughout the labor force, the literature has focused its effect on the decisions of teenagers to remain in school, and its effect on
the training decisions of firms.
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THE EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE ON SCHOOL
ENROLLMENT: THEORY AND FINDINGS
Economic theory provides no certain prediction about the effect of
increases in the minimum wage on teen school enrollment. Individuals are assumed to maximize their lifetime earnings by balancing the
present discounted value of the gains from additional education against
the costs of that additional education, mostly forgone earnings while in
school. Increases in the minimum wage compress the lower end of the
earnings distribution in a fashion favorable to low-wage workers. For
teens who can find employment following a minimum wage increase,
it raises the cost of forgone earnings, reduces the net benefit of continuing in school, and, where the net benefit becomes a net cost, induces
leaving school. However, if a higher minimum wage results in employers requiring higher productivity from their now more expensive lowwage employees and reducing the number of low-wage jobs available
to teens, then teens are less likely to find employment, the cost of forgone work declines, and the returns to schooling increase. The return to
schooling rises further if additional schooling increases the likelihood
of being hired into a job at the new higher minimum wage in the future.
If these factors sufficiently increase the net benefit of continued schooling sufficiently, increases in the minimum wage could be associated
with increased school attendance.3
Empirical Work on the Effect of Minimum Wage Increases
on School Enrollment
In The New Industrial State (1972), John Kenneth Galbraith indicated that an advantage of writing nonfiction is an absence of a need
to maintain suspense. We follow that dictum. Although the effect of
the minimum wage on schooling is an important topic and has been
addressed in 14 articles published between 1981 and 2007, conceptual
and methodological problems are sufficiently pervasive that little can
be concluded (see Table 6.1 for a summary of these studies).4
A pervasive methodological issue is that almost all of the recent
articles predate the work by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)
and use panel structures likely subject to serial correlation. Standard
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Table 6.1 Schooling and Human Capital
Study
Ehrenberg
and
Marcus
(1982)

Mattila
(1981)

Effect
Country
Target
Data
Data structure
National
Cross sectional
Higher relative minimum United Males and
States
females,
Labour
wages cause white males
14–19 Force Survey
and white females in lowincome families to shift
from enrolled/employed
to full-time schooling. Results for nonwhites are not
statistically significant.
Increases in the minimum United Teenagers,
October, Annual observations
States 14–17 and
CPS
from October CPS
wage positively
affect enrollment for both
18–19, by Education with correction for
gender
Supplement,
autocorrelation
genders and both age categories.
1947–1977

Cunningham Effect varies systematically United Teens and
1960
Cross section with
by race and age group
States young adults and 1970 1970 state enrollment
(1981)
census
and employment
outcomes a function of the change in
the minimum wage,
adjusted 1960 state
outcomes, and other
state characteristics

Period
1966
(male)
and
1968
(female)

Comments

1947– A 10% increase in the minimum wage
1977 would be associated with a 0.7 to 0.8%
increase in the enrollment of 14–17-year
olds and a 1.3 to 1.4 % increase in the
enrollment of 18–19-year-olds. The estimates are adjusted for auto correlation.
There is generally a positive effect on employment for those in school and a negative effect for those not in school.
1970 Higher minimum wages reduce school
enrollment for white teens 16–19 but do
not affect white 20–24-year-olds. Enrollments for black teens is increased by
higher minimum wages. When the model
for the white population is estimated
distinguishing between covered and uncovered sectors, there is no effect on teens
or young adults who are in school but not
employed, but a negative effect on enrollment of teens who are in school and in
covered employment.

Neumark and Higher minimum wage
United
Wascher results in a greater fraction States
(1995a) of teens in the not enrolled/
not employed status.

Teenagers
and young
adults

CPS

State-by-year panel

1978– As with other state-by-year research prior
1989 to 2004, there are issues of significance
tests being biased toward rejecting the
null. Although there is clear evidence that
the fraction of teens in the not enrolled/
not employed category rises, the minimum wage does not have statistically
significant negative effects in other categories, complicating the understanding of
whether the increase affects enrollment,
employment, or both.
1977– This article is greatly expanded in Neu1989 mark and Wascher (1996).

Neumark and Increases the likelihood
United Teens 16–19 Matched Matched individual
Wascher that teens move into the
States
CPS
observations in a
(1995b) not enrolled/not employed
state-by-year panel
category
Neumark and Increases the likelihood
United Teens 16–19 Match CPS Matched Individual 1979– The estimates are rich and varied accordWascher that teens move into the
States
observations in a
1992 ing to time period, sample, and estimation
(1996)
not enrolled/not employed
state-by-year panel
method. In general, only the transition
category but effects vary
estimated by multinointo not enrolled/not employed is statistigreatly by period, age, and
mial logit
cally significant, leaving questions about
initial wage level.
whether the measured effect is an enrollment or employment effect or both. The
estimated effect is large and significant
for the 1980–1984 period, but is not for
1985–1992. The RCS structure raises
issues with downward bias in estimated
standard errors.
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(continued)

Study
Effect
Country
Target
Neumark and Higher minimum wage
United Teenagers
Wascher results in greater fraction
States
(2003)
of teens in not enrolled/not
employed status

Campolieti, Increases in the minimum
Fang, and wage do not affect school
Gunderson enrollment.
(2005b)

Data
CPS

Data structure
State-by-year panel

Period
1978–
1989,
1980–
1989,
1980–
1998

Comments
Results generally show that an increase
in the minimum wage increases the fraction of teens who are not enrolled/not
employed but doesn’t have a statistically
significant effect on other categories.
Results are sensitive to the period under
consideration and the error structure.
Concerns about the downward bias of
estimated standard errors in state-by-year
panels apply to this research.
1993– Builds on Neumark and Wascher (1995b,
1999 1996).

Canada Teens 16–19 Survey of Matched individual
Labour and observations in a
Income Dy- province and year
namics
panel estimated with
multinomial logit.
Baker (2005) No effect on enrollment for Canada
15–24Canadian
Province-by-year
1983–
those aged 15–19 or 20–24
year-olds Labour Force
panel
2000
Survey
Hyslop and The minimum wage does
New
Teenagers New Zealand Individual-annual 1997– Once business cycle controls are inStillman not systematically affect
Zealand
Household
panel
2003 cluded, of the nine estimates of minimum
(2007)
enrollments, but some sigLabour
wage effects, there are significant effects
nificant effects are found
Force Survey
for 16–17-year-olds in 2002 and for
for particular age groups
20–21-year-olds in 2001.
and years.
Pacheco and Increased coverage increas- New Teens 16–19 New Zea- Year-by-age group 1986– Unpacks the effect of coverage, which
Cruick- es school enrollment, while Zealand and young land Labour
panels
2004 is positive, from the effect of increases
shank
increases in the real miniadults
Force Survey
in the real minimum wage, which is
(2007)
mum wage reduce school
20–24
combined
negative. As with other work with unitenrollment for 16–19-yearwith school
by-time panels, there may be issues with
olds. There is no effect on
enrollment
under estimation of the standard errors.
20–24-year-olds.
data
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Table 6.1 (continued)

Landon
(1997)

Chaplin,
Turner,
and Pape
(2003)

Warren and
Hamrock
(2010)

Crofton,
Anderson,
and Rawe
(2009)

Canada

16- and
17-year-old
males and
females in
six Canadian
provinces

United High school
States
students

United High school
States
students

Assembled
from a
variety of
Canadian
Education
and Labour
Market data
sources

Year-by-province
panel

Common State-by-year panels
core data
from the
U.S. Department of Education

Common
core data

United High school Maryland
States
students Report Card
(Mary(http://www
land)
.mdreport
card.org)

1975– Differs from most other studies in using
1989 education, rather than labor force data and
focusing on high school enrollment.

1989–
1990 to
1996–
1997
school
year

Differs from most other studies in using
a school-based education rather than a labor market data set and focusing on high
school education.

State-by-year panels 1982–
2005

County-by-year
panels

1993–
2004
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Increases in the provincial
minimum wage reduce
school enrollments for
16-year-old males and
17-year-old males and females. A $0.50 increase in
the relative minimum wage
would
reduce enrollment by about
0.7 percent.
Increased minimum wages
are associated with lower
continuation ratios in states
that allow school leaving at
age 16 and younger. There
is no effect on states that
do not allow school leaving after age 17.
Although the minimum
wage is never significant
of itself, the elasticity of
the interaction with the
state unemployment rate is
negative and significant.
The level of the minimum
wage does not affect dropout rates for all high school
students or any subgroup
except Hispanics. The errors are not clustered, so
significance may be over
stated.
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errors are never clustered by cross-sectional unit: state, province, or
age. This would not be an issue if the data were not serially correlated.
However, there is reason to believe, and perhaps hope, that there is considerable inertia, and therefore serial correlation, in enrollment ratios or
other measures of schooling.5 The Pearson correlation of the enrollment
to population ratio between its current value and its first lag is 0.99 in
U.S. national data for 14–17-year-olds between 1900 and 2000; both
Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares and Kwiatkowski-PhillipsSchmidt-Shin tests indicate unit roots in enrollment to population ratios. Although not necessarily determinative for state data, the factors
that cause such a high level of serial correlation in the national data also
characterize state data. As the errors are not clustered, the standard errors of all but short panels will be systematically underestimated, and
the null hypothesis, that the minimum wage has no effect on enrollment, will be rejected too frequently. Given this problem, the estimates
are reliable only when they do not reject the null, but they are unreliable
when they do. Of the 15 articles on this topic listed in Table 6.1, only
Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982) and Hyslop and Stillman (2007) provide
reliable hypothesis tests.
A second issue, one that is important to future research, concerns the
differences in approach arising from analysts’ home disciplines, labor
economics, and education. Labor economists have tended to approach
enrollment models as extensions of their employment models. The most
serious consequence of this has been conflation of the decision about
remaining in high school with that of going to college. Dividing populations into teens aged 16–19 and young adults aged 20–24 is standard
in labor market studies, but it is not consistent with decisions about
schooling. Most students complete high school at age 18 and, if they
choose, enter college at age 18 or 19. By constructing samples of teens
16–19, the research mixes decisions about remaining in high school
with the decision to continue education beyond high school. Mixing
these decisions complicates measurement issues, estimation, and application of findings to policy decisions.
Evidence for differences between these decisions can be found in
Neumark and Wascher (1996). Although the authors do not get beyond
descriptive statistics that distinguish outcomes for 16- and 17-year-olds
from 18- and 19-year-olds, their data suggest considerable differences in
the responses of enrollment for the two age groups to a higher minimum
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wage. Research that distinguishes the effects of the minimum wage on
decisions about staying in high school and entering college will be more
interesting and more useful than much of the current research.
The failure to embed studies of the effect of the minimum wage
on enrollment in generally accepted models of school staying or college entrance also raises issues about research originating in the labor
economic tradition. Although fixed effects by year and state control for
many factors, it is not reasonable to assert that such models can capture
the effect of state minimum wage variables on enrollment without also
allowing that state education requirements, finance, and related factors
should not also be incorporated into these models. There has been progress on this over time. Some of the work of Neumark and Wascher,
and the research by Baker (2005), Chaplin, Turner, and Pape (2003),
Landon (1997), and Pacheco and Cruickshank (2007) make important
contributions to a specification that integrates the factors favored by
labor economists with those that education scholars believe to be important in the determination of enrollment and graduation.
A final issue is that, despite the small number of articles, it is difficult to synthesize the results because of differences in definitions,
groups under consideration, methods, and the period studied. Where
findings differ, it is challenging to determine the source of differences
among articles. As current researchers seldom embed their work in
specifications used by prior researchers, one is unsure whether differences emerge because of the use of data for different time periods, different model specifications, different measures of the minimum wage,
or other sources. Most researchers wish to make their particular mark,
to bring their insight to an issue; this creativity is central to the evolution of research. This drive toward originality should not preclude explicit exploration of the sources of differences between earlier work and
their own; indeed, it highlights their contribution.
Early Research
Research on school attendance and the minimum wage first appeared in 1979 in papers presented at a conference on the minimum
wage at the American Enterprise Institute. Establishing a pattern for
future research, the studies by Mattila (1981) and Cunningham (1981)
reached opposite conclusions. Mattila’s time-series models of the en-
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rollment rate of men and women aged 14–17 and 18–19 from 1947 to
1977 find a consistent positive relationship between the minimum wage
index and school enrollment. Cunningham uses 1960 and 1970 census
data aggregated by state to consider the effect of the increase in the
level and coverage of the minimum wage between 1960 and 1970 on
youth school enrollment and employment. Estimates from models with
extensive controls for changes in demographic, economic, and industrial characteristics of states find that the minimum wage is associated
with a modest decline in the fraction of white male and female teens
not in school but does not affect the schooling decisions of 20–24-yearolds. The elasticity for white male teens is −0.15, −0.21 for white female teens. The effect on black youth is quite different: the minimum
wage has a statistically significant positive effect on the enrollment of
black male teens and no effect on other black populations.6
Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982) provide many of the concepts and
methods used in more recent research on whether the minimum wage
has different effects on teens from high- and low-income families, and
on the relationship between the minimum wage, employment, and
schooling and initiated work. They divide 1966 and 1968 NLS respondents aged 16–19 into four statuses: 1) those who are enrolled in school
but are not employed (ENE); 2) those who are enrolled and employed
(EE); 3) those who are not enrolled but employed (NEE); and 4) those
who are neither enrolled nor employed (NENE). The probability that
an individual is in one of the EE, NEE, or NENE categories relative to
being in ENE is determined by the relative coverage-adjusted minimum
wage and control variables. The effect of the minimum wage on individuals from households with an annual income no greater than $4,000
is compared to those from households with incomes of at least $8,000.7
Higher relative minimum wages induce white females to move from
working to not working while enrolled in school (from EE to ENE);
this same effect is found for white males from high-income families.
The relative minimum wage has no effect on the behavior of nonwhite
females, but it induces ENE nonwhite males to move out of school into
employment (from ENE to NEE). Broadly, higher minimum wages either do not affect enrollment outcomes or encourage greater schooling
among white teenagers. Results for nonwhites are distinct, with higher
minimum wages inducing black male teens, but not black female teens,
to leave school for employment.
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The work by Mattila (1981) and Cunningham (1981) has not aged
as well as might be hoped, and their methods are, for the most part, no
longer used. They are then more suggestive than conclusive. In contrast, Ehrenberg and Marcus’s (1982) work provides a foundation for
much of the research of the 1990s and 2000s.
Contemporary Research
Neumark and Wascher are the most prolific authors on this topic,
having published four articles on the relationship between the minimum wage and school enrollments. Their work builds on Ehrenberg
and Marcus (1982) but adds a time dimension by using state-by-year
aggregate panels or repeat cross sections. As these articles all predate
the work of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), errors are not
clustered by state, and hypothesis tests may be biased toward rejecting
the null hypothesis. We first consider the two articles using aggregate
panels.
Neumark and Wascher’s initial work (1995a) adapts the approach
of Ehrenberg and Marcus to aggregate panel data. The CPS is used to
calculate annual values of the fraction of teens aged 16–19 in each state
who are in each of the four enrollment/employment categories (EE, ENE,
NEE, and NENE) between 1977 and 1989. The fraction of each state’s
teens in each of these four categories is determined by the coverageadjusted effective relative minimum wage and its lagged value; the
fraction of the population aged 16–19; the prime-age male unemployment rate; a set of dummies indicating whether students are allowed
to leave school without graduating if they are less than 16, if they are
17, and if they are 18; and average teacher salaries by state along with
year and state fixed effect.8 Other than the minimum wage, only the
adult male unemployment rate has a statistically significant effect on
enrollment/employment status: it is positively related to the teens’ being enrolled and not employed (ENE) and negatively associated with
employment outcomes (both EE and NEE). Neither enrollment laws
nor teacher salaries affect the outcomes.
The effect of the minimum wage on enrollment is not certain. Putting aside the issue of bias in hypothesis testing, only the elasticity of
the NENE outcome with respect to the minimum wage is substantially
larger than its estimated standard error in Neumark and Wascher’s

272 Belman and Wolfson

(1995a) preferred model. A 10 percent increase in the relative minimum wage would increase the fraction of teens who were neither in
school nor employed by 6.4 percent. While elasticities of enrollment
for both the EE and ENE, the two outcomes related to school enrollment, are negative, they are small in magnitude and far from statistical significance.9 In 10 additional estimates, the elasticity of ENE with
respect to the minimum wage is smaller than its standard error in eight
estimates and never achieves 5 percent significance standard in any estimate. Only 2 of the 10 estimates of the elasticity of the EE outcome
meet a 5 percent test of significance. When the minimum wage is measured relative to inflation, rather than the state average wage, all decline
elasticities fall in magnitude and none approach 5 percent significance.
Responding to issues raised by Evans and Turner (1995), Neumark
and Wascher (2003) further update and expand their 1995 work. A
number of estimates use the more reliable measures of enrollment provided by the CPS October school enrollment supplement. Models are
estimated for 1979–1989 and for 1980–1998. Results for the four-way
division of outcomes are qualitatively similar to those obtained in the
1995 work. Although the elasticity of NENE is positive and significant,
albeit biased, neither EE nor the ENE outcome is affected by the minimum wage. Coefficients are small in magnitude and do not achieve a 5
percent level of significance across eight variants in specification and
sample.
More relevant to the issues of this chapter, the authors also estimate
models of enrollment without respect to employment. Twelve variants
of the model are estimated with models differing by period, error structure, and measure of enrollment. All 12 estimates find that the minimum
wage has negative effects on enrollment, but only 5 are significant in a 5
percent test. There is some evidence in additional models that state laws
that establish the age at which teens can leave high school moderate the
effect of the minimum wage, with the minimum wage effect attenuating
as the age of leaving is increased. However, given the problems with
hypothesis testing in this work, the interaction between the minimum
wage and state enrollment laws is only suggestive of issues to be pursued in future research.
Neumark and Wascher’s (1995b, 1996) second approach takes advantage of the rotation of CPS respondents to examine the work and
schooling transitions among teenagers between 1979 and 1992.10 Indi-
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viduals’ observations can be matched between their fourth and eighth
month in the survey, a one-year interval, in the outgoing rotation files of
the CPS. Although there is some loss in respondents between the fourth
and eighth month, most individuals’ transitions between employment
and unemployment and between school enrollment and nonenrollment
can be observed. Using the four employment enrollment categories, individuals’ second-year outcomes are modeled as an outcome of their
category in the first year, the contemporaneous and lagged level of the
effective relative minimum wage, and controls for adult unemployment, age, race, and sex as well as state and year fixed effects. More
than 36,000 records on teens can be matched between 1979 and 1992.
Neumark and Wascher estimate a number of models, and the effect
of the minimum wage varies considerably by specification. The variants that are most similar to their prior work find that higher minimum
wages are associated with a transition from EE to NENE, but they do
not affect other outcomes. When controls for unobserved individual
characteristics, individual fixed effects, are incorporated, the minimum
wage no longer has a statistically significant effect on schooling or labor market transitions. Although the authors express doubts about the
value of this estimate, the results suggest that unobserved individual
characteristics impact the estimates. Additional estimates by level of
schooling, age, period, race and ethnicity, and the level of the initial
wage suggest considerable variation in the effect of the minimum wage
on enrollment. The negative effect of higher minimum wages on enrollment and employment are larger for black and Hispanic teens than other
teens; black and Hispanic teens are at greater risk for transitioning into
NENE.
Estimates are sensitive to the study period and initial wage. The
authors estimate a number of models, dividing the data into 1980–1984
and 1985–1992, roughly the period affected by the double-dip recession of the early 1980s, and the period of strong growth following that
recession. During the recessionary period, the estimated likelihood of
transitioning into NENE is large in magnitude and generally considerably larger than its standard error. In contrast, the size of the effect
of the minimum wage on the transition between enrollment status and
labor market status is consistently small and small relative to its standard error, in the latter period. This suggests that estimates in the earlier
period are affected by the depth of the recession. We may be observing
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the transition of teens who entered a particularly difficult job market
upon graduating high school.
Where does Neumark and Wascher’s extensive and vigorous investigation leave us? The lack of reliable hypothesis tests limits what
may be concluded. If the minimum wage has an effect, it is likely on
the movement of those who are in school and employed to being out
of school and out of employment, from EE to NENE. Nonwhite teens
appear more vulnerable to the effects of the minimum wage than white
teens. The effect of the minimum wage on enrollment and employment may be limited to, or greatly exacerbated by, deep recession and
unemployment. Although the models included a control for adult unemployment, the marked difference in the 1980–1984 and 1985–1992
results suggests that the effect of macroeconomic performance was not
fully controlled and that the performance of the U.S. economy is an
important moderator of the impact of the minimum wage. Finally, and
perhaps most important, the estimates with matched data suggest that
the minimum wage measure is picking up unobserved characteristics
that affect individual transitions from enrollment and employment into
nonenrollment and nonemployment, from EE to NENE. Further investigation with a data set, such as the NLSY, which is better adapted to
controlling for unobserved individual characteristics, may produce interesting findings. Although this prolific and interesting work has not
accomplished as much as the authors had hoped in answering questions
about how the minimum wage affected school enrollments, it has provided a foundation for further inquiry.
Studies of Other Countries
Economic research on other countries builds on the work of Neumark and Wascher. In addition to providing estimates for other countries, it innovates with a more sophisticated approach to modeling school
policies and financing and household factors. Campolieti, Fang, and
Gunderson (2005b) use longitudinal data, with which they can follow
individuals over time, to study the experience of Canadian teens, aged
16–19 from 1993 to 1999. Baker (2005) uses a province-by-year panel
for 1983–2000 to consider similar issues. Hyslop and Stillman (2007)
consider the effect of the 2001 increase in the New Zealand minimum
wage on the enrollment of individuals aged 16–17, 18–19, and 20–21
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in 2001, 2002, and 2003. Building on Hyslop and Stillman, Pacheco
and Cruickshank (2007) combine data from the Ministry of Education
and the LFS to construct an age-by-year panel of 16–24-year-olds for
1986–2004 to distinguish the effect of broadening minimum wage coverage from the effect of changes in the real minimum wage.
In Canada the minimum wage is determined solely by provincial
legislation. Lacking a national floor on the minimum wage, statutory
minimum wages in Canada have greater variation than their U.S. counterparts. The greater variation can improve the precision of estimates.
The specification adopted by Campolieti, Fang, and Gunderson (2005b)
is also a step forward in incorporating a wider set of individual factors
that likely affect enrollment decisions such as household income. The
estimated elasticity of school enrollment with respect to the minimum
wage index is positive but not significant, and the authors conclude that,
at least in the Canadian case, the provincial minimum wage does not affect school enrollments.11 Baker (2005) also finds that provincial minimum wages do not affect school enrollment in Canada.
New Zealand introduced a minimum wage for those aged 20 and
older in 1983 and extended coverage, at rates below the adult rate, to
16–19-year-olds in 1994. In 2001, the rate for 18–19-year-olds was increased from 60 percent of the adult wage to the full adult minimum.
The wage for those younger than 18 was raised to 80 percent of the
adult wage. These reforms raised the minimum wage by 69 percent
for 18–19-year-olds, and by 41 percent for younger workers. These
substantial increases provided an opportunity to consider the effect of
both the extension of coverage and large increases to employment and
schooling outcomes of young workers in New Zealand. Hyslop and
Stillman (2007) construct a panel of age-by-quarter cells from 1997 to
2003 from the New Zealand Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS)
of those aged 16–25. Four of the six enrollment elasticities were not
statistically significant in a model with controls for business cycle effects. Enrollment among 16–17-year-olds was estimated to decline by
3 percent in 2002, while it fell by 4 percent among 20–21-year-olds in
2000.12
Pacheco and Cruickshank (2007) find that the 1994 extension of
coverage increased the enrollment of those 16–19 by 1.1 to 1.5 percent,
while changes in the real minimum wage had no effect on enrollments
in the full sample. When the sample was limited to 16–19-year-olds,
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broadening coverage raised enrollments, but the real minimum wage
itself was negatively related to enrollments, with an elasticity of −0.15.
Projections from these estimates found that the introduction of the minimum wage for teenagers resulted in a permanent increase in enrollments of between 1 and 1.5 percent, while the 2001 increase in the
minimum wage reduced enrollments of 18–19-year-olds by 10 percent,
and of 16–17-year-olds by 6 percent.13
Studies Informed by Research on Education
The work reviewed to this point is anchored in labor economics and
has been little influenced by the education literature on school enrollment. The definition of samples, specification models, and the data sets
used to construct variables reflect this approach. In particular, samples
that conflate the decision to remain in high school with the decision
to go to college, and equations that include no more than the minimal
controls for the state education policies, raise the possibility of omitted
variable bias and render it challenging to sort out the policy implications of the research.
Baker (2005); Chaplin, Turner, and Pape (2003); Crofton, Anderson and Rawe (2009); Landon (1997); and Warren and Hamrock (2010)
take important steps toward a more interdisciplinary approach to the
minimum wage enrollment issue. Landon estimates a province-by-year
model of enrollment of 16–17-year-olds for six Canadian provinces for
1975–1998. The sample of 16–17-year-olds focuses the research on
the decision to remain in high school. The use of enrollment data from
educational databases rather than from surveys with a primary focus
on labor market issues improves our confidence in the accuracy of the
enrollment measures. In addition to conventional economic controls,
Landon incorporates five measures of school finance; three measures of
educational characteristics, including the average number of pupils per
school; and demographic controls, including divorce rates, the percentage of immigrants, the fraction of provincial GDP from agriculture, and
real per capita income. The minimum wage is measured as the ratio of
the provincial minimum wage to the average hourly wage. We focus on
the estimates that include province and year fixed effects.14 Landon estimates separate equations by age and gender, resulting in four estimates
of the effect of the minimum wage.
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Higher minimum wages were associated with lower enrollment
levels for three of the four groups studied, but the magnitude of the
effect is small, and, because the standard errors are not corrected for
serial correlation, the statistical significance is uncertain.15 The elasticities of enrollment with respect to the minimum wage range from −0.08
(for 16-year-old males) to −0.17 (17-year-old males). Landon (1997)
calculates that a $0.50 wage increase in 1989 would have resulted in
a decline in enrollment of 3,074 students across six provinces (out of
about 475,000 students total), between 0.6 percent and 0.8 percent of
16–17-year-olds.
Chaplin, Turner, and Pape (2003) examine the effect of the minimum wage and its interaction with laws regulating when students can
leave high school with a state-by-year panel. The dependent variable,
the proportion of high school students completing their degrees by state,
is constructed from the common core of data, an annual survey of all
public schools conducted by the U.S. Department of Education, for the
1989–1990 to 1996–1997 school years. As the data pertain only to high
school students, the study avoids conflating decisions about leaving high
school and entering college. Measures of state policies on school leaving—the age at which teens are allowed to leave school, whether the
state requires an exit examination for graduation, and total school credits
required in high school—are included in the model, and the real effective minimum wage is interacted with the age-of-leaving indicator variables. As with other work predating Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan
(2004), the errors are not clustered.
Higher minimum wages are associated with reduced continuation
rates among states that allow students to leave school at age 16. In these
states, the elasticity of continuation with respect to the minimum wage
ranged from −0.042 to −0.057.16 However, the minimum wage does not
affect continuation rates among states that only allow school leaving
at age 17 or age 18. These results are consistent with the findings from
Neumark and Wascher (2003)—that the minimum wage did not affect
enrollment in states in which students could not leave high school until
age 18—but not with Neumark and Wascher (1995a), which finds that
legal restrictions on when students could leave school did not affect
enrollments.
Baker (2005) reports that higher provincial minimum wages are not
associated with reduced enrollments. Although this study conflates the
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decision to leave high school with that of entering college, it is otherwise especially thoughtful in synthesizing the economic and education
variables incorporated in panel data studies.
Warren and Hamrock (2010) add to this literature with a broad
discussion of factors affecting graduation as understood in economics
and education, better measures of state high school completion rates,
and more extensive controls for graduation requirements. Educational
theories of high school completion are structured around push and pull
factors as well as psychological processes. Push factors include a range
of state education policies, while pull factors include labor market conditions and family and peer influences. These factors are embedded in a
developmental process that is affected by success and failure in school;
student psychological orientations toward school, work, and family;
and other individual-level factors. In this context, the effect of the pushpull factors are contingent.
The data for the model are structured as a state-by-year panel with
year and state fixed effects. Explanatory variables include not only the
usual suspects (measures of the minimum wage and state unemployment rates) but also measures of compulsory school attendance ages,
the presence and stringency of graduation exams, and the courses required for graduation measured in Carnegie units.17 The dependent variable is a cohort-specific measure of the percent of 9th graders in public
high school who complete high school from 1982 to 2005.18 Errors are
clustered by state.
To allow for contingency, Warren and Hamrock (2010) estimate
five models, four of which allow the minimum wage to interact with
education policy variables or the unemployment rate. The coefficient
on the uninteracted minimum wage term is small in magnitude and
never statistically significant, with a standard error that is 2–10 times
the magnitude of the point estimate. The interaction of the minimum
wage with the state unemployment rate is negative and significant in
a 0.05 test. In this variant of the model, a 10 percent increase of the
mean minimum wage would result in a 1 percent decline in high school
completion. Other specifications in which the minimum wage is interacted with compulsory schooling laws and graduation requirements are
not statistically significant.19
The one state-specific study, an estimate of the effect of the minimum wage on dropout rates by county in Maryland between 1993 and
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2004, finds no relationship between the real minimum wage and dropout rates for their full sample or for the white, African American, or
Asian samples, but it finds a large negative effect for Hispanics (Crofton, Anderson, and Rawe 2009).20 An interesting addition to this panel
data model is a control for teen pregnancy rates, which has a strongly
significant positive effect on dropout rates.
The Minimum Wage and School Enrollment
Where do we then stand with respect to understanding the effect
of the minimum wage on school enrollment? One possible conclusion
is that we know little or nothing. Because of the likely problem with
rejecting the null hypothesis (of no effect) too frequently, most recent
studies cannot be used with any assurance to determine whether the
minimum wage affects schooling. Three of the remaining four studies,
Mattile (1981), Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982), and Hyslop and Stillman
(2007), generally find that the minimum wage does not affect enrollment, but Cunningham (1981) finds the opposite. A number of the studies for which there are issues with bias find no statistically significant
effect, and in those instances we can accept the result. In contrast, we
cannot know with certainty whether the studies that find a negative effect would, once estimated correctly, continue to find that effect. We are
left with a suspicion that there is likely no effect, but, as so much of the
evidence cannot be used, what appears to be reliable is not sufficiently
conclusive to argue against an effect with confidence.
Research on the effect of the minimum wage on enrollment and
attainment has advanced over the last decade, but it has not provided a
definitive answer about the effects of the minimum wage. Past research
has shown how to synthesize economic and education approaches. We
know that we need to distinguish between the decisions to remain in
high school and to enter college. We know that we need to address serial correlation by clustering observations when calculating standard
errors where appropriate, and by other approaches where clustering is
not appropriate, in order to get accurate hypothesis tests. Prior research
has also provided a considerable range of controls that should be considered for inclusion in empirical models. Building on this knowledge,
it should be possible to obtain useful estimates of the effect of the minimum wage on schooling.
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THE MINIMUM WAGE AND EMPLOYER-SUPPLIED
TRAINING: THEORY AND FINDINGS
As discussed, firms will not provide general training to employees
unless the employees pay for that training, possibly by accepting lower
wages. This insight is readily incorporated into a model of compensation by stylizing general training as a fringe benefit, a component
of total compensation. Employers offer some package of direct wages,
fringe benefits, and training to workers of a given marginal productivity. Packages with more general training will have lower levels of other
compensation. Workers choose the package that maximizes their lifetime discounted income (utility) by choosing among employers, but the
value of the package, total compensation, is fixed by their productivity.
Employees who place greater value on future income chose compensation packages that provide training and higher future income. Movement away from their voluntary choice can only, in an economic model,
make the employee worse off.
Increases in the minimum wage potentially move employees away
from their “preferred’’ mix of wages, training, and other fringes. Higher
minimum wages increase direct wages as a share of total compensation.
Unless a higher minimum wage results in greater productivity, employers will reduce the value of voluntary fringes, such as training.21 The
reduction in employee training reduces employees’ future productivity
and earnings. A higher minimum wage would then be associated with
less general training, reduced earnings growth, and lower levels of future income.
Although not specifically considered in the literature, increases in
the minimum wage may also cause firms to reduce firm-specific training. Specific training is more analogous to other forms of capital investment than general training, as there is no incentive for other firms to
poach these employees. Even if the firm shares some of the gains with
workers, it captures the lion’s share of productivity gains. As with increases in the price of other capital goods, by lowering the rate of return
on specific training, increases in the minimum wage would cause firms
to reduce investment in specific training.
When labor markets are not fully competitive, firms may respond to
higher minimum wages by increasing training (Acemoglu and Pischke
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1999, 2003). An increase in the minimum wage compresses wages
and sets the wage above the marginal revenue product of less-skilled
workers. In a competitive market, firms will lay off workers whose productivity is less than the minimum wage. Where labor markets are not
fully competitive, and firms earn rents, it may be profitable to hire lessproductive workers and provide training.22 As long as training costs are
less than the rents earned from a worker, firms will employ and train
workers; the training becomes a form of rent sharing.
Institutionalist theories also suggest a positive relationship between
the minimum wage and firm-supplied training. Constrained from using
low-cost labor, firms can only maintain their output and profitability
through better management of labor and improving its productivity.
Although firms can take many steps to improve labor performance, increased training plays an important role in these steps.
The “Old” New Minimum Wage Research
Just as the minimum wage increases of 1990 and 1991 spurred the
“new” minimum wage research, the increases in the minimum wage
and expansion of coverage in 1967 and 1968 was followed by a burst
of research. This work was creative and wide ranging, addressing
many issues revisited in the “new” minimum wage research, including
school enrollment and on-the-job training. The expansion of coverage
to smaller retail establishments raised concerns about the effect on positions that provide entry to employment and the development of on-thejob human capital.23 A particular concern was whether the combination
of reduced employment opportunities and firms’ reduction in the provision of training to early-career employees would reduce employees’
earnings throughout their careers. Hashimoto’s (1982) work provides
the most developed theory linking higher minimum wages to reductions
in employer-provided general training and, in turn, to reduced earnings
growth. The effect of the minimum wage on training and wage growth
depends on the magnitude of the difference between the wage the individual would receive absent the minimum wage and the minimum wage
itself. Those with the largest differences suffer the largest reductions in
training and wage growth.
The early research on training followed two broad paths. Researchers with data on training measured the relationship between the mini-
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mum wage and training directly. Those without training data measured
the response of wage growth to the minimum wage and, like Hashimoto
(1982), relied on economic theory to link results to training. We focus
our discussion on the former work, as the relationship is direct and less
dependent on theory to link the minimum wage and training. (A summary of articles on the minimum wage and training is found in Table
6.2.24)
Both the NLSY and PSID ask respondents about training, the former about whether the employer provided formal training, the latter
about whether skills learned in the current job would be useful in future
jobs. Leighton and Mincer (1981) use both to directly estimate the effect of the minimum wage on training. Few of the estimates are statistically significant: only 1 of 5 PSID and 2 of 14 with NLSY estimates
approach 5 percent significance.25 As part of his work with the NLSY,
Schiller (1994) finds limited evidence that higher minimum wages reduce training. Although only 1 out of 8 of the minimum wage workers
perceived a total lack of training, regression with controls for age, gender, marital and minority status, academic enrollment and achievement,
intelligence, location, firm size and broad industry group find a weak,
negative relationship, only significant in a 10 percent test, between being employed at exactly the minimum wage and training.
Grossberg and Sicilian (1999) provide the most explicit examination of the minimum wage’s effect on training, and the relationship between the minimum wage, training, and wage growth. They adopt a difference-in-difference regression methodology, dividing employees into
three groups: 1) those hired at the minimum wage, 2) those hired above
but no more than $0.25 above the new minimum, and 3) those hired at
higher wages. Comparisons between those hired at the minimum wage
and those hired at low but above the minimum wage determine whether
the minimum wage’s hires are less likely to obtain training than other
low-wage workers. Comparison between the high-wage group and
these two low-wage groups further delineates the impact of wages on
training. While being hired at the minimum wage was associated with
lower wage growth, it was not associated with reduced hours of training.26 Those hired at the minimum wage and those hired at low wages
received less training than those hired at high wages, but training hours
were not significantly different between the minimum-wage and lowwage workers. Lower levels of training for men seems to be an outcome
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of being hired at low wages rather than the minimum wage. For women,
starting at the minimum wage does not affect training hours relative to
the low-wage or high-wage group.27 Although Grossberg and Sicilian’s
(1999) work supports the view that the minimum wage is associated
with slower growth of wages, their work casts doubt on there being a
link from the minimum wage through training to slower wage growth.
More recent studies of training effects include the work of Acemoglu and Pischke (2003); Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan (2004); Baker
(2005); Fairris and Pedace (2004); and Neumark and Wascher (2001).
Neumark and Wascher use the 1983 and 1991 CPS, which include questions about formal and informal training, to estimate the effect of the
minimum wage on employer-provided training and on pre-job training undertaken by individuals. The analysis of the 1991 data compares
individuals aged 16–24 with those aged 35–54. The joint analysis of
data from 1991 and 1983 compares 16–24-year-olds in 1991 with those
in the 1983 survey. Individuals’ training outcomes are modeled as a
function of the individual characteristics, state indicator variables, an
age indicator variable, and the average ratio of the state to the federal
minimum wage by year interacted with age.28
The comparison of younger and older workers in 1991 finds no
connection between the minimum wage ratio and training, whether
training is measured as a whole or disaggregated into formal and informal training. Disaggregating teens and young adults finds no effect on
teens, but a 10 percent higher minimum wage is associated with a 1.8
percent reduction in the formal training for young adults aged 20–24.
Higher minimum wages are associated with lower levels of training
when younger workers are compared between 1991 and 1983. A 10
percent higher state relative minimum wage causes a 1.2 percent reduction in the likelihood of training among those 16–24 and a 1.8 percent
reduction in the likelihood of formal training among those 20–24. There
is no effect on informal training for the any-age group. Estimates are
robust with respect to the period over which the minimum wage is averaged but are sensitive to the CPS survey used for the estimates.29 There
is no evidence that higher minimum wages cause individuals to seek
more pre-job training to qualify for a position.30
Baker (2005) considers the minimum wage/training relationship in
Canada with the 1992, 1994, and 1998 Adult Education and Training
Survey.31 The model incorporates controls for individual, province, and
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year effects; the minimum wage is measured as the ratio of the provincial minimum wage to the average industrial wage for the province.
While there is evidence of a negative relationship between the minimum wage and training in the 1994 and 1998 data for those aged 17–24,
the measured effect is not different from that of those aged 35–44, a
group unlikely to be greatly affected by the minimum wage. Baker concludes that “a prudent conclusion would be at this stage the analysis is
uniformative about the relationship between minimum wages and training” (p. 40).
Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan (2004) find no evidence that the
United Kingdom’s introduction of the NMW in 1999 led to a decline
in training, and some evidence that training of those aged 18–60 increased. This main result, the absence of a negative effect, was robust
to distinctions between changes in both the provision and the intensity
of training and to the definition of the treatment group.
Fairris and Pedace (2004) use a difference-in-difference approach
with establishment data from the 1997 National Employer Survey to
measure the effect of state relative minimum wages on the likelihood of
employees’ receiving training and the average hours of training. Higher
minimum wages reduce the likelihood of training within establishments. However, when the sample is disaggregated by broad occupation, there is no difference in the effect of the minimum wage on the
likelihood of training between frontline workers, support staff, technical, and supervisory and managerial workers. The authors suggest that,
as the training of managerial and supervisory workers is unlikely to be
affected by the minimum wage, it is likely that the negative training effect of the minimum wage is proxying other factors affecting training
within establishments. When the minimum wage is measured as the
ratio of the effective minimum wage to the establishment-specific occupational wage, there is a large negative and significant effect for support
staff and for supervisory workers but no effect on frontline or technical
workers.32 The effect of the minimum wage on average hours of training is never significant in any specification. The authors conclude that
the evidence on the provision of training is mixed and problematic for
the provision of training, but that there is no effect on hours of training.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999, 2003) theorize that higher minimum
wages are associated with increased training in less-competitive labor
markets. They use the 1988–1992 NLSY to examine this with longitu-
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dinal data on those aged 24–34 with no more than a high school degree.
Difference-in-difference estimates with several definitions of the treatment group are positive but far from significant. The estimates from
simple regressions are more varied but are qualitatively similar. Of estimates from 40 specifications that are differentiated by the definition
of the affected group of workers, the way in which the minimum wage
is deflated and the control variables, only 9 are significant in a 5 percent test. Of these, 3 are negative and 6 positive. Given little reason to
prefer one regression estimate over another, and the lack of statistical
significance of the difference-in-difference estimates, the authors conclude that there is not sufficient evidence for establishing a systematic
relationship between the minimum wage and training.
Little empirical work explicitly addresses institutionalist hypotheses about the minimum wage and training. Hirsch, Kaufman, and
Zelenska (2011) report that 68 percent of managers at the quick-food
restaurants in their survey indicated that cross-training workers for
multitasking was a very important part of their response to the increase
in the minimum wage. McLaughlin’s (2009) qualitative comparison between Denmark’s and New Zealand’s training responses to increased
minimum wages suggests that whether small- and medium-sized employers respond to such increases with increased training depends very
much on the legal and institutional framework in which the increase
occurs. Minimum wage increases are more likely to occur and be more
robust in coordinated market economies such as Denmark than in liberal market economies such as New Zealand, which depend on firms’
individually making training decisions.
Summary
What does the current research say about the effect of the minimum
wage on firm-provided training?33 Leighton and Mincer’s (1981) research is sensitive to data set, with those based on the PSID indicating
a negative relationship and those derived from the NLSY generally not.
Grossberg and Sicilian (1999) find that for men the apparent negative
relationship between the minimum wage and training is, in fact, a negative relationship between low-wage employment and training. They find
no evidence of higher minimum wages’ reducing training for women.
More recent work generally but not universally finds no relationship be-
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tween the minimum wage and training. Neumark and Wascher (2001)
report that based on comparisons of young adults to older workers,
higher minimum wages reduce formal training for those aged 20–24 but
do not affect formal training for teen or informal training for any age
group; they also report stronger evidence that higher minimum wages
between 1983 and 1991 reduced training of those aged 16–24.34 In contrast, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999, 2003); Arulampalam, Booth, and
Bryan (2004); Baker (2005); and Fairris and Pedace (2004) report little
or no evidence that higher minimum wages are associated with reduced
training. The mixed evidence on the proposition that higher minimum
wages induce firms to provide less training supports a verdict of “not
proven” and perhaps “not guilty.” There is less support for the view that
higher minimum wages result in increased training.

THE MINIMUM WAGE AND EMPLOYER-PROVIDED
BENEFITS: HEALTH CARE AND PENSIONS
Although wages constitute the lion’s share of low-wage employees’ compensation, some receive benefits such as health insurance,
pensions, holidays and vacations, and, of course, training. Economic
theory suggests that the composition of the compensation packages will
be determined by the reconciliation of employer and employee preferences through markets. The result is an optimal combination of wages
and fringe benefits.
When the only form of compensation is the wage, employers’ response to the imposition or increase in the minimum wage is, in an
economic model, to reduce employment to a level where the marginal
revenue product of the marginal worker is equal to the minimum wage.
Other margins of adjustment become available once the compensation
package includes voluntary benefits. Suppose an employer provides
$5.00 in total compensation for each hour worked, of which $4.00 are
direct wages and $1.00 are voluntary fringe benefits. In this situation,
the imposition of a $4.50 per hour minimum wage leaves the employer
with a range of responses. At one extreme, the employer can continue to
pay the same fringe benefits and reduce employment to the point where
marginal revenue product equals $5.50/hour; compensation rises by the
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difference between the new minimum wage and ex ante direct wages.
At the other extreme, the employer can maintain ex ante employment
and reduce voluntary fringe benefits by $0.50 per hour, leaving the
value of the compensation package at $5.00 per hour. The first situation
is the familiar one where the minimum wage improves the situation for
those who remain employed, but those who are unemployed yet willing
and qualified to work at the original level of compensation are worse
off. In comparison, the second situation appears harmless since none
lose jobs, but employees are moved away from their optimal compensation package to another that is overweighted toward direct wages and
underweighted toward benefits. Where compensation packages include
voluntary fringe benefits, the adverse effects of the minimum wage may
not show up in reduction in employment but rather in the modification
of compensation packages.
Firms’ ability to alter fringe benefits is limited. Employers cannot reduce contributions to legally mandated fringe benefits, including Social
Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, and workers’ compensation. Employers may also be reluctant to reduce voluntary benefits such
as health insurance and pensions. Under IRS regulations, these benefits
have to be provided in a nondiscriminatory fashion to qualify for pretax
treatment.35 Firms with large numbers of non–minimum wage workers
may find that withdrawing benefits from minimum wage workers, and
losing the privileged tax treatment for their other workers, is very expensive. Other benefits, such as training, holidays, vacation, and sick
pay are not regulated and could be reduced without tax consequences.36
Early Research
In his book on the minimum wage in the restaurant industry, Alpert
(1986) investigates the effect of the minimum wage on fringe benefits.
He uses data from the Employer Expenditures from Selected Compensation Practices survey, a rich source of measures of fringe benefits developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (see Table 6.3 for a summary
of the articles on the minimum wage and benefits).37 The 20 benefits in
the series are merged with demographic variables from the CPS to form
short time series in which each benefit is measured on both a per-hour
and an annual per-firm basis. Four of the 40 estimates were significant
in a 5 percent test or better. The real minimum wage had a negative
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and significant effect on vacation expenditures and on total leave hours
when these were measured on a per-hour basis and on severance pay
and shift premiums when measured on an annual-firm basis. In a less
wide-ranging study, Card and Krueger (1994) find that fast food restaurants did not respond to minimum wage increases by limiting the
provision of meals at reduced prices.
Recent Research
Two more recent studies, Simon and Kaestner (2004) and Marks
(2011), use the Annual Demographic Files in the March CPS to study
different aspects of the relationship between the minimum wage and
health and pension benefits.38 These surveys collect retrospective information on pension and health insurance eligibility and coverage
at the firm where the employee spent the most time in the prior year.
The surveys include questions on whether workers participate in their
employers’ plan, whether they participate in a family health insurance
plan, whether the employer pays the full cost of the health insurance,
and whether the respondent participated in a pension plan sponsored
by their employer.39 The survey also includes a question on firm size, a
measure central to Marks’s (2011) work concerns.
Simon and Kaestner (2004) hypothesize that if the minimum wage
affects benefits, the effect should be smaller for better-educated and
higher-income workers. They use a quasi-experimental design, with
treatment and comparison groups defined by education or income, and
estimate models for 1979–1986, a period in which there was little state
variation in minimum wages, and 1987–2000, when there was considerable variation in state minimum wages. They find no evidence
that higher minimum wages resulted in worse outcomes for the treatment group with respect to whether the individual participates in an
employer-provided health insurance plan, whether they participate in a
family health insurance plan, whether the employer pays the full cost of
the health insurance, and whether the respondent participated in a pension plan sponsored by their employer.40
For more than 100 years, economists have noted that larger firms
pay higher wages and benefits to their employees and debated why this
is the case.41 One reason may be differences in the legal treatment of
large and small firms with respect to labor market regulation.42 Recog-

Human Capital 291

nizing this, Marks (2011) extends Simon and Kaestner’s (2004) work
by investigating the interaction between minimum wages, benefits,
educational attainment, and firm size. Although building on Simon and
Kaestner’s issues and the March CPS, she uses a regression methodology that includes a sample of the employed 18–64-year-olds in place of
Simon and Kaestner’s quasi experiment. The periods under examination, 1988–1993 and 1998–2005, overlap but differ from Simon and
Kaestner.43
Marks (2011) finds that the minimum wage influences the provision of health benefits at small, but not large, firms; this does not occur
with pension benefits for which the small and large firms face similar
regulation. In models that do not divide the sample by educational attainment, the minimum wage does not have a statistically significant
effect on health insurance provision in either large or small firms. When
the minimum wage is interacted with educational attainment, less than
high school, high school degree, and more than high school, there is
still no relationship between the minimum wage and health insurance
coverage for any group at large firms. There is, however, a negative and
significant relationship between a higher real minimum wage and the
provision of health insurance for those without high school degrees at
small firms.44 The elasticity of the health insurance coverage with respect to the real minimum wage at small firms is 0.13 in 1988–1993 and
0.10 in 1998–2005.45 A higher real minimum wage is also associated
with a reduced probability that employers would fully cover the cost of
health plans of less-educated employees at small firms; the minimum
wage had no effect on the likelihood of full coverage of any employees
at larger firms.46
The effect of the minimum wage on pension coverage is markedly
different. Small firms are not exempt from nondiscrimination standards
with respect to pension participation. Consistent with the hypothesis
that firms are constrained by the effects of regulations that restrict discrimination against lower-earning workers, higher minimum wages are
not associated with a reduction in pension participation among lesseducated workers in smaller firms.47
Although Marks (2011) builds on Simon and Kaestner (2004), differences in methodologies reduce certainty about why the estimates are
different. Simon and Kaestner find no difference in the effect of the
minimum wage on whether an employer provides health insurance be-
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tween those with less than a high school degree and those with a high
school degree. In a model that also does not distinguish outcomes by
firm size, Marks finds a negative relationship between the minimum
wage and health insurance coverage for the least-educated workers.
Given this difference in outcome, it may be that the differences between
Simon and Kaestner’s and Marks’s results originate in differences in the
periods under study, or between a quasi-experimental and regression
methodology rather than in allowing for the effects of firm size. Resolution of this matter is necessary before conclusions can be drawn about
the impact of the minimum wage on benefit coverage or the effects of
firm size.
The San Francisco Minimum Wage
In their quasi-experimental study of the effects of the San Francisco minimum wage, described in detail in Chapter 2, Dube, Naidu,
and Reich (2007) examine the impact of the minimum wage on health
insurance coverage. Although the coefficients on the minimum wage
term are positive (with one exception), the standard errors are usually as
large or larger than the coefficients. The increase in the minimum wage
in San Francisco does not appear to have reduced or improved health
insurance coverage in restaurants.

SUMMARY
As with many of the topics other than employment and wages, research on the effect of the minimum wage on fringe benefits is thin.
Alpert’s (1986) work suggests that, in restaurants, there may be some
effect on some voluntary fringes, leave, shift pay, and severance pay.
More recent work finds that although there is not an effect on health
insurance across all firms, there may be a negative relationship between
the minimum wage and health insurance for firms with fewer than 500
employees. There appears to be no effect on pension coverage, even
among small firms. However, findings for San Fransisco restaurants, a
small part of the national small-firm universe, also suggest no effect on
health insurance.
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Our ability to reach a conclusion is limited by authors’ not building
explicitly on the work of prior authors. The work of Simon and Kaestner (2004) and Marks (2011) is a case in point. Marks’s work builds on
Simon and Kaestner and uses the same survey. However, Marks uses
different time periods and a simple regression rather than a differencein-differences regression. As a result, it cannot be said with certainty
whether the difference in Marks’s results are to be attributed to her innovation, distinguishing the effect of the minimum wage by firm size
and education, or differences in samples and methods. Authors should
not be bound by prior work—they need to follow the logic of their
work and creativity. Taking a page or two to systematically investigate
whether, using the same approach as prior researchers, the innovations
developed in the current research would have the anticipated effect
would do much to fill the gaps in our knowledge.

Notes
1. See, for example, the discussion of firm human capital decision in Ehrenberg and
Smith (2012, pp. 152–156). Rosen (1972) laid the foundations for the current
approach.
2. An alternative is for the employee to agree to work off the training debt by remaining with the firm for a fixed period after completing the training. This has been
used by trucking firms that train employees to drive large trucks. The employee
incurs a “debt” for the training, which is then paid down as the employee drives
for the firm. If they leave the firm before the debt is paid, they are required to pay
the remaining debt.
3. This assumes that there is a close connection between worker productivity and
wages and an understanding by workers that additional education will improve
their likelihood of gaining employment at the higher minimum wage (Ravn and
Sorensen 1997).
4. Because the literature studying the effect of the minimum wage on schooling is
small relative to the employment and wage literature, we review articles as early
as 1981.
5. The enrollment ratio is the ratio of the population enrolled in school relative to the
population. As with the employment ratio, the enrollment ratio can be calculated
for specific demographic groups such as teens.
6. Although at the time, work by Mattila (1981) and Cunningham (1981) represented
estimates and hypothesis tests that are subject to question. The time-series methods used by Mattila have largely been superseded. There are reasons to be concerned that Cunningham’s adjustments to the 1960 census data and other variables
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7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.

have induced forms of heteroskedasticity that are not accounted for in the error,
throwing off the hypothesis testing.
Those from families with incomes of $4,001–$7,999 are excluded from the sample. The model includes controls for a variety of demographic and labor market
factors. The inclusion of a control for whether the individual has graduated from
high school helps resolve the problem of mixing the decision to remain in high
school from entering college.
Neumark and Wascher (1995a) use two specifications of the outcomes, one that aggregates the EE and NEE category into a single employed group, and one that uses
all four categories. We use the latter, as it better addresses the issue of enrollment.
Neither is sufficiently large relative to the standard error to reject the null of no
effect in a 5 percent test. Neumark and Wascher (1995a) do not provide a joint
enrollment elasticity or include the weights needed to construct such an elasticity.
Neumark and Wascher (1996) is more fully developed than the 1995 paper, and
we draw on it for this discussion.
As with other state-by-year panels, there may be an issue with downward-biased
standard errors. However, given that the null is not rejected, it is reasonable to
believe this result would have been obtained in a model with errors that were computed correctly. The problem of computation of the elasticities without weights
applies to the enrollment as well as employment results.
Both New Zealand studies use a time-by-cross-sectional-unit data structure and,
as a result, may be biased toward rejecting the null of no effect. Lacking information on whether the New Zealand real minimum wage or enrollments by age are
characterized by serial correlation, and the lack of clustering, we cannot be certain
about the presence of bias. As Hyslop and Stillman (2007) use relatively short
panels, 1996–2004, there is less likelihood of bias than Pacheco and Cruickshank
(2007), whose work covers 18 years.
Because 20–24-year-olds were already covered by the minimum wage during the
estimation period, the effect of the introduction of the minimum wage cannot be
estimated for that group.
Landon’s (1997) time indicators cover two years, an unusual and unexplained
choice.
Because of the small number of provinces, clustering does not resolve the issue
of serial correlation.
Further estimates with grade-specific continuation ratios suggest that the effect of
the minimum wage occurs between the 9th and 10th grades.
Models were also estimated with variants on the minimum wage, including the
average of the minimum wage in the students’ junior and senior year, a four-year
average, or an indicator for any change in the minimum wage during the junior
and senior year or during the four years of high school. Estimates were not qualitatively sensitive to the minimum wage. A Carnegie Unit is 120 hours of class time
over the course of a year at the secondary (U.S. high school) level.
The Warren and Hamrock (2010) measure of completion is constructed from the
Common Core data (CCD), but the authors adjust that data for net migration and
student’s repetition of grades. Warren has previously written about the accuracy
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19.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.

of CPS and CCD measures of high school completion. He reports that the CPS
overestimates completion because of adult respondent’s tendency to report enrollment or completion when children have left school without a degree (Warren and
Halpern-Manners 2007). He also finds that the CCD is biased by net migration and
retention of students (Warren 2003).
Warren and Hamrock (2010) argue that the positive effect of unemployment on
completion is convex and that the interaction with the minimum wage is picking
up this convexity. This might be resolved by including the squares of both the
unemployment and minimum wage terms as well as their interaction, thereby distinguishing nonlinearities from interactions.
As errors are not clustered by county, the significance for Hispanics may be
overstated.
The phenomenon of worker productivity rising with the minimum wage is known
as the shock effect and is not part of the conventional analysis.
See Burdett and Mortensen (1998) for a search model in which labor market outcomes are not fully competitive.
See Rottenberg (1981) for a broad-ranging set of papers on the effects of the minimum wage.
Grossberg and Sicilian (1999), Hashimoto (1982), and Leighton and Mincer
(1981) measure the effect of the minimum wage on training through the indirect
approach suggested by Hashimoto. Using the NLSY to study young white males
who had completed their education, Hashimoto finds no effect when his model
was estimated with OLS, but once corrected for sample selection, higher minimum wages are associated with reduced wage growth and training. Using NLSY
and PSID for young white and black males under age 25, Leighton and Mincer
find higher minimum wages are associated with lower wage growth for white, but
not black males. Using the Employment Opportunities Pilot Project data on the
last employee hired by a firm between 1980 and 1982, Grossberg and Sicilian also
find that the wages of men hired at the minimum wage grew more slowly than
the wages of those hired at low but above minimum wages and 47 percent more
slowly than the wages of those hired at high wages. Women’s wage growth was
not influenced by the wage at which they were hired. Schiller (1994) finds that
higher minimum wages are associated with higher wage growth among individuals aged 15–23.
The authors also estimate a series of models that incorporate the effect of state
minimum wage levels and distinguish the effects of coverage and the level of
the minimum wage. The results are again mixed and somewhat confusing. The
standardized minimum wage generally has a positive or nonsignificant effect on
wage growth, while coverage is negative or nonsignificant. With respect to job
tenure, the effects of coverage and the standardized minimum wage are opposite
signed in the PSID; the standardized wage effect is generally not significant in
the NLSY estimates, the effect of coverage is generally significant, but opposite
signed between the white and black equations. Results from the training equations
are equally mixed.
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26. As Leighton and Mincer (1981) provide only the coefficients for the logistic regressions, it is not possible to determine the reduced likelihood of training that
those at the minimum wage experience.
27. Grossberg and Sicilian’s (1999) wage growth results are discussed in Chapter 7.
28. The estimates include controls for firm-side measures, including firm size, weekly
hours, whether the individual was in a permanent job, and industry of employment, and individual measures, including related experience, union membership,
hours of work, occupation, job complexity, the firm’s capital stock, and whether
the individual had been employed for more than three months. The models are
estimated in a Tobit model, which allows for the part of the sample that received
no training.
29. See Table 8 of Neumark and Wascher (2001). Both coefficients and standard errors shift, and the estimated effects are no longer statistically significant if the
model uses the outgoing rotation file rather than the full training file. Given that
even the smallest sample has more than 2,000 observations, the shifts in magnitude and standard errors is unexpected.
30. The rigor of the assumptions and magnitude of the effects is critically discussed
by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999, p. 131 and Note 8).
31. The Adult Education and Training Survey is a Canadian survey intended to capture all types of training received by 17–24-year-olds in the previous year. The
survey asks whether the individual received any training, whether they received
employer-supported education or training, and the type of employer-provided
training received. It is similar but not identical to the CPS training supplement
survey.
32. Estimates with establishment-specific wages are instrumented because of the endogeneity of the establishment wage.
33. We do not place great weight on older indirect approaches to measuring training
effects, as Grossberg and Sicilian’s (1999) research calls into question whether
there is an empirical linkage between the wage growth and training and because
there are now sufficient direct estimates of the minimum wage/training relationship to reduce the need for indirect approaches.
34. As with all state-by-year panels prior to 2004, the bias of the hypothesis tests
toward rejecting the null makes the results difficult to interpret.
35. Employee pretax benefits are not counted as part of employee income and are not
subject to income tax. This tax treatment makes them valued by employees, and it
reduces employer tax liability, as they do not pay social security, unemployment,
workers’ compensation, or other taxes on these benefits.
36. Simon and Kaestner (2004) suggest that firms may be reluctant to adjust fringe
benefits packages if, because of inflation, the increase in the real minimum wage
is temporary and there are costs associated with ending and starting fringe benefit
programs. Minimum enrollment requirements of insurance firms may also limit
smaller firms’ ability to reduce fringe benefit coverage, particularly health insurance (see Simon and Kaestner [2004]). However, firms that are not self-insured
for health insurance are not covered by the IRS regulations on nondiscrimination
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and therefore may be in a better position to withdraw or reduce health insurance
coverage of minimum wage employees (Marks 2011).
The list is long and includes the value of private fringes; overtime pay; pension
expense; holiday expenditures; health, accident and life insurance expenditures;
severance pay; shift premiums; sick pay; other private fringes; and a measure of
total hours of leave
An unpublished article by Royalty (2001) is cited in some research on this topic.
She finds a negative relationship between higher minimum wages, and pension
and health coverage. There are issues with the methodology, specification, and
interpretation. It has not been published to date, and we do not include it in our
discussion.
Other measures might include whether a respondent works for an employer that
offers a plan or has coverage through a spouse or some other plan, such as veterans’ benefits. Measures of participation in one’s employer plan best measures the
effect of the minimum wage.
The models are estimated with between 24,500 and 255,000 observations, depending on the outcome, group, and period; standard errors are clustered by state.
For a discussion of this literature through 1998, see Belman and Groshen (1998).
Marks (2011) suggests that one cause may be differences in the legal treatment of
large and small firms with respect to regulation of working conditions. Under Internal Revenue Service codes, the health plans of self-insured firms, a type of plan
found mainly among larger firms, must not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. These rules do not apply to firms that purchase insurance, mainly
smaller firms, and they are permitted to discriminate in their provision of insurance.
The nondiscrimination requirement increases the cost of excluding low-wage
employees, including those hired at the minimum wage. Particularly for those
firms with large numbers of higher-wage employees who expect health insurance
coverage, the cost of excluding lower-wage employees from health insurance is
very high. For firms not covered by such requirements, the cost of discrimination
is lower, and we might expect to see them reducing health insurance coverage of
its lower-wage workforce in the face of higher minimum wages.
There are about 183,000 individuals in Marks’s (2011) large-firm sample and
244,000 individuals in the small-firm sample. The sample does not include the
self-employed and students.
Although the coefficient is significant in a 5 percent test, this standard may not be
sufficiently stringent for a sample with almost one-quarter million observations.
The elasticities are calculated at the average real minimum wage of $2.97 reported
by Marks (2011) for her sample.
Similar results are found with measures of the state relative minimum wage, the
ratio of the state minimum wage to the median wage for workers with a high
school degree or less. The effect on health insurance coverage is more marked
when the sample is limited to industries in which at least 20 percent of the labor
force has less than a high school degree. The elasticity of health insurance coverage for the less educated ranged from 0.18 to 0.23, depending on time period.
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47. There is, however, evidence that both the least- and highest-educated workers
in large firms and the highest-educated workers in small firms have lower probabilities of pension coverage when the minimum wage is higher. The cause of the
negative relationship between the minimum wage and pension plan participation
among the best-educated workers is uncertain; it may be proxying effects of other
variables related to the minimum wage.

7
Poverty and Inequality
An intent of the Fair Labor Standards Act and preceding state minimum wage laws was to assure that those who worked were able to afford a modest lifestyle. In this chapter we review the literature on how
the minimum wage affects both the absolute and relative standard of
living of those at the lower end of the income distribution in the United
States. We begin with the research on the effect of the minimum wage
on income inequality, the relative standard of living. Researchers are
unanimous in finding that increases in the minimum wage act to reduce income inequality. The results with respect to absolute standards
of living are less sanguine, as current research does not indicate that the
minimum wage affects the number of individuals living in poverty. This
may be due to the loose attachment of many of the low-income families
to the labor force.

INEQUALITY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES
Reversing a trend that started during the Great Depression, wage
and income inequality in the United States has increased over the last
four decades. The greatest changes have been the divergence in the upper and lower ends of the income distribution. In the later 1960s and
throughout the 1970s, the mean household income of the 5 percent of
families with the most income was 16 times the mean of the 20 percent
of families with the least income. This ratio began to rise in the 1980s,
when it averaged 18, continued to rise into the 1990s, when it averaged
22, and rose again in the 2000s, averaging 26. The ratio peaked in 2011
at 28 (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). The growth of inequality has been
due mainly to the rapid growth in the income of the highest earning
families. Between 1979 and 2007, the top 1 percent of families captured
60 percent of income gains, while the bottom 90 percent received about
9 percent of income gains (see, for example, Bivens [2011]).
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The rise in inequality has become a topic of public controversy and
academic discussion.1 Recent research has both documented the change
and examined plausible causes. Many have been considered, but most
attention has been on differential change in levels of education and skill
across demographic groups, on shifts in the supply and demand for different types of labor, on the effects of technology and of international
trade, and on the change in the industrial and occupational structure of
the economy. Changes in labor market institutions have also received
attention as important causal factors in the increase in inequality. At issue is whether the weakening of labor market institutions, specifically
declines in both the real minimum wage and the bargaining power of
unions, has been an important factor in the relative decrease in wages
and incomes of those in the lower tail of the income distribution. In the
context of this study, we are interested in what the research says about
the effect of changes in the minimum wage on lower-wage workers, as
well as the channels through which these increases raise the wages of
bound workers and near minimum wage workers.
The issues raised by this research revolve around how increases
in the minimum wage affect wages, particularly in the lower ranges of
the wage distribution. Does an increase in the minimum wage result in
a compression of the wage structure, thereby reducing inequality, or
does the wage structure as a whole move up, leaving inequality unaffected? We discussed the effect of the minimum wage on the earnings
of low-wage workers in Chapter 5, and we limit the current discussion
to research that addresses inequality directly.
Economists use many different measures to gauge inequality. Inequality, or change in inequality, can be measured by comparing the
income of individuals at different points in the earnings distribution.
For example, the 50/10 ratio is the ratio of the earnings of an individual
at the 50th percentile of the earnings distribution to the earnings of an
individual at the 10th percentile. This ratio is used to measure how the
bottom of the earnings distribution is doing relative to an individual in
the middle of the distribution. The 90/10 ratio is the ratio of the earnings of individuals at the 90th percentile to those at the 10th percentile.
It measures how well those close to the top of the earnings distribution
are doing relative to those toward the bottom. By considering these two
measures, along with the 90/50 ratio, we can form a clear idea of not
only how the overall distribution of earnings is shifting but also how
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individuals at various points in the distribution are doing relative to
one another. The more commonly used ratios are 90/10, 90/50, 50/10,
and 75/25. The last ratio measures how the middle of the lower half
of the earnings distribution is doing relative to the middle of the upper half. Measures of variance are also used; higher variance in earnings corresponds to greater income inequality. Variance measures can
be decomposed to allow changes in variance over time to be associated
with particular sources of change, such as the minimum wage. Decomposition of variance allows us to understand both the magnitude of the
effect of individual factors and the relative magnitude of the factors
affecting earnings inequality. Other measures, such as the difference in
earnings between those with only a high school degree and those with
a college degree, provide another approach to measuring changes in
earnings inequality.
Current research supports the view that the minimum wage reduces
inequality in the lower half of the wage distribution through raising the
minimum wage relative to the mean or median wage. (Table 7.1 provides information on the 8 studies of inequality.) There is considerably
less agreement about the size of the effect, and whether there is an effect
for men. The initial research, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996),
focuses on the effect of labor market institutions on wage distributions
between 1973 and 1992. Using CPS data and controlling for the effects
on the distribution of wages of individual attributes such as education
and age, macroeconomic factors such as shocks to supply and demand,
and institutional factors including unionization and the minimum wage,
the authors report that the decline in the real minimum wage between
1979 and 1988 accounted for about one-quarter of the increase in the
standard deviation of men’s wages, and nearly one-third of the increase
in the standard deviation of women’s wages. Other factors individually
contributed considerably less to the rise in inequality. Changes with respect to unions and individual attributes each accounted for about oneseventh of the increase in standard deviation, and supply and demand
for two-ninths for men. For women, the corresponding figures were
one-thirtieth, one-quarter, and nearly one-fifth.
The minimum wage mainly affected the lower tail of both the male
and female wage distributions. The decline in the real minimum wage
accounts for between 45 and 60 percent of the increase in the difference
in earnings between the 10th and 50th percentiles of the male distribu-

Study
DiNardo,
Fortin, and
Lemieux
(1996)

Sample
Analytic
Unit of
Data
Country
period
approach observation structure
Individual
Cross
United 1973–1992 Kernel
density
sectional
States

Effect
Target
Labor
The decline in the
force
real minimum wage
was the source of
one quarter of the increase in inequality.
United 1979–1989
Labor
Lee (1999)
Lower minimum
States
force
wages are associated with greater
wage inequality in
the lower tail of the
wage distribution,
particularly among
women.
Employed United 1973–2000
Card and
A simple model
labor
States
DiNardo
finds that 90% of the
force
(2002)
change in the 90/10
wage gap is due to a
declining real minimum wage.
Employed Canada 2000 for
Lemieux (2002) Minimum wages
Canada;
labor
and
affect the wage
force
United
distribution; higher
1973,
States
minimum wages
1979,
are associated with
1989, 1999
reduced inequality in
the lower tail of the
wage distribution.

Type of
standard
error
n/a
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Table 7.1 The Effect of the Minimum Wage on the Distribution of Wages
Data
seta
May CPS
and CPS
ORG

Regression Individual State-byHeteroaggregated year panel skedasticity
to state
adjusted
and clustered by
state

CPS ORG

Regression Individual

Series of
cross sections

n/a

March CPS
and CPS
ORG

Regression Individual
supplemented by
a logistic
or probit

Cross
sections

n/a

Canadian
LFS for
Alberta and
BC; May
CPS and
CPS ORG

Lemieux (2006) The decline in the
real minimum wage
was an important
source of increased
inequality.
Autor, Katz,
23% of the increase
and Kearney in the 50/10 wage
(2008)
gap is attributable
to the declining real
minimum wage.
Autor, Manning, If the real minimum
Smith (2010) wage had stayed at
its 1979 level, 50/10
inequality would
have been 28 to 39%
smaller.
Dolton,
The deeper the “bite”
Rosazza, and of the minimum
Wadsworth wage, the greater the
(2012)
reduction in lower
tail inequality.

Employed United 1973–1993 Reweight- Individual Cross seclabor
States
ing of
tions
force
residual
wage variance
College United 1963–2005 Regression Experience
Time
high
States
group by
series
school
year
wage gap
Labor
force
18–64

Bound
workers

United 1979–2009
States

Regression;
quantile
and two
stage

United 1999–2007 IncremenKingtal differdom
ence-indifferences
regression

n/a

May CPS
and CPS
ORG

Conventional

March CPS

State-by- State-by- Clustered
year
year panel by state

CPS ORG

Regionyear

NES and
ASHE

Aggregate Clustered
panel
by region

CPS ORG = Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Groups. LFS = Labour Force Survey. NES = New Earnings Survey.
ASHE = Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
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tion, and 57–66 percent of the increase in the difference in women’s
50/10 ratio. It has had a very small effect on the 75/25 ratio for the
wages of men, and it accounts for less than one-tenth of the increase
in the 75/25 ratio for women.2 Consistent with the discussion of wage
spillovers, the influence of the minimum wage does not reach as high as
the 25th percentile for men but has some effect at the 25th percentile
for women. Examination of data for 1973–1979, a period when the real
minimum wage rose, suggests that the minimum wage accounted for
between 25 and 33 percent of the decline in the standard deviation of
women’s wages and 33 percent of the decline in the standard deviation
of men’s wages. The minimum wage had a larger effect on the ratios of
those with no more than a high school degree than those with a college
degree for both genders in both 1973–1979 and 1979–1988.
Using a technique that better accounted for differences in labor
market performance among the states in the 1980s and early 1990s,
Lee (1999) finds that the decline in the minimum wage relative to state
mean and median wages accounted for at least 70 percent of the growth
in earnings inequality in the 50/10 ratio for women, and 70 percent of
the growth in the 50/10 and 25 percent of the growth in the 50/25 ratio
for men. Consistent with spillover effects occurring above the level of
the binding minimum wage, the minimum wage reduced female wage
inequality relative to the median as high as the third decile; the effect
on men does not extend as high and is more sensitive to specification.
Nevertheless, the effect on the 50/25 ratio for men suggests some spillover effect for men. A 10 percent increase in the minimum wage relative to a state’s mean earnings is estimated to reduce women’s 50/10
ratio by between 3 and 6 percent; for men the reduction is between 1
and 4 percent, but it is estimated with little precision.3
Additional research by Card and DiNardo (2002) and Lemieux
(2002, 2006) provides further evidence that a higher minimum wage
raises the bottom of the wage distribution and reduces wage inequality
in the lower tail of that distribution. In an analysis that they describe as
“somewhat informal,” Card and DiNardo suggest that factors such as
the decline in the real minimum wage played an important role in the 17
percent rise in the 90/10 wage gap between 1979 and 1999. Using a variety of measures and techniques, Lemieux (2002) finds that relative to
Alberta, British Columbia’s higher minimum wage was associated with
smaller wage inequality in 2000. The increase in the U.S. minimum

Poverty and Inequality 307

wage in the early 1990s similarly reduced inequality in the lower half
of the wage distribution. Lemieux (2006) finds that, after adjusting for
changes in workforce characteristics between 1972 and 2003, changes
in the minimum wage accounted for 80 percent of the change in male
inequality and 90 percent of the change in female inequality.
More recent work by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) and Autor,
Manning, and Smith (2010) suggests that the minimum wage has a
smaller but still substantial effect on wage inequality. The first analysis measures the effects of the minimum wage, of supply and demand
factors, and of unemployment on the ratio the wages of college graduates to those of high school graduates wages 1963 to 2005. A 10 percent higher real minimum wage is estimated to reduce the college/high
school wage ratio by less than 1 percent; one-tenth the magnitude of
that of aggregate labor supply conditions. There is also evidence that
the minimum wage only affects the college/high school wage ratio for
the initial 20 years after an individual’s education is completed. Models
that estimate the effect of the minimum wage on the 50/10 wage ratio
without regard to educational attainment suggest that the decline in the
real minimum wage from 1973 to 2005 accounted for 23 percent of the
increase in inequality over the period.
The second study addresses concerns with measures used by Lee
(1999). These estimates indicate that from 1979 to 2009, the decline
in the minimum wage was associated with a third of the 11 percent
increase in 50/10 inequality. This contrasts with Lee’s method, which
attributes all of the increase in inequality to the declining minimum
wage. Effects differ considerably by gender. Had the minimum wage
remained at its 1979 level, women’s 50/10 ratio would have been 38
percent lower, while male inequality would have remained unchanged
between 1979 and 2009.
Although considerably smaller than those reported by Lee (1999),
the magnitude of the effect remains substantial—too large to be explained only by the effect of the minimum wage on bound workers.
Separate regressions for different percentiles of the wage distribution
indicate that the effect of the minimum wage extends up to the 30th
percentile of the female wage distribution but only up through the 10th
percentile of the male wage distribution. Again, the male result in particular contrasts with Lee, who finds effects in the male 50/25 ratio.
The authors indicate that spillovers account for half of the effect of the
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minimum wage on wage inequality and provide some evidence that the
spillover effect is larger in periods in which the real minimum wage
falls. However, because of issues with self-reported wages, the degree
to which the estimated spillover is due to reporting errors is uncertain.
As part of an analysis of the regional effect of the NMW in England, Scotland, and Wales, Dolton, Rosazza, and Wadsworth (2012)
consider the effect of the NMW on lower-tail inequality.4 They apply an
incremental difference-in-differences estimator to earnings measures
from the New Earnings Survey and the Annual Survey of Hours and
Earnings from 1999 to 2007 to estimate whether the 5/50 and 10/50
income ratio has responded to changes in the NMW. Their regressions,
structured as a geographic area-by-year panel, include a variety of controls as well as year and area effects, and the reported standard errors
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and unspecified serial correlation.
They report that an increase in the proportion paid at or below the minimum wage was associated with reduced lower-tail inequality and that
the effect became more pronounced with the increases in the NMW
between 1999 and 2007.

THE EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE ON POVERTY
AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
As articulated in the preamble to the Fair Labor Standards Act, a
central goal of the minimum wage is to assure that low-wage workers
have sufficient earnings to support a modest standard of living. While
the minimum wage targets low-wage workers (and firms), what we ultimately want to know about the minimum wage is whether it improves
the lot of low-income workers—are they better off than they would otherwise be because of the minimum wage or an increase in the minimum
wage? Are they absolutely better off? Are they better off in comparison
with other, higher-income workers? Does the minimum wage raise living standards for those whose living standards are below average? If
so, does it do this as a stand-alone policy or in combination with other
policies? Does it enable them to afford better housing, diet, health care,
or any of the other things that together make up a standard of living?
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It is surprising how little work on this issue exists. Most of the
literature considers one of two issues. The first is the relationship between the minimum wage and poverty, in particular, how the minimum
wage affects either transitions of households into and out of poverty or,
at a more aggregate level, how it affects the poverty rate. The second
issue concerns interactions between the minimum wage and other antipoverty policies.
To understand the first strand, it is necessary to know what is meant
by poverty. The colloquial meaning is a bit vague, but dictionaries give
the following definitions:


The state of one who lacks a usual or socially acceptable
amount of money or material possessions. Poverty may cover a
range from extreme want of necessities to absence of material
comforts.5



The condition of having little or no wealth or few material possessions; indigence, destitution.6

Neither definition provides the quantitative precision that statistical
analysis typically requires, but both suggest that what is considered to
be poverty can change over time.
In the United States, there is a widely accepted definition of what it
means to be in poverty that varies over time and with the size and structure of the household.7 In the 1950s, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) developed four different food plans, with the least expensive one known as the “thrifty food plan.” In the mid-1960s, Orshansky
(1963, 1965) determined the cost of this plan and extrapolated that to
total household income based on results from the 1955 Household Food
Consumption Survey (also of the USDA), which indicated that families
of three or more spent about one-third of their annual income on food
(Fisher 1992). Families with incomes less than three times the amount
needed to buy the thrifty food plan were judged to be in poverty.
The definition of poverty-level income has been a contentious,
heavily politicized issue, as it can lead to sound bites about increases or
decreases in the poverty rate during politicians’ tenure in office. Since
originally defined, poverty-level income has been updated only for inflation, and it has not been adjusted for changes in spending patterns on
food, other consumer goods, or changes in housing and commuting patterns, in particular, the growth of suburbs. Correcting for these would
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substantially raise the level of income needed to be above the poverty
line. The income share of food expenditures had already fallen from
one-third to one-quarter by 1965, and, had the poverty-level income
been adjusted, the poverty line would have been one-third more than
it was. By 2007 food expenditures had declined to one-tenth of family
income; adjusting the definition for this change would have raised the
poverty line to three times its then current level (Clauson 2008). Income
used to calculate the poverty line also does not include many government transfers, which would either reduce the income needed to escape
poverty or increase the amount of income attributed to many households, in either case reducing the number of households in poverty.
While the poverty line may have reflected reality when first defined, it
does not any longer.8
Table 7.2 shows the minimum levels of income needed for families
of different sizes to be classified as being above poverty. A family of
one adult and two children would be considered not to be in poverty
if annual income exceeds $17,568, while one of two adults and two
children requires a minimum of $22,113. The poverty line defines a
very low standard of living, possibly destitution. For example, working
single parents almost always require child care. According to the National Association of Child Care Resource and Referral Agencies (2011,
p. 23), in 2010, the average cost of child care for two children (an infant
and a four-year-old) in Mississippi, the least expensive state, would be
at least $7,280, more than 40 percent of the poverty-level income of
$15,030.9 There would be little income for anything else.
The poverty line(s) and the minimum wage make almost no contact
with each other. First consider a single-parent family with one or two
children. In each case, the 2010 poverty line is $17,552 and $17,568, respectively. If this parent worked full time at minimum wage, she would
earn $14,500, not enough for the family income to exceed the poverty
line. The minimum wage, which was $7.25 per hour at the time of writing, would have to rise by more than $1.50/hour, in excess of 20 percent, to bring this household to the poverty line. None of the increases
in the federal minimum wage since the Korean War, except for those of
1956 and 1974, have been as large as 20 percent, and most have been
about half that.
Next, consider two-parent families. If both parents work full time at
the minimum wage, annual income is $29,000/year. Unless the family

Table 7.2 Poverty Thresholds for 2010 by Size of Family and Number of Related Children under 18 Years ($, 2010)
Related children under 18 years
Eight or
Size of family unit
None
One
Two
Three
Four
Five
Six
Seven
more
One person (unrelated
individual)
Under 65 years
11,344
65 years and over
10,458
Two people
Householder under 65
14,602
15,030
years
Householder 65 years
13,180
14,973
and over
Three people
17,057
17,552
17,568
Four people
22,491
22,859
22,113
22,190
Five people
27,123
27,518
26,675
26,023
25,625
Six people
31,197
31,320
30,675
30,056
29,137
28,591
Seven people
35,896
36,120
35,347
34,809
33,805
32,635
31,351
Eight people
40,146
40,501
39,772
39,133
38,227
37,076
35,879
35,575
Nine people or more
48,293
48,527
47,882
47,340
46,451
45,227
44,120
43,845
42,156
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/thresh10.xls, (accessed August 24, 2011).
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has more than three children, this is above the poverty line and would
require that the minimum wage drop to $6.50 an hour (a decline of
more than 10 percent) for the family to be at the poverty line if it has
three children, and to about $5.50/hour for a family with two children
(the federal minimum wage has not declined in dollar terms since it was
first established). If the family has more than three children, it would
be $137 below the poverty income with two full-time minimum wage
workers. An increase in the minimum wage of less than a nickel would
bring this family to the poverty line. Larger families would require increases in the minimum wage between $0.90 and $2.75 (between 12
and 38 percent) to earn more than a poverty-level income.
Transitions across the officially defined poverty line are too crude a
measure to discern the effect of the minimum wage. Although the minimum wage may affect the standard of living of low-income families
that include a bound worker, the definition of the poverty line and the
size of a typical minimum wage increase make it unlikely that changes
in the minimum wage will succeed in moving families out of poverty
as officially defined.
A second reason not to expect those in poverty to benefit from the
minimum wage is their low employment and labor force participation
rates. Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn (1995, Table 4) report that in 1989,
a quarter of households below the poverty line had no employed workers. Using data from the 2006 CPS, the last full year of the CPS prior
to the start of the Great Recession, Table 7.3 displays the percentage of
households in each of 16 income categories and tabulates the percentage in which at least one adult was employed, and if not employed,
whether at least one was nevertheless in the labor force (i.e., unemployed, defined as not employed but actively looking for work). The
first two columns define the income categories for family income over
the prior 12 months: the first one shows the percentage of households in
each income category, and the next displays the cumulative percentage
in that income category or a lower one. The next three columns give information about labor force status—whether anyone in the household is
employed, and if not, whether anyone is actively looking for work and
thus counted as unemployed; if no one is employed or unemployed, the
household is classified as having no one in the labor force.
Only half (51 percent) of the households in the lowest income categories had any members employed at the time they were surveyed
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by the CPS. As we go up the (2006) income distribution, this fraction
increases until, near the top, virtually all households have at least one
employed member. The percentage of households that had nobody employed but somebody unemployed falls from 12 percent at the lowest
income levels to nearly zero. The combination of these two categories
is households that had at least one member who was in the labor force.
If we consider the percentage of households with no labor force participants, we see that it falls from a high value of 45 percent in households with a family income over the last 12 months between $5,000 and
$7,499 to a low of 3 percent in households with a 12-month income
between $100,000 and $149,999. Sixty-two percent of households with
incomes less than $25,000 had any earner; in families that make at
least $25,000, 92 percent include someone who is employed. Given the
low level of employment among households that earned income under
$20,000 annually, opportunities for the minimum wage to affect household income are limited.
The last four columns in Table 7.3 highlight other differences between low- and higher-income households. Not only is it the case that
higher-income households are more likely to have at least one employed person, but as household income rises, so too do both the average number of employed individuals in households and the average
number of paid hours per household. In 2006, the federal minimum
wage was $5.15 per hour, and the poverty line for a single parent of two
children was an annual income of $16,242 (U.S. Census Bureau 2006).
The parents would have had to work more than 60 hours per week at a
minimum wage job for the whole year to exceed that level. More than
half of households with 2005 incomes below $20,000 worked no more
than 40 hours per week in the week before the survey. Too many lowincome households have no one in the labor force, much less employed,
for the minimum wage to have much effect on poverty. Even for those
that do, the minimum wage is too low and households work too few
hours for an increase to change poverty status.
Empirical Studies of the Minimum Wage and Poverty
Table 7.4 lists more than a dozen statistical analyses of the response
of poverty to the minimum wage. In this group, there are four data structures, the most common of which is a state-year panel (or province-year

No earners (%)
Share of
None in
Total family income labor force Cumulative
Unemployed the labor
in 2006 ($)
(%)
share (%) Earner (%) (at least 1)
force
Less than 5,000
2.8
2.8
51
12.0
37.0
5,000–7,499
2.1
4.8
47
7.7
45.0
7,500–9,999
2.2
6.8
49
6.2
45.0
10,000–12,499
3.0
10.0
56
6.2
38.0
12,500–14,999
2.8
12.8
61
5.9
33.0
15,000–19,999
4.7
17.5
69
3.7
27.0
20,000–24,999
5.6
23.2
74
2.9
23.0
25,000–29,999
6.0
29.0
80
2.3
18.0
30,000–34,999
6.5
35.6
84
1.6
14.0
35,000–39,999
5.8
41.4
87
1.0
12.0
40,000–49,999
9.1
50.5
90
1.1
9.3
50,000–59,999
9.2
59.6
91
0.8
7.8
60,000–74,999
10.9
70.5
94
0.6
5.7
75,000–99,999
12.2
82.7
96
0.4
3.9
100,000–149,999
10.2
92.9
97
0.2
3.0
At least 150,000
7.1
100.0
97
0.2
3.1
Overall mean/median
85
1.9
13.0
Less than 15,000
12.8
12.8
54
7.6
39.0
Less than 25,000
23.2
23.2
62
5.6
33.0

Labor force status
Number of earners
Mean
0.72
0.67
0.68
0.78
0.89
0.98
1.10
1.20
1.40
1.50
1.60
1.70
1.80
1.90
2.00
1.90
1.50
0.76
0.89

Median
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
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Table 7.3 Labor Force Status in 2006 by Family Income in 2005
Hours last week
Meana
52
52
51
53
57
56
59
62
65
67
71
75
81
83
87
88
74
53
55

Medianb
40
40
40
40
40
40
46
52
60
63
70
78
80
80
80
83
75
40
43

Greater than 10,000

17.0

83.0

97

0.2

3.0

2.00

2

88

Approximately one-sixth of respondents did not provide an answer to the income category question. The figures for total and cumulative
total are calculated with reference to the remaining 83% of the sample.
b
Calculated only over households with at least one earner last week.
SOURCE: 2006 CPS ORG files.
a
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panels in the case of Sen, Rybczynski, and Van de Waal [2011] and
Campolieti, Gunderson, and Lee [2012]).
The other three structures are a state-year repeat cross section
(Sabia 2008), an aggregate time series (Vedder and Gallaway 2002),
and longitudinal panels (Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher 2005;
Sabia and Nielsen 2013). Of these last two studies, the former has two
observations per family, while the latter is a more conventional longitudinal structure with considerably more observations on each individual and a variety of outcome measures. Except for three studies,
those that use a state-year panel or aggregate time series relate poverty
rates to the minimum wage, and the one based on a repeated cross section is conceptually similar, relating a family’s poverty status to the
minimum wage and other factors. The panel with two observations on
each family, Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2005), relates transitions into and out of poverty to the minimum wage and other factors in a
difference-in-differences framework. The analyses of Gundersen (2006)
and Gundersen and Ziliak (2004), both of which use state-by-year panels, are unusual in that they consider not only the poverty status of families (i.e., changes in the poverty rate) but also the severity of poverty,
that is, whether families below the poverty line move closer to it while
nevertheless remaining in poverty. Sabia and Neilsen (2013) are likewise unusual in going beyond poverty status to consider effects on the
income-to-poverty ratio and material hardship. The three exceptions
mentioned above are Grogger (2003, 2004), who relates the minimum
wage to whether families receive welfare benefits, and Page, Spetz, and
Millar (2005), who relate it to welfare caseloads.
Those studies in the first panel in Table 7.4 are, with the exception
of Sabia and Nielsen (2013), all vulnerable to the critique of Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). This has no consequences for findings
of no relationship between the minimum wage and poverty, but it raises
doubts about the reliability of any results reported to be statistically significant: Addison and Blackburn (1999); DeFina (2008); Grogger (2003,
2004); Gundersen and Ziliak (2004); Gundersen (2006); Neumark and
Wascher (2002); Page, Spetz, and Millar (2005); Morgan and Kickham
(2001); and Stevans and Sessions (2001). Four of the remaining regression analyses find no response of poverty to the minimum wage.
Two find that the poverty rate rises when the minimum wage is higher,
but both are problematic. Vedder and Gallaway (2002) are markedly
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nonchalant about the serial correlation that is almost certainly a part of
the aggregate time series that they analyze. (This analysis is treated in
slightly more detail in Chapter 3.) The difficulties of Sen, Rybczynski,
and Van de Waal’s (2011) analysis are more interesting. They analyze
a 25-year-long panel of nine Canadian provinces and present standard
errors that are clustered by both province and year in the calculation.
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) document that clustering
does not resolve the problem of serial correlation when the number of
clusters is too small; in their Monte Carlo example, nearly 11 percent
of their simulations using only 10 clusters (corresponding to states or
provinces) incorrectly reject the null of no effect at test size of 0.05, and
more than 15 percent using only 6 clusters do so. (Hansen [2007b] and
Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller [2008] confirm this result.)
Sabia and Nielsen (2013) are among the more interesting analyses
of the effect of the minimum wage on poverty. Using the Survey of
Income Program Participation (SIPP), a longitudinal survey with extensive information on sources of income and participation in welfare and
income maintenance programs, the authors estimate the relationship
between federal and state minimum wages and poverty, material hardship, and income for the years 1996–2007. Models are estimated for all
workers aged 16–64, for the employed, for those aged 16–29 without a
high school diploma, for blacks aged 16–24, and, as a falsification test,
for individuals aged 30–54 with a high school degree or better. The estimates of standard errors in the regression models are clustered by state.
Estimates for poverty and income take advantage of the longitudinal
structure to control for individual heterogeneity.
The authors find little or no evidence that the minimum wage is
related to any of the outcomes. In their sample with all individuals aged
16–64, the coefficient on the minimum wage is very small and never
significant for indicator measures of being below poverty, or of being
within 125 percent or 150 percent of the poverty line. It is also not
significant for either the ratio of income to poverty or being below poverty inclusive of transfer payments. Similar results are obtained with
the subsamples of workers, of those aged 16–29 without a high school
diploma, and for blacks aged 16–24. However, several estimates with
state time trends find that a higher minimum wage increases the likelihood that 16–29-year-olds with a high school diploma will be below
125 percent and 150 percent of poverty.

Study
Addison and
Blackburn
(1999)
Burkhauser and
Sabia (2007)
DeFina (2008)

Minimum wage
and poverty
relationship
Negative
None
Negative

Type of
Target
Sample Unit of
Data
Analytic standard
group
Country period observation structure approach
error
Teens, young
United 1983–
State
State-year Regression Convenadults,
States 1996
panel
tional
jr. high dropouts
Individuals in
United 1989–
State
State-year Regression + PCSEc
poverty
States 2003
panel simulationb
Kids in female- United 1992–
headed households States 2003

State

Grogger (2003)d

Varies with age
of children

Female-headed
families

United 1979–
States 2000

Family

Grogger (2004)d

Contradictory,
varies by
specification
Negative to
none

Female-headed
families

United 1979–
States 2000

Family

Gundersen and
Ziliak (2004)

State-year (Robust) Convenpanel
Regression tional
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Table 7.4 Statistical Studies of the Minimum Wage and Poverty
Data
seta
March CPS
March CPS
CPS

Repeated Regression Clustered March CPS
cross
(statesection
year)
Repeated Regression Clustered March CPS
cross
(statesection
year)
State-year Regression Robust
March CPS
panel

Families (2+ re- United 1981–
lated individuals) States 2000

State

Gundersen (2006) None except + Families (2+ re- United 1988–
for metro area lated individuals) States 2003
female-headed
households
Neumark and
Net small
Families with
United 1986–
Wascher
positive
income < 2 ×
States 1995
(2002)
poverty level

State

State-year Regression Convenpanel
tional

March CPS

Family

State-year Diff-in-diff. Convenpanel
and
tional
regression

March CPS

Page, Spetz, and
Millar (2005)d

Positive

Individuals on
Welfare

United 1983–
States 1996

State

Morgan and
Kickham
(2001)
Stevans and
Sessions
(2001)
Sabia (2008)

Negative

Children
(in poverty)

United 1987–
States 1996

State

None to
negative

Families

United 1984–
States 1998

State

None

Single mothers

NeweyWest
HAC SEse
State-year Regression PCSEc
panel

Various

State-year Regression Convenpanel
tional

CPS

CPS

United 1992– Individual State-year Regression Clustered March CPS
States 2005
RCSf
United 2003–
States 2007

State

State-year Regression + Clustered March CPS
panel simulationb

Canada 1981–
2004

Province

Province- Regression Two-way
year panel
clusteredg

Statistics
Canada

United 1966–
States 1998

U.S.

Census data

United 1986–
States 1995

Family

Aggregate Regression Conventime
tional
series
Two- Diff-in-diff. Bootperiod
/ kernel
strapped
panel
regression

Canada 1979–
2007

Province

Province- Regression Convenby-year
tional
panel

SLID

March CPS

(continued)
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Sabia and
None
Families in
Burkhauser
poverty
(2010)
Sen, Rybczynski,
Positive
All families
and Van de
Waal (2011)
Vedder and
None to positive Full-time workers
Gallaway
(2002)
Neumark,
None
Families with
Schweitzer,
income < 6 ×
and Wascher
poverty level
(2005)
Campolieti,
None
Families at the
Gunderson, and
LICO, 1.25 and 1.5
Lee (2012)g
times the LICOh

State-year Regression
panel

Minimum wage
and poverty
Target
Authors
relationship
group
Sabia and Nielsen Increases in the
minimum wage
(2013)
do not influence
the likelihood of
being in poverty
or the income-topoverty ratio.
Increases in the Minimum wage
Maloney and
Pacheco
MW raise the employees
likelihood that
(2012)
a MW worker
will be in lowerincome deciles.
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Table 7.4 (continued)
Sample Unit of
Data
Analytic
Country period observation structure approach
United 1996– Individual Longitu- Regression
States 2007
dinal

New 1997– Individual
Zealand 2008

Type of
SE
Clustered

Data
set
SIPP

Repeat Probit and
Conven- Annual incross multinomial tional come supplesection logit
ment to the
Household
Labour Force
Survey

Note that the March Current Population Survey (CPS) refers to data for the previous year. Thus, 2003–2007 data are for the period
2002–2006, and similarly for other periods. SLID = Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics. SIPP = Survey of Income and Program
Participation.
b
The simulation uses the regression results to estimate the effects of a proposed increase in the minimum wage.
c
Panel-corrected standard errors.
d
This article looks not at poverty but at whether the minimum wage moves families onto or off welfare rolls (Grogger 2003, 2004) or affects the size of welfare caseloads (Page, Spetz, and Millar 2005).
e
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors.
f
Repeated cross section.
g
Clustering is unlikely to address the Bertrand, Duflo, and Mallainathan issue for Canadian province-year panels because there are too few
provinces. See Bertrand, Duflo, and Mallainathan (2004).
h
Low-income cut-off.
a
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As we have indicated, we are unconvinced that estimates of
whether the minimum wage moves individuals across arbitrary thresholds provide useful insights. The estimates with the income-to-poverty
ratios move closer to addressing how the minimum wage affects lowincome employees and families. Sabia and Nielsen’s (2013) specification may, however, be submerging the effect of the minimum wage in
an overly broad sample.10 If, for example, the impact of the minimum
wage on family income occurred in the second and third decile of the
income distribution, the effect of minimum wage increases on income
may be difficult to detect with a linear specification across all income
deciles. The narrowing of the sample by age and high school graduation improves this but does not focus sufficiently tightly on the relevant
sample. Despite this, there is evidence that a 10 percent increase in the
minimum wage would be associated with a 5.7 percent increase in the
income-to-poverty ratio of individuals aged 16–29 who do not have a
high school degree. It would be better to divide the sample by income
quintile or decile and estimate the effects within those samples.11
Simulation Studies of the Minimum Wage and Poverty
Table 7.5 lists six studies that simulate the response of poverty or
poverty status to the minimum wage. Using estimates of disemployment
effects and wage increases from a number of nonsimulation studies,
each of these six studies derives estimates for the number of households
that a specific minimum wage increase would raise above the poverty
threshold and the number that it would move below it. Neumark and
Wascher (2008, Section 5.2.3) detail a number of problems that make
it difficult to express confidence in the conclusions drawn from these
simulations. Briefly, they generally must rely on estimates of minimum
wage effects on groups other than poor households, and they ignore the
possibility of a variety of behavioral responses to the minimum wage.
In both cases, the reason for doing this is that the estimates necessary
for avoiding these practices do not exist. Because of the shakiness of
the conclusions, we do not discuss the simulation studies.
Both the statistical and simulation studies of the relationship between the minimum wage and poverty leave us where we started, without any strong evidence that the minimum wage affects the poverty rate
one way or the other.

Horrigan and Mincy
(1993)
Knabe and Schöb
(2008)
Mascella, Teja, and
Thompson (2009)
Müller and Steiner
(2008)
Sutherland (2001)

Negative
Positive
Very slightly
negative
None
Negative
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Table 7.5 Simulation Studies of the Minimum Wage and Poverty
Minimum wage
and poverty
Sample
Study
relationship
Target group
Country period
Formby, Bishop, and Slight negative Poor households United
2007
Kim (2010)
States
Families (with United
MW workers)
States
Low-wage
Germany
workers
All households Canada

1980–
1987
2006

Individual

Data
seta
CPS
(March &
ORG)
Annual RCS March
CPS
Cross section SOEP

2004

Household

Cross section

SLID

All households Germany

2008

Household

Cross section

SOEP

2001

Household

Cross section

HBAI

Poor households

UK

Unit of
observation
Household
Family

Data
structure
Cross section

CPS = Current Population Survey. SOEP = Socio-Economic Panel (Germany). SLID = Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (Statistics Canada). HBAI = Households Below Average Income (UK).

a
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Interactions between the Minimum Wage and Other
Antipoverty Policies
There have been few studies on the interaction of antipoverty policies and the minimum wage; more often the studies focus on the combined effect on employment (see Table 7.6).12 Kramarz and Philippon
(2001) consider not only changes in the French minimum wage but also
in the payroll taxes that employers must pay. In the 1990s, those taxes
pertaining to low-wage employees were reduced several times to offset increases in the minimum wage. Consequently, despite increases in
the minimum wage, employers’ costs of hiring of low-wage workers
fell, and affected workers had a higher probability of employment than
would otherwise have been the case.
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) subsidizes employment by
reducing income taxes on labor income, primarily for low-income families with children. Neumark and Wascher (2011) examine the separate
and combined effects on employment and earnings of the EITC and
minimum wage on both single mothers and members of other demographic groups that are likely to compete with them in the labor market.
They report that the minimum wage has a positive effect on both employment and earnings of single mothers, an important part of the target
group of the EITC, both by itself and especially in combination with
the EITC. This effect carries through to raise the incomes of very poor
families with children, enough to reduce the incidence of poverty in this
group. The flip side is that both policies—in some cases separately, in
others together, and in yet others both separately and together—reduce
employment and earnings of individuals who are not eligible for the
EITC and who compete in the labor market with individuals who are
eligible for the EITC; they identify these individuals as childless individuals who have not gone beyond high school, white teenage boys, and
all teenage girls.
The French studies consider policies that differ from the antipoverty policy considered in the United States, making it difficult to
compare results across the two countries. The French policies are designed to offset effects of the minimum wage, either to encourage labor
demand or to reduce labor supply. The U.S. policy, the EITC, is designed instead to encourage labor supply and income of poor families,
and the minimum wage apparently makes it more effective.

Interaction
between minimum
Sample
Unit of
Study
wage and other policies
Target
Country
period observation
Neumark and Not examined—EITC EITC recipients United 1986–1995 Family
vs. minimum wage
States
Wascher
(2001)
Negative effect on
Low-wage
France 1990–1998 Individual
Kramarz and
Philippon
employment
workers
(2001)
Negative effect on
Married women France
1997
Individual
Laroque and
employment
Salanie
(2002)
Neumark and
Generally
EITC recipients, United 1997–2006 Family and
Wascher
complements
competitors in
States
individual
(2011)
labor market
a

Type
Data
Analytic of stanData
structure approach dard error set
Two-year Regression Clustered March
panel
(stateCPSa
year)
Repeated
Quasi
Conven- Labour
cross
experiment tional
Force
section
Survey
Cross
Regression Conven- Labour
section
tional
Force
Survey
Repeated Regression Clustered March
cross
CPS
section

Note that the March CPS refers to data for the previous year. Thus, 2003–2007 data are for the period 2002–2006, and similarly for other
periods.
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Table 7.6 Studies of the Minimum Wage and Antipoverty Policies
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Is the Minimum Wage Well Targeted to Help Low-Income
Households?
Another issue is whether the minimum wage is sufficiently well
targeted to aid low-income individuals and households. The rationale
for the minimum wage has been regularly criticized because too large
a proportion of those earning the minimum wage are not in the lowest
income deciles. We explore this issue in our discussion in Chapter 5,
Tables 5.1–5.3, and find that a substantial proportion of the U.S. labor
force and the career labor force were employed at or not far above the
minimum wage. As part of a study of antipoverty effects of the minimum wage in New Zealand, Maloney and Pacheco (2012) find that the
relevance of the minimum wage to low-income households is strongly
related to whether the minimum wage has kept pace with wage growth
and inflation. The National Party of New Zealand allowed the minimum wage to languish from 1990 to 1999. As a result, the value of the
minimum wage fell by 1.1 percent relative to inflation and by 8.7 percent relative to average hourly earnings. The Labour Party reversed this
policy beginning in 2000 and continuing through to 2008.13 Over this
period, the adult minimum wage rose by 32.9 percent relative to inflation and by 22.6 percent relative to average hourly earnings, and the
minimum wage of teenagers rose even more rapidly.
Using the annual income supplements to the Household Labor
Force survey for 1997 to 2008 to estimate the relationship between the
real minimum wage and the likelihood that an employee in an income
decile will be a minimum wage worker, Maloney and Pacheco (2012)
find that a 10 percent rise in the real minimum wage increases the likelihood that an adult in the 1st decile of the household income distribution
is a minimum wage worker by 9 percent, by 6.8 percent for one in the
2nd decile, 3.3 percent in the 3rd decile, 1.5 percent in the 5th decile,
1.5 percent in the 7th decile, and by 0.25 percent in the 10th decile. A
parallel analysis on the distribution of minimum wage workers across
income deciles finds that a 10 percent rise in the real minimum wage
increases the likelihood that an adult minimum wage worker is in the
2nd decile of household income by 3.8 percent, and decreases the likelihood of their being in the 5th or 10th deciles.
Maloney and Pacheco (2012, Figure 5) find that the proportion of
minimum wage workers in each income decile was both low and rela-
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tively constant across the household income deciles in 1997–1999, the
period in which the minimum wage languished. In contrast, the proportion of minimum wage employees in the lower income deciles were
markedly higher in 2006–2008, the end of the period in which the minimum wage was substantially raised. For example, the proportion of employees who were employed at the minimum wage in the lowest income
decile rose from 5 percent in 1997–1999 to 33 percent in 2006–2008.
In the 3rd decile, it rose from 4 percent to 16 percent. In contrast, in the
9th decile, it rose from 1 percent to 5 percent.
These results suggest that, at least in New Zealand, increases in
the minimum wage have their largest effect in the lower reaches of the
income distribution. Further, the answer to whether the minimum wage
appropriately targets low-income populations is not independent of the
level of the minimum wage. When the real minimum wage is very low,
the proportion of workers employed at the minimum wage is not closely
related to household income. As it rises, it affects the lower deciles of
the income distribution far more than the upper deciles.14

HOW LONG DO MINIMUM WAGE EARNERS CONTINUE
TO EARN THE MINIMUM WAGE?
The importance of the minimum wage to the economic well-being
of minimum wage earners is related to how long they remain in positions that pay at or near the minimum wage. If those earning the minimum wage are at the minimum for a brief time and ascend the wage
distribution rapidly, there is less reason to be concerned about the minimum wage and its effect on workers’ earnings. The effect cannot be
large because workers spend little time working at or near the minimum
wage. If, on the other hand, they spend considerable time at or near the
minimum wage, the minimum wage may have substantial effects on
their annual and lifetime income. How long individual workers are in
minimum wage positions is then an important consideration in assessing the effect and effectiveness of the minimum wage.
Answers to this question are influenced by researchers’ decisions
about the point in an individual’s economic life cycle to begin measuring their wage growth. The wage path of those still in school is quite
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different from that of individuals who have permanently left school and
are beginning career employment. Answers also depend on how far
above the minimum wage researchers look for wage effects. Several
studies define the minimum wage as exactly the minimum wage and
treat any earnings in excess of that minimum wage as above minimum
wage earnings. Others treat those earning within $0.25 of the minimum
as minimum wage earners and then consider bands of $0.50, $1.00,
and $1.50 above the minimum as potentially affected by the minimum
wage. While the former approach assures that we will find few workers
spending long periods earning the minimum wage, the latter provides
better insights into how rapidly workers move beyond the minimum
wage.15
The most thoughtful study of minimum wage dynamics is the work
of Carrington and Fallick (2001) (see Table 7.7). Their use of the NLSY
allows them to track individuals over a decade, providing an extended
portrait of the wage movement of workers through their early careers.
Restricting their sample to individuals who have completed their
schooling removes a large number of minimum wage earners whose labor market decisions are secondary to their education decisions. Defining a minimum wage job as one that pays no more than $0.25 above the
minimum wage addresses the imprecision in the reports of the hourly
earnings from household surveys. Finally, by presenting their results in
bands above the minimum wage, the authors allow for spillover effects,
for the effects of within-firm pay increases of longer-term workers who
entered at the minimum wage, and for increases in the legislated minimum wage. It allows the readers to determine for themselves the wage
band at which the minimum wage is no longer relevant, rather than being constrained by the authors’ choices.
Carrington and Fallick (2001) report that 8 percent of the career
workforce spent at least half of the first 10 years after completing school
in positions paying no more than $1 more than the minimum wage. Employees with a typical career spent at least 2 of their first 10 years working within $1.00 of the minimum wage. African Americans and women
spent longer periods close to the minimum wage. In the first year of
employment after permanently leaving school, 30 percent of employees
work at jobs paying within $0.25 per hour of the minimum wage, and
54 percent (including the 30 percent already mentioned) work in jobs
within $1.00 of the minimum wage. These percentages decline steadily
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Carrington
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Table 7.7 The Dynamics of Minimum Wage Earners: How Long Do Those Earning the Minimum Wage Remain
Close to the Minimum?
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model
women and in the
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CPS
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mate boot 1–15
strapped of the
BHPS

NLSY = National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. SIPP = Survey of Income and Program Participation. CPS = Current Population Survey.
BHPS = British Household Panel Survey.
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as employees gain experience. Those working at the minimum wage
have about a 50 percent chance of remaining at the minimum wage in
the next year, and those who are earning above the minimum wage have
a better than 90 percent chance of continuing to earn above the minimum wage in the following year. At 10 years, only 7 percent earn the
minimum wage, and a total of 12 percent earn no more than $1 above
the minimum wage (see Table 7.8).
Rather than looking at snapshots in time (the end of the first year,
the end of the first decade), the data can also be arranged according to
the time spent in various wage bands. Only 4 percent of the respondents spent 5 years of the 10 years within $0.50 of the minimum wage,
but larger proportions of the workforce spent considerably more time
within $1 of the minimum wage. Almost 20 percent of the postschool
workforce spend a quarter of their first 10 years within $1 of the minimum wage, and 8 percent spent 5 years within $1 of the minimum wage.
Again, fractions of women and African Americans who spent extended
periods at or close to the minimum wage were higher than the general
population. Carrington and Fallick (2001) conclude that “most workers
who begin their careers in minimum wage jobs eventually gain more
experience and move on to higher paying jobs; however, some workers
Table 7.8 Share of Population in Minimum Wage or Near-MinimumWage Jobs by Years into Career
Years into
career
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Above prevailing minimum wage by no more than
$0.25
$0.50
$1.00
$1.50
$2.00
30.5
38.7
54.5
64.3
72.6
23.4
30.2
42.4
52.4
62.0
16.7
21.8
31.9
42.0
50.8
13.5
17.2
25.6
33.9
42.9
10.5
14.0
21.0
28.0
37.0
9.2
12.0
27.9
24.2
32.4
8.6
10.4
15.8
20.6
27.5
7.7
9.5
14.4
18.2
25.2
7.3
8.8
12.7
17.1
22.5
7.3
8.6
12.2
15.1
20.3

NOTE: “Years into career” begin immediately after schooling was completed.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the NLSY79. Reproduced from Carrington and
Fallick (2001, Table 2).
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spend substantial portions of their early careers consistently working in
minimum wage jobs” (p. 17).
Most studies examine wage dynamics over shorter periods, use
more restrictive definitions of minimum wage workers, or consider different populations. Smith and Vavrichek (1992) use data from the SIPP
from September 1983 to March 1986 to track employees who are hired
at exactly the minimum wage ($3.35 in 1983). As summarized in Table
7.9, 37 percent still earned no more than the minimum wage a year
later: 16 percent earned an hourly wage up to 7.5 percent more than the
minimum wage (between $3.36 and to $3.50); 24 percent earned between 7.5 percent and 19.5 percent more than the minimum wage (between $3.51 and $3.99); and 23 percent earned at least 120 percent of
the minimum wage (at least $4.00). Similar patterns, again reported in
Table 7.9, are found in a replication of this study with data from 1991 to
1994 (Long 1999). Nineteen percent remained exactly at the minimum
wage after two years. Another 45 percent of respondents were earning
at least 124 percent of the minimum wage two years after being paid
the minimum.16 These results are comparable to those of Carrington and
Fallick (2001), who report that of those earning the minimum wage, between 34 and 54 percent earned an hourly wage more than $0.25 above
the minimum wage a year later.
The CPS follows individuals for no more than two years, and until
1994, linking individuals across even these two years was technically
challenging and incomplete. Thus, the CPS is less suited for tracking
the wage dynamics of individuals than true longitudinal data.17 These
limits are counterbalanced by the size of the CPS sample, its representativeness, and the long time period for which CPS data are available.
Using the CPS monthly surveys for 1979–1999 and matching individuals across the two years in which they are respondents to the survey,
Even and Macpherson (2003) consider wage change in the year following employment at exactly the minimum wage. Twenty-nine percent of
respondents continue at exactly the minimum wage, 47 percent have
earnings at least $0.01 above the minimum wage, and 24 percent leave
employment. Of those who earned exactly the minimum wage in their
second year in the survey, Even and Macpherson report that 39 percent
were not previously employed, 32 percent had been earning less than
or exactly the minimum wage, and 28 percent had wages above the
minimum in the previous year. That some workers “fall back” to the

Long (1999)
October 1991–December 1995
$4.25
Individual earns exactly
the binding minimum wage

Even and Macpherson (2003)
January 1979–December 1999
Varies
Individual earns exactly
the binding minimum wage

Distribution of the earnings of minimum wage (MW) workers
Wage bands used % of sample
Wage bands used
% of sample Wage bands used % of sample
One year later
No more than MW
37
No more than MW
30
No more than MW
29
Above the MW to
16
Above the MW to
21
More than MW
47
105% of minimum
111.5% of minimum
Above 105%
11
Above 115% to 123%
20
More than 119%
21
More than 123%
29
Two years later
No more than MW
19
Above MW to 111.5%
15
Above 111.5% to 123%
21
More than 123%
25
One year before
No more than MW
33
More than MW
28
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Table 7.9 The Dynamics of the Minimum Wage
Study
Smith and Vavrichek (1992)
Period studied
September 1983–March 1986
Minimum wage
$3.35
Definition of
Individual earns exactly the
MW worker federal minimim wage of $3.35
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minimum wage suggests that the dynamics of the minimum wage are
more complex than its simply being an entry-level wage that individuals rise above over some time. Although this study does not estimate
how far back individuals fell, it indicates the possibility of retrograde
movement.
Factors Affecting Wage Growth
What factors affect whether individuals remain at or near the minimum wage? There is broad agreement among studies. All of the research indicates that minimum wage earners are more likely to remain
at the minimum wage, however defined, if they are female, younger,
have less education, or are Hispanic. Most studies indicate that African
Americans are more likely to remain at or close to the minimum wage.
Studies that include older workers indicate that those approaching the
end of their working lives have lower wage growth and, if near the
minimum wage, are more likely to remain there than younger workers. The unmarried are more likely than those who are married to have
lower wage growth and to remain at the minimum wage, although some
studies suggest this is only true of unmarried men.
Is the pattern of wage growth among workers exactly at the minimum wage different from that of other low-wage workers? At issue is
whether earning the minimum wage either identifies workers with particularly low productivity or permanently affects them—“scars them,”
in the colorful terminology of economists—so that their wage growth is
adversely affected. Comparing those earning the minimum wage with
those earning slightly more, Grossberg and Sicilian (1999, p. 547) find
the wage growth of women in these two categories does not differ, but
that the difference for men is large, with the minimum wage group experiencing slower growth.
What explains wage growth of men at the minimum wage being
slower than that of men earning a bit above the minimum? One possibility is that those who are hired at the minimum wage are less productive. Another is that there is scarring, that time spent at the minimum
wage reduces wage growth either by reducing a worker’s productivity
(bad habits) or labeling the worker so that employers are unwilling to
grant the types of increases granted other low-wage workers. Neumark
and Nizalova (2007) investigate this issue, but, as we have suggested in
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Chapter 2, their methods are not adequate to their purpose. Jones et al.
(2007) use the British Household Panel Study, a longitudinal data set
that follows the members of families over time, to investigate whether
the lower-wage growth of minimum wage workers is due to unobserved
lower productivity or scarring (see Table 7.10). Their panel, which runs
from 1999 to 2004, includes the initial implementation and early increases in the NMW. Those earning at or below the minimum wage
have a 29–36 percent probability of remaining at a wage no higher than
the minimum wage the following year; 50 percent of those no higher
than the NMW earn more than the NMW in the following year. The
rest move out of employment. After allowing for individuals’ observable characteristics, Jones et al. estimate that those at the NMW are 14
percent more likely to be employed at that wage in the next year than
an employee who is currently earning more than the NMW. However,
once the estimates allow for unobserved individual differences, those at
the NMW are only 4 percent more likely to earn that amount in the next
year than are those currently earning a bit above the NMW. Much of the
persistence in individuals’ remaining at the minimum wage is then associated with their characteristics; working at the minimum wage does
not per se reduce prospects for future wage growth.
Phimister and Theodossiu (2009) use the British Household Panel
Survey to investigate how the implementation of the NMW affected
wage growth among low-wage men and women. They estimate competing risk-hazard rate models that allow for individual heterogeneity
for a pre-NMW panel running from 1992 to 1998 and a post-NMW
panel running from 1999 to 2005. Individuals potentially exit low-wage
employment into a high-paid job, unemployment, or inactivity. The authors report a complex relationship between personal characteristics
and gender, the duration of low-pay spells, and the likelihood of exiting a low-pay spell that makes it difficult to “draw out a single pattern
in gender differences” (p. 33). Broadly, personal characteristics have
a smaller influence on women than men, but these differences decline
after implementation of the NMW. The gender difference in the likelihood of exiting to a high-pay job declines after implementation, as does
the difference in the duration of low-pay spells. Simulations for the
“typical” characteristics of those observed in low pay suggest that the
duration of low-pay spells rises after the NMW, and there is a substantial increase in the probability of exiting to a high-pay job. The NMW

Table 7.10 The Dynamics of Minimum Wage Earners: How Is Wage Growth Affected by Receiving the
Minimum Wage?
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is then associated with complicated alterations in the low-wage labor
market, narrowing gender differences, increasing time spent at low—if
higher than before—wages, and increased probabilities of moving into
better-paid work.

CONCLUSION
What can we conclude about the effect of the minimum wage on
inequality and poverty and on the duration of employment at the minimum wage? Although the magnitude of the effect remains in play, all
eight articles that consider the effect of the minimum wage on the wage
inequality find that higher minimum wages reduced wage inequality by
raising the wages of those in the lower tail of the earnings distribution.18
The effect is stronger for women than for men. This research supplements the research on bound workers and spillovers, as it indicates that
minimum wage affects the wages of bound workers and spillover into
higher deciles of the wage distribution, particularly among women.
Research also suggests that the minimum wage may have not have
much effect on poverty. This result is not entirely surprising, given
that those in poverty are substantially less likely to be working than
higher-income groups. Broadening the focus of research on this topic to
low-wage workers would likely produce more interesting results. The
near poor, families with incomes between 100 and 150 percent of the
experimental poverty line, compose one-sixth of the U.S. population.
Half live in households headed by a married couple, and more than a
quarter have a family member working in a full-time, year-round position. Research that focuses on the effect of the minimum wage on the
near poor is a natural step in establishing whether the minimum wage
aids low-income workers.
Finally, a broad conclusion about the dynamics of employment at
the minimum wage is that most career workers who start in minimum
wage jobs move on to higher-wage jobs fairly rapidly, but a substantial
proportion spend the first decade of their careers employed at or near
minimum wage. This conclusion is universal among the studies that
examined how fast those employed at the minimum wage move out of
minimum wage employment (Carrington and Fallick 2001; Even and
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Macpherson 2003; Long 1999; and Smith and Vavricheck 1992). Of the
three studies of the effect of the minimum wage on future wage growth,
one suggests that the lower rate of wage growth among minimum wage
employees is due to personal characteristics (Jones et al. 2007), and the
other suggests that minimum wages scar workers and result in lower
wage growth (Grossberg and Sicilian 1999).
For a large minority of the working population, including the part
that has completed its schooling, earnings remain close to the minimum
wage. Given the effect of the minimum wage in setting a floor under
the wage structure, and the evidence for spillover effects, the minimum
wage positively affects the income of part of the working population for
more than a brief period. Although few workers remain at the minimum
wage for long, substantial numbers do not pass through the neighborhood quickly.

Notes
1. Edsall (2013) summarizes discussions of the importance of increases, or lack
thereof, on income inequality. Although he finds the arguments of those concerned
with inequality more compelling than the arguments of those who find it to be
unimportant, he provides links to the key arguments and evidence on both sides
of the controversy.
2. The effect of the minimum wage is sensitive to the order in which the effects are
entered into the model. There is no “right” order of introducing the effects into
the model, so we include the highest and lowest estimates reported by DiNardo,
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996).
Although the effect of the real minimum wage on wages appears to be limited
to the lower portion of the wage distribution, the upward movement of wages
caused by the minimum wage has had a large effect on inequality by reducing the
90/10 and 95/5 wage differential. For example, the decline in the real minimum
wage between 1979 and 1988 accounted for between 25 and 30 percent of the increase in the 10/90 differential and 44–48 percent of the 5/95 differential (for men
and women, respectively).
3. Lee (1999) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) note the somewhat puzzling
positive relationship between the minimum wage and inequality between the 90th
and 50th percentiles of the wage distribution. Although the latter suggests that the
minimum wage variables are picking up spurious economic relationships, an alternative possibility is that legislated changes in the minimum wage are reflective
of broad changes in legislation affecting wage inequality. For example, the most
recent period of stagnation in the minimum wage was also a period in which taxes
and market regulations were reduced, likely increasing the growth of wages and
salaries at the upper end of the wage distribution.
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4. The analysis of inequality is used to determine whether the NMW is so binding as
to produce the employment effects that are the main concern of their work.
5. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. 9th ed. Springfield, MA: MerriamWebster, 1985.
6. The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971.
7. Fisher (1992) presents a detailed history of the development and evolution of the
poverty line, and the bulk of our discussion of this topic is based on this article.
Fisher mentions that at the same time as Orshansky was doing her analysis, at least
one other government economist derived a similar figure for the poverty line with
a different approach, suggesting that this figure was reasonable at the time.
8. Current work by the U.S. Census Bureau with experimental poverty measures
represents an effort to better align poverty measures with the needs of families
relative to their income (see Short [2010]). The experimental measures account for
the effects of income transfer programs and better allow for the costs that different types of families face. In terms of the interests of this study, the experimental
measures result in a larger proportion of those who are working part- or full time
being classified as poor.
9. Note that this is for care in someone’s home, which is less than it would be in an
accredited child care center.
10. Further reason to be concerned with the effectiveness of this method for measuring state-level effects are the results with other state variables. It would be expected that the prime-age male unemployment rate, the prime-age wage rate, and
EITC coverage would have substantial effects on poverty levels, but, with a single
exception among 15 estimates, they are not significant.
11. There would potentially be issues of sample selection in the division of the sample
by income decile, but these matters are well understood, and the appropriate corrections are incorporated into modern software.
12. As a result, these analyses are described more fully in Chapter 2.
13. Inflation was measured by the New Zealand Consumer Price Index.
14. Maloney and Pacheco’s (2012) work applies multinomial logit and probit to repeat cross-section data and are likely subject to issues with the correct estimation of standard errors that characterize regression models. Such issues, which are
not discussed in their paper, limit the usefulness of the hypothesis tests. This research nevertheless begins to address how the minimum wage affects low-income
workers.
15. We omit Schiller (1994) from this review. Although interesting, 80 percent of the
sample was in school at the beginning of the study. Their labor market decisions
were likely secondary to their decisions about school, making their wage dynamics less relevant to our concerns.
16. Both sets of estimates include both individuals who are in school and individuals who have completed their schooling. Both studies provided distributions restricted to those employed as hourly workers in their second and third years, as
well as for the full sample, including those who were unemployed, who were not
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in the workforce, who were no longer hourly employees, and those who were selfemployed. We present the distribution for those who remained hourly employees.
17. Until 1994, linking individuals across time was uncertain because, while households carried the same identifiers across years, individuals were not identified.
Matching within households was done by age, gender, and race, and, due to the
“hot carding” of incomplete records, there were a significant number of individuals who appeared to change sex, race, or both between years. Since 1994, individual identifiers allow for exact matching. Because the CPS is a geographic survey
rather than a survey of individuals, there is significant attrition of respondents
between their first and second rotations. In contrast, longitudinal data sets follow
individuals when they move and make heroic efforts to retain individuals in the
survey.
18. A ninth article, Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2004), also considers the effect of the minimum wage on the distribution of wage by creating wage bands
relative to the minimum wage. There are issues with the construction of the data
and the lack of clustering of errors. Because the authors believe that there are
considerable lags in the effect of the minimum wage, and their model is based on
annual changes in wages in matched data, they need to measure wage change over
a two-year period. Unfortunately, the rotation structure of the CPS only allows the
observation of individuals’ wages over one year. The authors build a specification
that may capture the lagged effects over this longer period, but the assumptions
about the wage formation process are rigorous. The estimates find a positive effect
of the contemporary minimum wage on wages but a strictly negative effect of the
constructed lagged minimum wage. This raises the question of whether the lagged
effect is a result of the construction of the lagged data. Adding to this concern is
that they find a positive effect of the contemporary minimum wage, and a negative
effect of the lagged minimum wage, among individuals earning six to eight times
the minimum wage. This is well above the level at which effects are found in any
other study. These suggest sufficient issues that lead us, here as in Chapter 2, not
to include this analysis in this review.

Part 2
Macro

8
Gross Flows in the Labor Market
As both the survey and meta-analysis of employment studies indicate, the effect of the minimum wage on employment is at most small.
One way to understand why this is so is to examine the effect of the
minimum wage on gross flows—the flows into and out of employment
over time.
If Empt is employment at a single moment, say, the beginning of
year t, Equation (8.1) defines the change in employment during year t:
(8.1)

dEmpt = Empt +1 − Empt

The first thing to notice about this is that the two variables on the
right are stock variables, measured at different moments of time, while
dEmpt on the left is a flow variable, measured over the period separating
the two stock variables. The second is that even as definitions go, it is
not especially interesting. However, rearranging to read
(8.2)

Empt +1 = Empt + dEmpt

redirects our attention. Employment at the beginning of year t + 1 is
determined by employment one year earlier and the change in employment over the intervening year. The flow variable, dEmpt , is the net
change in employment during year t. A useful next step is to decompose
it into its positive and negative components, the gross changes or gross
flows, and separately examine their responses to the minimum wage.
The positive gross flow is accessions, the number of people who
are working in positions at the beginning of one year that they were not
working in at the beginning of the previous year. The jobs in question
may have existed, but someone else may have been working in them;
or they may be newly created, perhaps as a result of a firm that opened
for business during the year; or they may result from an expansion or
reorganization at a firm that was already in business at the year’s start.
The negative gross flow is separations, the number of people who at
the end of the year are no longer working in the same position as at the
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beginning. Some separations consist of positions that no longer exist,
either at firms that downsized their workforces or that are no longer in
business. Others are positions that not only existed previously but continue to be occupied, just not by the same person as before.1 As defined
here, both accessions and separations are quantities, but each can also
be defined as a rate, where the quantity is divided by employment at
the beginning of the year. The accession rate, Accessionst /Empt, is the
number of people who move into new jobs during the year (the number
of accessions) divided by employment at the start of the year. The separations rate is Separationst /Empt . The result is either of the following
equations:
(8.3a)

dEmpt = Accessionst − Separationst

(8.3b)

dEmpt Accessionst Separationst
=
−
Empt
Empt
Empt

When employment is growing over time, dEmpt , the change in
employment, is positive and accessions exceed separation; when
employment is shrinking, dEmpt is negative and separations exceed
accessions.
Table 8.1 lists one dozen studies of gross labor market flows. For
descriptive purposes, studies of gross flows can be organized into three
groups. Analyses in the first group rely on models of the labor market other than a perfectly competitive one. Pinoli (2010); Portugal and
Cardoso (2006); and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012) appeal to search
models that incorporate frictions so that minimum wage increases have
the potential for increasing employment. Georgiadis (2013) examines
efficiency wage models in which it is cost minimizing for firms to pay
a higher than competitive wage. Studies in the second group make
no appeal to any theoretical model of the labor market: Dube, Naidu,
and Reich (2007); Thompson (2009); and Skedinger (2006). Giuliano
(2013) straddles the two groups, taking an agnostic view of these models. Studies in the third group focus on quits, a part of separations;
because most of these studies predate the NMWR and grow out of a
different literature, human capital and compensation, they are treated
separately in the last section of this chapter.
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DATA ISSUES
Although it is the Swiss Army knife for the examination of many
economic issues concerning the U.S. population, the CPS is far from
ideal for the study of gross flows (Bjelland et al. 2007; Davis and
Haltiwanger 1998).2 It is a retrospective household survey in which one
adult often responds for all household members. Data collection errors
that tend to cancel out in the measurement of stocks reinforce each other
in the measurement of flows. Systematic biases and attrition that can be
adjusted for in the measurement of stocks are more difficult to correct
in the measurement of flows. The rotation structure of the CPS interferes with the construction of any but short-term employment histories.
Finally, before the 1994 revision that included the question, “Do you
still work for [company name]?” in order to improve data consistency,
use of the CPS to measure gross flows between jobs was not possible.3
Although the federal structure of the government that is reflected in the
CPS complicates some of these problems, household labor force surveys in other countries also exhibit them.
Long-term longitudinal surveys such as the NLSY and the PSID
overcome some (not all) of the shortcomings of the CPS but introduce
other problems, such as samples that are not representative of the entire
labor force (Fallick and Fleischman 2004).
Data that link employers and employees, especially tax data, are
better than either one of those surveys for the examination of flows
to or from jobs. In the United States, recent work on gross flows has
moved to reliance on data sets that link employer and employee survey
data through data collected by state unemployment insurance programs
(Abowd and Vilhuber 2011a,b; Bjelland et al. 2007; Hyatt and Spletzer
2013).4 Because not all employers must pay taxes for unemployment
insurance (the self-employed, most employers of domestic and agricultural workers, government), these data do not capture all flows. Nevertheless, this type of data, such as the Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics Program of the Census Bureau, is not only extensive but also
unique in tracking both individuals and firms over time and including
characteristics of each. Its increasing use in the study of gross flows
suggests a belief that it is the most appropriate public data available.5

Study
Target
Country Sample period Data seta
Dube, Naidu, and SF restaurants United
2003–2004
Private
Reich (2007)
States
survey
Dube, Lester, and
Teenagers,
United
2001–2008
QWI
Reich (2012)
restaurants
States
Georgiadis (2013)
Home care
United
1999–2001
Private
sector
Kingdom
survey
Giuliano (2013)
Teens in retail United
1996–1998 Personnel
States
data
Grossberg and
Minimum
United
Sicilian (2004) wage workers States
(men, women)
Leighton and
Mincer (1981)

Pinoli (2010)

Portugal and
Cardoso (2006)

White and
black men

1988–1994

Variable
Separation rate

Response
None

Comments

Accessions,
separations
Accession rate,
separation rate
Teen share of
accessions and
of separations

Negative

Accessions,
≈ separations

None
Varied, none

Teen share in accessions
doubles only when using
both preferred sample
and specification.

NLSY

Quits (women) None. Negative if
Quits (men) MW is relatively low,
positive if MW is
relatively high
NLSY and
Job tenure
None (NLSY),
PSID
negative (PSID)

United
States

1967–71
(NLSY)

Youth

Spain

1973, 1975
(PSID)
2000–2006

EPAS

Accessions,
separations

Teenage
workers

Portugal

1986–1989

QP

Teen share of
accessions and
of separations

Varied, positive

No hiring response
to unexpected increases,
negative after a large,
expected increase
Negative, negative Accessions-separations
>0
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Skedinger (2006)
Sicilian and
Grossberg
(1993)
Thompson (2009)
Wessels (1980)
a

Unskilled
workers
3,000 small
firms in the
South and
Midwest
Teenagers
Manufacturing
industries

Sweden

1979–1999

CSE

Accessions,
separations

Negative, varied

United
1982
States (back to 1978)

EOPP

Quit rates

Net negative

United
States
United
States

1996–2000

QWI

Negative

1909–1972

EE

Accessions (teen
share)
Quits

Separations positive
1979–1991, mixed later
in the 1990s
Interaction with tenure
dominates direct effect
on quits

Mixed

QWI: Quarterly Workforce Indicators (based on Unemployment Insurance records). NLSY = National Longitudinal Survey of Youths;
PSID = Panel Study of Income Dynamics; EPAS = Economically Active Population Survey (quarterly household survey, 6 quarters in
sample); QP = (Portugal) Quadros de Pessoal (personnel records, Portuguese Ministry of Qualification and Employment); CSE = Firm
and worker data from the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise; EOPP = Employment Opportunities Pilot Projects. EE = Employment
and Earnings (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1973).
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The studies discussed below use many types of data. Dube, Lester,
and Reich (2012); Portugal and Cardoso (2006); and Thompson (2009)
use tax data. Skedinger (2006) uses payroll data for many firms collected by an employer confederation, and Giuliano (2013) uses personnel and wage data from a single firm. Grossberg and Sicilian (2004) and
Leighton and Mincer (1981) rely on long-term longitudinal surveys.
Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) and Georgiadis (2013) use data from
privately conducted surveys of employers, Pinoli (2010) uses the Spanish counterpart to the CPS, and Sicilian and Grossberg (1993) analyze a
survey from the late 1970s and early 1980s that was conducted in order
to study a program for retraining the unemployed and aiding them in
finding work.

STUDIES OF GROSS FLOWS THAT LEAN HEAVILY ON
SPECIFIC LABOR MARKET MODELS
Several of the studies that include examinations of the gross flows
make appeals to (or firmly embed themselves in) models of the labor
market other than the competitive model. Georgiadis (2013) examines
implications of one type of efficiency wage model for gross flows. Pinoli
(2010) appeals to the search model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
to motivate her study. Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and Dube, Lester,
and Reich (2012) turn to Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to explain their
results concerning the response of gross flows to the minimum wage.
Georgiadis (2013) uses the UK care home industry data of Machin,
Manning, and Rahman (2003) to examine the relevance of an efficiency
wage model. Efficiency wage models resemble the competitive model
of the labor market insofar as prospective employers and employees
have no difficulty in finding each other; members of both groups have
complete and costless information about who is on the other side of the
market. Where these models differ is that in efficiency wage models,
a higher wage is associated either with greater productivity or lower
nonwage costs. Consequently, it is optimal in these models for firms to
pay a wage that is higher than the equilibrium wage of the corresponding competitive model; that is, the two models are identical except
for this effect on productivity or costs. At the higher wage, aggregate
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employment is less than in the competitive equilibrium. Knowing this
and the consequence that finding a new job as good as their current one
is not so easy (unlike in a competitive equilibrium), employees are less
likely to either quit or behave in ways that would lead to being fired.
By itself, the lower level of employment results in fewer separations;
the employee response adds to this, reducing the separation rate. Similarly, the lower level of employment results in fewer accessions, and
the lower separation rate implies a lower vacancy rate (fewer job openings relative to the level of employment), which in turn implies a lower
accession rate. Georgiadis (2013) focuses on the turnover efficiency
wage model, which emphasizes reduction in turnover as the motivation
for the efficiency wage. Firms pay the high wage because turnover is
costly; total costs are less despite the higher wage because it reduces
the quit rate and, with fewer positions to be filled, the accessions rate.
With regard to both rates, Georgiadis reports that “the results are uniformly insignificant across all specifications and minimum wage measures used” (p. 36).
Pinoli (2010) appeals to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), extending their search model to motivate her focus on the distinction between
anticipated and unanticipated increases in the minimum wage. Important features of the original Mortensen and Pissarides model are that
only the unemployed search for work, it is costly to firms to create a
vacancy, and all jobs pay the same wage. Pinoli (2010) adds an additional friction, a firing tax that firms pay. Since her focus is the lower
end of the labor market, the single wage is the (binding) minimum
wage. For an unexpected minimum wage increase, all changes to separations and accessions occur only after the fact. Separations rise immediately and then stay constant.6 Accessions fall immediately, but the
increase in unemployment from both their fall and the rise in separations means that unemployment rises; this in turn makes it easier for
firms to fill vacancies, leading to a gradual increase in accessions to
a higher level than before the minimum wage increase, though not so
high as to reduce unemployment to its previous level. Turnover, the
sum of accessions and separations, has increased above its initial value
by the time accessions have recovered from their initial fall.
For an anticipated minimum wage increase, there are not two periods for the purposes of analysis, before and after the increase, but three:
1) before the increase in the perceived likelihood of the minimum wage
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increase; 2) after the minimum wage increases; and 3) an intermediate interval, before the minimum wage increases but after its perceived
likelihood has risen. In this scenario, separations rise in steps. The first
increase in separations occurs immediately upon entering the intermediate period, i.e., when expectations change. Separations rise to their
final level, as high as in the case of an unexpected increase, when the
minimum wage increase actually occurs. Accessions fall immediately
on entering the intermediate period, and then, as in the case of an unexpected increase, rise to a level higher than their initial level because
of the increase in unemployment. When the minimum wage actually
increases, accessions initially fall to the same level as before the change
in expectations, and then, as before, gradually rise to the new long-run
level, higher than either the initial or intermediate levels. Because much
of the adjustment takes place during the intermediate period before the
minimum wage increase, once the increase occurs, accessions approach
their new level more rapidly in the anticipated scenario than in the
unanticipated one. Not only is turnover higher after the increase than
before the change in expectations (at the same level in the long run as
in the unanticipated scenario), it first rises in the intermediate period.
Turning to the empirical analysis, Pinoli (2010) reports that the
separation rate of teenagers rises by 3 percentage points following the
unexpected minimum wage increase, all in the quarter immediately
following the increase.7 For the three largest expected increases in her
sample, the separation rate increases by 5.6 percentage points, 4.1 percentage points in the quarter before the increase, and 1.5 in the following two quarters. The accession rate displays no (statistically detectable)
response to unexpected minimum wage increases, and a decrease of 4.8
percentage points in the two quarters after a large expected increase.8
When she distinguishes between permanent and temporary workers (a
category that includes 70 percent of employed teenagers), there is no
detectable impact on the separation rate for permanent workers, but the
effect on the separations rate of temporary workers (those hired for a
fixed rather than indefinite term) is the strongest so far: 4 percentage
points on impact for unexpected increases and 7.7 percentage points in
response to a large, expected increase. More than 6 percentage points of
that response immediately precede the increase in the minimum wage,
half of the remainder immediately follows the increase, and the other
half comes in the next two quarters. She explains that the difference in
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responses reflects the smaller penalty firms suffer from laying off temporary rather than permanent workers.9
How do these estimates compare with Pinoli’s (2010) theoretical
model? The estimated response of separations in the unexpected scenario are about half the size as that in the expected scenario, not the
same size as the theoretical model predicts, and the point estimate during the intermediate interval of the expected scenario is not smaller than
that after an unexpected increase but a third again as large. Rather than
an increase in accessions, she finds no response to an unexpected minimum wage increase and a decline in response to an expected minimum
wage increase.
Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012)
both turn to Burdett and Mortensen’s (1998) search model as a way of
rationalizing their findings.10 In this model, firms with vacancies post
a wage, and with a positive probability some individual learns of it
(employment status is not germane to this probability). If the wage is
sufficiently high—above the individual’s current wage if employed
or above the individual’s reservation wage if unemployed—then the
individual takes the job. Unlike the model of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), this one generates a distribution of wages. In the absence of a
minimum wage, many who are currently employed will take a vacant
job because the offered wage is higher than their current one, which sets
off a cascade of separations and accessions until someone who is not
currently employed fills a position.
A minimum wage raises the entire wage distribution, but more at
the bottom than the top, compressing it at the lower end, that is, compressing wages in low-wage labor markets. Because of the compression, workers in low-wage labor markets are less likely (than in the
absence of the minimum wage) to find positions with a higher wage
than they are already earning, so rather than move to a new job, they
stay put.11 An open position is therefore more likely to go to someone who is currently not employed.12 With a (higher) minimum wage,
the cascade either never begins or it ends more quickly, reducing both
accessions and separations.13
Portugal and Cardoso (2006) rely on a detailed data set of employees
in Portuguese firms to understand the response to a substantial increase
in the minimum wages for teenagers in 1987. Theirs is the first study
we consider in which gross labor flows are the focus of the analysis.
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Their data consist of annual observations on individual firms. They use
the recent history of the firm to classify labor flows in finer detail than
accessions or separations, distinguishing among accessions and separations at continuing firms, accessions due to births, and separations due
to deaths. At continuing firms, the share of teenagers in accessions fell
by about four percentage points in both 1988 and 1989, the second and
third years after the increase in the teenage minimum wage (see Table
8.2), but their share in separations fell several times as much, 14–15
percentage points in each of these years. At new firms, their share of
accessions changed by about the same amount as at continuing firms,
about four percentage points in both 1988 and 1989, while their share in
separations due to deaths rose by 5 percentage points in 1988 and half
as much in 1989. Overall, teenagers’ share in accessions fell, and their
share in separations fell even more. Portugal and Cardoso conclude that
“workers affected by a sharp rise in the minimum wage are not overrepresented among those who afterward separate from their employers”
(p. 999).14
To see how sharply the behavior of accessions and separations
for teenagers differed from that of adults, it is necessary to correct for
employment change during this period. The accession and separation
rates allow us to do this.15 In 1986, the year before the increases, the
teenage accession and separation rates were both about two and a half
Table 8.2 Changes in Teen Shares in Gross Flows in Portugal Following
the 1987 Minimum Wage Increase
Deaths
Continuing firms
Births
Separations
1988
0.050**
−0.150**
1989
0.025
−0.140**
Total
0.075
−0.290
Accessions
1988
−0.036**
−0.042**
1989
−0.043**
−0.041**
Total
−0.079
−0.083
NOTE: **statistically significant at the 0.05 level for the annual dummies. Statistical significance for the totals is not known (covariance between annual dummies is
needed).
SOURCE: Portugal and Cardoso (2006).
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times as large as the corresponding rates for adults: 50 percent versus
19 percent for accessions, and 45 percent versus 16 percent for separations (see Table 8.3). Two years later, in the second year after the
increases, the rates for adults increased by about one-third, to 26 percent for accessions and 21 percent for separations. For teenagers, the
increases were proportionately smaller, resulting in an accession rate of
57 percent and a separation rate of 48 percent. Teenagers’ attachment
to jobs did not increase in absolute terms during this period; however,
because the adult separation rate grew nearly six times as fast as that of
teenagers, the increase in teenagers’ share of total private employment
was dramatic relative to previous trends, more than a percentage point
in two years.
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012) apply their border-discontinuity
approach (Dube, Lester, and Reich 2010) to the 2001–2009 Quarterly
Workforce Indicators to examine the minimum wage response of hiring and separation rates of both teenagers and the restaurant industry.16
Table 8.4 displays their results. They begin with a regression equation,
similar to Neumark and Wascher’s canonical model, with fixed county
and time effects. Their use of a familiar specification enables the reader
to determine how dependent the results are on a novel data source. For
teenagers, the employment elasticity is −0.2 (standard error = 0.07), and
those for accessions and separations are −0.45 (0.09) and −0.46 (0.10),
respectively. The employment elasticity equals the midpoint of the consensus range of estimates in the older minimum wage literature. For
the restaurant industry, the employment elasticity is −0.12 (0.04), and
those for accessions and separations are −0.47 (0.08) and −0.47 (0.08).
In each case, the minimum wage responses of the two gross flows effectively cancel each other out, an outcome that is difficult to square with
the estimated response of employment.17
Table 8.3 Gross Flows for Teens and Adults in Portugal Following the
1987 Minimum Wage Increase (%)
Separations
Accessions
Teens
Adults
Teens
Adults
1986
45
16
50
19
1987
48
22
56
23
1988
48
21
57
26
SOURCE: Portugal and Cardoso (2006, Table 6).
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Table 8.4 Estimated Elasticities
Canonical model

Employment
Hires
Separations
Turnover rate

Teens
−0.20**
−0.45**
−0.46**
−0.27**

Restaurant
workers
−0.12**
−0.47**
−0.47**
−0.33**

Border-discontinuity model
Teens
−0.04
−0.22**
−0.25**
−0.19**

Restaurant
workers
−0.06
−0.34*
−0.32
−0.26**

NOTE: *statistically significant at the 0.01 level; **statistically significant at the 0.05
level.
SOURCE: Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012, Table 3.)

In Dube, Lester, and Reich’s (2012) border-discontinuity model,
they compare adjacent counties across the borders of states that have different minimum wages. Instead of two-way fixed effects, they include a
common time effect for adjacent counties. Although the wage response,
which is positive and statistically significant in the canonical model,
becomes larger (and remains statistically significant) in the borderdiscontinuity model, the estimated employment response disappears.
For teenagers, the employment elasticity is −0.04 (0.07), the accessions
elasticity is −0.22 (0.11), and the separations elasticity is −0.25 (0.10).
For restaurants, the three elasticities are −0.06 (0.10), −0.34 (0.17), and
−0.32 (0.13). In both cases, the gross flows cancel out, as before, but in
contrast with the canonical model, the point estimates for employment
elasticity in the border discontinuity model are both small and not statistically significant. An especially telling detail is a comparison of estimates for the border-discontinuity model using the whole sample and
using a sample purged of people with less than one-quarter of tenure
in the current job, that is, those most likely to be earning the minimum
wage. The minimum wage elasticity of the separation rate falls dramatically, for teenagers by more than half, and for restaurant workers by
more than 90 percent. In both cases the results are no longer statistically
significant despite modest reductions in the estimated standard error. It
appears that the minimum wage affects separations of those with little
job tenure, not those with greater job tenure; a minimum wage increase
leads to greater stability in firms’ personnel and reduces high-frequency
job changes, something that is costly to firms. It is not possible with the
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data that Dube, Lester, and Reich use to determine whether this is due to
changed behavior on the part of firms and employees or to a compositional effect in the labor force as a result of the minimum wage increase.
The findings of those who rely on formal models in their study of
gross flows are mildly contradictory. The model that Georgiadis (2013)
uses predicts lower accession and separation rates, which he does not
detect. Pinoli’s (2010) model predicts higher levels of accessions and
separations. She reports higher separation rates, though not quite as her
model predicts, and unchanged or lower accession rates. The model that
Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012) turn
to predicts a decline in both accession and separation rates, and that is
what both analyses find, the former reporting greater declines in separations than accessions of teenagers, and the latter reporting declines in
the two flows of roughly the same size.

STUDIES OF GROSS FLOWS THAT ARE AGNOSTIC ABOUT
LABOR MARKET MODELS
In their analysis of San Francisco’s restaurant industry and its
response to the introduction of a citywide minimum wage, Dube, Naidu,
and Reich (2007) detect no change in the separation rate. In his study
of the effect of the minimum wage on teenage employment, Thompson
(2009) briefly considers the teenage share of hires, reporting a variety
of samples and specifications that make it difficult to summarize his
results quantitatively. However, 8 of his 12 results are statistically significant and have the negative sign that Thompson expects. The 1997
increase appears to have reduced the teenage share of new hires by
between 8 and 12 percentage points overall, and between 10 and 13
percentage points in small counties where the minimum wage is high
relative to the wage distribution.18
Skedinger (2006) uses accessions and separations as his primary
measures of the response of unskilled employment to changes in the
minimum wage in the Swedish hospitality industry. Rather than examine
the response of each to changes in the minimum wage, he considers the
response of separations only to increases in the minimum wage and the
response of accessions only to decreases in the minimum wage. In both
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cases, the competitive model of the labor market implies an increase
in the gross flow under consideration. For the period 1979–1991, the
elasticity of the separation rate with respect to minimum wage increases
is 0.58 (and highly statistically significant). For the same period, the
elasticity of the accession rate to minimum wage decreases is 0.84 (also
highly statistically significant). However, when Skedinger turns to the
minimum wage increases of the 1990s, the results are more varied, with
the elasticity of the separation rate varying by sample and age group.
Estimates for older teenagers (18–19-year-olds) are not statistically significant. Depending on the sample of firms used, estimates for adults are
larger or smaller than the estimates from the earlier period. The larger
adult estimate is statistically significant, and the smaller one is not. As
mentioned in the chapter on employment, Skedinger believes that the
results with regard to separations are consistent with the standard competitive model, but that the results for accessions are much weaker and
may be consistent with a monopsony model.19
In a study using personnel data from a large U.S. chain store,
Giuliano (2013) reports that the minimum wage has no effect on the
share of teenagers in separations and a fragile positive effect on their
share in accessions. When she combines her preferred sample with her
preferred specification, the share of teenagers in new hires doubles; otherwise the increase in the share is about 50 percent but is not statistically significant.20

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ON SEPARATIONS
AND ACCESSIONS
Several of the analyses consider either only one type of gross flow
or both types but only in different situations: Dube, Naidu, and Reich
(2007) report only on separations, and Thompson (2009) looks only
at accessions. Skedinger (2006) considers both types of employment
flows but looks at accessions only following minimum wage decreases
and at separations only following minimum wage increases. It is difficult to use these results for further insight on the question of the minimum wage and employment.
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Although Giuliano (2013) does not find a robust response of either
accessions or separations to the minimum wage, Portugal and Cardoso
(2006), studying a highly regulated labor market, and Dube, Lester, and
Reich (2012), studying one that is considered very unregulated for a
developed economy, report sharp declines in both accessions and separations following an increase in the minimum wage. In both, the decline
in separations is at least large enough to cancel out the employment consequences of the decline in accessions. Because Pinoli’s (2010) results
are less clear, they are difficult to interpret. Contrary to Dube, Lester,
and Reich (2012) and Portugal and Cardoso (2006), Pinoli reports that
separations rise as a result of both anticipated and unanticipated minimum wage increases. Her findings about accessions are largely inconsistent with her model; they fall after a large expected increase, but
apparently do not subsequently rise again, nor do they respond beforehand. Further, she detects no response following the unexpected minimum wage increase, especially surprising since this is also the largest
increase in her sample.
It appears that the strongest evidence, the combined findings of Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012), supports
declines in both accession and separation rates that roughly cancel each
other. This would explain the absence of a clear employment response
to the minimum wage in the literature. The evidence is certainly not
overwhelming, and there are results that are not consistent with this
conclusion. As with the literature on employment, more analysis that
carefully controls for confounding factors is necessary to arrive with
confidence at a conclusion.
Quits
An accession requires an agreement between two parties who, if
they agree, become employer and employee. Separations occur when
one or both no longer find the agreement to be beneficial, and can therefore be further divided into quits, sometimes called voluntary separations, and dismissals and layoffs.
Because research on quitting, one component of separations, is
embedded in the theories of human capital and employee compensation (see Chapter 6), the relationship between the minimum wage and
quit rates is not central in most of the studies below. However, for the
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purposes of a rough-and-ready history of results in this vein, we shall
pretend that it is; it begins with Mixon’s (1978) analysis of low-wage
industries.21 Next comes Wessels’s (1980) analysis, which incorporated
the expanded notion of a compensation package that includes fringe
benefits; firms can reduce benefits to offset minimum wage increases,
and employees have incomplete information about compensation packages at other firms. In their study of human capital and the minimum
wage (see Chapter 6), Leighton and Mincer (1981) report results for a
phenomenon closely related to quits, the length of job tenure. Although
they do not examine quitting behavior, Holzer, Katz, and Krueger
(1991) mention implications of their analysis for aspects of Wessels’s;
Sicilian and Grossberg (1993) examine quit behavior in the same data
set as Holzer, Katz, and Krueger (1991) to refute these points. Finally,
Grossberg and Sicilian (2004) make a more expansive use of incomplete information and combine it with De Fraja’s (1999) model of jobs.
Wessels (1980) expands the notion of the compensation package
to include fringe benefits. The tax treatment of benefits allows firms to
provide them at lower after-tax cost than employees can do for themselves, creating a wedge between firm and employee costs. If firms
respond to an increase in the minimum wage by reducing benefits, a
higher minimum wage can reduce workers’ total compensation. Wessels reasons that if those already employed experience this and believe
that only their own employer has responded in this way to the minimum
wage increase, quit rates may rise until employees understand the marketwide effect of the minimum wage increase.
Wessels (1980) finds some support for the hypothesis that higher
minimum wages are associated with higher quit rates among broadly
defined manufacturing industries. Estimating models on 13 3- and 4digit low-wage industries, Wessels reports 8 positive point estimates
for the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to the minimum wage. Of
these eight, only two are statistically significant, but, consistent with
his hypothesis, they are in the highest-wage industries. Leighton and
Mincer (1981) consider the effect of the minimum wage on job tenure in
the same framework and with the same data used in their study of wage
growth and training. They are noncommittal about the expected effect
of the minimum wage, emphasizing that human capital theory does not
provide an unambiguous prediction about the relationship between the
minimum wage and quits. As with their work on the minimum wage
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and human capital, their estimates vary systematically with data source
and specification. Estimates using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) indicate that both higher minimum wages and increased coverage have a significantly negative effect on tenure. Estimates using the
NLSY indicate that job tenure among white or black men is unaffected
by either the level or coverage of the minimum wage.
Sicilian and Grossberg (1993) revisit issues that Wessels (1980)
examined, and they compare his analysis to that of Holzer, Katz, and
Krueger (1991). Using data collected by the Economic Opportunity
Pilot Projects, Holzer, Katz, and Krueger had determined that longer
queues formed for minimum wage jobs than others, ceteris paribus,
and inferred that these positions had rents that accrued to the employees because firms were unable to fully offset the higher costs from the
minimum wage. Sicilian and Grossberg (1993) use the same data set
to consider whether workers altered their views of jobs once they were
working and had more complete information. If so, quits would rise
following minimum wage increases, consistent with Wessels (1980), as
the rents would only be expected, not actual.
Sicilian and Grossberg (1993) compare quit rates of those hired at
exactly the minimum wage with workers who were hired above the
minimum. The “hired at minimum wage” dummy enters the regression
equation by itself and interacts with measures of labor market tightness
and employee tenure. Although the coefficients for the dummy and its
interaction with tightness are both positive, neither satisfies a 0.05 significance test. The only minimum wage coefficient that does is the one
for the interaction with tenure, and it is negative; for someone hired at
the minimum wage, a one-month increase in tenure reduced the likelihood of quitting by 0.14 percent. The authors conclude that their results
are consistent with Wessels’s (1980) hypothesis but do not relate them
to Holzer, Katz, and Krueger’s (1991) hypothesis concerning rents.
In fact, their use of a “hired at minimum wage” dummy rather than
the percentage change in the minimum wage turns attention from the
response of employees earning the minimum wage when it increases to
those who begin a position at the minimum wage irrespective of subsequent increases. In doing this, they are focusing on a different issue,
one that they analyze more explicitly in their next work.
Grossberg and Sicilian (2004) expand the problem of incomplete
information beyond one that applies only to current employees, combin-
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ing it with De Fraja’s (1999) model of the nonpecuniary features of jobs
that affect workers’ utility. The wedge from the tax treatment of fringe
benefits plays no role, and that is also true of mistaken belief in the
short term by current employees that only their employer has reduced
them. The issue instead explicitly concerns the inferences about a position’s intangible characteristics that prospective employees must draw
when deciding whether to accept an offer. According to Grossberg and
Sicilian’s hypothesis, the posted wage is the most important piece of
information for these inferences, and only after a perhaps quite lengthy
period can the (now) employee determine whether they were reasonably accurate.
The authors agree with Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and Dube,
Lester, and Reich (2012) that the amount of wage compression at the
low end of the wage distribution will vary monotonically with the relative minimum wage, more salient when it is high than when it is low.
Grossberg and Sicilian do not, however, rely on Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) and expect this to lead to a decline in quit rates due to the inability of those already in low-wage jobs to find higher paid ones. Rather,
they expect that wage compression in low-wage environments results
in mistaken inferences about the nature of jobs. In the presence of wage
compression, positions that pay minimum wage will not be homogeneous with respect to these intangible qualities that can be judged accurately only with experience. Those newly hired at the minimum wage
will then include many who, after some experience of the job, conclude
that it is not what they expected. Their hypothesis is similar to that of
Wessels (1980) and Sicilian and Grossberg (1993) in the central role
played by information loss resulting from compression of the lower
tail of the wage distribution due to the minimum wage. It differs from
Wessels’s (1980) in that this is now a problem not just for those who
are employed when the minimum wage increases but for all individuals
who start a position at the minimum wage, at least when it binds and
leads to much wage compression.
To examine this hypothesis, Grossberg and Sicilian (2004) turn primarily to the NLSY, with a bit of help from the CPS. In addition to
much important descriptive data about individuals and their jobs and
employers, the NLSY has information about when an individual began
a job and the starting wage, when employment in that position ended
and why. From the CPS they construct a relative minimum wage vari-
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able as the ratio of a state’s effective minimum wage in each year to
its median that year; the period of their study, 1988–1994, was one of
considerably greater variation in the minimum wage, both across states
and years, than was available in their earlier work. From these two data
sources they can identify quits and model them (i.e., the probability
that an employee quits a job) as a function of job tenure, the relative
minimum wage, the starting wage relative to the minimum wage, an
extensive list of individual and job-specific factors, and local macroeconomic conditions. In presenting their results, they distinguish between
state-year cells in which their relative minimum wage was very high
and very low.22
Grossberg and Sicilian (2004) estimate separate hazard models for
men and women, reporting their results in a fashion that calls to mind
a difference-in-differences framework. They compare the likelihood of
quitting a job when the minimum wage is high, and wage compression
is greater, with that when the minimum wage is low. What corresponds
to a treatment group consists of those hired at the minimum wage, and
the analog to a comparison group is those hired at more than 10 percent
above the minimum wage. Their central result is that when the minimum wage is binding and there is (likely) much wage compression, the
likelihood of a man’s quitting is many times greater for one hired at the
minimum wage than for one hired at more than 110 percent of the minimum wage (and the level of statistical significance is phenomenally
high). In contrast, when the relative minimum wage is low, the same
difference in likelihoods appears to run the other way, although it is
both much smaller and not statistically significant. They detect no relationship between starting wage and women’s relative quit rates. They
conclude that when the minimum wage is relatively high, and wage
compression ensues, the minimum wage results in a loss of information
that reduces the value of matches in the labor market because job seekers cannot tell without experiencing a position that the previous correlation between wages and intangible characteristics of jobs no longer
exists.23
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Notes
1. Firms that are newly in business are referred to as births, and those that are newly
out of business are referred to as deaths. Those that were in business previously
and are still operating are called continuing firms.
2. This led the Bureau of Labor Statistics to cease publication after 1952 of estimates
for a related set of gross flows, those between labor force states: employed, unemployed, not in the labor force (Frazis et al. [2005]).
3. Fallick and Fleischman (2004) were the first to take advantage of this question to
measure flows between jobs.
4. Data from the Unemployment Insurance program and income tax programs can
be used to link employer and household data, as they include both social security
numbers and employer identification numbers.
5. One drawback is that the Census Bureau limits access to the data and closely
controls how the data are used and what is released to prevent the identification of
individuals and firms. See http://lehd.ces.census.gov/.
6. This discussion of the behavior of gross flows in Pinoli’s theoretical model draws
from Figure 3 in Pinoli (2010).
7. In presenting the estimated effects for flows, Pinoli (2010) assumes a 10 percent
increase in the minimum wage. While this is an efficient way to convey information, this is at least 50 percent larger than any of the in-sample increases (and more
than twice as large as most of them), so involves extrapolating well outside her
sample.
8. Pinoli (2010) presents results for other treatment and control groups, but the ones
cited here are among the strongest and are based on the best match between treatment and control group: those aged 16–24 and those aged 25–34, respectively.
The “large expected increases” were the anticipated ones that occurred under the
center-left government and were between two-thirds and five-sixths as large as the
unexpected increase that occurred shortly after it came to power.
9. Pinoli (2010) does not present results for accessions of temporary workers.
10. Both report a sharp decline in separations. Portugal and Cardoso (2006) report
a decline in accessions that is smaller than the decline in separations, leading to
an increase in the teenage share of employment. Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012)
report a decline in accessions of both teens and restaurant workers that is roughly
equivalent to the decline separations.
11. It is worth noting that this result is not due to the posting of fewer higher-wage
jobs when there is a minimum wage but to low-wage workers already occupying
a higher-wage job than they would in the absence of the minimum wage.
12. This could happen eventually without a minimum wage, when the cascade of hirings and quits ends with the hiring of an unemployed person, except that the cascade itself raises costs for firms and they end up trying to fill fewer positions than
otherwise.
13. A further consequence, relevant later when we come to labor force participation,
is that because the wage compression increases the probability of finding a job for
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14.

15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.

23.

someone who is unemployed, it draws more of those who are not employed into
active search.
Portugal and Cardoso (2006) report results as changes in relative shares, which
complicates straightforward interpretation of the effect of the minimum wage on
gross flows. However, because the only changes in the minimum wage were for
those of teenagers, we can treat minimum wage–induced changes in gross flows
of other groups as zero.
All calculations are based on Portugal and Cardoso (2006, Table 6, p. 995). The
accession rate is defined as the number of accessions divided by employment at
the beginning of the year. An accession is identified as an individual employed at a
firm, either continuing or new, at the beginning of one year but not at the same firm
at the beginning of the previous year. The separation rate is defined similarly, as
the number of separations during a year divided by employment at the beginning
of the year, where a separation is identified as an individual employed at a firm,
either continuing or one that went out of business, at the beginning of one year but
not at the same firm one year later.
Teenagers are defined as those aged 14–19 inclusive.
Owing to differences in presentation, a quantitative comparison of the results of
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) with those of Portugal and Cardoso (2006) is not
possible.
Chapter 2 contains more detailed discussions of Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007)
and Thompson (2009).
Böckerman and Uusitalo (2009) apply Skedinger’s approach to Finnish teenagers,
but their results appear to be internally inconsistent to a degree, and they suspect that their sample period is too short to control adequately for trends in youth
employment. Thus, as in the chapter on jobs, this chapter does not discuss their
results.
Guiliano develops several alternatives to competitive theories in understanding the impact of the minimum wage within firms. Her work is guided by these
theories.
Because of the use of now-dated time-series methods and strong evidence of
uncorrected first-order serial correlation in Mixon’s analysis, the account that follows begins with later work.
In their mildly confusing terminology, a state-year cell in which the relative minimum wage is high is a low-wage environment (because the median wage is relatively low), and one in which the relative minimum wage is low is a high-wage
environment (because the median wage is relatively high). We will instead focus
on whether the relative minimum wage is high or low (and thus whether it results
in much compression of the distribution of low wages).
A serious concern is the reliability of Grossberg and Sicilian’s (2004) statistical
inference. They report using robust standard errors, a correction for conventional
heteroskedasticity (i.e., different variances). The use of state-year cells to define
the relative minimum wage immediately calls to mind not only the Moulton (1986,
1990) problem but the critique of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), both
of which indicate that clustered standard errors are in order. The extremely small
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p-value of Grossberg and Sicilian’s (2004) most interesting result, the relative
probability of quitting for a man hired at minimum wage in a low-wage environment, 0.00001, reinforces this concern.

9
Labor Force Participation Rate,
Unemployment, and Vacancies
We have so far considered the effect of the minimum wage on several labor market quantities: the number of jobs filled, the number of
people employed, and the number of hours worked, all of which are
measures of employment; and gross flows in and out of employment
(accessions and separations). These are measures most frequently of interest to labor economists and those interested in the functioning of the
labor market. In this chapter, we examine four other labor market measures that are more often considered in discussions of macroeconomic
phenomena: the labor force participation rate (LFPR), the unemployment rate, unemployment duration, and the vacancy rate.
Table 9.1 indicates how the population is segmented for the purpose of defining the labor force and its two primary components, the
employed and the unemployed—those who are not employed but are
actively searching for jobs. Individuals who are neither employed nor
actively seeking employment are classified as “not in the labor force.”
Mincer (1976) suggests that changes in the size of the labor force are
a better indication of the effect of minimum wages on the welfare of
actual and prospective workers than is the response of employment.
He reasons that even if both employment and the probability of finding
work decline following a minimum wage increase, an increase in the
size of the labor force indicates that, for many, the higher prospective
wage offsets these other factors.
As Table 9.2 shows, the LFPR is the number of people in the labor
force divided by population size. Like the employment ratio (the number employed divided by the number in the population), the LFPR can
be defined for specific demographic groups.
The unemployment rate is the number of the unemployed divided
by the number in the labor force, or one minus “the employment ratio
divided by the LFPR.” At first glance, this is inversely related to the
employment ratio, rising when the latter is falling and falling when the
latter is rising, so it is not obvious what is to be gained by its study. The
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Table 9.1 Labor Force Definitions
Term
Definition
Civilian noninstitu- All individuals aged 16 and over who are not in the armed forces or in prison, or other institutions.
tional population
(CNIP)
Employed
Members of the civilian noninstitutional population who did any work for pay or profit during the survey reference week; persons who did at least 15 hours of unpaid work in a family-operated enterprise;
and persons who were temporarily absent from their regular jobs because of illness, vacation, bad
weather, industrial dispute, or various personal reasons.
Unemployed
Persons are classified as unemployed if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the
prior four weeks, and are currently available for work. Persons who were not working and were waiting to be recalled to a job from which they had been temporarily laid off are also included as unemployed.
Labor force
The sum of employed and unemployed persons. The labor force participation rate is the labor force as
a percent of the civilian noninstitutional population.

Table 9.2 Labor Force Measures
Measure
Definition
Labor force
The ratio of the number of individuals in the labor
participation ratio force to the number of individuals in the civilian noninstitutional population (CNIP).
Employment ratio
The ratio of the number of individuals employed to the
number of individuals in the CNIP.
Unemployment rate

The ratio of the number of individuals unemployed to
the number of individuals in the labor force. Measured
as a percentage.

Formula

LFPR =

ER =

# in LF
# in CNIP

# Employed
# in CNIP

 # Unemployed 
UR = 100 × 

 # in LaborForce 

367

368 Belman and Wolfson

answer is that the unemployment rate varies not only when the employment ratio does, but also when the LFPR does. Partridge and Partridge
(1998) observe that at the state level, the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of teenagers’ employment is several times as large
as that of the annual teenage unemployment rate (pp. 368–369).1 They
suggest that this higher variability is noise that obscures the signal of
the minimum wage and is unrelated to anything that is either of interest
or controlled for. At the least, examination of the unemployment rate
will complement studies of the employment rate in the minimum wage
literature and may well be more fruitful.
Unemployment duration is the average length of time that an unemployed worker has continually sought work.2 This is of interest because
even if none of the other variables already mentioned vary in response to
minimum wage changes, a change in unemployment duration contains
information about the effect of the minimum wage on (some) workers.
It is widely believed that it is undesirable to be unemployed (the song
“Hallelujah! I’m a Bum” not withstanding), and longer periods in this
condition are worse, perhaps more than in proportion because as skills
and networks deteriorate while unemployed, finding a job becomes
ever more difficult.
The unemployment rate is a supply-side quantity in the labor market. The vacancy rate is its counterpart on the demand side. Also defined
as a fraction, its numerator is the number of positions that firms are trying to fill—the number of vacancies—and its denominator is typically
the size of the labor force.3

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
Table 9.3 lists Flinn (2006), already discussed in Chapter 2, and
three other studies that have problematic standard errors. Flinn (2006)
develops two closely related search models, which he calls the endogenous and exogenous models. The difference between them is that the
minimum wage influences the contact rate in the endogenous model
but not in the exogenous model, which is the one that he believes to
be more reliable.4 To estimate the models’ parameters, Flinn relies on
CPS data for teenagers and young adults from just before, between, and

Table 9.3 Labor Force Participation Response
Study
Flinn (2006)

Country
Target
Data
United White, male CPS
States teenagers and
youth

Data
structure
Individual
repeated
cross section

Addison and Ozturk OECD
Women
OECD Country-annual
(2012)
panel
Wessels (2005)
United Teenagers
CPS State-quarter
States
panel
Ahn, Arcidiacono,
United White, male CPS
Repeated
and Wessels
States
teenagers
cross section
(2011)

Period
9/96,
2/97,
8/97,
1/98
1980s–
2000s
1979–
2001
1989–
2000

Comments
Very rich search model that models the participation
decision. Indicates that the late 1990s increases in the
U.S. federal minimum wage most likely increased
youth participation, employment, and unemployment,
the last because of a larger increase in the LFPR than
employment.
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) critique
applies.
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) critique
applies.
Search model that builds on Flinn (2006). Identifies
compositional effects, where the minimum wage attracts
teenagers from more-educated households into the labor
force. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) critique
applies; no standard errors for the elasticities (which are
the interesting result).
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shortly after the 1996 and 1997 changes in the minimum wage.5 The
exogenous model implies that labor force participation rises until the
minimum wage exceeds more than $8.00/hour, above which it declines.
The endogenous model pegs this decline as beginning, imperceptibly,
at a minimum wage somewhere around $3.00/hour and first becoming
perceptible around $3.75/hour.6
Considering calculations based only on the range of minimum wage
values in the data, the exogenous model indicates a small rise in the
LFPR from less than 64 percent at a minimum wage of $4.25/hour to 65
percent at a value of $5.15/hour, while the endogenous model indicates
instead a fall from less than the original value of 64 percent to about 59
percent in this interval. As mentioned in the earlier discussion, Flinn
(2006) provides no error bias for these results that would allow us to
judge whether these movements are the equivalent of statistical noise.7

THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
Table 9.4 lists 10 studies that examine the effect of the minimum
wage on either the unemployment rate or the duration of unemployment.8
Partridge and Partridge (1998) consider the effect of the minimum wage
on teenagers’ unemployment rates, and in their 1999 study they look at
the long-term unemployment rate.9 Most of the estimates in each study
come from models that include both a contemporaneous and a lagged
minimum wage; in these cases, the two-point estimates are always statistically significant but have opposite signs. When they do not include
the lagged term, the point estimate of the coefficient on the contemporaneous term is not even remotely near statistical significance. According
to the equation with both terms, the response of the unemployment rate
is quite large, both initially when it declines in response to a minimum
wage increase, and in the next year when an increase in the unemployment rate more than cancels out the previous decline. It would be
useful to know the statistical significance of the two coefficients’ sum,
something that would take into account the correlation between the two
terms. It is likely that the sum, the net response of the unemployment
rate over two years, is not distinguishable from zero.10
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In their study of the effect of minimum wage increases on teenagers
in New Zealand in 2001, 2002, and 2003, Hyslop and Stillman (2007)
report a statistically significant increase in unemployment for those
aged 16–17 in response to the largest of the increases, which happened
in 2001, but only when they do not include business cycle controls.
Once included, none of the increases has a statistically significant effect
on unemployment. For older teenagers, aged 18–19, a lack of business
controls is associated with a statistically insignificant effect on unemployment. With the inclusion of business cycle controls, the effects on
unemployment are statistically significant decreases in the later years,
and no statistically significant effect in 2001.
Flinn’s (2006) analysis has interesting implications for the unemployment rate. His model has three states for individuals: 1) out of
the labor force; 2) unemployed (that is, in the labor force and not employed); and 3) employed. According to the exogenous model, where
the contact rate is independent of the minimum wage, the 1996 and
1997 minimum wage increases led to increases in both the employment
ratio and the unemployment rate, the latter by 0.2 percentage points.
The increase in the unemployment rate was due to a small increase in
employment and a slightly larger increase in labor force participation.
In the endogenous model, the policy raised the unemployment rate by
0.4 percentage points, resulting from a large drop in employment and a
slightly larger drop in labor force participation.
Tulip (2004) examines whether the minimum wage affects the rate
of unemployment consistent with a stable inflation rate. The question
arises from an interpretation of macroeconomic data, which concludes
that prolonged attempts to hold the unemployment rate at a level that is
too low can be identified by a rate of inflation that is getting ever larger,
while allowing the rate to be too high can be identified by its opposite,
an inflation rate that declines over time. NAIRU, the abbreviation for
nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment, is one acronym for the
“Goldilocks value” of the unemployment rate—the value that is just
right because it is associated with a stable inflation rate. To address the
issue, Tulip derives a regression equation in which the rate of wage inflation depends on the current unemployment rate, on the Kaitz index,
on the change in the relative minimum wage, and on several lagged

Study
Carmeci and
Mauro
(2002)

Country
Italy

Target
Data
Data structure
Regional Many Italian
Regionalgrowth rates
sources
annual panel

Period
Comments
1965–1995 Apply cross-country growth framework to Italy’s
regions; argue that inappropriately high minimum
wage leads to high unemployment, slower growth
in poorer regions. Minimum wage disappears from
view in the course of the model’s derivation.

Flinn (2006)

United White, male
States teenagers
and youth

Hyslop and
Stillman
(2007)

Teenagers
New
Zealand

Partridge and
Partridge
(1998)

United
States

Teenagers

CPS, BEA, State-year panel
others

1984–89

Similar to Neumark and Wascher approach, for
unemployment of teens; panel short enough that
Bertrand critique not too serious.

Partridge and
Partridge
(1999)

United
States

Long-term
unemployment

CPS, BEA, State-year panel
others

1984–89

Similar to Neumark and Wascher approach, for
long-term unemployment; panel sufficiently short
that Bertrand critique not too serious.

Pedace and
Rohn
(2011)

United UnemployStates ment duration

CPS

Individual
repeated
cross section

9/96, 2/97,
8/97, 1/98

HLFS

Individualannual panel

1997–2003 Once business cycle controls are included, the only
effects are declines in the unemployment rate for
18–19-year-olds.

CPS,
Displaced
Worker
Survey

Individual-year
panel; repeated
cross section

Very rich search model that models the
participation decision. Indicates that the late 1990s
increases in the U.S. federal minimum wage most
likely increased youth participation, employment,
and unemployment, the last because of a larger
increase in the LFPR than employment.

1984–2000 Hazard model of unemployment duration. Separate
estimates for men, women, and various subgroups.
Decline in duration for male high school
graduates; increase for male high school dropouts,
and for women, especially older women and lessskilled women.
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Table 9.4 Unemployment Rate/Duration

Tulip (2004)

United
States

BLS

Quarterly
time series

1948:1–
2003:1

Estimate a Phillips curve with minimum wage
as a control variable. Then holding inflation
constant, solve for the NAIRU, see how the
NAIRU responds to minimum wage. NAIRU rises
0.7 percentage points in response to a 10 percent
increase in the minimum wage.

van den Berg Nether- Dutch labor OSA Labor
Unbalanced
and Ridder lands
market
Supply Panel individual-year
(1998)
Survey
panel

1985–1990 Apply Burdett and Mortenson’s (1998) search
model to the Netherlands; partition the labor
market into 170 segments; estimate MRPL for
each, and analyze effect of the minimum wage.
No standard errors provided for the policy
analysis, and they express some skepticism about
the result.

Fortin, Keil,
Canada
and Symons
(2001)

1967–1991 Why has the unemployment rate risen over this
long period? Four sets of estimates, by gender
and age. Effect reported for both types of women;
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) critique
applies.

Addison and
Ozturk
(2012)

OECD

Women

Statistics
Canada

Regional-annual
panel

OECD

Country-year
panel

1980s–2000 Cross-country analysis of women’s labor market
outcomes; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan
(2004) critique applies.
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measures of wage and price inflation. The intuition for including the
minimum wage derives from the following line of reasoning:


An increase in the minimum wage raises wages.



Because firms set prices as a percentage over unit costs, they
raise prices.



Higher prices lead to lower demand for output.



Firms respond by reducing their demand for labor.



Unemployment rises.

According to the underlying logic of the NAIRU, if policymakers
respond by stimulating demand to keep unemployment constant at the
original level but make no further changes to the minimum wage, several rounds of ever-smaller price increases will follow that will inflate
away the minimum wage increase. In the end, both the unemployment
and inflation rates will have returned to their original levels, and the
price level will be higher, offsetting the initial rise in the real minimum
wage. If policy is instead focused on keeping both the real minimum
wage constant at its new, higher level through repeated increases in
the nominal minimum wage, and the inflation rate at its original level
through tighter monetary policy, the unemployment rate necessarily
rises.
Tulip (2004) estimates this equation on aggregate quarterly data for
the United States for the period 1947–2003.11 Based on his estimate,
a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage increases the NAIRU by
0.7 percentage points, slowly declining over time until inflation has reduced the real minimum wage to its original value.12
Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) use data from the Netherlands to
examine how well a search model that generates wage dispersion fits
observed data. Previous work in this vein relied on a model in which
only unemployed workers searched for work. Van den Berg and Ridder
instead use Burdett and Mortensen’s (1998) search model, which, by
allowing for on-the-job search, is able to generate certain types of heterogeneous results with fewer assumptions made specifically to attain
this goal. Observed wages are always between an employee’s reservation wage and the corresponding employer’s marginal revenue product
of labor. Individuals are heterogenous in the value of their reservation
wage for a variety of reasons, including their current employment sta-
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tus and their current wage if employed.13 Firms differ in the value of
their marginal product of labor. Wages of employees at the bottom of
the wage distribution rise as the minimum wage is increased until it
exceeds the value of some firms’ marginal revenue product. That firm
goes out of business and its employees become unemployed.
To estimate the model, Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) make use
of a long-term survey of Dutch households that has information on individuals’ employment spells between 1985 and 1990. It allows them
to partition the Dutch labor market into nearly 200 segments based on
traits of both individuals and jobs. From their estimates of the marginal revenue product of labor in each segment, they calculate that a
10 percent increase in the minimum wage would have no effect on the
unemployment rate, but a 25 percent increase would raise the unemployment rate by 16 percentage points. They present no standard errors
for this estimate and are wary of placing much weight on its precise
value because institutional factors in the Dutch labor market prevent
them from being able to distinguish adequately between the effects of
search frictions and the minimum wage.14

UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION
Pedace and Rohn (2011) study whether (and how) the minimum
wage affects the length of unemployment spells by estimating hazard
functions on 1984–2000 data from the Displaced Workers Survey (a
biennial supplement to the CPS). Hazard functions model durations,
how long something lasts, in this case the duration of unemployment
spells. In Pedace and Rohn’s specification, unemployment duration depends on an individual’s demographic traits, including details of the
last job held before becoming unemployed, on state and year dummies,
and on the level of the minimum wage. In some specifications, they
also include the percentage of each states’ labor force that receives the
minimum wage. As an ad hoc examination of robustness, Pedace and
Rohn report results from several different functional forms commonly
used to relate duration to regressors, and they perform their estimations
separately for each gender as well as for subgroups within each gender:
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by age (younger than 25 or not), skill level, and whether or not the individual completed high school.
For males, higher minimum wages reduce the length of unemployment spells of high school graduates, with a $1.00 increase leading to a
21 percent reduction in the average unemployment spell. At the average
values in the data for this group, this is a reduction of 5 weeks in unemployment duration, a 27 percent increase in the minimum wage, and an
unemployment duration elasticity (with respect to the minimum wage)
of −0.8. For males without a high school degree, the corresponding figures are a 63 percent increase in length of unemployment spells, a 28
percent increase in the minimum wage, an elasticity of 2.25, and a more
than 21-week increase in the mean length of unemployment spells.15
The pattern of results for women is quite different in signs, size,
and statistical significance. For the same $1.00 (27 percent) increase,
females with a high school degree experience a 55 percent increase in
unemployment duration, nearly 18 weeks at the average, for an elasticity of about 2. Lower-skilled women experience a 66 percent increase in
unemployment duration, 15 weeks at the average, for an elasticity near
2.4.16 For those aged 25 and older who experience the same $1 increase
in the minimum wage, the increase in women’s unemployment duration
is 47 percent, for an elasticity of 1.74, and the decline in men’s unemployment duration is −17 percent, for an elasticity of −0.62.
As an alternative way to consider their results, Pedace and Rohn
(2011) report the response of median unemployment durations to all
the federal minimum wage increases during the 1990s. For males with
a high school diploma, the minimum wage increases resulted in a decrease in the median duration of unemployment from 17 weeks to 11
weeks. For males without a high school diploma, however, the median
unemployment spell more than doubled from 21 weeks to 49 weeks.
For women with a high school diploma, the median duration more than
doubled, from 16 weeks to 35 weeks, as it also did for women who are
lower skilled, from 19 to 47 weeks.
These estimated effects, both the elasticities and the increases in
median durations, are substantial. In addition to the compositional effect indicated by the simultaneous reduction in unemployment duration
for male high school graduates and increase in duration for women,
these results are consistent with incumbents in minimum wage jobs becoming more attached to them, as both Portugal and Cardoso (2006)
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and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012) report for teenagers. They are also
consistent with Grossberg and Sicilian’s (2004) results for men in highwage states, for whom the minimum wage increases job tenure.17

VACANCIES
The Beveridge curve, which plots the vacancy rate against the unemployment rate, is a tool that macroeconomists use to diagnose the
state of the economy. In the short run, if the Beveridge curve is not
shifting around, a plot of observations is downward sloping, with high
values of the vacancy rate observed simultaneously with low values of
the unemployment rate, and low values of the vacancy rate observed
at the same time as high values of the unemployment rate. The former
set of points indicates that the economy is in a boom and the latter that
it is in a recession. Over the longer run, it is not uncommon for the
Beveridge curve to move toward or away from the origin (also described as shifting in or out). When it shifts out, higher vacancy rates
than before are observed with each unemployment rate, and higher
unemployment rates with each vacancy rate; the labor market is operating less efficiently as more unfilled jobs coexist with more workers in
search of jobs.
Table 9.5 lists two studies that examine the impact of the minimum
wage on vacancies. Both—Samson’s (1994) study of the Canadian Beveridge curve for the period 1966:1–1988:4 and Singell and Terborg’s
(2007) study of vacancies in the restaurant and hotel industries of Washington and Oregon in 1994–2001—rely on time-series data. Neither
adequately addresses serious problems that time-series data commonly
present to the econometrician: unit roots, cointegration, and serially
correlated residuals.18 If serial correlation is not properly addressed,
whether in the estimation or in the calculation of standard errors, then
the resulting statistical inference is unreliable. If variables in the regression have unit roots that are not addressed, then the point estimates are
meaningless.

Singell and
Terborg
(2007)

Target
Macroeconomy

Data
Various

Data structure
Period
Comments
Quarterly time 1966:4– Estimate unemployment and vacancy equaseries and region- 1988:4 tions, including the real minimum wage in
quarter panel
both. Lack of attention to time-series issues
(unit roots, cointegration, serially correlated
residuals) despite the use of time-series data
defeats any confidence in the results.
1994:1– Analyze monthly want-ad data for restaurant
United Restaurant Classified Monthly time
ads
series
2001:12 and hotel jobs collected from Portland and
States and hotel
Seattle newspapers (one each). (Even) less
industries in
WA and OR
sensitivity to time-series issues than in the
analysis of employment, similar to Samson
(above).
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Table 9.5 Vacancies
Authors
Country
Samson
Canada
(1994)
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CONCLUSION
On balance there is reason to believe that minimum wage increases
of the size seen in the U.S. data slightly increase the LFPR of youth,
but it is not clear that the size of this response is at all precisely measured. It also appears that the unemployment rate increases in response
to minimum wage increases, but here too the lack of appropriately calculated standard errors defeats attempts at reliable inference. Flinn’s
(2006) model suggests that the increase in the unemployment rate is
not big and is in large part due to growth in labor force participation
that outstrips employment growth. Pedace and Rohn’s (2011) study of
employment duration is quite interesting, suggesting that employers
substitute toward better-educated male workers and away from both
less-educated men and women in all relevant categories, not just lesseducated ones. Although they do not mention this, the adverse impact
on older women but not younger ones raises the possibility of sexistage discrimination. Finally, the small bit of work relating the minimum
wage to vacancies has statistical problems that keep it from being informative. A fair summary of the research into the consequences of the
minimum wage for these macroeconomic variables is that too little of
it exists to draw any certain conclusions, and much of what does exist
relies heavily on specific models. The models may well be of high quality, and they are certainly interesting, but they are not sufficiently tested
yet to inspire great confidence.

Notes
1. Admittedly, focusing on employment growth rates rather than the employment
ratio involves a comparison of apples and oranges; the point would be clearer, and
substantively the same, if Partridge and Partridge (1998) referred to teen employment ratios instead of employment growth rates.
2. “Duration of unemployment represents the length of time (through the current reference week) that persons classified as unemployed had been continuously looking
for work. For persons on layoff, duration of unemployment represents the number
of full weeks since the end of their most recent period of employment. Thus, it is
a measure of an in-progress spell of joblessness, not a completed spell. Two useful
measures of the duration of unemployment are the mean and the median. Mean
duration is the arithmetic average computed from single weeks of unemployment.
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3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

Median duration is the midpoint of a distribution of weeks of unemployment.”
See BLS Handbook of Methods, Chapter 1, for a discussion of duration and its
measurement. http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/homch1_c.htm (accessed August 15,
2013).
Defining the denominator to be the labor force (the sum of the number employed
and the number unemployed) rather than the sum of vacancies and the number of
jobs filled (which itself is roughly equal to employment) makes the vacancy rate
as measured a mix of demand and supply side measures, but it makes it easier to
compare the vacancy and unemployment rates.
Briefly, the contact rate is the number of job offers that a job seeker can expect to
receive in each period of search, or that a firm can expect to make for each vacancy
in each period. More precisely, in labor-search models, a contact is defined as a
worker’s approaching a firm that has a vacancy and asking “How much would you
pay me to fill that vacancy?” The firm is able to evaluate how much the worker is
worth in that position and makes an offer that reflects that value. The contact rate is
defined differently depending, on whether the perspective is that of the job seeker
or of the employer. In each period, the numerator is the number of contacts in that
period, and the denominator is either the number of job seekers or the number of
vacancies that firms are looking to fill.
The federal minimum wage rose from $4.25/hour to $4.75/hour on October 1,
1996, and, as part of the same legislation, to $5.15/hour on September 1, 1997.
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm (accessed August 15, 2013).
This is inferred from the behavior of “out of the labor force” in the top part of
Flinn’s (2006) Figures 1 and 2.
Wessels (2005) and Addison and Ozturk (2012) also examine the LFPR, using the empirical approach associated with Neumark and Wascher (1992,
1994). Both report a labor supply response that is negative and statistically significant, Wessels for teenagers in the United States, and Addison and Ozturk
for women in OECD countries. In both cases, the statistical significance relies on conventional standard errors, which are likely to be biased downward.
Hyslop and Stillman (2007) consider several variables measuring labor
market outcomes, but these are not mutually exclusive and cannot be combined
to give labor force participation.
Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2011) use a search model similar to Flinn
(2006) to study compositional effects of the minimum wage, specifically, the difference in labor market outcomes for teenagers from more- and less-educated
households. According to their estimates, as the education level of the head of
household increases, teenagers’ reservation wages rise, and their search costs fall.
The reverse is true if the household head is either unemployed or a single parent.
They conclude that a higher minimum wage attracts teenagers from all types of
households into the labor force. While most of their point estimates are statistically
significant, that is based on conventional standard errors and, given the structure
of their data, the Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) critique is pertinent. In
addition, they present no standard errors for the elasticities calculated from these
point estimates.

Labor Force Participation Rate, Unemployment, and Vacancies 381
8. One study not listed is Bouvet (2009), which studies unemployment, vacancies,
and the minimum wage using both an annual panel of five countries and an annual
panel of 60 regions in those five countries. Bouvet’s minimum wage variable is a
dummy for the existence of a legislated minimum wage; it is difficult to figure out
exactly how she carried out her analysis; and unless minimum wage policy in these
countries is very different from that in the United States, the Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan (2004) critique is pertinent. Except for the criticism of the minimum
wage variable, the same comments apply to Morgan and Mourougane’s (2005)
analysis of structural unemployment in several EU countries.
9. Both this study and Partridge and Partridge (1999) are short enough (six years of
annual data) that the problems may not be especially severe.
10. With a pair of positively correlated variables, this situation (each coefficient
statistically significant and with opposite signs when both variables are in the regression, but when only one is in the equation its coefficient is much smaller in
magnitude and not statistically significant) suggests that the variables probably do
not belong in the equation.
11. Tulip’s (2004) residual diagnostics indicate a few of the typical problems from
this type of estimation. The exception is a test that indicates that the residuals are
not normally distributed. On the one hand, this raises doubts about any statistical
inference using the equation. On the other hand, it is rarely evident what sort of
adjustments to the equation or estimation will solve this problem.
12. Tulip (2004) recognizes that the relationship between the minimum wage and unemployment or the NAIRU is not likely to be a simple causal one and may in
fact be due to a third variable that is both causally related to unemployment and
correlated with the minimum wage, but that until this is better understood, the
relationship remains useful for forecasting if not policy analysis. Tulip also reports
other countries’ experiences and explores other variables that may play the role
of the third variable. He writes, “If some strong but plausible assumptions are
made . . . when wages at the bottom of the distribution are compressed, the NAIRU
usually increases. Furthermore, the wide variety of policies across countries suggests that this correlation is not the result of one particular set of institutions or
rules. . . . [T]he latter may reflect a causal effect of inequality on unemployment . . .
[and] the strong influence of governments in setting wages at the bottom of the
distribution” (pp. 17–18).
13. The relevant reservation wage here is not the standard one, the wage necessary
to draw someone into the labor force and accept a job, but the lowest wage offer
necessary to induce someone to switch jobs.
14. Another study of minimum wage effects in countries other than the United States
is Carmeci and Mauro (2002), which uses data for 19 Italian regions during the
period 1965–1995. The causal chain linking the minimum wage to unemployment
is quite long, in the course of which the minimum wage disappears from view.
The minimum wage plays no explicit role in any versions of the equation that they
estimate, and in the end, it is both difficult to ascertain the effect of the minimum
wage and not at all clear that any effect attributed to the minimum wage is not
actually due to other factors.
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15. The $1.00 increase is a different percentage increase in the average minimum
wage experienced by high school graduates and those without a high school
degree because they are distributed differently across states and their different
minimum wages.
16. Low-skilled is defined by the occupational category of the last job held before
becoming unemployed. Pedace and Rohn (2011) report the details needed to calculate the elasticity only when the results are statistically significant across several
specifications of the model: thus, the figures for men without a high school degree
versus those for low-skilled women.
17. Recall their interpretation that in low-wage states, the minimum wage results in
so much wage compression that the wage alone does not convey useful information about job quality to prospective workers, so there is no discernible effect on
tenure.
18. Samson (1994) reports the Durbin-Watson statistic, but the values she reports are
typically agnostic about serial correlation. Of greater concern is that it is not an
appropriate statistic to report; because of the lagged dependent variables in her
equation, the Durbin-Watson statistic is biased away from detecting serial correlation. If there is serial correlation in her residuals, the reported standard errors are
inconsistent.

10
The Product Market
How does the product market reflect increases in the minimum
wage? In the short run, any adjustment must come through output and
prices. If there are important differences in productivity across firms
in markets that are affected by the minimum wage, then the degree of
competition may change in the long run as less-productive firms shrink
or leave the market and more productive ones expand. A number of
analyses have examined the price response, a few have examined the
effect on profitability, very few have studied the output response, and
none have seriously explored any long-term effect on market structure.
This chapter discusses studies of the effect on prices and then briefly
discusses those that have examined the effects on output or profitability.

PRICES
Most analyses of the price response have examined only the restaurant industry, especially the fast food sector, and by and large they
agree that minimum wage increases lead to higher prices at fast food
establishments.1 They do this with a variety of analytic techniques, applied to a variety of data sets drawn from several different time periods
in three countries, bolstering the robustness of this finding. There is
some disagreement about the strength of the response, but none about
its existence or direction. Table 10.1 lists seven studies of the price response to the minimum wage. Those of Fougère, Gautier, and Le Bihan
(2010); Lee, Schluter, and O’Roark (2000); and MaCurdy and McIntyre
(2001) are based on explicit economic models that relate increases in
the minimum wage to price increases in either the restaurant industry or
in the broader food sector. Rather than estimating these models directly,
parameter values are set according to relevant estimates or measurements that others have calculated elsewhere. The remaining analyses
are purely statistical in nature, with no underlying economic model
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Study
Aaronson
(2001)
Dube, Naidu,
and Reich
(2007)
Fougère,
Gautier, and
Le Bihan
(2010)
Lee, Schluter,
and O’Roark
(2000)
MacDonald and
Aaronson
(2006)
MaCurdy and
McIntyre
(2001)
Wadsworth
(2010)
a

Sample
Analytic
Unit of
Data
Type of
Effect
Target
Country
period
approach observation structure standard error Data seta
Positive Food away from United 1978–1995 Regression City-month
Panel
Robust
BLS, Stathome sector
States,
Can, Chamber
Canada
of Commerce
Positive San Francisco
United 2003–2004
Quasi
Firm-year
Panel
Robust
Private survey
restaurants
States
experiment
Positive

Restaurants

France

1994–2003 Regression Meal-establishmentmonth

Positive

Food sector

United
States

1992, 1997 I/O analysis

Positive Food away from
home sector

United
States

Positive Minimum wage
workers

United
States

1995–1997 Regression Item-estabPanel Clustered (by
lishmentest.)
month
1996
I/O analysis Industry Cross sec—
tion

Long- Minimum wage United 1996–2006 Regression
term
industries
Kingdom
Positive

Industry

Industrymonth

Panel

MLE

FSI

Cross section

—

Various

Time
series

NeweyWest(1)

BLS

SIPP, CES

Various

BLS = Bureau of Labor Statistics. FSI = French Statistical Institute. CES = Consumer Expenditure Survey. SIPP = Survey of Income and
Program Participation. Various = CPS-ORG, Census of Manufactures, BEA I/O Tables for the United States.
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guiding the attempt to relate the timing and size of price increases in the
restaurant industry to the timing and size of minimum wage increases.
Having suggested that monopsonistic competition (also called dynamic monopsony) in the labor market may explain the absence of a
decline in employment following minimum wage increases, Card and
Krueger (1994, 1995) look for evidence of a decline in prices, one of
the implications of this hypothesis. In a labor market that is a dynamic
monopsony, a sufficiently small increase in a sufficiently small minimum wage will lead to more employment of low-wage labor, and this
will in turn lead to more output. Then, whether or not the output market is competitive, output prices must fall for the market to clear. Both
Card and Krueger (1994), in their study of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007), in their study of the San
Francisco Bay area, report a substantial rise in average prices in the
area that experienced the minimum wage increase. Because this result
is in both cases based on a simple two-by-two difference-in-differences
analysis, its reliability is suspect for the reasons that Donald and Lang
(2007) identify. However, each study also presents estimates based on
a wage-gap measure of the minimum wage increase, a framework not
suspect in this way. In both, the size of the price increase in the treated
area does not vary with the wage gap. If not evidence against the presence of dynamic monopsony in the labor market, it is at a minimum not
evidence in its favor. While Card and Kreuger draw no inferences from
these results about the structure of the labor market, they do conclude
that the higher wage bill came out of consumers’ pockets (and not from
reductions in firm profits).
In a series of studies, both alone and with others, Daniel Aaronson has examined the effect of minimum wage increases on restaurant
prices in Canada and the United States, and the implications of these
responses for labor market structure.2 In the earliest study, Aaronson
(2001) constructs monthly inflation rates from 1978–1995 using BLS
data from 88 U.S. cities to compare changes in the “food away from
home” component to changes in the minimum wage, considering both
the timing and the size of the changes. He performs a similar analysis
for “food at restaurants” in 10 Canadian provinces. In both countries, in
the seven-month period centered on the month that a minimum wage increase occurs, the minimum wage elasticity of restaurant prices is about
0.07. One interesting difference is that in the United States, the bulk
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of the price rise takes place in the three-month period centered on the
increase, especially the month before and the month of the increase. In
Canada, the price rise appears to begin only a month after the increase,
and the largest part of it occurs three months afterward.
Another data set allows Aaronson (2001) to look specifically at three
fast food chains in the United States—McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried
Chicken, and Pizza Hut—and the results are less clear cut. Analyzing
the data in several different ways, he consistently finds a response in
the price of McDonald’s hamburgers that is at least as large, and perhaps twice as large, as that of the restaurant prices already mentioned.
The response of Kentucky Fried Chicken prices varies from none to as
large as the largest McDonald’s hamburger price response, while the
response of Pizza Hut prices varies from none to barely a third of that
reported above for the restaurant sector.
MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) use the same BLS data for 1995–
1997 before it has been aggregated to the level of the city to explore
the behavior of price changes in individual establishments, both fullservice and limited-service restaurants, and how changes in the minimum wage affect this. Fougère, Gautier, and Le Bihan (2010) perform
a similar analysis using French data for 1994–2003. In both surveys,
the prices refer to combinations of items called meals (breakfast, lunch,
or dinner) rather than to individual items. In both countries, minimum
wage labor is an important component of employment (40 percent of
restaurant workers in France), and inflation was low during the periods
covered. The U.S. data set covers a period in which there were two
increases in the national minimum wage, three states each raised their
own minimum wages to levels above the new national minimums at
the same time as these increases, and six states raised their minimum
wages a total of 12 times in other months. During the eight and a half
years that the French data cover, the national minimum wage changed
in May 1998 and each July, 9 times in all. Complicating the analysis is
the changeover of French currency from the franc to the euro in January
2002, a moment at which it was easier than usual to slip price changes
through unnoticed.
Both studies document that prices of individual items in restaurants
are fairly constant. In the United States, limited-service restaurants
(predominantly fast food restaurants) raised prices on about 5.5 percent of items on average in months when they experienced no increase
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in the minimum wage, and 11 percent in months when they did. For
full-service restaurants in France, prices on about 5 percent of items
increase each January and September, when they reopen after the holidays, compared to about 3 percent in each of the other months. In fast
food restaurants, about 10 percent of prices rise, on average, in each of
the months of January, February, and July, versus less than 7 percent in
each of the other months. As July is also the month of the annual minimum wage increase, the large July increase may be related to the rise
in the minimum wage. The month of minimum wage increases, July,
exhibits an unusually high proportion of price increases, but so do two
months as far from July as possible, January and February. Fougère,
Gautier, and Le Bihan (2010) attribute a larger role to seasonality than
to the minimum wage in explaining price increases in French restaurants. In the United States, the corresponding numbers for full-service
restaurants are 5.6 percent in months of minimum wage increases (versus 10 percent in France) and 5.4 percent in other months (versus 7–10
percent in France). Presenting data for France, and reporting others’
findings for the United States, they show that in other sectors of the
economy, larger fractions of prices change each month.
The geographic variation in the U.S. data and the variation in both
wage distributions and the level and timing of changes in the minimum
wage enable MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) to gain purchase on the
data from a number of purely statistical angles. First, controlling for
whether the item is typically associated with breakfast, lunch, or dinner; for price changes in other inputs; and for recent price increases
and decreases, they report an elasticity of restaurant prices with respect
to the minimum wage of about 0.07 in the three two-month periods
centered on minimum wage increases.3 That is, a 10 percent increase in
the minimum wage quickly leads to a (roughly) 0.7 percent increase in
restaurant prices. When they break out limited-service restaurants separately, the elasticity is more than twice as large (0.16); for full-service
restaurants, the elasticity drops by about half. Explicitly exploiting the
variation that comes with the geographic reach of the United States,
MacDonald and Aaronson interact the minimum wage with terms that
locate it relative to the 20th percentile of the local wage distribution.
In areas where low-wage workers earn relatively high wages, changes
in the minimum wage should have little effect on wages or costs, and
therefore, one expects, on prices. That is indeed what they find.
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Do restaurants respond to minimum wage increases with larger individual price increases or increases in the prices of more items? To
examine this, MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) rely on the reasoning
underlying conventional models of price adjustment: that it is costly
to the firm not only to change prices but also for prices not to be at the
value that equates supply and demand. The cost of having the wrong
price depends on its distance from the optimum price. The cost of
changing prices, known as an adjustment cost, is attributed to the costs
of gathering and evaluating information needed to determine the appropriate price and of changing signs, labels, database values, and
advertising. The amount of adjustment costs that the firm incurs depends on the frequency of price changes.4 To reflect recent incidence
of adjustment costs, they constructed a dummy variable, review, which
was set to one if an establishment had changed any price in the previous
period. According to the underlying reasoning, having recently incurred
the costs of price adjustment, a restaurant would be less likely to do so
again even if the minimum wage had subsequently risen. MacDonald
and Aaronson (2006) report exactly this outcome. Of particular interest
is the estimate that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage roughly
doubles the probability that an individual item in a fast food restaurant
will experience a price increase in the same month.
The French data set had less variation in the timing of minimum
wage increases and in the variables that would be expected to vary
across large geographic expanses. Consequently, Fougère, Gautier, and
Le Bihan (2010) find a more formal approach necessary, modifying and
estimating a conventional model of price adjustment that combines the
two different parts of the decision that MacDonald and Aaronson (2006)
examine separately: the decision to change a price, and the calculation
of the appropriate value of the new price. According to their estimate,
those prices that change in response to the minimum wage exhibit a
minimum wage elasticity of between 0.08 and 0.11, with those in fast
food restaurants nearer the upper end, and those in full-service restaurants nearer the lower end. Robustness tests of their model are generally
reassuring, although they note that it appears to produce mild overestimates of both the frequency of price changes and the size of both
increases and decreases. Both studies find that restaurants do not raise
all prices in response to minimum wage increases, but rather groups of
prices, leaving others unchanged.
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Using their estimates to examine how long it takes for the mouse of
minimum wage increases to work its way through the python of French
restaurant prices, Fougère, Gautier, and Le Bihan (2010) report a much
longer period than Aaronson (2001). Recall his result that nearly all the
response of fast food restaurants in both the United States and Canada
occurs in a three-month period, which is centered on the increase in the
United States, and which follows the increase in Canada. For French
fast food establishments, only half of the adjustment occurs within the
six months following the increase, and after another year, roughly 10
percent of the adjustment remains. The process is nearly twice as long
for full-service restaurants in France.
Lee, Schluter, and O’Roark (2000) also rely on a formal model,
though not one of price formation and change, to study the impact of
two of the increases of the federal minimum wage in the 1990s.5 They
use a specific model of production that has clear implications for price
formation, an input-output model of the food sector. The model begins
with data on the distribution of each sector’s production costs that are
payments to producers in other sectors of the economy and to employees. It combines these data with two important assumptions. The first
is that the technology implicit in this distribution is optimal in the short
run so that even if relative input costs change, firms will not quickly reorganize production. The second is that residual income (profit, interest
payments, and depreciation allowances) does not change; prices adjust
fully to reflect any change in costs. As they admit, these are very strong
assumptions and imply that their estimates of the price response are
an upper bound.6 Finally, they consider several different assumptions
about the effect of minimum wage increases on wages that were higher
ex ante than the new value of the minimum wage (known as spillover
effects).
Lee, Schluter, and O’Roark (2000) report that had the 1992 minimum wage increased in that year by 12 percent, from $4.25 to $4.75
(something that did not happen until 1996), restaurant prices would
have increased by between 1.0 percent and 1.4 percent.7 The implied
price elasticities with respect to the minimum wage are between 0.08
and 0.12. A $0.50 increase in 1997, from $5.15 to $5.65 (10 percent),
would have led to restaurant price increases of between 1.0 and 1.2
percent, or price elasticities between 0.09 and 0.13. While greater than
both the 0.07 of MacDonald and Aaronson for restaurants (both full-
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service and limited-service) and the 0.08–0.11 of Fougère, Gautier,
and Le Bihan (2010), this is not surprising in light of their recognition
that their numbers are an upper bound. In addition, Lee, Schluter, and
O’Roark report elasticities for different food manufacturing industries
that range between 0.01 and 0.03 in 1992, and 0.01 and 0.03 in 1997.
MaCurdy and McIntyre (2001), as part of a more ambitious analysis to determine which households gain and which lose from minimum
wage increases, also perform an input-output analysis to measure price
responses to a minimum wage increase. After allowing for their having
considered a substantially larger minimum wage increase, their analysis
differs from that of Lee, Schluter, and O’Roark (2000) in two important
ways: MaCurdy and McIntyre incorporate employer payroll taxes while
neglecting spillover effects. These modeling choices lead to offsetting
results, with the former choice resulting in larger price increases than
otherwise, and the latter in smaller price increases. For the restaurant
sector as a whole, they report a price elasticity with respect to the minimum wage of slightly less than 0.12, at the high end of those that Lee,
Schluter, and O’Roark estimate when they allow for the greatest spillover effects.
The United Kingdom’s National Minimum Wage (NMW) was
introduced with the expectation that it would lead to higher prices, according to Grimshaw and Carroll (2006). It was thought that affected
firms would either become more efficient (by some combination of reorganizing operations or improving employees’ skills) or move into a
niche in which they could compete on quality or characteristics other
than price. The price response was instead quite tepid, and Grimshaw
and Carroll explore this experience in interviews with owners and managers of 36 small British firms in six low-wage industries.8 The one
manufacturing industry faced international competition that prevented
pass-through of the increase. In three of the service industries (cleaning, care home, and security), firms dealt with a dominant customer that
refused to pay the higher prices. In the security industry, there was both
widespread violation of the new law and reductions in service (fewer
guards in place) without any reduction in what was charged—possible,
it seems, because the customers were unaware of the practice. In the
care home industry, there may also have been some attempt to cut service quality, but this was constrained by government regulations (recall
Note 1).
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Wadsworth (2010) is an extensive exploratory analysis of the relation between the NMW and prices in the United Kingdom. Using a
variety of data from several sources, he examines the effect of the minimum wage on prices in both the short run and the long run. He begins
with wage data from two sources to determine which industries have a
large number of minimum wage employees. His next step is to examine (publicly available) accounts of firms in these industries to identify
those in which wages of minimum wage workers are a large share of
value added. Having identified 10 “minimum wage” industries, most
of which are consumer services including such familiar ones as hotels,
restaurants, pubs, and take-out food, Wadsworth turns to monthly retail price data for the corresponding products. His empirical analysis of
prices uses these either as is or aggregated up to each industry.
The analysis itself is fairly simple. Recognizing that the connection
between changes in costs and changes in prices is not straightforward—Milton Friedman’s comment about the long and variable lags
relating monetary policy to its effect on the economy comes to mind—
Wadsworth (2010) avoids elaborately specified regression equations.
To examine the short-run association between price changes and
changes in the NMW, he asks, “Is there an association between price
increases and the NMW, its implementation, and subsequent increases
in the months immediately before or after these changes in the NMW?”
To address this, he regresses the monthly inflation rate for each industry on a constant and a dummy variable that indicates whether the
NMW increased that month, as well as two leads and two lags of the
dummy. The results are underwhelming: 6 out of 41 coefficients on
minimum wage dummies are statistically significant. A variety of additional analyses, including combining the individual time series into a
panel, also generate no statistically significant estimates. One exception
is when he considers inflation rates for individual goods and services
rather than the more aggregated ones for each industry: there is then
evidence of a weak association starting in the month of the increase
and continuing for (at least) the next two months. However, the same
exercise performed on non–minimum wage industries and their goods
also generates a statistically significant result either one month before
the increase (using industry-level data) or two months before and two
months after (using item-level data). To this point, there is no strong
evidence that the NMW leads to higher prices, at least in the short term.
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To examine longer-term effects, Wadsworth (2010) asks, “Has the
inflation rate in affected industries been greater since the beginning of
the NMW than it would otherwise have been?” His answer involves
estimating a difference-in-differences equation where the dummies indicate whether the observation is for an item from a minimum wage
industry, and whether the observation was before or during the period
in which the NMW was in effect. The coefficient of interest has an estimated t-statistic of three, suggesting that over the long run, the NMW
is associated with a statistically significant increase of 0.7 percent in
the annual inflation rate of minimum wage industries.9 He concludes,
“The extent of any observed relative price increases in minimum-wage
sectors does not appear to rise in line with the share of minimum-wage
workers in total costs, suggesting that a simple pass-through model of
price changes may not hold. . . . [In addition], any effects on prices appear to accumulate gradually over time” (pp. 111–112).

OUTPUT
Little research on the minimum wage considers the response of output from affected firms. Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003) turn to
it briefly near the end of their study of the effects of the introduction of
the national minimum wage in 1999 on Britain’s home care industry.
They report a positive response that is not statistically significant once
control variables are included in the analysis. In combination with their
finding of “some evidence of employment and hours reductions occurring in homes after minimum wage introduction,” this suggests that the
minimum wage led to less output than would have otherwise been the
case (p. 178).

PROFITABILITY
If firms act as profit maximizers, and if the only immediate effect
of the minimum wage increase is higher costs, then profits must fall.
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By assumption, firms have no new possibilities available to them.10
Several responses are possible, all of which were available before the
increase in the minimum wage. If the labor market is competitive, then
one response is for firms to reduce employment and output. If the labor market is monopsonistic, they may raise employment and output.
If they have market power in the product market and are unregulated,
then the qualitative effect is likely to resemble that of competitive labor
and product markets, with both higher prices and lower employment
and output. Firms may substitute capital for labor. Finally, firms may
not respond in any way other than to raise wages where necessary. The
higher minimum wage does not create any of these possibilities but
only changes conditions so that certain choices become relatively more
attractive in comparison with what they had been doing. It follows that
since firms could have done any of these before but are only choosing
to do them following the minimum wage increase, and since costs are
higher, lower profits must result. If profits do not fall, something else
must be going on (see Note 10).
Do profits in fact fall? Table 10.2 lists seven studies that examine
the effect of the minimum wage on profitability or outcomes related that
reflect profitability. Card and Krueger (1995) devote a chapter to this
question, reporting the results of several event studies. The premise of a
typical event study is that a firm’s share price reflects the best estimate
of its future profits in light of all relevant information that is currently
available. An event study is a comparison of changes in the share price
relative to the value of the whole market as new information that is
especially pertinent to the firm or firms in question becomes available.
Card and Krueger identify two sets of publicly traded companies for
examination, those in industries with a large number of minimum wage
employees, and those whose annual reports include mention of the federal minimum wage hikes of the early 1990s as a source of increased
labor costs. The information events they study are headlines in the Wall
Street Journal over a two-and-a-half-year period preceding final congressional approval of the increases, and the timing of events about a
memo leaked during the early Clinton administration concerning plans
to push for minimum wage increase (resulting eventually in the increases
in the later 1990s).
For both sets of firms, the first set of events provides no consistent
support for the hypothesis that the minimum wage is bad for profits.

Type of
Central
Sample
Analytic
Unit of
Data
standard
Study
variable Effect
Target
Country period
approach observation structure
error Data seta
Card and Krueger Profits Mixed Firms sensitive United 1987–89, Event study Daily-firm
Panel
OLS
CRSP
(1995)
to the miniStates 1992–93
(stock return)
mum wage
Draca, Machin,
Profits Negative Low-wage
United 1998–2002
Quasi
Firm-year
Panel
OLS
FAME,
and Van Reenen
firms
Kingdom
experiment
LFS,
(2011)
WERS
Machin and Wilson Exits
None
Home care
United 1998–1999 Regression Firm-survey Two-period OLS
Private
(2004)
Kingdom
response
panel
survey
Mason, Carter, and Profits
Tagg (2006)

Small and
United
2003
midsized Kingdom
enterprises
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—
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OLS UI records,
private
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CRSP = Center for Research in Security Prices (US). FAME = Financial Analysis Made Easy (UK). HLFS = Household Labour Force
Survey (New Zealand). IRG = Investment Research Group (Share Prices in New Zealand). IS = Income Survey (New Zealand).
WERS = Workplace Employment Relations Survey (UK).
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Results for the second set of events are different, especially for those
firms that had previously referred explicitly to the importance of the
minimum wage for their operations. Card and Krueger (1995) conclude
that their results are ambiguous and that further work is necessary; on
the basis of their analysis, one could make a case that the minimum
wage has a noticeable effect on profits of firms that one would expect to
be sensitive to it, but one could make the opposite case with equal ease.
Pacheco and Naiker (2006) perform an event study similar to Card
and Krueger’s (1995), using data from New Zealand, where a substantial reform and increase of the minimum wage for teenagers occurred,
starting in early 2001.11 Using detailed income data to determine which
industries are sensitive to the minimum wage, they find four that together employ more than half of minimum wage workers and in which
the share of minimum wage workers substantially exceeds the industry’s share of the total workforce. Pacheco and Naiker next identify 32
firms that are largely specialized in 1 of these 4 industries, and 10 events
that were both related to the revision of the minimum wage between
late 1999 and late 2000, and are discussed in published news sources.
They judge the results of their event analysis to be ambiguous, with
profitability responding to some events as expected but not responding
to many others. While expressing concern that the result may be due to
extensive noncompliance (between 2 and 3 percent of the employees in
the data earned less than the relevant minimum wage), they conclude
that “the number of tests and robustness checks performed in this study
all point to the same conclusion, implying that some weight should be
given to the argument that investors simply find changes in minimum
wage value irrelevant” (p. 488).
Mason, Carter, and Tagg (2006) conduct a nationwide survey of
small business firms in the United Kingdom to examine the response
to the 2003 increase in the NMW and how it varies geographically.
The difference between high- and low-wage regions is evident in the
effect of the NMW increase. Fifteen percent of firms in high-wage areas (southeastern England and the London metropolitan region) had to
raise wages while 25 percent did in low-wage, peripheral areas (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and both the northeast and northwest of
England). The proportion of employees who received wage increases
ranged from 6 percent in the high-wage regions, to 13–14 percent in
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most of the low-wage regions, and to nearly 18 percent of those in
Wales.
Mason, Carter, and Tagg’s (2006) use of a five-point Likert scale
makes interpretation and comparison with other analyses difficult. On
the one hand, they report that “London and the South East contained the
smallest proportion of businesses that anticipated a decline in profitability, at just 15 percent. In contrast, around one-quarter of businesses in
the North East, Northern Ireland, Wales, Yorkshire and the Humber, and
the North West anticipated a decrease in their profitability as a result of
the national minimum wage uprate” (p. 109). These percentages match
those for the proportions of firms that had to raise wages in response
to the increase. On the other hand, only 20 percent of firms that had to
increase wages for any employee expected this to decrease profitability,
and, on the 5-point scale, the mean response for overall profitability
was 2.84 (where 3 means no change and 2 means a slight decrease), so
the effect on profits appears to be very slight even for firms that had to
increase wages. It thus appears that profits declined or were expected to
do so, but not by much. Because of their presentation (which is not altogether clear) and the low survey response rate (which raises questions
of selection bias), the accuracy of this finding is not certain.
If firms’ profits decline following a minimum wage increase, one
likely consequence is an increase in firm failure rates. Waltman, McBride, and Camhout (1998) run a simple regression to examine failure
rates for the whole economy, comparing years without minimum wage
increases to those with them, and do not find a larger rate in the former
years. They repeat this for years following those with minimum wage
increases relative to other years and produce a similar result.12
Orazem and Mattila (2002) study low-wage retail and nonprofessional service firms in Iowa from the middle of 1989 through 1994.
Combining quarterly data collected by the unemployment insurance
program with tax and other economic data allows them to examine the
effect of the minimum wage on firms and workers at the county level.
They report statistically significant, negative responses in the number
of firms. The minimum wage elasticity of the number of firms is −0.17
within one quarter and −0.25 over four quarters. Peculiarly, there is
little difference between the covered and uncovered sectors; that is, the
movements are almost identical for firms that must pay the minimum
wage and those for which it does not apply. Either all firms feel obliged
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to pay employees the minimum wage, whether or not legally required to
do so, or their minimum wage variable is picking up other phenomena
for which Orazem and Mattila have not adequately accounted.
In their study of the British care home industry and its response
to the introduction and first increase of the NMW, Machin and Wilson
(2004) examine exit of firms from the industry. While the overall rate
of exit is high, they are not able to find any indication that it varies
with either firms’ sensitivity or exposure to the minimum wage.13 This
suggests that the NMW did not have a material effect on profits; otherwise, homes with greater exposure or sensitivity would presumably
have experienced a greater decline in profits and would be closing down
at greater rates.
Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen (2011) examine two samples of
firms. With one, they perform a much more ambitious analysis of the
minimum wage and firm profitability than those previously presented,
a quasi experiment in which the firms in the treatment and comparison
groups differ according to their average wages. In the United Kingdom, even privately held corporations must report considerably more
accounting information than U.S. firms, including employment and the
total wage bill. This gives Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen a broad sample of firms, including many smaller ones likely to be more sensitive to
the NMW than larger, publicly traded firms. The average wage bill in
their treatment groups suggests an average wage about 9 percent higher
than the NMW at the time it was first introduced. After determining that
wages in the treatment group rose relative to those in the comparison
group, they report that profits fell in the treatment group, and by an
amount that suggests that affected firms made no adjustments other than
to raise wages as needed to satisfy the law. Because a given value of
the average wage is consistent with many different wage distributions,
Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen are not entirely comfortable with their
definitions of the treatment and comparison groups, and they poke and
prod their specification in a variety of ways to test the robustness of
their findings. Their results hold up.
Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen (2011) also conduct a regression
analysis on the sample of residential care homes that Machin and Wilson
(2004) and others have used to study the NMW; the sample of firms is
much narrower than their prior work, but this is balanced by the greater
detail, and so more careful measurement of each firm’s response to the
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NMW. They are able to infer total costs, and from that—defining profits
as the difference between revenue and total costs—the rate of profit (as
a percentage of revenue). Relating this to the value of a firm’s wage
gap—the percentage that the wage bill must rise if low-wage employees
are to make no less than the minimum wage—Draca, Machin, and Van
Reenen report an elasticity of the profit margin of −1.5. A firm with a 10
percent wage gap faces a 15 percent decline in its profit margin (about 5
percentage points on average). However, they confirm the conclusions
of Machin and Wilson that the data on firm closings do not reflect this.
For both samples, Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen (2011) consider
exits and find no effect of the NMW on this measure. What they cannot examine with these sources is any effect on births of new firms. A
different data set based on registration for the value-added tax allows
them to study the rates of entry into and exit from low-wage industries,
and whether this changed in response to the NMW relative to other industries. They find a small and statistically insignificant relative decline
of the rate of firms’ entry into low-wage sectors. Rather than study exit
alone, they combine entry and exit and report a statistically insignificant
(or imprecisely measured) decline in growth rates of low-wage sectors
of five percentage points. One response to this estimate is to extrapolate
to the long run and infer that after a period of 25–30 years, the NMW
will lead to roughly half as many firms in low-wage sectors as would
otherwise have been the result.14 The long horizon, especially in combination with the large standard errors, suggests that other factors would
likely swamp this effect. In summary, there is good evidence that the
minimum wage reduces profits, certainly in the United Kingdom, but it
does not show up where one would expect, in changes in exit rates or
firms’ share prices. Results of Orazem and Mattila (2002) suggest that
the situation may be different in the United States, but the similarity of
their results for firms in the covered and uncovered sectors suggests that
they have not adequately controlled for other factors affecting the rates
of firms’ exit and profits.
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Notes
1. A handful of articles look at the care home industry in the United Kingdom and
find no price response. This is not surprising in light of the heavy price regulation
of that sector, which makes any further reference here to this work superfluous.
2. Although Aaronson, French, and MacDonald (2008) have an additional analysis
of the same BLS data, it is, empirically, largely a reprise of Aaronson (2001) and
MacDonald and Aaronson (2006), its focus being more on the implications for
labor market structure of the minimum wage response of prices. For these reasons,
we do not discuss it here.
3. Restaurants were each surveyed monthly or bimonthly, thus the use of two-month
periods.
4. For big-ticket items especially, frequent price changes may be costly as well to
customers, who may respond by more frequent information gathering, which may
in turn lead them to switch to a new supplier.
5. These are the second increase, in 1992, and the fourth and last increase, in 1997.
6. If the assumption that inputs cannot be quickly readjusted is correct, but the assumption that cost increases fully pass through to prices in the short run is not, it
is likely that profits will suffer.
7. The range results from different assumptions about the extent of spillover effects
on the wages of those higher up the wage distribution.
8. The industries are clothing and footwear manufacturing, industrial cleaning services, hospitality, residential care, retail, and security.
9. While Wadsworth (2010) presents results overall and separately for each minimum wage industry, this discussion is limited to the overall results.
10. This rules out, for example, shock effects and effects on labor supply. Shock effects, the sudden rise in costs due to the minimum wage increase, lead firms to
search more carefully for efficiencies in production, which in turn reduces the cost
of hiring qualified employees.
11. For details, see the discussion of Hyslop and Stillman (2007) in Chapter 2.
12. Taylor and Arnold (1999) identify a serious data mistake but agree that it does not
change the results that Waltman, McBride, and Camhout (1998) report.
13. Exposure is measured by the percentage of employees initially paid less than the
NMW. Sensitivity is measured by the wage gap, the fraction of the ex ante wage
bill needed to bring those who had been paid less than the NMW up to that level.
14. From the discussion, it is not exactly clear what period the entry and exit rates refer
to, but it appears to be not a single year but rather the entire period following the
treatment, about two and a half years.
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Conclusion
What have we learned from this exhaustive (and to us, exhausting)
review of the minimum wage literature? It is only fair to the possibly
equally exhausted reader that we briefly summarize our findings and
provide some, but not too many, comments about the implications for
the minimum wage as a tool of policy and about how economists go
about studying controversial topics.
Evidence leads us to conclude that moderate increases in the minimum wage are a useful means of raising wages in the lower part of the
wage distribution that has little or no effect on employment and hours.
This is what one seeks in a policy tool, solid benefits with small costs.
That said, current research does not speak to whether the same results
would hold for large increases in the minimum wage. Our suspicion
is that large increases could touch off the disemployment effects that
are largely absent for moderate increases, but evidence for the United
States is lacking because there have not been large increases in the last
generation. Similarly, increases in the minimum wage are not the only
policy needed to address issues of low income in the United States. As
many others have argued, programs such as the EITC and Food Stamps
play a critical role in placing a floor under incomes and consumption,
and higher minimum wages are not a substitute for such programs. In
other words, the minimum wage is a useful tool for policy and, as with
most policy tools, must be used wisely and in coordination with other
policies to achieve the desired end.

A SUMMARY OF OUR FINDINGS
Employment
Employment, long square one for disputes about the minimum
wage and its effects, has been more intensively studied than any other
variable in the minimum wage, both in the NMWR and before. Un401
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fortunately, much work exhibits one or the other of two statistical
problems (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Donald and Lang
2007) that make judging the reliability of the analyses impossible. Of
the work that has avoided or satisfactorily resolved these issues, little
has been able to detect a substantively significant response of employment, measured as the number of jobs, the number of people working,
or the number of hours. Although this does not close the issue, the preponderance of the evidence currently leans that way. This is borne out
by our own meta-analysis.1 Once a correction for publication bias is
incorporated, overall elasticities for the United States are both statistically insignificant and very close to zero, even when restricting the
focus to teenagers and young adults. The corresponding elasticities for
eating and drinking establishments in the United States appear to be
somewhat larger, with precision weighted means near −0.05, but still
not statistically significant.
How long does it take for employment responses to increases in
the minimum wage to play out? Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger (1999)
is one of the most ingenious and frequently cited analyses by someone
other than a participant in the original conference. Providing an interpretation of earlier work, it suggested that the period in question is at
least five to six years. Coming, however, before Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan (2004) and the increased recognition of the relevance of
the Moulton (1990) problem to panel data research on the minimum
wage, the robustness of their interpretation is not clear. Following the
logic of the rational expectations hypothesis, Pinoli (2010) argues that
much of the response to an anticipated increase occurs before the increase itself. From the little work that is relevant, this does not appear to
be the case, at least in the United States. Furthermore, analyses that directly examine the timing indicate that the employment response takes
no more than three years to complete (Belman and Wolfson 2010).
However, considerably more work, using data from a variety of situations and countries, is necessary before drawing any conclusions with
confidence.
Gross Flows
If employment is not affected, what is? For one, there is some evidence of declines in both accessions (hiring) and separations (quits and
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layoffs). This suggests that jobs do become harder to find following
increases in the minimum wage, and that previously employed workers
are sufficiently productive, at least afterward, that employers are not
inclined to fire them. Explanations for this include a different allocation
after the increase of the surplus that the employee creates in this job, a
reorganization of the work process following the increase (known as the
shock effect), and efficiency wage theory, where the higher minimum
wage induces greater productive effort from the worker.
The study of the effect of the minimum wage on quits (voluntary
separations) is a theoretically and methodologically distinct area of
research on gross flows. Although Wessels (1980) reports evidence
consistent with his hypothesis that quit rates are temporarily higher following minimum wage increases, the research is old, the result is at
odds with more recent work on separations, and new research is needed
to establish that Wessels’s findings remain relevant.
Unemployment
A few analyses examine the response of the unemployment rate to
increases in the minimum wage. The only one that makes no recourse
to economic models detects no effect on the unemployment rate of teenagers. Those that begin with well-articulated models report a moderate
increase in the unemployment rate. This disagreement raises questions
about the extent to which the results are baked in, that is, whether the
theoretical models determine the result. One of those that indicates an
increase in the unemployment rate attributes it to increases in the labor force participation rate—in other words, increases in the minimum
wage induce those without jobs to begin looking for them.
Even if the unemployment rate does not move up and down with the
minimum wage, the decline in hiring suggests that it may be harder for
those previously unemployed to find work following increases, something that should be reflected in the length of unemployment spells. The
one study that examines this reports a decline in unemployment duration for male high school graduates and increases in duration for several
groups: men without a high school diploma, women with a high school
diploma, low-skilled women, and women older than 24. The one decrease in unemployment duration is slightly more than a month, while
the increases range between three and a half months and five months.
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Wages and Benefits
What effect does the minimum wage have on wages and their distribution? It is evident that average wages rise along with increases in
the minimum wage. Most studies that look specifically at workers who
were previously earning less than the new higher minimum wage report
higher wages after the fact. It is quite clear that wages of the lowest paid
10 percent of workers are higher following a minimum wage increase,
and for women it appears that this is true for the lowest 30 percent.
The extent of spillovers varies by country; research on spillovers in the
United Kingdom suggests it reaches considerably higher up the wage
distribution, and particularly the male wage distribution, than is the
case for the United States. Current research also finds that while many
incumbents quickly move out of minimum wage jobs after entering the
labor market, a substantial fraction of U.S. workers spend much of their
first decade at the minimum wage or at wage levels that are affected by
the minimum wage. Finally, studies that look at the entire wage distribution report that the minimum wage does indeed raise wages at the
bottom and reduce wage inequality.
It has long been suggested that employers may respond to minimum wage increases by reducing spending on training, fringe benefits,
and working conditions valued by employees. Results for health insurance are mixed, as are those for training, though some of the evidence
for a decline in training after increases in the minimum wage seems to
be due to those in low-wage jobs receiving little training irrespective of
minimum wage policy.
Enrollment
As with many types of policy, the minimum wage may have unintended consequences. One of the most serious that has received
attention is that it may induce teenagers to leave school, interrupting or
prematurely ending their formal education. An issue with this literature
is how little discussion there is between those approaching the topic
from economics and those coming from education policy. Another is
statistical problems that likely overstate the precision of the estimates.
These problems and the disagreement among results suggest that a de-
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finitive answer awaits further work, although a reasonable foundation
exists on which to build it.
The Product Market
Broadly speaking, economists use two competing classes of models
to understand the minimum wage and its effects in the labor market,
competitive models and a variety of models referred to as monopsonistic models, the most important of which involves firms’ searching for
workers and workers’ searching for jobs. Competitive and monopsonistic models have different implications for the response of both
employment and product prices. Competitive models imply lower
employment and higher output prices in response to a minimum wage
increase. Monopsonistic models allow for the possibility of higher employment, which in turn implies lower prices in affected industries. It
is quite clear that restaurant prices rise by a small amount following
minimum wage increases. In industries that are both sensitive to the
minimum wage and face foreign competition, the price response appears to be weaker. In the United Kingdom, there is some evidence that
increases in the minimum wage reduce profits at affected firms, but it is
difficult to detect this in exit rates, that is, in firms going out of business,
suggesting that the response is small. Analyses of the value that financial markets in the United States and New Zealand place on firms that
are affected by the minimum wage indicate no pass-through to profits.
Perhaps the price response, while weak, protects profits enough to make
it worthwhile to remain in business.

WHAT WE KNOW WITH CONFIDENCE
What then can we be reasonably certain of with respect to the
minimum wage? As the minimum wage increases considered in this research have been moderate, the conclusions that we draw are premised
on moderate increases.
Under such conditions, there is little evidence of negative labor
market effects. Hours and employment do not seem to be meaningfully
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affected. Accessions and separations may slow after minimum wage
increases. Decisive evidence that training or benefits responds at all to
increases in the minimum wage does not exist.
The evidence on schooling is suggestive but not sufficient to draw
conclusions for policy making. This reflects both limitations of the currently available studies and the variety of outcomes across studies. If
any conclusion can be drawn from extant studies, it is that any negative
effects of the minimum wage on school enrollment is associated with
allowing students to leave school in the first two years of high school.
Mandatory attendance laws that only allow students to leave in their
junior or senior year of high school appear to eliminate any negative
effect on school attendance.
There is strong evidence that the minimum wage boosts the earnings of the lowest-wage workers, and it may boost the earnings of those
earning moderately higher hourly wages. In almost every wage study,
the effect is more marked for women, who are more likely than men to
be in low-wage positions.
Considered together, increases in the minimum wage raise the
hourly wage and earnings of workers in the lower part of the wage distribution and have very modest or no effects on employment, hours, and
other labor market outcomes. The minimum wage can then, as originally intended, be used to improve the conditions of those working in the
least remunerative sectors of the labor market. While not a full solution
to the issues of low-wage work, it is a useful instrument of policy that
has low social costs and clear benefits.

BIG IDEAS
Given the certain predictions of core economic theory, how is it
possible that the minimum wage raises wages without the anticipated
negative effect on employment and employment-related measures? We
are reluctant to spend much time and ink on this, as the ground has been
covered repeatedly over the last two decades. Earlier we alluded to the
two most widely discussed models of the low-wage labor market, the
competitive model and monopsonistic/search models.
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Another possibility, which Kaufman (2007) has ably synthesized,
is that in the presence of transaction costs and uncertainty about the
future, firms do not respond to wage changes mechanistically. In this
view, an employment relationship is not the exchange transaction depicted in the core economic model but rather a relationship that persists
over time because of transaction costs in the labor market. Moreover,
uncertainty about these costs means that firms do not face a precisely
defined relationship between wage levels and employment.
In Kaufman’s (2007) view, although the use of labor in the production process is universal and labor’s place in production can be
organized many ways, the labor demand curve used in the core economic analysis presumes an employment relationship: “That is, firms
are the ‘employer’ who go to the labour market and hire people as ‘employees’ to provide a certain amount of labour services and follow the
directions of the employer in return for a certain amount of remuneration per time period” (p. 776).
Such a relationship cannot exist absent transaction costs because
without such costs, labor markets become competitive markets for inputs from atomistic independent contractors. Rather than each supplier
being an employee of a specific firm, each has a separate relationship
with one or more firms to provide a product or service. There is no
employment relationship and no labor market that differs in important
ways from, say, Summers’s (1985) market for ketchup.
Transaction costs arise from the combination of limited human
rationality, imperfect information, and ambiguities in property rights.
They require that employers and employees establish employment contracts that define the terms under which work will be performed, and
so define labor supply curves.2 Employment contracts are inherently
incomplete; they cannot fully specify outcomes because changes in circumstances such as economic environment, technology, and consumer
taste necessitate altering the terms of employment. For example, most
employment contracts establish compensation but not hours or employment levels. Changes in the circumstances facing an employer can
result in large fluctuations in employment and hours. Because of imperfect information and bounded rationality, marginal product schedules
and the demand curves derived from those schedules are probabilistic.
If future circumstance A occurs, then the demand curve is in position
A, but if future circumstance B occurs, then the demand curve will be
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in the nearby but not identical position B. The firm faces a “set” of demand curves with different likelihoods attached to each curve. The firm
does not know which curve will be realized tomorrow and may well be
uncertain about which demand curve it is on today. This moves firms
away from a deterministic relationship between wages and employment
levels and provides some latitude for firms to set wages. Latitude in
wage setting is increased because the costs of job search for individuals
provide firms limited monopolistic power over employees. Because of
the transactions costs, deviation from a market wage will result neither
in instantaneous loss of labor if a firm pays a below-market wage nor
a long line of individuals seeking employment if it offers an abovemarket one.
Our own thoughts on why there is such a weak employment effect
follow a different and possibly more practical path. Economic theory
and models are developed to explore specific topics. This focus makes
possible rigorous exploration and full development of the implications
associated with an issue of interest. This approach does not replicate
the situation of decision makers in the market. Decision makers are
daily confronted not with a situation in which all is constant except the
change in the minimum wage. Rather, they face a world in which little
is constant from day to day, week to week, month to month, or year to
year. Not only does the minimum wage change, so do prices of supplies,
fuel, rental, and myriad other factors. Demand is constantly changing as
economic conditions, changes in views and tastes, and chance influence
consumers’ choices.
In a situation where so much is in flux, the stylization of decision
making used in economics does not reasonably approximate decision
makers’ situations. In determining how much to produce, employers
cannot simply take the consumer demand curve as fixed and, having determined their price, know what quantity to produce. Instead, in the face
of a shifting demand curve, one must determine both price and quantity
and then accept either the excess that could not be sold or the lost profits
due to less product than could have been sold at that price. Because the
firm’s labor demand curve is derived from its product demand curve,
the decision maker has no more certainty about the appropriate number
of employees to hire than about the price and quantity needed to exactly
satisfy demand.
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In such a world, one dominated by change rather than comparative
static exercises, economic actors are unlikely to make decisions on the
knife edge depicted in economic diagrams. Rather, small changes in
prices are unlikely to move the decision maker to action. Slight movements in rent, fuel prices, or wages are unlikely to cause decision makers
to rethink their use of inputs. While a large price increase might have
sufficient effect for one to reconsider how to use that and other inputs,
small increases likely get lost in the change of day-to-day operations.
This view is consistent with our results. It does not require that demand curves neither exist nor slope downward; rather, it suggests that
the downward slope is not a one-dimensional line but rather a line with
some width, implying that for any quantity of employment, the firm is
willing to pay a wage within a defined range. Were the minimum wage
to increase 50 percent, it would be beyond the range consistent with the
current employment level, and firms would reduce their employment.
However, when increases are moderate, are within the range consistent
with current employment levels, decision makers are too engaged with
the world to change their existing arrangements. It is also consistent
with the finding that increases in the minimum wage reduce accessions.
Both the formation of a firm and the decision to expand require positive
action to bring new employees into a business. At such times, decision
makers may well consider the cost of inputs, including labor inputs, and
alternative arrangements.
If we supplement economic theory with this view of the situation
facing economic decision makers, we are then likely to conclude that
thresholds, which must be crossed before decision makers act, exist.
These thresholds differ by market and individual and are unlikely to
be stable over time. Without a doubt, the changes in the value of financial instruments that impel arbitragers and their computers to action
are many times smaller than those required to attract the attention of a
retailer or fast food franchiser to change their employment policies. The
rise in the minimum wage needed to catch the attention of the fast food
franchiser in Westchester County, New York, may be far larger than
that for exurbia in Alabama. With such an understanding of the world,
the lack of a relationship between moderate increases in the minimum
wage and employment no longer stands in contradiction to core economic theory. Rather, it points to a research program to investigate the
factors affecting thresholds of action in labor markets.
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ISSUES OF INNOVATION AND CRAFTSMANSHIP
Although the purpose of this review is not to reflect on the work
of the economics profession, our reading and rereading of hundreds of
articles reveals a tension between innovation and craftsmanship. The
drive toward innovation is strong in economics—witness the popularity
of Freakonomics (Levitt and Dubner 2005)—and has been productive
over the last 50 years in driving a rethinking and expansion of economics thought. Innovators such as Gary Becker, Ronald Coase, William
Baulmol, and George Akerlof have done much to advance our understanding of markets and of homo economicus.
Answering the important economic questions of the day requires
more than novelty. While it can provide new understandings and approaches, unless founded on strong methodological approaches and
placed in the context of prior work, it forgoes much of its opportunity
to expand knowledge. Too often in our review we have been unable to
reconcile results across journal articles because the authors have not
systematically explored the sources of differences between what they
present and prior work on the topic. Even when articles draw on the
same data sources, differences in time period, technique, and measures
preclude knowing the source of (the sometimes dramatic) differences in
the results. All too often, systematic investigation would have required
no more than one table and a page or two of text. Furthermore, in too
many cases, authors have failed to investigate important variations of
their model to examine the robustness of their results. For example,
although it is well established that the choice of comparison group can
affect the estimates from difference-in-differences models, most authors choose to present estimates for one or possibly two comparison
groups rather than for each of the obvious comparison groups.
Absent greater emphasis on craftsmanship, on the workmanlike
investigation of an issue, economists limit their contributions to our
understanding of a topic. Without knowing how differences in controls,
data, time period, and method influence results, we are left with too
many unreconciled findings. Sensitivity to these issues is particularly
important when topics are controversial, because there is a greater need
to understand the sources of differences between studies and so limit
the scope of passion.
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How might economics place greater weight on craftsmanship?
Partly by training graduate students to be more thoughtful about their
research, but more so by reviewers and editors requiring authors to explicitly reconcile their work with prior work and to address reasonable
variants on their models. This requires that editors and particularly reviewers be familiar with the topic under study. It also requires that they
ask authors to compare and contrast their work with prior work explicitly, and to investigate differences. We believe that reconciliation would
not require too much empirical effort or too many journal pages. It will
be challenging intellectually, as it is likely to bring to the fore issues of
control groups, time periods, and measures.
Redressing the current imbalance between innovation and craftsmanship is then important to advancing our understanding of markets
and the investigation of markets. Innovation provides the drive forward,
while craftsmanship provides integrity. Both are required for the robust
and credible investigation of markets.

INTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Social scientists emphasize, and possibly delight, in pointing to the
unintended consequences of social policies. This reflects the dual concern of social science: to document the world and to reveal what cannot
be readily seen or understood. Unintended consequences have played a
large role in the discussion of the minimum wage, with many arguing
that despite the goal of raising the earnings of low-income workers, the
minimum wage has resulted not only in higher unemployment but also
the receipt of the gains by large numbers of individuals who do not need
them, for example, teens in relatively high-income families.
Our review finds that the effect of the minimum wage has largely
been one of intended consequences: it achieves the ends initially sought
by the originators of the U.S. legislation. The moderate increases seen
in the United States have resulted in increased earnings with little to
no effect on employment. The increase in earnings has gone largely to
households in the lower half of the earnings distribution. While not a
stand-alone policy for resolving the issues of low income in the United
States, the effectiveness of moderate increases in the minimum wage in
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raising earnings with few negative consequences makes it an important
tool for labor market policy.

Notes
1. Caveat lector: As we discuss in Chapter 4, it does not include all articles because
too large a number do not report results in a way that makes them comparable to
others.
2. Following Rosen (1974), the labor supply curve is defined not only by the wage
but also by all the terms and conditions of employment available to employees.
The presence of labor supply curves is then premised on there being an employment relationship that specifies those terms and conditions, and following back a
step in Kaufman’s (2007) logic, on transaction costs.

Appendix A
Data Sources and Variables
Several data sets are used in many analyses of the minimum wage and
its effects. The same variables appear in much of this work. For the reader’s
convenience, we discuss these below rather than discuss them in detail either
repeatedly or only the first time each is encountered.
DATA SOURCES
Governments are the source of the most frequently used data in minimum
wage research.1 There are two types of government data sets that are most
commonly used in studies of the minimum wage: household surveys and establishment-based data. Other types of data follow individuals or families over
long periods of time.
Household Surveys
In many countries, the government conducts a large-scale survey of households at regular intervals, and it provides the data used to calculate unemployment rates, as well as other information about the labor market. Studies of the
minimum wage that focus on demographic groups—for instance, teenagers,
minorities, young adults, single mothers, or married women—most commonly
rely on household surveys. In the United States, the household survey that
typically fills these roles is the CPS. Every 10 years, the U.S. census generates
a complete listing of all extant residences in the United States. Every month,
the U.S. Census Bureau generates a sample from this list of households to
interview.2 Within each household, one person answers questions about all the
people in the household. Once selected, a household is interviewed for four
consecutive months, is not interviewed for eight months, and is then interviewed over four additional consecutive months. This is known as a 4-8-4
rotation. In the last month of each of the four-month interview cycles, the usual
monthly interview is supplemented with questions about hours, earnings, and
other economic matters. The households in the last four months of interviews
are collectively referred to as the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG), and it is
information from the ORGs—not those from households in any of the other
months of their cycle—that is used in most minimum wage studies.

413

414 Belman and Wolfson
About 50,000 households are interviewed for the CPS each month.
Roughly 25 percent of these are in the ORG for either the first or second time
and will leave the CPS after this month, either for eight months or permanently.
Each month, roughly 12.5 percent of the households are added to the CPS for
the first time, and another 12.5 percent start their second cycle of four months.
The answers of each household refer not to the whole month but to a reference
week, which is defined as the week (Sunday through Saturday) that includes
the 12th of the month.
Other countries have similar surveys. In Canada, Statistics Canada conducts the monthly Labor Force Survey. It comprises about 56,000 households
each month, each household remains in the survey for six consecutive months,
and each month one-sixth of the households are in the survey for the first time
and another one-sixth are in for the last time. The reference week is the one that
contains the 15th of the month. In the European Union, countries also conduct
Labour Force Surveys, often quarterly. In the United Kingdom, it consists of
about 60,000 households that remain in the survey for five consecutive quarters, also with a rotation structure similar to the Canadian one. The survey is
conducted throughout the quarter, and the reference week is distributed uniformly throughout. New Zealand has the quarterly Household Labor Force
Survey, consisting of about 15,000 households, each of which remains in the
sample for eight quarters. The survey is conducted throughout the quarter and
the questions asked refer to the week before the interview.
In the United States and Canada, these surveys can be aggregated to the
level either of states or provinces, respectively, or the entire nation. In the
United States, most studies that aggregate to the state level combine the ORGs
for an entire calendar year to minimize problems of high variability associated
with small samples in the less-populated states. Canadian studies follow the
U.S. convention of aggregating the data into calendar years.3 The studies that
use European data, whether individual or more aggregated, are more evenly
split between quarterly and annual frequencies.
Establishment-Based Data
An establishment survey is a survey of workplaces: stores, offices, factories, and so forth. In the United States, the most important establishment
survey is the Current Employment Survey (CES). The CES collects data from
payroll records of about 400,000 establishments. These data include the number of employees, number of paid hours, and total wages paid for both all
workers and only production workers, for the payroll period that includes the
12th of the month.4 Data series are available by industry, state, or both.
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Another data set that has become important in recent years is the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which “derives its data from
quarterly tax reports submitted to State Employment Security Agencies by
over 8 million employers subject to state Unemployment Insurance laws and
from federal agencies subject to the Unemployment Compensation for Federal
Employees program. This includes 99.7 percent of all wage and salary civilian employment. These reports provide information on the number of people
employed and the wages paid to the employees each quarter.”5
The types of data available are total number of jobs and total payroll, by
SIC or NAICS industry, and aggregated to county or state. Because both the
CES and the QCEW rely on payroll or tax records, they are considered to be of
unusually high quality, but the number of variables measured is limited.
Another relatively new data source in the United States is the Quarterly
Workforce Indicators, based on a partnership between states and the Census
Bureau. Intended to provide data in which the unit of observation is the job,
that is, the employer-employee pair, it combines data from multiple sources,
including Unemployment Insurance data from the states, household data from
the Census Bureau, and establishment data from the U.S. Department of Labor
(Abowd et al. 2005). Because it is a voluntary partnership with states, few
states were involved in the early years (the 1990s), and the number grew over
time.
Other countries also have establishment surveys. Several studies of the
United Kingdom examine the New Earnings Survey (NES), a very large-scale
annual survey of employers about those of their employees who are currently
in sample. Because the NES has evolved into a longitudinal survey, we delay
further discussion to that section. Two articles covered in this volume use a
Portuguese establishment survey, the Quadros de Pessoal. Based on personnel
records, it has considerably more demographic detail then either the CES or
the QCEW.
Longitudinal Surveys
Longitudinal surveys repeat measurements of the same subjects over a
long period of time. In the United States, among the best known are the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS), conducted by the Bureau of Labor Studies
of the U.S. Department of Labor. They are a set of surveys designed to gather
information at multiple points in time on the labor market activities and other
significant life events of several groups of men and women. The most wellknown are the surveys of Youth (NLSY79 and NLSY97), both of which began
with about 10,000 people in their teens or early twenties at the time of the first

416 Belman and Wolfson
interview. They are interviewed annually or, after a period of some years, biennially about many topics, including their schooling and labor market experience. For more than four decades, NLS data have served as an important tool
for economists, sociologists, and other researchers.
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is a longitudinal
household survey used in a few studies of the U.S. minimum wage. Its focus is
the measurement of labor income and various government transfers, both cash
and noncash, and includes questions that indicate labor force status. Begun in
1984, the sample size has varied over time, from 14,000 to more than 35,000
households. The length of time that households are in the sample has varied
over time. Household members over the age of 14 are interviewed three times
a year.6 The size of the SIPP allows it to be used as a cross-sectional household
survey for some purposes, but the linking of data across time, usually several
years, allows the data to also be used as longitudinal data.
Longitudinal surveys such as the NLSY79, NLSY97, and the SIPP are
useful for studying changes that occur over long periods of time, such as the
number of job changes or unemployment spells that people experienced over
some segment of their lives, the number of times they moved to a different
county or state, or the number of years in which their family income was below the poverty threshold. They are also useful for examining cause-and-effect
relationships. Cross-sectional surveys of the labor market have shown, for example, that workers who have been with their employers a longer period of
time have higher earnings than workers who have shorter service with their
employers. Cross-sectional surveys are not useful, however, for determining
whether longer service leads to higher pay, whether higher pay leads to longer
service, or whether there is a cause-and-effect relationship at all. Longitudinal
surveys have been used to examine whether the statistical correlation between
tenure and earnings exists because workers become more productive as they
gain seniority and are paid more for that higher productivity or, conversely, because highly paid workers tend to stay with their employers for longer periods,
rather than seeking employment elsewhere.
Several studies of the United Kingdom rely on the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS), a household survey conducted (mostly) every fall, in
which the same households are followed for many years. From time to time,
additional households are added to the panel. It was originally modeled after a
long-running U.S. survey, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
The NES is a longitudinal establishment data set used in minimum wage
studies for the United Kingdom. It is based on annual tax records from employers, and the sample includes every employee with the same last two digits in
their National Insurance number, the British counterpart of a social security
number. Although not originally intended to be longitudinal, because these two
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digits have been the same since the original survey in 1975, individuals remain
in the sample indefinitely and can be tracked from one year to the next (Ada
et al. 2006, p. 647). One consequence of the sampling design is that data on
about 1 percent of employees are gathered each year. Because the data come
from employers, they contain rich and accurate descriptive information about
each employer and the position that an employee fills, but little demographic
information beyond the age and sex of the employee. The questions of the survey refer to the first week of April, and the sample is constructed in February.
Individuals whose earnings fall below the minimum required for this particular
tax withholding (Pay as You Earn), in particular, part-time employees and lowearning women, are underrepresented in the data set.7 Furthermore, individuals
who are unemployed in February but not in April are also excluded.
VARIABLES
Several key variables reappear in many studies. Rather than describing
them each time, or describing them only the first time they occur, we describe
them below.
Measures of Employment
Employment is measured in several different ways. The degree of fineness
turns on whether the measure refers to the total amount of paid (employed)
labor, typically the number of hours, or a cruder measure. We will first look at
the latter, because studies that use them are the most common.
In studies of demographic groups, the most widely used measure is the
employment ratio. This is the fraction of the group under study that is employed. The teenage employment ratio is the percentage of teenagers who report having a job.8 If at some moment all teenagers reported that they had a
job, the teen employment ratio would be one. If none reported having a job,
it would be zero, and if half did, it would be 50 percent. It automatically corrects for changes in the size of the teenage population, and studies that use it
implicitly assume that if there were no trends and nothing changed but the size
of the teenage population, a constant fraction of teenagers would always be
employed. Employment ratios can be calculated for any demographic group or
for the entire population. In many studies that use aggregate panels, where an
observation is, for instance, of a particular state and year aggregated from the
CPS, the teenage employment ratio would be the fraction of teenagers in that
state who report having a job during the year.9
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Industry studies and others that use establishment data more commonly
measure employment as the number of jobs (number of individuals employed)
or the growth rate of the number of jobs. Quasi experiments in which the unit
of observation is a business establishment, perhaps a fast food restaurant,
would measure the number of jobs at each establishment before and after the
change in the minimum wage. Regression analyses of the restaurant industry
generally use either the total number of jobs in the industry or the growth rate
of the number of jobs in the industry.
Measures of Hours
As mentioned, these employment measures are somewhat crude, distinguishing between neither full-time and part-time employment nor differences
in the length of the workweek. Controversy about the response of employment to the minimum wage suggested to some that less-crude measures might
provide resolution. These tend to be variations on the number of paid hours
of employment. Total hours, for an individual, an establishment or firm, or an
industry, are a common choice. Others include average hours over all individuals in an establishment or an industry, and full-time equivalents (FTEs), that
is, total hours divided by the number of hours considered to be in a full-time
workweek (40 or 35, for example).
“Hours of employment” drawn from establishment data are based on actual hours that were paid for during a specified period, often a specific week. It
is not uncommon for studies of demographic groups, which most often depend
on household surveys, to include several measures of hours worked. As an
example, before 1994 the CPS asked about both total hours worked at all jobs
in the previous week and usual weekly hours worked. Starting that year, and
continuing through the present, it asks separately for the number of hours at
the primary job and at all other jobs, if any, in the previous week. The question
on usual hours was changed in a parallel but somewhat problematic fashion.
While before 1994 this was a simple question about “usual hours worked per
week,” since then this question has not only also distinguished between usual
hours at the primary and all other jobs, but people who respond “variable,” that
is, that they do not have a usual number of hour of work per week, are coded
as −4.10
A few observations about this are pertinent. To begin with, studies that use
usual hours will not be directly comparable to studies that use actual hours;
they are measuring closely related but different phenomena. Second, studies
that use usual hours from the CPS for the period since 1994 must exclude people who answered “variable” since they are coded −4, unless the variable for
hourly wage earners is used. Even if the studies do not address hours directly,
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those that use a measure of hourly earnings will exclude individuals who indicate that they work variable hours and are not paid by the hour from their
sample because it is not possible to calculate hourly earnings. It is not evident
that those excluded are, in either instance, statistically identical to those who
remain.11
Third, it is useful to understand how “total hours of work,” “average hours
of work, conditional on employment,” and “average hours of work” differ. The
first is calculated as the product of average monthly hours and total monthly
jobs. It is the total number of hours worked each month (in their case, in a particular industry) and is the obvious analog to the number of jobs. The second,
common in studies that use data derived from establishment surveys, is the
total number of hours that those employed have worked, divided by the number of employed. It tells us more about the length of the workweek than the
amount of labor employed or paid for. While useful for some purposes—for
example, determining whether the employed are actually earning more following a change in the minimum wage—it is not appropriate for examining the
effect of the minimum wage on employment measured as the amount of labor
paid for. Changes in the minimum wage that lead to changes in the number of
individuals employed will cause this measure to vary differently from total
hours. However, if the minimum wage does not influence the number of jobs,
then it is possible to infer change in total hours from this measure. This can be
seen with a bit of algebra. Let Ht, ht, and Jt be the total number of hours, the
number of hours per job, and the total number of jobs, all in period t: Ht = htJr.
If the minimum wage increases between periods one and two, then the change
in hours is
H2 − H1

= h2J2 − h1J1
= h2J2 − (h1J2 − h1J2) − h1J1
= (h2J2 − h1J2) + (h1J2 − h1J1)
= (h2 − h1)J2 + h1(J2 − J1)

If there is no change in the conditional number of average hours, then h2 −
h1 equals zero, and the first term in the last line of the expression above is zero.
If there has also been no change in the number of jobs, then the very last term
in the line is also zero, and total hours have not changed.
The third measure, average hours of work (sometimes referred to as the
unconditional average), is the total number hours that those employed work,
divided by everyone in the same category (i.e., teenagers, immigrants, etc.),
whether or not they are employed or even in the labor force. For instance, the
unconditional average hours of work of teenagers is the total hours that em-
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ployed teenagers work divided by all teenagers. So long as the number of teenagers does not vary in response to changes in the minimum wage (and there are
no large changes in its value from period to period), then this figure correlates
highly with total (usual) hours of work. Where the second measure is used, it is
necessary to combine the findings for hours with those for employment where
possible, but this is a bit ad hoc.
The Minimum Wage
The value of the legislated minimum wage at any moment is a nominal
variable; that is, without consideration for the price of anything else, it is measured in terms of dollars per unit of the item under consideration, here an hour
of labor. We can say that the federal minimum wage was $5.85 (per hour) for
the year beginning on July 24, 2007, and that the minimum wage in Washington, D.C., was $8.07 in January 2008. This raises two issues about measuring
the minimum wage. The simpler one is “What is the measured value of the
minimum wage when the data are aggregated over time?” If the unit of observation is aggregated from monthly data up to a calendar year, as is frequently
the case with panels that rely on the CPS, what is the appropriate value of the
federal minimum wage for 2007? The standard approach is to set it to the average value not over the course of the year but over the dates of the CPS surveys,
which are monthly and refer to the week that contains the 12th of the month.
The value of the federal minimum wage was $5.15 for the first seven surveys
(January through July) of 2007, and $5.85 for the last five (August through
September), so the annual value would be $5.44.
In some jurisdictions, there is more than one minimum wage law: for example, in the United States, not only is there a federal minimum wage, but
many states have their own minimum wage. Except in well-specified situations wherein, for example, a firm is smaller than a certain size specified in the
federal law, the higher of the two applies. The standard practice is to ignore
this condition because it applies to relatively few employees, and to use the
higher of the applicable levels. Rather than repeatedly use the phrase “higher
of federal or state minimum wage,” this is commonly indicated by the phrase
“effective minimum wage.”
A more complicated problem pertains to inflation and the price level more
generally. A minimum wage of $5.85 has a different impact in 2007, when the
mean wage for U.S. teenagers was $8.20 per hour and the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) had a value of 207, than it has in 1981, when the teenage mean
wage was $3.77, and the CPI was 91. The cost of living also varies between
cities, states, and regions, but there is no accepted index comparing costs
geographically.
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To think about possible solutions, consider a panel data set where each
observation refers to a specific state and year and the relevant variables are
constructed from CPS data. One common way of correcting for cost differences among states and over years is to calculate the average wage (for all
employees, perhaps, or for prime-age adult males or teenagers) for each state
and year, and divide that into the minimum wage. This is the relative minimum
wage. As Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) observe, in times of prosperity, both
employment and wages will rise, and the rise in wages will cause a decline in
the calculated value of the relative minimum.12 Similarly, in times of recession,
employment and wages will fall, and the decline in wages generates a rise in
the relative minimum wage. As a result, there will be a negative correlation
between employment and the relative minimum wage due only to movements
in wages, whether or not employers respond to a higher minimum wage with
lower employment or hiring. An alternative is to calculate the real minimum
wage, dividing the nominal one by a price index such as the CPI. The shortcoming with this approach (at least for the United States) is that the CPI is
not available at the same level of geographic disaggregation as the minimum
wage. An equivalent approach is the inclusion of a distinct constant term for
each year (annual fixed effects).13
The Kaitz index—a coverage-adjusted, relative minimum wage—is a
measure of the minimum wage that once was quite common but no longer is.
The relative part of this term is clear enough; coverage adjusted refers to the
fraction of individuals employed in industries to which the minimum wage applies, industries that are covered. At different times in the past, different levels
of the minimum wage have been relevant for different groups of individuals,
and for different businesses or industries. There have been lower minimum
wages for teenagers than for older workers, and minimum wages for smaller
establishments have often been less. Adjusting for coverage uses a messy formula that is a weighted average of minimum wages that reflects the distribution of employment across industries, establishments, and demographic groups
with different values of the minimum wage.14
Two other ways of measuring the minimum wage are the fraction affected (also sometimes called fraction at risk) and the wage gap. Card (1992a)
introduced the fraction affected measure early in the NMWR in his crosssectional analysis of change in employment following the 1990 increase in the
federal minimum wage. Its value is the percentage of workers who, prior to
an increase in the minimum wage, earn between the old and new values of the
minimum wage. The intuition is that observations where this value is large are
more sensitive to the minimum wage increase because it will be necessary to
raise wages for a large fraction of employees to remain in compliance with the
new, higher minimum wage. In Card’s (1992a) study, with states as the level
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of analysis, it accounts for differing levels of the minimum wage across states
before the federal increase. Employees initially earning below the minimum
wage are excluded from the measure under the assumption that their employers
are either not required to pay the minimum wage or have chosen not to comply,
and this is likely to continue following the increase.
The wage gap, introduced by Currie and Fallick (1996), can be calculated
for an individual worker or for a larger aggregation. For an affected individual,
one who was previously earning less than the new, higher, value of the minimum wage following an increase, the wage gap is the difference between the
new level of the minimum wage and her wage before the increase. It can be
measured as a monetary value (e.g., in dollars) or as a percentage. For all others, those whose wage prior to the increase was already above the new, higher
value of the minimum wage, the wage gap is set to zero. For establishments
or regions, the wage gap is measured as the share of total payroll necessary to
bring the fraction affected up to the new minimum wage.
Unlike the measures that incorporate the value of the minimum wage, both
of these measures reflect the size of the relevant section of the lower tail of
the wage distribution, the part of the employed workforce that is potentially
affected by an increase in the minimum wage. Consequently, both are more
sensitive to the ex ante facts on the ground. The wage gap goes beyond fraction
affected in considering not only the size of this part of the tail, but the wage
levels of those within it.
Wages
The terms wages and earnings are used inconsistently across studies. For
the purposes of this review, wage rate refers to the straight-time hourly wage
an individual is paid. Earnings commonly indicates the pretax amount in an
employee’s paychecks over some period. For those paid weekly (or biweekly
or monthly), hourly earnings are the amount they are paid per week (or fortnight or month) divided by the number of hours they worked that week (or
fortnight or month). For those paid by the hour, hourly earnings might also
be their wage rate, but if they worked overtime at time and one-half or better,
hourly earnings might be greater than their wage rate. While earnings can be
computed for all employees, wage rates are only available for those who are
paid by the hour. In this review, we use wages as a general term referring to
employee pay. It encompasses both wage rates and earnings, but, unlike wage
rates or earnings, it is not a specific measure.
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Notes
1. Only 10 of the roughly 70 studies covered in Chapter 2 use privately generated
data: Böckerman and Uusitalo (2009); Card and Krueger (1994); Dube, Naidu,
and Reich (2007); Giuliano (2013); Katz and Krueger (1992); Machin, Manning,
and Rahman (2003); Machin and Wilson (2004); Neumark and Wascher (2000);
Orazem and Mattila (2002); and Skedinger (2006).
2. As time passes since the last census, the list of residences grows out of date. The
Census Bureau addresses this by collecting data on building permits on an ongoing basis and augments the list of residences to keep the list current. The formula
used to determine whether to include a particular household is quite complicated
and is not of particular interest for our purposes, but the likelihood is not equal
across all households because with careful design, it is possible to construct more
accurate statistics for surveys of the same size (and thus cost) by allowing this
likelihood to vary in certain systematic ways.
3. Canadian studies could aggregate the data by quarter. The sample size is similar to
the CPS, and there are only nine provinces, so there would be less of an issue with
small samples in causing excessive variance in the measures.
4. This may seem a strange way of defining the reference period, but it differs across
establishments, depending on whether they pay weekly, biweekly, semimonthly,
or monthly.
5. From http://www.bls.gov/cew/cewfaq.htm (accessed April 28, 2011).
6. This information drawn from the SIPP Web site, http://www.census.gov/sipp/
overview.html on July 28, 2013.
7. Ritchie (1995) contains a wealth of information on the NES.
8. Individuals who are institutionalized or in the armed forces are not defined as part
of the potential labor force and are not asked labor force questions in household
surveys. Similarly, only those aged 16 or older are asked labor force questions, as
those under 16 are not currently considered part of the potential labor force. There
is no age limit after which the labor force questions are no longer asked.
9. Other common measures of employment outcomes, such as unemployment, are
only rarely used in minimum wage studies. The definition of an unemployed person is one who is not only neither self-employed nor employed by another but is
also actively seeking a job. The unemployment rate is the ratio of the number of
those who are unemployed to the sum of those employed and the unemployed.
A problem with this measure for minimum wage studies is that the distinction
between the unemployed and those without jobs who are not actively seeking
work is sensitive to influences such as the current condition of the labor market,
the availability of unemployment benefits, and whether respondents are in school
(full-time students are not classified as unemployed). Teasing out the effect of the
minimum wage from other factors affecting the unemployment rate is considerably more challenging than the already difficult task of measuring the effect on the
employment ratio.
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10. In addition, since the early 1980s and continuing through the present, the CPS
has had a separate question for hourly wage earners that before 1994 recorded the
usual weekly hours “at this job” and since 1994, “at this rate.” Analysts who rely
on “usual weekly hours” rarely specify whether they are using this variable or one
of the others, but the large number of missing values for this indicates its rare use.
11. In 2006, those who answered “variable” compose about 8.5 percent of respondents and 14 percent actual working hours, but 14 percent of teenagers and10.6
percent of their actual hours. Those answering “variable hours” are as likely to be
male as female among both teens and adults. Teenagers are more likely to be 16 or
17 and less likely to be 19.
12. Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) are here extending an observation that Freeman
(1982) made with reference to studies that analyze cross-sectional data.
13. It appears that Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2004) first introduced this
approach.
14. Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1961 and 1966 extended full
minimum wage coverage to all but the smallest firms, making adjusting the minimum wage for coverage far less important. As a result, the Kaitz index has largely
disappeared from minimum wage research.
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